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Abstract 
First and foremost, my work develops a postanarchist literary theory that repositions the 
reading and writing of experimental texts as activist practice. Following the most recent trends in 
anarchist theory and political philosophy, postanarchist literary theory merges the primary 
concerns of classical anarchism with shifts in the conceptions of power and the State born out of 
postmodern and poststructural theory. Focusing specifically on the ways that the experimental 
text complicates the traditional relationship between author and reader, my project emphasizes 
how these experimental texts make manifest the role of language in a radical conception of the 
common. The concept of language as a part of the common is one shared, implicitly, by all the 
poets in my project, in some form or another, and to account for both the aesthetic and political 
anarchism of their experimental approach to authorship and readership, my dissertation takes on 
an experimental form. As both an insurrectionary tactic and a means of navigating the potential 
limitations of a more traditional print-based dissertation form, my project was first produced as a 
series of short single-author chapters linked through hypertext, and these were distributed via an 
open-access blog which invited reader contribution via interventionary comments.  
Ultimately, my project sees a theory of alternative and experimentation in action in 
experimental poetic texts that are either implicitly or explicitly concerned with an anarchist 
activist practice on the level of the disruption of the author-function. We can see the intersection 
of postanarchism and poetry in the way John Cage reappropriates source texts in “62 Mesostics 
re Merce Cunningham” (1973), or the way Jackson Mac Low writes to and rewrites Gertrude 
Stein in The Stein Poems (2003): both authors seek to defamiliarize language for anarchic ethical 
ends. This intersection is represented differently in Denise Levertov’s call for readerly 
responsibility in The Jacob’s Ladder (1961), or in Robert Duncan’s call for readerly community 
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in his Passages sequence (in Bending the Bow [1968] and Ground Work [1984,1987]). It 
becomes radically feminist in the experiments with authorship seen in the revisionist 
appropriations  of Susan Howe (Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike, 1993), the 
indeterminacy of Erin Mouré (Pillage Laud, 1999), the racialized Language work of Harryette 
Mullen (Sleeping with the Dictionary, 2002), and communal politics of Juliana Spahr (Response, 
2000). Working to establish a nascent but important postanarchist literary theory, this project 
reads and writes through each of these texts to show that postanarchism can and should be used 
as a literary theory that works to make the acts of reading, writing, and thinking about 
experimental texts part of an anarchist activist practice. While I have selected texts that explicitly 
challenge the authorial role and its concomitant political problems, it is my hope that my project 
brings to light the availability and importance of postanarchism as a theory of reading, and thus, 
of reading all literary texts.  
Ultimately, this project argues that these authors or individual texts themselves are less 
important to my project than the way that my readings (rather than interpretations) of them help 
to illuminate the shortcomings of a critical literary theory that, as of yet, has not and cannot 
account for the changing face of popular resistance movements (anarchist or otherwise). For this 
reason, while I have, for the most part, selected texts that actively seek to disrupt the conventions 
of authorship and authorial intention, I have also chosen to examine both poets who are explicitly 
anarchist (Cage, Mac Low, Duncan, and to an extent Howe) alongside political authors who are 
not anarchist (Levertov, Spahr, Mullen). It is my hope that this selection of authors exposes both 
the necessity and the limitless possibilities of postanarchism as a literary theory.  
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“I’m sitting in a coffee shop while I’m typing this and I know this is NOT the common.”  
- Sean Braune 
 
“The common speaks: a conversation unfolds…” 
- Cesare Casarino, In Praise of the Common  
 
What is Postanarchism? A Brief Introduction 
Despite recent interest in incorporating political philosophies into literary studies, one of 
the most interesting (and potentially most useful) contemporary political philosophies, 
postanarchism, has yet to been given adequate attention as a literary theory. Yet elements of 
postanarchism are not only readily available as literary theories, they also allow incorporation of 
political activism with criticism. The intersections between postanarchism and literary studies 
have been woefully ignored, and this is probably most evident in the 2011 publication of Post-
Anarchism: A Reader, edited by Süreyyya Evren and Duane Rousselle. The text draws a clear 
link between poststructuralism and anarchism, and between anarchist philosophy and activism, 
but it seemingly ignores the potentials of postanarchism as a literary theory that would 
incorporate literary cultural production into activist practice. As literary studies works to become 
more practical, and more in line with activist movements of all kinds, it would seem that 
postanarchism, in its desire to reframe and rethink our ontological and epistemological practices 
within and outside of the academy, would be an appropriate and effective addition to literary 
studies on the whole.   
The postanarchism proposed in Evren and Rouselle’s reader, articulated explicitly in the 
editors’ introduction, clearly situates postanarchism as an activist practice, emphasising that its 
fundamental ideas would be defined not simply as philosophies, but rather as “consequence[s] of 
actual activist experiences” (3). Poststructuralism invigorates classical anarchism with a 
rhizomatic, new activism (5), creating a new current in radical politics (15). Evren and 
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Rousselle’s collection is most important because it gives a name (that is, it collects various 
essays under this name) and a clear set of ideals to postanarchism proper. Additionally, it puts at 
the centre of its philosophy and activism the essential mutability of human nature and 
subjectivity, maintaining that classical anarchism (despite contemporary criticism of its utopian 
humanism) was actually always convinced of this mutability (13). While I will discuss this 
notion further in the theorizations of anarchism and postanarchism that follow, it is clear that 
Evren and Rouselle’s text is both a revaluation and a reclamation of classical anarchism that 
seeks to bring anarchism’s classical texts into contemporary relevance.  
Given classical anarchism’s standing as a political philosophy, and one primarily 
concerned with government and resistance, it may be surprising for some readers to learn that 
classical anarchism has actually long been concerned with artistic practice. There has been a 
long-standing and close relationship between anarchist thought and poetry, especially 
experimental or avant-garde poetry. One need only to look at the popularity of Herbert Read’s 
Anarchy & Order; Poetry & Anarchism (1938), or recall André Breton’s oft-quoted adage, “An 
anarchist world … a surrealist world: they are the same,” to confirm this. As I will discuss 
towards the end of this introduction, some recent anarchist philosophers and activists (Jesse 
Cohn at the forefront) have done substantial work in connecting a renewed interest in anarchism 
with the seemingly constant popularity of the avant-garde. But, as Evren and Rouselle’s reader 
suggests throughout, classical anarchism, despite its suggestions of the mutability of human 
nature, does not adequately account for shifting conceptions of power and the self, and thus 
cannot keep pace with the changing face of anarchist activism.  
My dissertation endeavours to help anarchist philosophies catch up to this changing 
activism, working to examine, and in some cases, to define, postanarchism as a theory of 
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activism that can and will incorporate the processes of reading and writing experimental poetry 
into the realm of activist practice. That is, as poststructuralism teaches us, and as I extrapolate in 
the pages that follow, the new conceptions of power, subjectivity, and authorship that 
poststructuralist philosophers have elucidated require that we experiment with new forms of 
“resistance” practices. And if we understand that diffuse power functions most effectively at the 
level of ontology and epistemology (an argument made persistently by Foucault and his 
contemporaries), then surely the cultural artefact, and especially the literary artefact, must come 
into play as an element of activist practice. To be sure, art has historically played a role in anti-
authoritarian struggles internationally, but postanarchism forces us to make a distinction between 
political art and art as politic; in the latter, the very form (and not simply the content) of the 
artefact and the process of its production is a political experiment. My project will privilege the 
formally experimental poem as the subject of postanarchist literary reading practices.  
In order to expand on this theorization I should first explain that, throughout my project, I 
define the experiment (as a poetic form) as distinct from the avant-garde. While I will work 
towards a positive definition of the experiment later in the section entitled “Anarchism and the 
Experiment: What is an experimental poem?” it is important that I, in setting the textual 
parameters of my work, meditate briefly on existing theories of the avant-garde. The genre of 
avant-garde literature has been theorized and studied extensively, perhaps most famously in 
Renato Poggioli’s Teoria dell’arte d’avanguardia (Theory of the Avant Garde, 1962), and later 
in Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde (1984). Poggioli’s work emphasizes the ways in 
which the avant-garde, as an expression of authorial and audience alienation from society, 
positions itself as anti-traditional, noting that the “avant-garde looks and works like a culture of 
negation” (107). For Poggioli, this negation is especially focused on notions of individual 
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production and artistic or authorial control over the artistic product as cultural artefact. Bürger 
develops this argument further, arguing that the avant-garde’s interest in the negation of authorial 
autonomy is directly correlated with a negation of audience individuality, an attack against 
bourgeois ideations of aesthetics and art. He writes, “[t]he avant-garde not only negates the 
category of individual production but also that of individual reception” (53, emph. Bürger’s). 
While I will work to complicate the use of the term avant-garde later in this introduction, this 
preoccupation in theories of the avant-garde with the disruption of creative autonomy is, I argue, 
the most important intersection of postanarchism and experimental poetics. As I will work to 
demonstrate throughout this project, the primary concern of the experimental text is to move 
beyond the discourse of disavowal that Poggioli and Bürger recognize at the centre of the avant-
garde, and to embrace alternative rather than negation and experiment rather than resistance. 
More directly, the experimental text embraces a multiplicitous strategy of resistance based on 
alternatives rather than the binarism of the avant-garde practice of resistance through negation. 
Ultimately, my project sees this theory of alternative and experimentation in action in 
experimental poetic texts that are either implicitly or explicitly concerned with an anarchist 
activist practice on the level of the disruption of the author-function. We can see the intersection 
of postanarchism and poetry in the way John Cage reappropriates source texts in “62 Mesostics 
re Merce Cunningham” (1973), or the way Jackson Mac Low writes to and rewrites Gertrude 
Stein in The Stein Poems (2003): both authors seek to defamiliarize language for anarchic ethical 
ends. This intersection is represented differently in Denise Levertov’s call for reader 
responsibility in The Jacob’s Ladder (1961), or in Robert Duncan’s call for reader community in 
his Passages sequence (in Bending the Bow [1968] and Ground Work [1984,1987]). The same 
intersection becomes radically feminist in the experiments with authorship seen in the revisionist 
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appropriations of Susan Howe (Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike, 1993), the 
indeterminacy of Erin Mouré (Pillage Laud, 1999), the racialized LANGUAGE work of 
Harryette Mullen (Sleeping with the Dictionary, 2002), and communal politics of Juliana Spahr 
(Response, 2000). In working to establish a nascent postanarchist literary theory, this project 
reads and writes through each of these texts to show that postanarchism can and should be used 
as a literary theory that works, above all else, to make the acts of reading, writing, and thinking 
about experimental texts part of an anarchist activist practice. 
While I have selected texts that explicitly challenge the authorial role and its concomitant 
political problems, it is my hope that my project brings to light the availability and importance of 
postanarchism as a theory of reading, and thus, of reading all literary texts. Ultimately, this 
project argues that these authors/individual texts themselves are less important to my project than 
the way that my readings (rather than interpretations) of them help to illuminate the 
shortcomings of a critical literary theory that, as of yet, has not and cannot account for the 
changing face of popular resistance movements (anarchist or otherwise). While I have, for the 
most part, selected texts that actively disrupt the conventions of authorship and authorial intent, I 
have also chosen to examine poets who are explicitly anarchist (Cage, Mac Low, Duncan, and, to 
an extent, Howe) as well as political authors who are not anarchist (Levertov, Spahr, Mullen). It 
is my hope that this selection of authors exposes both the necessity and the limitless possibilities 
of postanarchism as a literary theory.  
What is Postanarchism?: Poststructuralism and Postmodernism  
 Aside from Hakim Bey, who coins the term in 1985 (and who I will discuss in more 
depth momentarily), arguably the most important writer on postanarchism is political 
philosopher Todd May, whose The Political Philosophy of Poststructural Anarchism (1994), 
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paved the way for later texts that sought the inherent anarchism of poststructural philosophy. 
May’s text sees postanarchism as poststructural-anarchism, looking especially to the works of 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to examine how the 
implicit politics of these philosophers is necessarily anarchic. For May, the French 
poststructuralists altered the face of activist resistance by shifting the focus from a Marxist one-
sided Statism, to a more effective and appropriate micropolitics (3). Postanarchism, then, 
incorporates aspects of poststructuralist philosophy into its activist practice to achieve two 
concomitant aims. As I will work through in the paragraphs that follow, May’s postanarchism 
has two primary concerns: first, it rejects what May sees as the a priori humanism of classical 
anarchism, and to replace it with a positive definition of power; second, it works towards a 
rhizomatic resistance practice that uses diffuse power relations as not only something it opposes, 
but also an important element of its resistance tactic. For these two aims, May relies on 
Foucault’s work for the former, and Deleuze and Guattari’s for the latter. 
 May incorporates Foucauldian conceptions of power relations into classical anarchist 
thought. He begins by exposing how Foucault’s ideas of power necessitate a revision of anarchist 
tactics, which typically reject all forms of power, arguing instead for aspirational systems based 
upon the avoidance of hierarchies. Instead, May posits that poststructuralist anarchism allows for 
the incorporation of power into its theories by maintaining that power is constraint, but not 
necessarily restraint (67). As Foucault asserts throughout his work, power emanates from 
innumerable points, is not exterior to relationships, comes “from below” as well as “from 
above,” and is both intentional and nonsubjective (May 72).   For an anarchist resistance 
movement this means two things. First and foremost, it dissolves the false dichotomy of the 
individual subject and governing structures that individualist anarchism praises; after all, as May 
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writes, “[p]ower does not merely suppress its objects; it creates them as well” (73). Second, it 
requires an immediate break from the humanism attributed to many classical anarchists.1 That is, 
the primacy of a humanist, individual identity must be abandoned once we understand that the 
political subject is produced at the same time, and in the same manner, as those larger governing 
structures that anarchism critiques. In this way, Foucault’s assertions about power and the State 
form the base of May’s poststructural anarchism and set the tone for his activist politics.  
 May argues, then, that a poststructuralist activist practice is, at its core, an anarchist 
critique of representation (98). This critique of representation is linked, he maintains, to the 
deleuzoguattarian concept of “overcoding” (105). Deleuze and Guattari define overcoding as a 
series of “phenomena of centering, unification, totalization, integration, hierarchization, and 
finalization” (A Thousand Plateaus 41). These phenomena are processes that seek to stratify and 
normalize subjects, and the best way to resist these processes is to “decode,” or to put these 
processes in flux. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is achieved through a deterritorialization that 
produces the “nomad” figure, which May argues is inherently anti-Statist (Political Philosophy 
104-5). May also notes that “[t]he state is not the only operator of overcoding, but it is the 
operator that makes it stick” (107). Thus, a purely anti-Statist, or classical anarchist, resistance 
would be largely ineffectual because it does not account for those elements of power that exist 
external to and a priori of the State. Instead, May looks again to Deleuze, who advocates a tactic 
of “experimentation” rather than resistance (112). This, along with its rejection of humanism, 
marks poststructuralist anarchism’s major break with classical anarchist thought. Poststructuralist 
anarchism values experimentation over resistance because, as May asserts, “[e]xperimentation, 
                                                
1 This humanism is perhaps most evident in anarcho-syndicalists following in the tradition of Max Stirner, or the 
staunch individualism of William Godwin, and much later, Emma Goldman. It is also clearly evident in the 
deference to human nature of anarchists like Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. But, elements of a primal humanism are still 
present even in the most communal anarchism, such as the anarcho-communism proposed by Peter Kropotkin. 
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unlike transgression, seeks positive alternatives rather than revolt” (114). The revolutionary, anti-
Statist nature of classical anarchism seeks this “transgression,” which can neither account for nor 
combat these processes of overcoding. In understanding power, and thus political struggle, as 
unidimensional (as transgression rather than experimentation), classical anarchism ignores those 
other “operators” of overcoding that proliferate in the power structures that anarchism should, 
and must, disturb. In literature, poststructuralist experimentation places an emphasis on 
subjugated discourses (116), which Deleuze and Guattari refer to as minor literature. It also 
reorients the role of the intellectual, making philosophical, theoretical, cultural, and artistic 
practice an active engagement rather than a passive analysis of activism (117). That is, “[t]heory 
does not exist outside of practice; it, too, is a practice” (97). Here May’s poststructuralist 
anarchism prioritizes artistic, and especially poetic, practice, as a part of activism rather than 
simply a way to talk about political engagement. It thus lends itself especially well to studies of 
radically experimental poetry. Most importantly, it makes my own project (its theorizations, its 
criticism, its experimentation) an active practice, and, in some ways, an activist practice.  
What is Postanarchism?: Theorizing Anarchism 
 At this juncture, I should make a brief note about the explicitly political, activist nature of 
these theoretical texts, and of the political philosophy behind them. While I maintain that these 
texts are valuable to literary study (and invaluable to the creation of a postanarchist literary 
theory), I do not want these literary elements to detract or distract from the inherent activism of 
anarchism and postanarchism. As such, I would like to note that Evren and Rousselle’s 
aforementioned reader is preceded by Saul Newman’s The Politics of Postanarchism (2010), a 
less comprehensive but no less important treatise on postanarchism, which argues vehemently 
for the merger of classical anarchism and poststructuralism as a way to reinvigorate new 
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anarchist activist practices.2 While Newman maintains that postanarchism is a response to the 
postmodern condition (140), marked by a skepticism of metanarratives, an abandonment of 
essential identities, and a new view of discourse and constitutive power (àla Foucault) (141), he 
tends to move these philosophical ideals into an activist practice. Arguing that the political is the 
“constitutive space between society and the state” (169, emph. Newman’s), Newman uses 
postanarchism to contest borders and border control (172), to advocate non-authoritarian forms 
of political organisation (177), and to develop a productive disjuncture between politics and 
ethics (139). For Newman, postanarchism is, at its core, not “tactical” (169)—that is, not thought 
before action—but rather, a celebration of heretical (anti)politics (180).  
 Alongside Newman, who problematizes my work by enforcing the practical activist 
nature of postanarchism, I also place David Graeber, a prominent radical author and activist 
whose “Anarchism, Academia, and the Avant-garde” (in Routledge’s Contemporary Anarchist 
Studies, 2009), should be included in every subsequent anarchist-academic work because it poses 
the important (though ultimately unanswerable) question: what would an anarchist academic do? 
(107). Graeber argues here that the anarchist academic occupies a precarious position because 
these two terms are often understood to be incommensurate; anarchists and academics value 
entirely different and often contradictory ideals3 (104). Nonetheless, Graeber positions the 
                                                
2 Evren and Rousselle make a distinction between Todd May’s work and Saul Newman’s work by arguing that 
while May uses anarchism to make poststructuralism more effective, Newman uses poststructuralism to make 
anarchism better (10), implying that in this dynamic May is the philosopher, Newman the pragmatist. 
 
3 For example, the anarchist seeks to destabilize hierarchy and hegemony, and what could be more hierarchical than 
the academy and its valuation of tenure? Indeed, the very system of the academy is based on a hierarchy of 
presidents, deans, assistant deans, full professors, associate professors, assistant professors, sessional or adjunct 
instructors, graduate students, and support staff of various types. I will admit that classical anarchism does not object 
to or reject the authority or expertise denoted by specialization; after all, in God and the State, Mikhail Bakunin 
famously argues, “Does it follow that I reject all authority? Perish the thought. In the matter of boots, I defer to the 
authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads, I consult the architect or the engineer. … But I 
allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect … to impose his authority on me” (229). But, the academy, in its 
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anarchist intellectual as a sort of litmus test, “provid[ing] a potential role for the radical, non-
vanguardist intellectual” (111). His assertion that the anarchist intellectual must be anti-
vanguardist is especially relevant for my work and should immediately recall Deleuze and 
Guattari’s desire for experimentation over transgression. Rejecting the vanguardism of avant-
garde literary and artistic movements such as dadaism and futurism (and, in one fell swoop also 
dismissing the anarchism often attributed to them), Graeber argues that the anarchist intellectual 
must be interested in exploring alternatives, not setting a vanguard (109). His assertion here 
breaks with classical anarchism, making his anti-vanguardism decidedly postanarchist. Classical 
anarchism, despite its vocal denigration of vanguardist ideals, often implicitly believed in 
vanguardism to a degree.4 The anarchist academic’s task is difficult, but not doomed ab ovo. 
“Untwining social theory from vanguardist habits might seem a particularly difficult task,” 
Graeber writes, “because historically modern social theory and the idea of the vanguard were 
born more or less together” (108). Instead, the role of the anarchist academic is to develop 
manners of reading, writing, and understanding, not as a “vanguard leading the way to a future 
society,” but rather as a way of “exploring new and less alienated modes of life” (109). In this 
project, I argue that through its defamiliarization the formally experimental poem allows us one 
way of doing just this, and that it is indeed possible to work as an academic studying avant-garde 
literature without necessarily falling victim to a vanguardism oneself.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
hierarchical nature and its concomitant privileging of certain voices, seeks explicitly to impose its hegemonic 
authority on others. 
 
4 As evidence of this anarchist vanguardism, consider the classical anarchists’ interest in propagande par le fait 
(propaganda by/of the deed), the concept popularized by French anarchist Paul Brousse, and later taken up by mnay 
activist circles, anarchist and otherwise, that privileged unique and spectacular resistance tactics, both violent and 
non-violent, as a means of disseminating political statements. 
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What is Postanarchism?: Hakim Bey and “Poetic Terrorism” 
 In 1985, when Bey published The Temporary Autonomous Zone; Ontological Anarchy; 
Poetic Terrorism, he did so, at least in part, out of frustration with an anarchist-activist 
movement that had stalled, suffering from the aforementioned unidimensional and unidirectional 
approach that failed to account for a society in which we must understand power as diffuse and 
pervasive. Instead, he proposes postanarchism (61), an anarchism that is, not oedipal (to borrow 
a deleuzoguattarian term, as Bey is wont to do), but rather, band-like (95), a carnivalesque 
festival (96), and psychically nomadic (97). Bey’s postanarchism would be “a perfect tactic for 
an era in which the State is omnipresent and all-powerful and yet simultaneously riddled with 
cracks and vacancies” (93). Bey’s postanarchism is not a temporal term, not an “after anarchism” 
that picks up where a failed movement leaves off, but an anarchism that always contains within it 
the lessons learned from poststructuralist conceptions of power and the State, as well as its 
revolutionary potentials. What differentiates Bey’s postanarchism most from the anarchism that 
preceded it is its prioritisation of art, and often poetry specifically, as a revolutionary activist 
practice. Lamenting the fact that art and literature are no longer regarded as threats to an 
authoritarian regime, Bey insists that poetry become more radical (although he does not specify 
how), and that other facets of resistance movements take on the revolutionary potentials of poetic 
language. He writes: “If rulers refuse to consider poems as crimes, then someone must commit 
crimes that serve the function of poetry, or texts that possess the resonance of terrorism” (TAZ 
27). And yet, while this reads as a resounding advocation of (political, corporeal) radical poetics, 
Bey never fully develops this concept. Instead, his notion of “poems as crimes” remains unclear. 
Even his own poetry leaves this poetics underdeveloped and unclear. In it, he maintains the 
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mysticism, the politics, and the viscera of his political writing—see, for example, his Opium 
Dens I Have Known (2009)—but because so much of his creative work recalls or even works 
within the confines of lyrical structure,5 it is difficult to see where or how these poems engage 
with the “criminal” potentials of language. Bey thus provides us with a more effective and 
tantalizing poetic theory than he does a poetic practice. This is not to say that his postanarchist 
poetry is ineffective or irredeemable, but rather that Bey’s political writing can, and should, be 
taken further as an experimental poetics, as well as a practical reading philosophy. My project is 
an attempt to do precisely that. Looking to the postanarchism first proposed by Bey, I interrogate 
the poetic theory latent in Bey’s work, and develop this into a postanarchist literary theory that 
shows us not only how to create texts that are crimes, texts that defamiliarize the modes of poetic 
production, but also how to make the reading and writing of these poems ontological activism.  
  Central to the poetic theory Bey proposes is his concept of Poetic Terrorism, an activist 
practice that occurs at the site of the Temporary Autonomous Zone (hereafter referred to as the 
TAZ). The TAZ is a philosophical thought experiment that can be, should be, and is often 
produced literally. Varying constantly in longevity, type, and size, TAZs range from an 
individual moment of refusal to the widespread “Occupy” movements popularized in 2012. Bey 
goes to great lengths to avoid or resist defining the TAZ, but he does note that it is a moment 
when artistic and activist practices convene in an “uprising that doesn’t engage directly with the 
State, a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then 
                                                
5 I admit that there can be experimental potentials of the lyric. Canadian poet bpNichol in The Martyrology is a good 
contemporary example. Additionally, the modernists (among them, of course, Eliot, Pound, and Williams) called 
for, in a gross oversimplification, the experimentalization of the lyric. Indeed, attempts to radicalize the lyric have 
been, and continue to be, numerous and wildly popular. That said, this project positions the lyric poem, with its 
irrepressible contemporary popularity, its rich canonical history, and its predominant interest in a unified, singular 
writing subject supposedly in control of his/her use of language, in opposition to the radical, experimental poem 
purely in terms of form. The primary elements of experimental form are elusive but necessarily work against the 
primary elements of the lyric. 
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dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen” (TAZ 92). Similarly, Bey refuses to define Poetic 
Terrorism in a prescriptive fashion. Instead, he does so indirectly through examples, such as:  
Pick someone at random & convince them they’re the heir to an enormous, 
useless & amazing fortune—say 5000 square miles of Antarctica. … Later they 
will come to realize that for a few moments they believed in something 
extraordinary, & will perhaps be driven as a result to seek out some more intense 
mode of existence. (TAZ 14) 
While still obscure and eccentric, this definition by example reveals the hallmark of Poetic 
Terrorism:6 it attempts to defamiliarize, but by way of moving the quotidian into the 
extraordinary, and, in this example especially, by calling into question the taken-for-granted 
principles of capitalism and Statism. That is, the sudden acquisition of Antarctic territory, for 
example, brings to the fore assumptions of ownership as economic, as state-sanctioned, and as 
socially-recognized. Bey’s Poetic Terrorism here begs the question: how does government, in its 
many forms, limit our ability to believe in and embrace the “extraordinary”? Thus, Poetic 
Terrorism infringes on the laws of State and logic, patriarchy and normativity, grammar and 
                                                
6 Comment by Sean Braune (18/11/13): “I have always thought of anarchism as a politically creative endeavour and 
I like that Bey explicitly relates his ‘postanarchism’ to art. Good question regarding ‘Poetic Terrorism’ and the ways 
in which poetry can be ‘criminal.’ Criminal to what? Hegemony? Grammar? Can the lyric poem become ‘criminal’ 
if it describes or celebrates different instances of life—instances that are seen as outside of hegemonic, social, or 
cultural norms? If Bey does this … then his associations with pedophilic subcultures is worrisome. I like to think of 
postanarchist criticism or invention as being a practice that disrupts ‘meaning’ systems.” 
 
Response (18/11/13): “Yeah, Sean. We do need to talk about the pedophilia stuff. I’ve obviously avoided it as best I 
could, but you are absolutely right that the TAZ does leave us open to the potentials of some really dangerous 
activity. My response can only be that the TAZ can only function where there is mutual respect and public trust, and 
considering the very interesting political discussions these days about clear definitions of consent (a foundational 
aspect of respect and trust in the common), I fail to see how Bey could justify these problematic sexual preferences.  
As this article (http://libcom.org/library/paedophilia-and-american-anarchism-the-other-side-of-hakim-bey) 
suggests, Bey’s apparent pedophilia implies that his conception of the TAZ is more opportunist than it is communal, 
and that is regrettable. But, if we’re de-chiefing, as you mentioned in another comment, then I can just as well 
discard his sexuality and take his philosophy, sufficiently doctored to avoid it being used to justify oppression. 
On the criminal lyric—you are more hopeful about that than I am. Perhaps I have lost hope in the lyric at large. But, 
perhaps there can be terrorist lyrics out there.” 
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propriety. These regulating and codifying effects produce, as poststructuralism insists, the 
political subject, and Poetic Terrorism works to liberate the individual from these effects. Bey’s 
concept of Poetic Terrorism prioritises the poetry of the deed7 (that is, the activist practice of 
disseminating art and beautiful artefact), but my project focuses specifically on how this concept 
of Poetic Terrorism helps us to understand the experimental and radical poetics of some 
contemporary poetry at the site of language itself, and to make them activist.  
Appendixn: A Note on “Terrorism”  
 I realise that in 2013 in North America I write about terrorism in a vastly different 
political climate than the one in which Bey wrote in 1985. I am also acutely aware that my use of 
the term is not without political motivation or desire for controversy. Following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the United States especially—but also to some extent the better part of the 
Western world—adopted and adapted the use of the term “terrorism” to demonize the racial 
Other and to justify multifarious abuses of civil liberties. Importantly, this adaptation has 
abstracted terrorism to the point where it no longer requires a specific act or a specific enemy, 
producing a vague, non-localizable threat that effectively produces fear and complicity in 
political subjects. The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) publishes an Annual 
Report on Terrorism that, in its annuality, both restates and persistently alters its definition of 
terrorism. These definitions are always taken from the official mandates of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The publication and republication of this “Annual Report” 
implies that this so-called terrorism is omnipresent in contemporary society, and that there will 
necessarily be a need for subsequent reports, implicitly legitimizing the FBI’s reports, and the 
NCTC’s very presence, in a distinctly Foucauldian turn. The subtle changes in this definition 
                                                
7 Bey uses the phrasing “poetry of the deed” in contradistinction from Paul Brousse’s “propaganda by/of the deed” 
to refuse the vanguardism and prescription attributed to the latter. 
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year-to-year could be the subject of this entire introduction. Instead, I hazard only this brief note 
on the term to account for, and justify, my use of “terrorism” as a term for experimental 
resistance. In the FBI Annual Report on Terrorism of 2005, they define terrorism specifically as 
“the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social 
objectives.” But, in 2011, the FBI reports the NCTC’s definition as “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.”  This latter definition, in its maintenance of the stress on political motivation 
alongside its shift of focus onto the identity of the perpetrator—a delegitimised cause that is 
subnational or clandestine, as opposed to the recognised authority of the State—allows the 
NCTC and the FBI to classify and condemn activist organisations (even those operating within 
the US) as terrorists. In this way, the term “terrorism” is persistently used to pre-emptively 
delegitimize and/or criminalize dissenting voices in the US, and, in turn, the rest of the Western 
world.   
 While this project neither condemns nor condones the actions of any organisation 
classified as “terrorist” under US law, I maintain that the term itself is important to, and helps to 
explain, the activist nature of reading and writing experimental texts. While the only “violence” 
committed in the texts studied here is that of radical poetic practice against the normative, 
organising structures of language, the anti-Statist position at the core of any anarchist practice 
would be classified, under these definitions, as terrorist. This violence against language itself is 
one I can, without hesitation, endorse, and that I can, somewhat reservedly, classify as a Poetic 
Terrorism against the State(s) of Language, Literature, and the Lyric. As Lyotard writes, 
breaking from the comfort of preconceptions is a kind of violence, a suffering; “The unthought 
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hurts because we’re comfortable in what’s already thought. And thinking, which is accepting this 
discomfort, is also, to put it bluntly, an attempt to have done with it” (Inhuman 20). And so, trite 
as it may read, the experimental writer is a kind of guerrilla poet, and her/his terrorism is 
instigating the suffering of thinking the unthought.8  
Anarchism and the Experiment: What is an experimental poem? 
 It is important at this juncture to define the parameters of the experimental poem for my 
work. I have opted for the term “experimental”9 over the term “avant-garde”10 for a number of 
reasons, not the least of which is the military connotation of the latter. I also employ Graeber’s 
skepticism of vanguardism, which is also a poststructuralist concern.11 For the most part, the 
texts I read in this project share not only an anti-traditional poetics, but a poetics that resists the 
vanguardism that marks many of the movements of the literary avant-garde outlined above. 
These texts avoid vanguardism’s hierarchical nature in favour of a more egalitarian relationship 
between the reader and the writer—and between texts themselves—by complicating the role of 
                                                
8 Comment by Caitlin O’Kelly (15/6/13): “I am confused with how an anarchist would be considered a terrorist if 
they have not committed a ‘violent’ act for the purpose of furthering their cause. Are you saying that even their 
words could be considered a violent act under that definition of terrorism? Even if they are not causing any physical 
harm to themselves or others?” 
 
Response (15/6/13): “Good question. What this means, first of all, is that we adequately define what we mean by 
‘violence.’ It’s a tough concept to define. What we can say is that the NCTC and the FBI consider violence done to 
bodies AS WELL AS to property enough to level terrorism charges. This violence can also be mental/emotional as 
well as physical. This is where Lyotard’s work factors in. If causing suffering is violent (is it?), then forcing 
someone to think the unthought, or to adopt a new critical mind-set, is a violent act. And here we can say that the 
anarchist academic commits a terrorism of sorts, and so does the experimental poet.” 
 
9 I define the experimental, first and foremost, as a matter of formal innovation. In this way, the experimental text is 
one that does not discount or ignore innovation in terms of content, but that necessarily ties innovative content to the 
creation of new, alternative forms of expression. 
 
10 The terms themselves are clearly etymologically linked. As the Oxford English Dictionary notes, “vanguard” is 
“avant-garde”’s contemporary aphetic. 
 
11 Poststructuralism has long been concerned with critiquing the vanguardist nature of resistance or oppositional 
movements. See, for example, Paul Bové’s foreword to Deleuze’s Foucault: “Deleuze emphasises that Foucault’s 
sense of the diffusion of power is a challenge not only to Statist theories but also to theories of the oppositional or 
vanguard party” (xxix). 
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the author (through, for example, chance or indeterminate operations, “plagiarism” or copying, 
direct or collaborative engagement with the reader, etc.) and demonstrating an interest in the 
commonality of language. In light of this, any definition of the experiment is nebulous, a 
compendium of ideas that forms a collaborative series of suggestions rather than a prescriptive 
map of what the experimental poem should be. I include these criteria only to gesture toward a 
theory of the poetic experiment.  
1. Artifice: The experimental text is concerned with exposing and/or foregrounding artifice, 
as Charles Bernstein writes in “Artifice of Absorption” (A Poetics, 1992). Bernstein 
argues here that a poem’s meaning is located in a “complex” (9), wherein the artifice 
opposes the realism and mimesis often attributed to conventional texts (and especially to 
the lyrical poem). Artifice, which also includes “nonsemantic” effects (11), is 
necessarily part of a poem’s “meaning.” This is to say that a poem’s form is meaningful 
in and of itself, rather than simply contributing to an overall meaning, or enforcing the 
meaning of the poem’s content (10). Radically experimental form in poetry threatens to 
negate (or complicate) semantic meaning in the same way that the reverse can be true for 
traditional verse (15).  
2. Open: The experimental text is never exhausted or exhaustive, and its production is a 
constant revisionary practice. As made famous in Lyn Hejinian’s “The Rejection of 
Closure” (1985), the experimental text refuses the “smug pretension of universality and 
its tendency to cast the poet as guardian to Truth” (2). Closed texts, for Hejinian, 
maintain a stratified position for text and author, enforcing a single interpretation, and 
shutting out their readers from the process of their production. An experimental text 
resists closure and leaves itself open to multiple readings because of gaps in the text left 
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to be filled by the reader. This notion of the closed text is also famously critiqued as 
fallacy by Roland Barthes, as I will discuss shortly.  
3. Chance: The experimental author leaves him/herself open to the intervening forces of 
chance, indeterminacy, improvisation, or spontaneity. This includes collaborative 
inclusion of the reader or other participants, as well as uncreative or Oulipian modes of 
writing that leave the writing process (in part or whole) up to external procedures. This 
element recalls the scientific meaning of the term “experiment,” wherein the parameters 
of the project are set, but the role of the initiator is severely limited regarding the final 
result.12 Jackson Mac Low argues that leaving oneself open to chance in the production 
of experimental texts is a necessarily anarchic political decision; it reproduces an 
anarchic “state of society wherein there is no frozen power structure, where all persons 
may make significant initiatory choices in regard to matters affecting their own lives” 
(“Statement” 384). In other words, the initiator of these procedures anarchically refuses 
authoritative control over the production of his/her poem, and thus relinquishes power 
over the final product.  
4. Politic: The experimental text is political. What Bernstein, Hejinian, and Mac Low all 
suggest in their aforementioned manifestos is that formal manipulation in poetry is a 
political (anti-traditional, anti-authoritarian) act that seeks to disturb the organizing and 
thus limiting principles of overcoding inherent in language. This is made most apparent 
in John Cage’s frequent references “to N[orman] O. Brown’s remark that syntax is the 
arrangement of the army” and Cage’s subsequent “devot[ion] to nonsyntactical 
                                                
12 It should be noted that, despite indeterminacy’s indebtedness to the scientific meanings of “experiment,” its end-
goal is markedly different. The scientific experiment seeks category, system, hierarchy, and Truth (bolstered by 
juridical, medical, logical, and scientific discourses); the experimental poem seeks to disrupt these methods of 
overcoding. 
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‘demilitarized’ language” (Writing Through Finnegans Wake 1). For Cage, the 
experimental poem is a way out of this militarization, a way not to resist, but to refuse; 
as he suggests in Silence, we need a new language in order to have new ideas (203).  
 I should also add that, in the vein of Bey’s definitions of the TAZ, the experiment must 
also be defined by what it does not do. The only concern here is that the experimental text does 
not reify, rely on, or relish the individual as author. This contradicts John Ashbery’s definition of 
the experimental avant-garde in his 1968 Yale lecture, “The Invisible Avant-Garde.” Here, 
Ashbery argues that the very existence of his lecture proves that the avant-garde has become 
“stratified” (394), insisting that the primacy of anti-traditionalism in the avant-garde has created 
another tradition that eventually subsumes the individual prowess of the author. In the end, he 
tellingly laments: “has tradition finally managed to absorb the individual talent?” (397). 
Recalling Eliot’s famous treatise on the subject, Ashbery maintains that the real avant-garde is 
the individual; it is not a school, genre, or group, but rather a personal refusal.13 I maintain that 
while Ashbery’s privileging of the individual, monadic author is a marker of the avant-garde, it 
is also antithetical to experiment, which embraces the influence of tradition, the mutability of the 
writing subject, and the collaborative nature of the processes of reading and writing.14  
Anarchism and the Experiment: Who is the author? 
 Because I have privileged authorship (and its destabilization) as the most important 
aspect of the experimental poetic text, I should here spend some time discussing what 
                                                
13 While I refute Ashbery’s notion here, I do want to make note of the fact that Ashbery holds this very true for his 
own work, and this is the primary reason why his poetry has proven so difficult to classify in terms of experimental 
school/genre. 
 
14 It is important to note that, at some point in the scholarship surrounding them, each of the authors studied in this 
project have, in some cases mistakenly, been described as a part of the avant-garde. While I will expand on these 
distinction on a text-by-text basis, I should now note that ascribing an author a position in the literary vanguard is a 
political choice that runs counter to the explicitly anti-vanguardist stance of postanarchism as a reading practice. 
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experimental authorship entails, and how its problematizing of traditional authorship is a 
politically-charged activism. As with any contemporary discussion of shifting perspectives of 
authorship, this discussion begins with the poststructuralist meditations on the Author, the two 
central texts of which are Foucault’s “What Is an Author?” (1969, republished in Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice, 1977) and Barthes’s “The Death of the Author” (1967, republished 
in Image – Music – Text, 1977). Foucault’s essay stands in stark contrast to Ashbery’s Yale 
musings on the avant-garde, as Foucault begins with the assertion that the author him/herself is 
not an individual, but rather a discursive practice (114). Rather than view the writer as the 
“sovereignty of the author” (126), an authoritarian figure that, recalling the Hejinian quotation 
above, closes the text and stands as the arbiter of literary Truth, Foucault proposes an author-
function that situates text and author in a complex of discursive practices that eliminates the 
notion of correct reading practices in favour of a reader-based manner of reading.  
 Barthes makes this same point, arguing famously that “the birth of the reader must be at 
the cost of the death of the Author” (Image – Music – Text 148). He notes that this shift in the 
power dynamic of author and reader is long overdue, arguing that “classic criticism has never 
paid any attention to the reader; for it, the writer is the only person in literature” (148). While I 
argue here that one element of a postanarchist literary theory is to make good on Barthes’s 
command, I do not mean to suggest that this shift is not already an important element of 
contemporary literary criticism in its various forms. What I do want to stress is the manner in 
which other contemporary literary theories—among them reader response, but also historical 
materialism and its ilk—have recognized the importance of the reader insofar as s/he receives 
and makes sense of the text in question. Postanarchism hears Foucault’s assertion, and 
understands Barthes’ call-to-arms, as a merger of author and reader in the form of an author-
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function that is in constant engagement with a real or imagined audience, which is to say that 
postanarchism argues for an even more central and active role for the reader in the creation of 
textual meaning, and, indeed, in the production of the text itself. If, as Barthes argues, removing 
the “Author” makes attempts to “decipher” a given text futile because the Author necessarily 
limits interpretation (147), postanarchism’s collapsing of the Author proper opens indefinite 
readings, and indefinite readers, and is thus especially well-suited as a theoretical framework for 
reading experimental, indeterminate, and (especially) semantically nonsensical texts.15 
 A postanarchist literary theory, then, takes into its framework Foucault’s discussions of 
the author-function in “What Is an Author?” to understand the relationship between literal writer 
and the author-function s/he takes on. To begin, the Author is an appropriation that possesses the 
text (in name as well as legally in the form of intellectual property) (124).16 Moreover, the 
author-function—in each individual case, as well as conceptually—is neither universal nor 
constant, and, instead, functions as a result of various discursive practices determined 
sociohistorically, and predicated on the production of power-knowledge (126). That is, as 
Foucault writes, the author-function “is not formed spontaneously through the simple attribution 
of a discourse to an individual. It results from a complex operation whose purpose is to construct 
the rational entity we call author” (127). As such, the author-function is certainly not an actual 
individual, but rather the complex interplay of author/writer/narrator (130), and, in light of 
postanarchism’s interest in the reader, we can now append him/her to that list. This inclusion of 
                                                
15 I acknowledge here, and will repeatedly acknowledge throughout my project, my own role as critic in the 
limitation of readers/readings. This limitation is, I will concede, a necessary evil of the English Department. 
 
16 Foucault notes that this primary element is historically determined, writing: “It is important to notice … that its 
status as property is historically secondary to the penal code controlling its appropriation. Speeches and books were 
assigned real authors, other than mythical or important religious figures, only when the author became subject to 
punishment and to the extent that his [sic] discourse was considered transgressive” (Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice 124).  
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the reader as a substantial and central element of the author-function demands a radical re-
envisioning of the entire author-function. In the experimental poem, where issues of 
author/writer/narrator are blurred, often to the point where the boundaries of these entities are 
unintelligible, Barthes’s and Foucault’s assertions are problematized, and yet also never more 
valuable because they have opened the door to the reader’s inclusion in the active production of 
textual meaning. This does, however, suggest that new understandings of reading processes 
(processes of reading text and reading author) are necessary in order to develop new and 
effective ways of readings these experimental texts.  
 Additionally, it is worth noting that Barthes’s conceptions of “readerly” and “writerly” 
texts also signal his frustrations with closed and conventional reading practices. In his ideation, 
the “readerly” text is one that does not provoke the reader to produce his/her own meanings 
within the text. Alongside his argument that the Author necessarily limits the meanings of a text, 
Barthes argues that the “readerly text” employs the text and its tradition “like a cupboard where 
meanings are shelved, stacked, [and] safeguarded” (S/Z 200). Alternatively, for Barthes, the 
“writerly text,” which in this project is represented par excellence by the formally experimental 
poem, is one that endeavours “to make the reader no longer a consumer but a producer of the 
text” (4). Ultimately, he argues that this is, or at the very least should be “the goal of literary 
work (of literature as work)” (4, emph. mine). In a project that seeks to reclaim reading as 
activist practice, this notion of “literature as work” is especially pertinent; the work here is not 
simply the hermeneutic interpretive function of the passive reader, but also necessarily the 
active, and thus activist, intervention of the reader in the process of textual production, thus 
destabilizing the hermeneutic process from the start. In essence, Barthes argues that the author-
function’s relationship to the text and its readers is the very site at which reading can (and 
 23 
should) be made activist.  
 The issue of authorship in the experimental text has drawn a considerable amount of 
scholarly attention. The majority of scholarship on the experimental text since the seventies has 
focused on how the author enacts his/herself in the text at the expense of actual textual analysis. 
As a prime example of this, in 2010, Marjorie Perloff, perhaps the most famous name in studies 
of experimental poetics, published Unoriginal Genius, a book-length study of authorship in the 
experimental text, focusing specifically on texts produced by indeterminate or chance methods. 
Perloff concludes in her text that while these experimental texts may complicate the author’s 
role, there is still an author and s/he can still (and often should) be regarded as a literary genius. 
She writes that even in texts that complicate authorship and originality, we cannot really “say 
that genius isn’t in play. It just takes different forms” (21). Perloff not only relies too heavily on 
the Author for her analysis, she prizes it. By arguing that the formally experimental text, in its 
complications and refusals of authorship, maintains an Author (rather than an author-function), 
she essentially ignores poststructuralism’s critiques in the name of genius.17  
Anarchism and the Experiment: How do we read the illegible? 
                                                
17 Comment by Kate Siklosi (18/6/13): “Right. I’m thinking through this lately with respect to Cage’s (among many 
others) problematic relationship to authorship in terms of his writing through process. He renounces authorship of 
his Joyce texts, for the language used is in fact Joyce’s, but the concept and the processing of the work is all his 
‘genius,’ for lack of a better word. So, I’m wondering—can the conceptual poetic process itself be considered 
authorship, in terms of extending Foucault’s definition of the author as ‘practice’? This certainly becomes pertinent 
in digital poetics, which not only relies on an authorial ‘processor’ but also the reader’s participation in the virtual 
‘practice’ of poetic creation.” 
 
Response (18/6/13): “And something like Flarf poetry, in which the process isn’t the laborious writing through that 
Cage does, or even the work involved in Goldsmith’s conceptual stuff, complicates this further. For Cage’s work, 
and for others who do writing through stuff (I’m thinking of Mac Low here, too, because I am going to be writing on 
the two soon), I like to use the term ‘initiator’ over author, because I do see them as a spark. The match to the end-
product-poem’s candle, maybe. It starts it, but it really has nothing to do with the fire/flame. I think what’s great 
about Cage is that as much as he makes choices/asks questions, there’s really nothing Perloffian ‘genius’ about him. 
He constantly asserted in interviews that the questions he asked of texts were often not very unique/insightful, he 
just thought they might have interesting answers. So, he becomes famous for writing grade-school acrostic poems. 
At least, that’s what I think.” 
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To work against the relatively conservative18 scholarship of Perloff, my project employs 
the work of Craig Dworkin, who often works closely with, and pays homage to, Perloff. Perloff’s 
extensive bibliography has done its part to bring radically experimental poetry to the forefront of 
poetic study in the last twenty years. But, in light of the postanarchist literary theory this project 
seeks to establish, Dworkin’s work is much more applicable, and ultimately more effective. This 
is best demonstrated in Dworkin’s book-length study, Reading the Illegible (2003), published 
seven years before Perloff’s Unoriginal Genius. Reading the Illegible is a meditation on the 
author-function in formally experimental poetic texts wherein Dworkin neither holds dear, nor 
laments the loss of, the Author and its claim to genius. Rather, he notes that poetics of 
“plagiarism,” indeterminacy, and collaboration refuse notions of the Author, and instead 
privilege a détournement, Situationist author and activist Guy Debord’s concept of the 
defamiliarization of the quotidian. Dworkin writes: 
The antithesis of quotation, which marks and reinscribes authority, 
détournement19 pursues a poetics of plagiarism in the tradition of [Comte de] 
                                                
18 Here (in light of committee member Stephen Cain’s comments) I am careful to distinguish Perloff’s work as 
conservative relative to the work of other scholars, for example Dworkin, who considers the same experimental 
texts, but does so without (or with a less prominent influence from) the vestiges of a conservative, hermeneutically-
driven scholarship. 
 
19 Dworkin engages frequently in Reading the Illegible with the work of Guy Debord and his theorizations of 
Situationist experimentation. Most important for Dworkin is Debord’s concept of detournement, which is articulated 
most clearly in Debord’s “Methods of Detournement” (1956). In this statement, Debord argues that “[o]nly 
extremist innovation is historically justified” (1), and that the most extreme and effective forms of detournement 
(what he terms “ultradetournement”) occur on the level of everyday life (5). In this way, the Situationists, and by 
proxy Dworkin, politicize the poetic form as defamiliarization, a break from the essentializing and reductive factors 
of the quotidian. Detournement, for both authors, is a form of parody, but rather than seeking comedic effect, it 
seeks to devalue the original (Debord 2).  
 
Importantly, the Situationists, and their role in the May ’68 riots in France, provide the artistic and literary backdrop 
for Barthes’s and Foucault’s arguments about authorship and readership. Thus, Debord’s work, while not 
significantly referenced in my project, provides an important sociohistorical context to postanarchism’s revaluation 
of the relationships between author, reader, and text. 
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Lautréamont, whose infamous syllogism declares: “Les idées s’améliorent. Le 
sens des mots y participe. Le plagiat est nécessaire, le progrès l’implique [Ideas 
improve. The meaning of words plays a part in this development. Plagiarism is 
necessary. Progress implies it].” (13) 
While I will shy away from Dworkin’s (and Lautréamont’s) progressivist rhetoric, what is most 
important to note here is that Reading the Illegible does not dwell on authorship (as Perloff’s 
texts, including but not limited to Unoriginal Genius, are wont to do). Instead, Dworkin uses 
Lautréamont’s syllogism as if to accept all radical forms of authorship without reservation, and 
then moves on. The rest of his text examines the reader and the reading processes of formally 
experimental, “illegible,” or semantically nonsensical poetic texts, all the while refusing 
prescriptive ways of reading.20 He states this explicitly in his introduction when he argues that 
“[p]art of what [he] hope[s] to establish … through this book’s many close readings is an 
alternative strategy of reading itself” (xix). This alternative strategy of reading embraces the 
artifice, openness, indeterminacy, and politics that I have noted are integral to the experimental 
text. In this way, the experimental poem (to the chagrin of traditional literary studies), is read but 
not interpreted. In Dworkin’s own words: “If I have, at times, abjured interpretation in the 
following pages, it has only been to give onto reading” (xxiv, emph. Dworkin’s).  
This shift from interpretation to reading recalls Lyotard’s skepticism of representation, 
and his desire for cultural artifacts that are not limited to the vicarious, substitutive function of 
denotation. Dworkin’s study argues that these experimental, illegible texts complicate both 
representation and denotation; their “active language,” that is, language that does not languish in 
                                                
20 In his introduction, for example, Dworkin writes: “In short, the basic thesis of this book is ………..…………….” 
(Reading the Illegible xviii). 
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the denotative realm,21 demonstrates that “when language exceeds its communicative authority—
in those moments when its familiar and overworked utility stutters to reveal its ‘fundamentally 
strange and foreign’ nature—one catches a glimpse of ‘the insubordination of words’” (11). 
Instead, Dworkin suggests a manner of reading (and perhaps, too, a manner of producing texts) 
in which communication is achieved without subordinating language to the limiting denotative 
process of Wittgenstein’s language-game of information.  
Finally, it is important to note that this reading process is, for Dworkin, necessarily a 
communal practice, and one born out of the process of communication. He first makes this point 
implicitly in his reading of Susan Howe’s Eikon Basilike, when he notes “the repetition and 
emphasis of ‘common’ (‘in common,’ ‘communism,’ and twice with ‘common-wealth’) [which] 
gesture toward ‘communication’ through the Latin comunis from which they all directly 
descend” (45). This may seem, on its own, unremarkable, until one understands that Dworkin 
reads Howe’s work as “noise”—that is, nonsemantic communication. But, he contends, “noise 
proliferates hand in hand with an increase in the terms of communication” (45). And, conversely, 
the proliferation of noise necessarily produces the common.22 The experimental, illegible texts, 
for Dworkin, produce in readers a commonality, a community based on the ethical, political 
dimensions to reading and engaging with the formally experimental text. He makes this political 
element explicit when, at the very end of Reading the Illegible, he writes: 
                                                
21 Indeed, complicating semantics and denotation is central to the experimental poem, and especially to a 
postanarchist reading of that poem. But, I should note here that this complication of poetic denotation has long been 
a hallmark of formalist poetics. Consider, for example, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s now infamous note in Zettel: “Do not 
forget that a poem, although it is composed in the language of information, is not used in the language-game of 
giving information” (§106). 
 
22 All uses of the term “common” throughout this project are meant to recall this first usage, borrowed from 
Dworkin, from Howe, and from the anarchist and postanarchist political theorists whose work is referenced in this 
introduction. It is meant to designate a site of communality rather than quotidian insignificance. I will work to make 
this distinction clear throughout my project, but want to signal it immediately to avoid confusion.  
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Whatever the value of the claims I have made in this book … the mere fact of that 
hermeneutic activity … should suggest an ethics of the illegible and remind us 
that the unreadable text is a temporary autonomous zone: one which refuses the 
permanence of its own constitution, and which calls on its readers to account for 
the semantic drives that they cannot, in the end, resist—and for which we must 
learn, as readers, to take responsibility. (155, emph. mine) 
In light of this, I adapt Dworkin’s work, along with the political philosophies outlined above, to 
be included in postanarchist literary theory. All of these elements—the proliferation of noise, the 
act of communication, the inevitable “hermeneutic activity” amidst the attempted resisting of 
“semantic drive,” and the responsibility that readers must take—produce a postanarchist literary 
theory that is, at its core, a theory of poetry as inherently communal.23 Or, to be more precise, it 
is a theory of new activist reading practices that re-envision the production and reading of 
experimental texts as also producing the common.  
 
                                                
23 Comment by Samantha Bernstein (5/7/13): “If I understand rightly, you are suggesting that reading illegible texts 
makes us aware of the drive to classify/make coherent the world around us. This making of meaning, when properly 
scrutinized, seems a potentially powerful communal act. Indeed, as Dworkin and you suggest, we can no more resist 
our ‘semantic drives’ than our appetites—they are, I would imagine, part of our most basic brain structures that 
differentiate one thing from another. Though we should indeed take responsibility for them, why would we try to 
resist them? How does awareness of our own necessarily contingent, individual semantic drives generate 
community? Rejecting denotation, we embrace the multiplicity of meanings crouching behind seemingly rigid 
language; is community generated, then, by our willingness to have others’ meanings sprung upon us, a pounce that 
communicates—creates knowledge in us—but does not inform, or impart fixed information?” 
 
Response (8/7/13): “You put it so beautifully. Yes, of course, we cannot refuse our semantic drives entirely. We 
would mumble ourselves into oblivion if we did. But, I do believe that there is something radically communal about 
leaving ourselves open to communicative noise, rather than viewing illegibility, ambiguity, and difference become 
blocks to our communication. On a practical level, this is good advice for relating to anyone; it’s all about 
embracing difference, and leaving ourselves open to the values of others. Radically experimental poetry, and the 
postanarchist theory I propose to read this poetry, true to that adverb, take this ‘good advice’ to the extreme. We 
can’t live like a radically experimental poem all the time, but poetry is the perfect site for linguistic/semantic play. 
And, as was true for us as children, the best play is one that teaches us a better and more responsible/attentive 
manner of living.” 
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Anarchism and the Experiment: “Poetry is radically communal” 
The concept of language as a part of the common is one shared, implicitly, by all the 
poets in my project, in some form or another, but it is articulated most clearly and explicitly in 
Duncan’s work. For example, in a late poetic series, Dante Études, he writes:  
  Go, my songs, then in zealous 
       liberality, no longer mine, 
  but now the friendship of the  
       Reader’s heart and mind. (Ground Work 126) 
Stephen Collis argues that this linguistic commonality is central to Duncan’s poetic and political 
theories. For Duncan, Collis argues, “language is the commons: we all have equal rights to enter 
there—permission to return to the common source. … Poetry is a gift of the givenness of 
language and no poet holds property rights over it, but owes it his or her service and 
responsibility. Poetry is radically communal” (“A Duncan Etude” n.p.). The indeterminacy, the 
engagement of the reading community, the anarchic themes of attentiveness and 
interconnectivity, and the politics of responsibility that run throughout the very notion of the 
poetic experiment (and that are central to the texts studied in this project) emphasize the 
importance of understanding language, and poetic language especially, as a major feature of the 
common. That is, the common, as elaborated upon by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, is 
constituted by, and of, love as a political concept and a resistance tactic.24 They write: “Every act 
                                                
24 Comment by Sean Braune (19/5/14): “I love the invocation of love—love as disruptive. I think about this in 
similar terms in relation to Cage, namely that love is something illegible and nonsensical that pushes, pulls, ties up, 
and liberates subjects (becoming-subjects or just coming-subjects). However, ‘love’ is this big and empty signifier: 
an aporia of projection—one person’s ‘love’ is another person’s Hallmark card. I guess I’m asking where this 
‘common’ is located. Where on earth are these spaces of revolutionary potential—such as Bey’s TAZ, Foucault’s 
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of love is an ontological event in that it marks a rupture with existing being and creates new 
being. … To say that love is ontologically constitutive then, simply means that it produces the 
common” (Commonwealth 181). As such, the traditional prioritization and valorisation of the 
author figure, in its privileging of a single voice, and its subsequent resistance to conversation 
(which Casarino, in my epigram, suggests is the hallmark of the linguistic common), is an 
example of the common as corrupt. Consequently, as the texts I study work to problematize or 
resist authorship, they also work to construct a poetic language that is “radically communal.”  
 Hardt and Negri’s conceptions of the common show us that Duncan’s notions of the 
communal nature of language are, to an extent, naïve. They note in their preface to 
Commonwealth that language, although a part of the common, is becoming increasingly 
privatized (ix). And, indeed, many other critical theorists have argued that language (through its 
language-game of giving and receiving information, its substitutive process) is itself inequitable, 
                                                                                                                                                       
heterotopia, or Hardt and Negri’s common—supposed to be hidden? (I’m sitting in a coffee shop while I’m typing 
this and I know this is NOT the common). If the common is a space of postanarchism (and it destabilizes and 
deterritorializes hegemonic structures of culture and language), then it needs to be un-common. The illegibility 
needs to be graffitied on the walls, or are there walls? My issue has always been that these liminal spaces of 
resistance are typically abstract: insofar as Foucault offers examples of heterotopias, one wonders if these examples 
truly encompass his self-declared definition. Does writing happen in the common? Does love?” 
 
Response by Jessica Matouzzi (19/5/14): “I’m wondering if this inability to speak the location of the ‘common’ 
might actually be construed as an advantage—or at least as a strategy for avoiding the space’s incursion and 
reification by corporate profit-making schemes, governmental repression, or both. For me, the magic of anarchism 
lies in the fact that the forms resistance will take can’t be dictated in advance, since they arise out of dialogue and 
shifting participant constituencies. For historical accounts, this requires unflagging inductiveness and collective 
authorship. But literary theorizing presents a more difficult methodological issue, precisely because it’s theorizing—
I’m not sure what the most rigorous way to address this issue might be, but it’s definitely something I struggle with 
in my own work.” 
 
Response (1/6/14): “I would absolutely agree that the inability to speak the location of the common is an advantage, 
but I also share Sean’s frustration with the fact that the inherent deterritorialization of the common renders it 
annoyingly abstract. Love indeed happens there, ‘writing’ may or may not. Your point about theory and 
methodology is an interesting one, too. I often wonder if my attempts to transcribe these moments of the common, 
of a radically communal textual relationship, could ever do anything except stratify what might otherwise be in flux. 




predicated on the exclusion of others for its expression.25 Hardt and Negri propose a common 
that is not, as Duncan’s work here may suggest, a purely public space, but rather one that seeks 
alternatives to the binary: “neither private nor public, neither capitalist nor socialist … [but one 
that] opens a new space for politics” (ix). Central to the common, and to the commonality of 
language, then, is an embracing of the mutability of human nature and of individual subjectivity. 
What biopolitics shows us is that “human nature” is always in flux (353). And, this argument 
has, as I have demonstrated, deep roots in the classical anarchist tradition. To this end, the best 
way to experiment with (and against) biopolitical production is to embrace this flux, to move 
from identity to deleuzoguattarian becoming (x).  
This shift is evident in the way that the experimental text disrupts or refuses authorship, 
but, Hardt and Negri maintain, a revolutionary politics cannot exist solely through the refusal of 
identity, an argument with which the feminist writers of my project would strongly agree. After 
all, as Howe famously stated in a 2008 interview, the complete refusal of authorship and identity 
is “alluring—but problematic for women writing/reading poems” (Guthrie np). Instead, Hardt 
and Negri argue that “revolutionary politics has to start from identity but cannot end there. … 
Identity is a weapon of the republic of property, but one that can be turned against it” 
(Commonwealth 326). This process begins, for them, with an attack on invisibility, a reclamation 
of the means of production of subjectivity, and, ultimately, a shift from stratified identity to a 
singularity in flux (327-333). In language, this shift can occur only when the text refuses the 
representation that Lyotard and May both critique above because representation, Hardt and Negri 
argue, turns singularities into concrete identities (346). Instead, they propose a production of the 
                                                
25 See, for example, Jacques Lacan’s “Signification of the Phallus,” Gayatri Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak,” 
Jacques Derrida’s “Disseminations,” or Luce Irigaray’s This Sex Which is Not One. Also of interest are Helene 
Cixous’s “The Laugh of the Medusa,” or Deleuze and Guattari’s Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, for their 
notions of experimentation as a means out of the exclusionary nature of linguistic signification.   
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common (a production which necessitates alternatives to the language-games that stratify) that 
relies not on anti-globalization, but rather alter-globalization, that moves beyond opposition and 
resistance and into the creative process of experimentation (102-104). The common is the 
production of a revolutionary politics that relies on collective social expression, and here we 
return to the concept of love. For Hardt and Negri, and for this project as a whole, love is the 
productivity of and in the common (xii). It is a physical force and a political action, but one that 
embraces flux, seeks alternatives, disrupts representation and expression, and engages the social 
in collective responsibility within and to itself.26 Love is responsible to, and part of, the common; 
it does not rely on the binarism of individual and society, of self and other, but rather embraces 
the varied connections between individuals that exist exclusively in flux. Indeed, Hardt and 
Negri’s conception of love here is virtually synonymous with experimentation as postanarchist 
literary theory defines it.  
What Does a Postanarchist Literary Theory Look Like?: The Crisis of Representation 
 What becomes clear at this point is that the core of an anarchist (and, to that same end, a 
postanarchist) literary theory is a critique of representation. It is not surprising, then, that the only 
scholar who explicitly attempts to develop an anarchist literary theory, Jesse Cohn, focuses 
precisely on this concern. His book-length study on the subject, Anarchism and the Crisis of 
                                                
26 Comment by Samantha Bernstein (5/7/13): “Love ‘is a physical force and a political action, but one that embraces 
flux, seeks alternatives, disrupts representation and expression, and engages the social in collective responsibility 
within and to itself.’ Indeed! And, beautifully, we can love what we don’t yet know or will never know; we can love 
possibilities. Love is maybe largely the embrace of/penetration by what can never be fully legible. Love brings the 
willingness to be disrupted, the belief that such disruption is generative. A perfect philosophy for the ways of 
reading you are proposing.” 
 
Response (8/7/14): “‘We can love what we don’t yet know or will never know’—Yes!!And we can let 
postanarchism take this one step further: love as radical politics/poetics is embracing a lack of ‘knowledge.’ This 
can sound Keatsian (and it is, in a sense, a revisionist negative capability—those Romantics were nothing if not 
good anarchists). I want it to be taken further. Not simply accepting that I do not understand, cannot ever adequately 
communicate, but celebrating the fact that this lack means a freedom from the limiting structures of Truth! The 
dancing at Emma Goldman’s revolution.” 
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Representation (2006), “calls into question the relationships between our concepts and the truths 
they mean to denote, our images and the realities they are supposed to depict” (11). In efforts to 
create unifying and clearly expressionist systems of meaning-making (on the level of language, 
but also on those of genre, canon, tradition, etc), these representative systems, in essence, speak 
to (and thus, for) the multitude, and in turn silence its multiplicity (12). Cohn admits early on that 
writers and readers cannot reject all representation—it is, after all, requisite for signification—
but, rather, that an anarchist literary theory necessitates viewing representation as a relationship 
of power (13). For this reason, Cohn’s work privileges prose texts27 with decentered, polyphonic, 
or rhizomatic narratives that present a collage of multiple voices rather than the single 
perspective of a narrator (172). Additionally, he notes that the politics of form and style are 
necessarily limited to issues of audience interpretation (181). In these cases, Cohn’s work walks 
the line between an anarchist literary theory and the now out-dated relativism that marks 
postmodernism. That is, by allowing for this decentering on the level of the text and relying 
instead on a highly individualized hermeneutic interpretation on the level of the reader, Cohn’s 
work does not really constitute a radical anarchist re-envisioning of the reading process.28  
 What really sets Cohn’s work apart is its assertion that an anarchist literary theory must 
                                                
27 For example, Cohn’s literary readings focus on writers like Leo Tolstoy (who has clear and frequently discussed 
anarchist sympathies). 
 
28 Comment by Jesse Cohn (28/4/14): “I just ran across your really fascinating dissertation/blog project, and I’m 
flattered to be cited there. I think you may misread me at a few points, though. May I offer a couple of comments? 
First of all, I really didn’t mean to propose ‘an affective reader-response theory (à la Stanley Fish)’; after all, I spend 
a good deal of time taking Fish and Rorty to task for exactly that (reducing the text to whatever the reader wishes to 
make of it). You also seem to quote my book in a way that takes material out of context…  Attributing these 
statements to me is misleading, because in that passage, if you reread it in the context of the chapter, I’m 
characterizing (fairly critically!) the views of someone else (Mike Michael, an Actor Network Theorist). I definitely 
don’t believe that individuality is prior or superior to community, or that real freedom is necessarily ‘difference 
without unity’; my sympathies are pretty definitely with the social and communitarian tendencies in the anarchist 
tradition. I’m sorry—I know that book wasn’t my best writing (it’s dense, overly quotational, and jargon-ridden), 
and I’m sure this isn’t what anyone engaged in a dissertation process wants to hear, but I wanted to take the 
opportunity to clarify my position, and I hope it doesn’t come across as adversarial. There are so few of us working 
in this area, and if anything, we ought to practice mutual aid!” 
 33 
always be understood as a dialectic between identification and disidentification (177). That is, in 
some ways pre-empting the Hardt and Negri text that would come three years later, Cohn 
suggests a reading and writing strategy that begins with identification and subjectivity, and turns 
that tool against the text and its representation, in order to embrace both singularity and 
multiplicity. Cohn asserts, then, that we can, and must, read identitarian subjectivities as products 
of coalition rather than hegemony (244). While the destabilization of the subjectivity that 
poststructuralism and postmodernism ushered in may have done away with universalisms and 
claims about “human nature,” Cohn notes that it “has all too often produced … unity in the form 
of unstable alliances and single-issue reformist activism” (242). The answer, then, is singularity 
in the form of radical29 difference. Embracing this singularity, Cohn’s anarchist society is a 
series of networked communities, extreme regionalism, and affiliation rather than filiation (253). 
This translates directly to his conceptions of anarchist reading and writing practices, which 
would entail a “representational politics of duration and difference, motion and multiplicity” 
(256). And yet, Anarchism and the Crisis of Representation, despite its explicit concern with 
anarchist politics and aesthetics, shies away from developing a literary theory out of anarchism.  
 This theory proper would follow a year later, in Cohn’s “What is Anarchist Literary 
Theory?” published in Anarchist Studies in 2007. Making note of the fact that the anarchist 
tradition has long been concerned with issues of cultural production, artistic practice, and 
linguistic politics, Cohn asserts that an “anarchist literary theory draws its inspiration from the 
body of thought and practices which have historically comprised the anarchist movement” (1). 
Cohn’s anarchist literary theory reads ethically as anarchist, “with the aim of determining what 
                                                
29 Cohn’s anarchist difference is indeed radical. He writes that “an anarchist social order cannot impose such a 
spurious unity [as proposed by filiative communities], but must embrace cultural, aesthetic, even religious and 
political diversity” (252).  
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kind of relationships the text offers to bring about between ourselves and one another, between 
ourselves and the world” (3). In this way, anarchist literary theory, as I have detailed, is primarily 
concerned with the relationship between text and reader. As Cohn goes on to write: 
an ethical approach to the text cannot simply mean a receptive or empathetic 
reading, in which we merely submit to its terms, nor can it mean a purely active 
reading, reading as the “use” or violent “appropriation” of the text; instead of 
positing ourselves as the slaves or the masters of texts, we ought to place 
ourselves into a dynamic relation with them, to see each encounter with them as a 
dialogue fraught with risk and promise. (7) 
Here, the anarchist literary theory Cohn develops recalls the poststructuralist contemplations of 
readership, and even Dworkin’s endeavour to produce new forms of reading and writing about 
illegible poetry.30 What it seems to ignore is the role of the authorial presence in the production 
of the literary artefact, a presence that a postanarchist literary tradition sees as quintessential to 
the role of the reader. Cohn’s critiques of representation, his concern with individuality and the 
collective, and his interest in liberating language from the substitutive function of information-
giving all make his work invaluable to the notion of a postanarchist literary theory. But, in his 
attempts to value the reader and the ethical dimensions of the relationship between audience and 
text, he overlooks the necessary third-party in that relationship: the Author, whom the 
postanarchic reader must confront; the author-function, necessary for understanding the text’s 
social context; and, the authorial presence of intrusive, annotative readers.   
What Does a Postanarchist Literary Theory Look Like?: Hypertext 
                                                
30 It should be noted here that Cohn is a vocal critic of postanarchism, and especially the controversial connotations 
of the post prefix. For Cohn’s aversion to postanarchism, see “‘What is “Postanarchism” Post?’ Review of Saul 
Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power.” Postmodern Culture 13.1 
(Sept. 2002), or “What’s Wrong with Postanarchism?” (co-authored with Shawn Wilbur). 
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To account for both the aesthetic and political anarchism of experimental form, and to 
attempt to recreate the common through engagement with reader, writer, and critic, my 
dissertation itself takes on an experimental form, which I will touch on briefly now, but will 
explain in greater detail in my treatise on the dissertation form at the end of this introduction. As 
both an insurrectionary tactic and as a means of navigating the potential limitations of a more 
traditional print-based dissertation form, my project is made up of a series of short single-author 
chapters linked through hypertext.31 According to George Landow, who stood at the forefront of 
critical hypertext theory in the academy, the form of the hypertext allows us, as readers and 
critics, to develop reading and writing practices that work towards “abandon[ing] conceptual 
systems founded on ideas of center, margin, hierarchy, and linearity and replac[ing] them [with] 
ones of multilinearity, nodes, links, and networks” (Hypertext 1). Landow stresses that 
“hypertext blurs the boundaries between reader and writer” (4), and engages with an “active, 
intrusive reader [who] can annotate a text” (11), rather than a passive reader who consumes even 
as s/he reads critically. And indeed, the reader of a hypertext produces the text as s/he reads. 
While, as I have argued, the experimental text similarly provokes the reader to produce the text 
as s/he reads, hypertext makes this turn to the writerly text, and its concomitant engagement with 
its audience, more manifest. Because of this, hypertext is particularly well-suited for my project. 
                                                
31 Comment by Jessica Matouzzi (19/5/14): “I have a question regarding the form of the dissertation; why the 
single-author format, given your desire to further problematize and re-define the Author-function? Also wondering 
why you focus on poetry rather than prose?” 
 
Response (1/6/14): “On poetry: 1) It’s always been my baby, and I’m not ready to let it go yet. But, more 
importantly, 2) I am interested in the ways that authorship is disrupted through high formalization, and I rarely if 
ever see this enacted in a way I find useful in prose (save Danielewski, perhaps, some digital prose, occasionally 
Murakami who I am only now getting into). On the form of this diss: I imagine the sections of plateaus as single-text 
rather than single-author, but I take your point. I also look at a lot of interviews and poetics written by the authors 
themselves, so I do pay significant attention to the writer. I would say first that the writer is not the author, and to 
conflate the two can be a very dangerous path. But, I also think that the only way to look at how the text disrupts 
traditional authorship is to look precisely at the hand writing and to discuss the ways in which this writing-person 
gets translated to and distanced from the Author-figure and the Author-function.” 
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Additionally, the critical theorists that inform my work are all sympathetic to the rhizomatic, 
technology-based structure at the heart of the hypertext form.32 So, the chapters of my 
dissertation will produce careful readings of the texts, and will include rigorous studies of the 
scholarship surrounding each author, but will always be informed by a sense of jouissance. 
Essentially, my work has produced two different dissertations: the first is linked through the 
rhizomatic structure of the web, and takes the form of blog-like entries through which readers 
can engage with my own writing; the second is this static capturing of the process on paper, able 
to be distributed and defended as a traditional print-based dissertation, wherein the rhizomatic 
structure of this project is made momentarily arborescent.  
Landow’s philosophy of the hypertext is clearly linked with Hardt and Negri’s notion of 
the common, and with the ethical and political concerns of the postanarchists discussed above, 
through its new approach to the author-function, which Landow aligns with the “erosion of the 
self” (71). This is achieved, he notes, through the invitation of the reader into the text, an 
invitation he characterizes as an intrusion. He writes: 
Like contemporary critical theory, hypertext reconfigures—rewrites—the author 
in several obvious ways. … [T]he figure of the hypertext author approaches, even 
if it does not entirely merge with, that of the reader; the functions of reader and 
writer become more deeply entwined with each other than ever before. … [I]t 
infringes upon the power of the writer, removing some of it and granting it to the 
reader. (71) 
In this way, hypertext, in its rhizomatic structure, and through its engagement with the reader, 
                                                
32 Landow writes: “Like Barthes, Foucault, and Mikhail Bakhtin, Jacques Derrida continually uses the terms link 
(liasons), web (toile), network (rèseau), and interwoven (s’y tissent), which cry out for hypertextuality” (53). He 
could have easily appended Deleuze and Guattari, and Lyotard to this list. 
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works to complicate (though it never completely escapes) the hierarchical relationship between 
author and reader. By taking on a hypertext form, my work uses this complication to mimic a 
similar complication of authorship and readership in the experimental text, as seen throughout 
this introduction. Of course, the hypertext is not without its own problems; as it engages in 
semantic meaning and expression, it necessarily falls victim to those representative faults 
critiqued by postanarchists and poststructuralists alike (indeed, any attempt at normative or 
comprehensible communication would fall into this trap). This project instead proposes, as 
Landow suggests, that the hypertext is one, potentially more egalitarian, way of approaching a 
postanarchist reading practice, another rhizomatic node in postanarchism’s theories of reading 
and activism.33 Landow has, of course, gone slightly out of favour with digital humanists as he, 
despite his numerous attempts to update newer versions of his seminal Hypertext, could not 
possibly anticipate the movement of digital literatures. I include him in this project because he 
functions as a bridge between the poststructuralism that forms the foundation of postanarchism 
and the radical potentials of the digital that this project works to embrace.  
Appendixn: A Treatise on the Dissertation Form 
As a digital, hypertextual project, my dissertation is made up an introductory section, 
eight single-author studies presented in four chapters. Each single-author study is approximately 
thirty print-pages, and each shares three primary concerns: how is authorship contrived, 
complicated, or restricted? how is the commonality of language approached? and, how can we 
                                                
33 Comment by Jesse Cohn (28/5/14): “I do wonder if Landow didn’t slightly underestimate the ‘intrusive’ aspect of 
readers’ interactions with online text. Hope the comments section of this blog-dissertation escapes what seems to be 
the iron law of the internet—where there be comments, there be trolls. It’s a brave experiment in so many respects!” 
 
Response (29/5/14): “I think he might have. In a lot of ways, his ideas of hypertext are dated. I have been lucky in 
that most people don’t care to read about postanarchism and poetry, so I haven’t gotten many trolls. But, I also 
haven’t gotten many comments. So, that’s a double-edged sword.” 
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employ a postanarchist reading practice to these texts to reimagine reading and writing as activist 
practice? In their digital forms, each was written and posted over the course of approximately six 
weeks, and incorporated my responses to and analyses of the primary texts and the scholarship 
that surrounds them, in addition to interventionary reading tactics (my own and the interventions 
of invited readers from various positions—academic, creative, activist, or simply interested—
who could comment on or annotate my readings). As these entries accumulated to form chapters, 
they openly spoke to each other by way of hypertext links that united the sections themselves and 
directed readers to external sources. In this way, the original digital text approached a 
deleuzoguattarian rhizome. What you are holding is the aforementioned static capture of this 
process that transcribes the entries and includes some comments and connections in the form of 
footnotes and can thus be presented and defended as a print-based dissertation. Most importantly, 
my work positions each hyperlinked chapter as a plateau,34 as a Temporary Autonomous Zone 
that functions at once as meditation and insurrection.35
                                                
34 I use the term “plateau” much in the same way Deleuze and Guattari use it: “A plateau is always in the middle, 
not at the beginning or the end. A rhizome is made out of plateaus. … We call a ‘plateau’ any multiplicity connected 
to other multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome” (A Thousand 
21-22). Brian Massumi, in his forward, puts this another way: “Each ‘plateau’ is an orchestration of crashing bricks 
extracted from a variety of disciplinary edifices” (A Thousand xiv). 
 
35 Comment by Sean Braune (19/5/13): “This concept is really wonderful and I love it. A gutsy move because we all 
know that the dissertation is a draconian artefact of a terminally-ill print era (we are all good posthumans 
nowadays). My question though is maybe more pragmatic and too academic (not at all anarchistic): does this blog 
method essentially ‘publish’ your dissertation as you write it? and if so, then what happens when you really want to 
publish it or excerpt it for journal articles? Academics fight nowadays to not have their dissertation .pdfs uploaded to 
ProQuest Dissertations (bartering for a two to three year ‘grace period’ before it gets uploaded) because publishing 
houses consider such online archivization ‘publishing.’ So my question is I guess a very non-anarchist and 
conservative one. Do you have any reservations about publishing portions/pieces of this wonderful and original 
project online beforehand? (Incidentally, I hate that this is even a question because part of what makes your idea and 
approach so radical is the presentation of it in a digital commons where colleagues and friends can engage with your 
thinking. So I hate the question).” 
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Chapter One: Making Noisy Analogies: John Cage and Jackson Mac Low 
Despite the dramatic rise in critical attention paid to John Cage’s work over the last 
decade, his poetic sequence “62 Mesostics re Merce Cunningham” (1973) has garnered little 
critical attention. The sequence is a difficult one to deal with in scholarship: its unique 
typography makes quotation cumbersome; it is semantically nonsensical, and often visually 
undecipherable; and it invites readers into dangerous exegesis via biography with Cage’s 
dedication of the piece to his life partner, Merce Cunningham. And yet, the piece is actually 
emblematic of Cage’s poetics generally, especially in that it makes manifest Cage’s creation of 
an active, engaged readership that runs throughout his work. In their refusal of exegesis and of 
clear hermeneutical analysis, the Cunningham mesostics invite readers into a communication that 
values commonality and connection above all. In this way, they prove themselves to be vital to 
Cage’s oeuvre. Before I get into my own readings of this particular sequence, I would like to 
begin where many scholars start their work on Cage: with his silence. Silence is central to an 
understanding of Cage’s work (in poetry, prose, music, and visual art), and it has been a point of 
scholarly contestation since academics began discussing these pieces in any depth. Part of the 
reason that Cage’s silence has become so integral to his scholarship is that, despite the recent 
exponential growth1 of Cagean scholarship, he remains best known for his musical composition 
4’33” (1952), a composition in three parts in which the musician (traditionally a single pianist) 
does not play for the duration of the piece. The result is that the audience (usually equal parts 
uncomfortable and attentive) is forced to listen to atmospheric and environmental sounds, and 
                                                
1 The last fifteen years have seen a particular increase in book-length studies of Cage’s work in music and poetry as 
in David Berenstein and Christopher Hatch’s Writings Through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, + Art (2001), David W. 
Patterson’s John Cage: Music, Philosophy, and Intention, 1933-1950 (2002), David Nicholl’s John Cage (2007), 
Julia Robinson’s John Cage (2011), and perhaps most popularly Kay Larson’s extensive biographical study, Where 
the Heart Beats (2012).  
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especially the impromptu sounds of each other’s discomfort. The general reception of the piece, 
both contemporary and contemporaneous, as Kyle Gann’s book-length study, No Such Thing as 
Silence, demonstrates, is that it is some sort of pretentious joke, a kind of Emperor’s New 
Clothes. The average review, Gann points out, judged the composition as pointless: it says 
nothing; it is not art.  
It is this reaction to the many manifestations of silence in Cage’s work that Jonathan D. 
Katz responds to in “Identification,” an essay that essentially revolutionized readings of Cagean 
silence by asserting that Cage’s refusal to communicate in a conventional sense is a mixture of 
both “camouflage and contestation” (51). That is, Katz demonstrates that this silence—which 
includes but is not limited to Cage’s politics of non-engagement both in his personal politics and 
his compositional poetics—is emblematic of a queer passivity and resistance in the manifestly 
homophobic climate of post-McCarthy Cold War America.2 Katz’s arguments are, in addition to 
being a radical rereading of Cage’s work, a response to Moira Roth’s seminal readings of Cage, 
in “The Aesthetic of Indifference.” Roth argues that Cage’s work, especially 4’33” (where the 
silence is literal), expresses “no messages, no feelings, and no ideas” because such things could 
not be articulated in the restrictive, oppressive atmosphere of America’s contemporaneous 
political climate (41). Roth admits that “Cage would object to such an interpretation,” especially 
because Cage imagined that the refusal of conventional meaning would allow for the production 
of, and more importantly in light of my project’s emphasis on readership, the reception of, new 
                                                
2 Indeed, the Cunningham mesostics are emblematic of a post-McCarthy era and its concomitant fear of 
homosexuality, and of political dissent (both of which clearly mark the piece). But, it is even more important to note 
that 4’33” was first performed in 1952, while Joseph McCarthy still held his position as Senator, and was right in 
the middle of the “Lavender Scare” (the name now given to McCarthy’s witch-hunt against homosexuals in 
government positions). For more information on McCarthyism and its abuses of homosexuals, see David K. 
Johnson’s acclaimed book-length study, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in 
the Federal Government.  
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meanings or new ways of meaning (41). Nonetheless, Roth maintains that Cage’s work suggests 
an indifference to a policy that was seemingly indifferent to him as a homosexual. While Roth 
attempts to show how this silence can move from negative to positive, from passive to active (ie. 
from silenced to refusing), her work maintains that a lack of conventional meaning equals a lack 
of any meaning. Most importantly, Roth dismisses Cage’s poetics of silence as apolitical (36). 
Instead, Katz proposes that this “indifference” is not, as Roth would have it, an apolitical 
position, but rather a position outside of conventional politics. After all, Cage always insisted 
that he was not particularly interested in politics proper: “I am interested in social ends, but not 
in political ends, because politics deals with power, and society deals with numbers of 
individuals” (Kostelanetz 274). Katz also objects to Roth’s designation of Cage’s silence as a 
refusal to engage because it assumes that a choice was made. He writes, “her [Roth’s] 
implication that they [his contemporaries, a group that includes Marcel Duchamp, Robert 
Rauschenberg, Jasper Johns, and Cunningham] did not become involved assumes that they could 
have” (“Identification” 53). I would go much further than Katz here, because what he calls 
Roth’s “implication” is not implied at all, but rather plainly stated. Roth argues that Cage and 
these contemporaries either willingly or instinctively decided on silence rather than an 
oppositional engagement. Worse, Roth characterizes this silence as lamentable and cowardly: 
to have chosen, consciously or not, to advocate indifference and neutrality as a 
psychological and intellectual way out of the impasse of the McCarthy period was 
perhaps not a courageous stance but, in retrospect, was understandable in view of 
the paralyzing effect that the early 50s had on so many intellectuals. (46) 
Katz, on the other hand, does not ignore the clearly oppressive elements of this silence, and 
argues instead that Cage’s silence is both due to oppression and is itself a kind of resistance. In a 
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later essay, “John Cage’s Queer Silence; or, How to Avoid Making Matters Worse,” Katz 
clarifies this argument, insisting that “there are both surrender and resistance in these silences” 
(53, emph. mine). While Katz does a great service to Cage studies in redeeming this silence as, at 
least in part, political, his language is tellingly dualistic, despite his arguments in “Queer 
Silence” about Cage’s non-oppositional politics.3 In “surrender” and “resistance,” he captures the 
classical anarchist elements of Cage’s work, and the clear anti-authoritarian elements. But, this 
also fails to recognize that Cage persistently shied away from oppositional politics, and instead 
embraced a world of alternative and experimentation. As Christopher Shultis explains in 
Silencing the Sounded Self: John Cage and the American Experimental Tradition, an objection to 
dualism has always been a prominent feature of Cage’s work. Shultis writes that Cage, following 
in the tradition of Thoreau, attempts to forge “a nondual universe where coexistence replaces 
control—where there is no need for reconciliation because there are no opposites” (33). Katz, 
instead, paints a dualistic picture in which Cage feels oppressed, and therefore remains silent as 
if to refuse the oppression; it’s an oppositional strategy, and one to which Cage constantly seeks 
alternatives. While Katz’s work here may have opened up new potential readings, the 
explanation it affords us as readers of Cagean silence is ultimately unsatisfactory. 
The looming presence of Joseph McCarthy was not the only oppressive force leading 
Cage to silence. The American art community, and especially the New York school, where Cage 
and Cunningham conducted the bulk of their creative work, was dominated by abstract 
                                                
3 Nonetheless, the danger of reading Cage’s politics as oppositional is underscored by Katz, who notes that “Once 
marked as oppositional, any disturbance can be incorporated into a discourse of oppositionality that only catalyzes 
oppressive constructions” (59). Andy Weaver, in his dissertation chapter on Cage, “Not Understanding, But 
Undergoing: John Cage’s ‘Writing for the Second Time Through Finnegans Wake’” notes that, in light of this 
danger, Cage’s silence is an attempt to move beyond such binaries, in order to expand the field of play” 
(Indeterminacy 159). Despite this, I maintain that Katz’s language ends up placing Cagean silence into the very 
dualism it looks to disturb. 
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expressionist artists who were attracting public attention for their avant-garde4 works. Led by the 
very public personas of Jackson Pollock, Willem de Kooning, Mark Rothko, and Franz Kline, 
the New York art scene was permeated, from the ‘40s into the early ‘60s, by what Roth calls a 
“machismo attitude” that clearly opposed Cage’s non-oppositional politics and its seeming 
“indifference” (37). The abstract expressionists relied heavily on both the persona of the artist 
and the expression of meaning (however abstracted).5 This, then, brings me to my discussion of 
the “62 Mesostics re Merce Cunningham.” These mesostics,6 in their nonsemantic lines joined 
by a combination of chance procedure and clearly defined parameters, the virtual illegibility of 
most of the “words,” and the persistent repetition, all resist conveying meaning in the 
conventional sense. For Cage, this resistance to conventional meaning is a resistance to an 
expressive power over the reader (and here the poems lend themselves quite clearly to a 
postanarchist reading practice), but it is also a resistance to being “read” by the audience. As 
Katz goes on to write, for Cage “meaning was concomitant with interpolation, the act of being 
read by another” (55). So, Cage’s work gets characterized by Katz as “unexpressive 
expressionism” (62), another unsatisfactory term that begs the question: if, as Katz asserts, Cage 
wants to refuse expression, why express at all? 
A postanarchist reading of Cage’s poetics of silence undercuts Katz’s designation of an 
“unexpressive expressionism,” understanding Cage’s work as engaging in a proliferation of 
noise, which is to say that it seeks to communicate rather than to express.  Noise, as understood 
                                                
4 As my discussions of this term in my introduction would indicate, my use of the term “avant-garde” to describe 
Pollock, de Kooning, and the other abstract expressionists, is purposeful and political. 
 
5 See, for example, Hans Namuth’s short films Jackson Pollock and Jackson Pollock 51 for a demonstration of the 
way the authorial persona of the artist and his intention dominate the production and reception of Pollock’s work.  
 
6 Cage coins and defines the term “mesostic” as, quite simply, like an acrostic poem but with the spine down the 
centre. 
 44 
by communication theories, is a break in communication, an external entry into the message that 
disturbs its eventual delivery. Communication still occurs, but it is not “successful” in that it is 
no longer “sensical.” When this communicative understanding of noise is adapted into poetic 
study by Craig Dworkin in Reading the Illegible, “noise” becomes a multiplication of meaning, 
an overabundance of sense that, in turn, renders the message nonsensical, illogical,7 and thus a 
kind of terrorism or violence against a militarized8 language. While, in this case, Dworkin is 
discussing the work of Susan Howe, who I will also discuss much later in this project, his 
observations regarding noise are relevant to Cage’s silence. “[N]oise,” he writes, “proliferates 
hand in hand with an increase in the terms of communication” (45). And, more importantly, he 
                                                
7 Comment by Andy Weaver (19/08/13): “Is ‘illogical’ stumbling back into binarism (is Cage attempting something 
more… alogical, if that’s possible?).” 
 
Response (20/08/13): “Illogical, I think, only falls back into an unhelpful binarism so long as we maintain a 0-1 
binaric understanding of a logical/illogical system. If we, instead, position the illogical as an alternative to this 
binary (something akin to Kristeva’s 0-2 doubleness of poetic language), then illogic becomes not the negative side 
of a two-part system, but rather an alternative to, or perhaps an outside of, this system. That is only partially a cop 
out. I think that extracting nonsense from a logico-sensical system is integral to understanding how Cage’s work 
plays with otherwise overcoded sign systems.” 
 
8 Comment by Andy Weaver (19/08/13): “Would Cage, a committed pacifist, agree with Dworkin’s (and yours?) 
endorsement of ‘terrorism or violence against a militarized language’? Maybe something like David Bernstein’s 
application of Raymond Williams’s ‘alternative culture’ rather than ‘oppositional culture’ to describe Cage’s stance 
might be more appropriate?” 
 
Response (20/08/13): “It is on this note that Cage’s poetics, and my (and Dworkin’s) criticism part ways. Cage 
believes in an anarchic pacifism, but my own anarchism, and the theorizations that Dworkin provides, instead 
propose that a linguistic anarchism (a poetic anarchism, a literary TAZ) is necessarily a violence against 
organizational structures. Certainly, Cage would be disgruntled with some elements of my reading of his work (his 
distaste for even literary violence is perhaps best demonstrated by his writings-through of Ezra Pound). But I 
maintain that dismantling linguistic structure the way Cage does is a violent, terrorist act whether the man would 
concede to that or not.” 
 
Comment by Andy Weaver (21/08/13): “I’m still not convinced about Cage as violent terrorist. Is it possible to 
adjust the terminology, I wonder? It’s certainly true that some readers/listeners are terrorized by Cage’s work (or at 
least outraged, which seems to be much the same thing, aesthetically), but ‘violence’? That seems a tougher 
argument. Can there be such a thing as a non-violent terrorism? Could we meet mid-way, by thinking of Cage’s 
work as transgressive or destructive, rather than violent. Of course, Lyotard’s notion of education as violence is one 
I agree with, and so perhaps my arguments are undone? Perhaps I merely want you to define ‘violence’ in relation to 
Cage’s disruption of language codes?” 
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notes that noise, rather than merely engaging in what Wittgenstein famously calls “the language-
game of giving information” (Zettel §106), instead contains the “potential to disrupt the message, 
to unsettle the code of the status quo” (Reading the Illegible 39). Thus, it is our responsibility, as 
the audience of Cage’s work—poetic, musical, or otherwise—to allow this communication (to 
enter into the comunis of communication) without requiring that the text make its expressions. 
As such, the “62 Mesostics re Merce Cunningham,” articulate a noisy silence, much like a 
theatre full of people anxiously listening as David Tudor does not play. Accepting that, as Cage 
so frequently contended, silence is more than simply the absence of sound, the mesostics 
articulate a silence in line with the one Michael O’Driscoll defines in his discussion of Cage’s 
work. O’Driscoll writes, “If ambient sounds are called silent only because they do not form a 
part of a music intention, then Cage’s poetic assemblages (made up of ambient or, better, empty 
words), are silent texts, texts without intention, without meaning, without purpose” (632). In the 
sequence’s illegibility, in the ways that the already nonsensical language overlaps and obscures 
itself, the reader is forced to see how language gets coded and overcoded, and to critique the 
ways in which this overcoding produces a limiting and oppressive violence.9 
Alongside Cage, Jackson Mac Low is one of the few authors in my project who self-
identifies as anarchist. Similar to Cage’s anarchism, Mac Low’s politics are largely dependent on 
non-engagement, on allowing individuals to exist and enact their desires as they see fit. 
However, while Cage’s anarchism is particularly concerned with how to exist as anarchist in a 
society that is definitively not anarchic, Mac Low’s politics are seemingly more utopian. Cage’s 
                                                
9 To scapegoat McCarthy once more, the violence he enacted on the victims of the “Lavender” and “Red” Scares 
was, in addition to an economic and sometimes physical violence, very much a violence of language, a language 
game of naming in which the individual is coded (as communist, as homosexual) by the State, publicly, but not 
communally. By refusing this language-game, Cage implicitly critiques those structures that label and limit him, as 
author, as lover, as anarchist. 
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work, such as the example of the “62 Mesostics re Merce Cunningham,” is interested in using the 
pre-existing tools of poetic language to work towards something outside of interpretation and 
representation.10 Mac Low, on the other hand, uses the performative elements of his work as a 
means to reproduce a utopian (free, communal) anarchist society on a microcosmic scale. This is 
a major preoccupation of Mac Low’s work throughout his career, as he asserts in the Jacket 
conversation transcript, “Making Poetry ‘Otherwise,’” when he states: “I am still to some real 
extent an anarchist. … Anarchy simply means people are making their own decisions.” In this 
sense, the other elements of Mac Low’s poetics that I will examine—the interplay of chance and 
authorial engagement, the potentialities of reading as performance, the problem of literary 
tradition in the quest of the unique—must all be read as elements of an anarchist poetics that 
envisions what a purely anarchist society would look like. As I will demonstrate, Mac Low also 
works through how artistic practice can be an activist practice that enables its producers and 
perceivers to come closer to that anarchist utopia. 
For my purposes, it is important to first recognize that Mac Low’s desire to see political 
affect in his art is loosely related to his inclusion in the Fluxus School of the avant-garde. 
However, while other Fluxus-affiliated artists, such as George Maciunas, saw the goal of Fluxus 
as the purging of “bourgeois sickness, ‘intellectual,’ professional & commercialized culture” 
(“Manifesto”) through the incorporation of the quotidian into artistic practice, Mac Low’s 
outlook is the entire opposite. Contradicting Maciunas’s anti-art view, Mac Low argues that he 
                                                
10 It could be argued that some of Cage’s performance-based pieces, such as his earlier percussive work, or the 
Musicircus, function as sorts of utopian societies, as Charles Junkerman suggests in “‘nEw / foRms of living 
together’: The Model of the Musicircus.” He argues that the politics of the Musicircus is essentially Hegelian, 
wherein a critical antithesis (codes or rules that govern us are bad) is met with an affirmative thesis (the creative 
potentials of communal love) to produce a visionary synthesis (utopian community) (Junkerman 42).  I would argue 
that while there is some gesture toward a utopian moment in the Musicircus, it is far more concerned with the ability 
to produce communal unintended sounds within this community than it is in envisioning a wider community that 
mimics the chaos of the Musicircus. Junkerman’s own designation of the “happening” as “insubordinate” (40) seems 
to support my own claims. 
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has “never had any anti-art attitude whatsoever. I wanted (and still want) to expand art to include 
a good deal of ordinary life, but not to destroy art in any way” (Art, Performance 266). Instead, 
more in keeping with Dick Higgins’s views of Fluxus, allowing artistic practice to include “a 
good deal of ordinary life” works in tandem with a desire for the quotidian in Fluxus to exist on 
its own, rather than signifying something larger (i.e. allowing art to exist as analogous to life, 
rather than as a metaphor for it). As Higgins describes in “A Child’s History of Fluxus,” 
“[e]verything was itself, it wasn’t part of something bigger or fancier” (87). This understanding 
of Fluxus lays the groundwork for Mac Low’s conception of art as a practice of embodying and 
enacting meaning, rather than encoding and decoding messages. 
Postulating the artwork as a mediatory experience—one that mediates the perceiver 
(reader, viewer, even, in Mac Low’s conception, performer) of the art piece and his/her role in 
the social institutions that govern his/her existence—is not new. Tyrus Miller, in Singular 
Examples, discusses this political role of the poem perceptively.   He writes: 
Artworks, especially those programmatically designed to expose new formal and 
experimental possibilities, may not be unitary, static, and punctual vessels of 
content; rather, they dynamically embody the contradictory and conflictual 
relations between those people, materials, and contexts shaping their genesis and 
continuing to play a role in their posterity. (3) 
That is to say that developing, for example, a textual experiment that seeks to “expose new 
formal and experimental possibilities” foregoes control over the text’s content in order to 
recognize the subjectivity’s inability to control those very social institutions that govern its 
existence. As such, the form of the text comes to signify this lack of control. “Form, in this 
view,” Miller goes on to say, “is a weak boundary conditioning the artwork’s relative degree of 
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control over the social heterogeneity it incorporates” (6). And yet, as the text necessarily 
functions within generic conventions, the politically anarchist text must navigate between these 
two poles. As Miller later states in his discussions of Mac Low and Cage’s writings-through of 
Ezra Pound’s Cantos, “in parallel with their attempts to re-situate the question of the self in the 
space of language games and textual forms, both Mac Low and Cage come up against a common 
problem of literary genre” (59). For Mac Low, at least, a way to reconcile this problem is not 
simply to (politically, anarchically) disrupt authorship by way of formal experiment and chance 
procedure, but to enjoy (or take pleasure in) this very process. 
Mac Low was open about the potential activist or political elements of his work, arguing 
often that his attempts to disrupt the self in his texts, to produce texts that are “minimally egoic” 
(Tardos, “Forward” xviii), is an action against the overcoding of subjectivity at the hands of 
social institutions. For example, in “Poetry and Pleasure,” he writes that “[t]he kinds of pain that 
people suffer in present day societies are often due to clumsy social, economic, and political 
arrangements that simply need not be so clumsy, so slovenly” (xxvii). And later, “[s]o many 
artists and experiencers of art believe that the point of art is to change these slovenly, pain-
causing—and boredom-causing—arrangements” (xxviii). But, importantly, he adds, “I do not 
think this ‘point’ is at odds with pleasure’” (xxviii). The pleasure that Mac Low discusses occurs 
on two levels: first, on the author’s part as initiator and collaborator of/within the text; second, on 
the reader’s part as performer/enactor of the text. Indeed, much of the enjoyment or pleasure one 
takes from Mac Low’s work, especially The Stein Poems (1998-2003), comes from the level of 
freedom afforded on both the levels of production and enactment of the text. By subjecting 
Stein’s work to his own chance operations, Mac Low produces poems that do not fit entirely into 
syntactic or semantic sense, and yet clearly recall Stein’s work. For example, the first few lines 
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of the series’ first poem, “Little Beginning (Stein 1),” read: “Little lingering father little regular 
simple. // Little long length there louder happening deepening. / Beginning and little way singing 
neat cooked.” By avoiding the prescriptive overcoding of a syntactical text that demands to be 
received and interpreted on an exegetical level, that encodes and decodes a message, the text 
opens itself up to a jouissance that could not be available otherwise. Much like Cage’s noisy 
silence, Mac Low’s virtual illegibility opens his texts up to variant other readings.  
Mac Low also argues that this freedom makes the text more anarchically activist, or, 
more appropriately, a more effective activist text, because of its ability to act as an analogy of a 
free community rather than a description of such a community. Also in “Poetry and Pleasure,” he 
writes that it is indeed true, as many political or activist authors have argued, that “speaking 
differently changes a culture and … different ways of speaking are most prevalent in poetry” 
(xxxiii), but he also notes that this process functions both positively and negatively; it can open 
up potentialities just as easily as it can close them off. For Mac Low, any text that functions 
politically on a prescriptive level, that instructs its readers about better, more free, ways of living, 
actually enforces an opposing politic by limiting the reading process. Mac Low’s work, in its 
desire to expose new potentials, functions as an anarchic politic specifically because it does not 
prescribe a change in thought or speech. Rather, it leaves itself open for its perceivers to, in turn, 
leave themselves more open to these potentialities. In this sense, Mac Low’s later work that 
prioritizes performance as the enacting of meaning rather than the reception of it, functions as a 
microcosm for anarchism. It produces “a state of society wherein there is no frozen power 
structure, where all persons may make significant initiatory choices in regard to matters affecting 
their own lives” (“Statement” 384). It is a turn that gestures toward Mac Low’s ideals of a 
utopian anarchic community, but one that, even he admits, is necessarily imperfect. 
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Mac Low preferred to think of his work as producing analogies rather than paradigms of 
anarchic communities. This sentiment comes from an interview with Mac Low published in an 
issue of the journal Paper Air (2.3 1980), which was dedicated entirely to Mac Low studies. In 
the issue, interviewer Gil Ott poses the question “When one of your works is being performed … 
is that a model political community?” (21), and Mac Low’s response is telling. I quote it at 
length here because he seems to summarize, in his own words, what I have been trying to say 
about his work, and the work of the other poets in my project for some time: 
although performers are not directly regulated by a central authority, eventually 
they are, since I as the composer am giving them the materials, procedures, rules, 
etc. (This is why I usually say these days that such performances are ‘analogies’ 
rather than ‘paradigms’ of free communities). Nevertheless, they’re exercising 
their own initiative within the situation, the given materials being analogies of the 
real-life conditions provided by nature and society. Within such situations people 
can be regulated either by central authorities, as in most of the modern world, or 
by their own spontaneity and initiative. (21) 
Reading The Stein Poems and enacting their meaning on an individualized but necessarily 
collaborative level, one is afforded the opportunity to choose, momentarily, to refuse some of the 
regulatory aspects of a larger system of overcoding; to refuse the clumsy, slovenly categories 
that limit the initiatory choices we are able to make in our lives; to choose, instead, spontaneity. 
It’s incomplete and imperfect, but it forces those who encounter Mac Low’s work to realize how 
and when those choices are made for them. 
Reading Cage and Mac Low, But Refusing Exegesis 
Considering how involved both Cage and Mac Low were in the artistic-performance 
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community, it is unsurprising that issues of performance surface in the poetic work of both. 
However, understanding reading as performance in the Cunningham mesostics is a more simple 
analogy, as the poems were used quite literally as notations for performance, which I will detail 
momentarily. The Stein Poems, on the other hand, is a series of poems that, save for poetry 
readings, were not composed with their eventual performance in mind. The Stein Poems 
nevertheless demonstrate that performance is integral to the understanding and experience of 
Mac Low’s work. In them, as in other of Mac Low’s asyntactical works, the lines between 
notation and performance, between a message encoded and a message received, are blurred, and, 
as such, the experience or perception of The Stein Poems, and the meaning-making involved in 
that perception, amounts to a performance similar to that of the dancers in The Pronouns (1964), 
an earlier composition of Mac Low’s in which the poems served as instructions for the dancers’ 
eventual performance. This analogy is, I should add, not at all a stretch, as Mac Low often 
maintained that much, if not all, of his work after 1954 combined the elements of music, poetry, 
and theatre into one (Art, Performance 257). By envisioning the experience of asyntactical work 
as the performance of meaning, or what Mac Low himself terms the “enacting” of meaning, The 
Stein Poems break open the processes of exegesis, of meaning-making at the level of the reader. 
Ultimately, this is a political decision in line with Mac Low’s larger poetics and ethics of 
anarchism and free communal engagement. 
Part of Mac Low’s poetic goal in his production of asyntactical texts is an interest in the 
intrinsic significance of all sounds, recalling Cage’s silence as a desire for an attentive audience. 
In “Making Poetry ‘Otherwise,’” for example, he asserts that he believes “there’s something 
significant in any sound made by a sentient being.” Arguing that, for example, animal noises 
convey meaning or significance without the vestiges of semantics, without the encoding and 
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decoding of a linguistic message, Mac Low asserts that the meaning (or meanings) of a sound are 
intrinsic to, or a part of, the sound itself, directly opposing Ferdinand de Saussure in Course in 
General Linguistics where he famously asserts that the relationship between signifier and 
signified is arbitrary, and that semiotic meaning does not significantly correspond to the visual or 
aural properties of the signified itself. Mac Low, elsewhere, directly addresses this anti-
Saussurian viewpoint when he says: 
I believe (despite Saussure and his followers) that there’s an intrinsic connection 
between sound and meaning. ... However, each word has a number of different 
meanings connected with it, and these multiple meanings may be combined in an 
infinitely large number of ways, so that perceivers of work such as mine may find 
(or ‘enact’) for themselves many different meanings. (Art, Performance 257) 
What this means is that while some may understand a refusal of Saussurian linguistics, and 
specifically a refusal of the arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified, as a gesture 
towards essentialized meaning, for Mac Low the result is the exact opposite. Instead, 
understanding that each phoneme, intentional or nonintentional, semantic or otherwise, is the 
vehicle for infinite possible meanings, opens up the reading process in ways that traditional 
semiotics does not, or cannot. 
Rather than understanding the materiality of language as essentially meaningless, Mac 
Low revels in the limitless potentials of meaningful sounds. In an interview with Nicholas 
Zurbrugg, he exclaims, “I am convinced that meaning abounds” (270). In poetry, this places the 
responsibility of meaning-making not on the poet who composes the piece, but rather on the 
reader who performs meaning-making at the level of experience or perception. He says:  
All words in poems are meaningful, whether they intentionally convey messages 
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or not and whether they’re brought into the poems intentionally or through 
nonintentional methods. The perceivers of the poems enact meanings, at the end 
of the day, whether the poets intend to convey meanings or not. (271) 
This process, he argues, frees language from overcoding, from the weight of the communicative 
message, allowing the linguistic elements themselves to speak, and freeing the perceiver or 
reader to engage with or enter into an affective relationship with the piece unburdened by 
traditional communication. The goal of this writing, then, “is to let what’s there be; especially 
letting words, linguistic units, be, not make them carry a burden of my thoughts, my feelings, 
whatever” (“Making Poetry” n.p.). What Mac Low proposes here, then, is, in no small terms, a 
postanarchist reading practice in which expression is refused in favour of a more productive 
engagement with the text at hand. This view of readership opens up asyntactical texts like those 
of The Stein Poems—but also, in effect, all texts—to the production of infinite unique readings 
on the part of the reader. “Each person who hears or reads this kind of work produces something 
new,” he tells Zurbrugg, “whether one wishes to call it ‘meaning’ or something else” (271). The 
result is a reading practice that is radically communal, radically anarchic.11 
I say “anarchic” here because by placing the responsibility of meaning-making on the 
reader as performer, Mac Low refuses the potential authority of the composer/author role. This 
has long been a concern of his work, as his widow Anne Tardos recognizes in her forward to 
                                                
11 Comment by Andy Weaver (29/08/13): “After quoting Mac Low … you write that ‘The result is a reading 
practice that is radically communal, radically anarchic.’ Is it communal, though? It seems that it is radically non-
hierarchical, and I can certainly agree that it is anarchic, but I’m not convinced about the communal, since the reader 
is presumably unable to convey her ‘meaning’ or ‘something new’ to other readers. Isn’t this reading practice 
radically isolated or individualized, rather than communal? Or do you see that reading experience differently?” 
 
Response (30/08/13): “I understand this reading practice as communal insofar as the production of meaning is 
collaborative (initiator, chance, machine, reader[s]). But, I take your point that this view of meaning is also highly 
individualized, and necessarily outside of semantic communication. In this sense, each reader/reading is a node in a 
molecular structure of potential readings.” 
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Mac Low’s selected poems, Thing of Beauty (2008), when she quotes the now unavailable 
“Instructions” for his “Music for Gathas”: “[The composer] values freedom—everybody’s 
freedom with this composer-performer community. He [sic] is neither the dictator nor … the 
primary soloist” (“Forward” xvi). But, ever the realist, Mac Low never asserts that these 
moments of free meaning-making are purely anarchic. Rather, the experience of Mac Low’s 
work functions as a Temporary Autonomous Zone, which is what Mac Low himself suggests 
when he states that the pieces are “‘analogies’ rather than ‘paradigms’ of free communities.” By 
creating a TAZ, a performative analogy of an anarchist, free community, Mac Low allows 
perceivers of his work to recognize how sign systems and their concomitant limitations reinforce 
the organizing, ruling, and thus inhibiting, effects of larger social institutions, allowing the reader 
as performer momentary freedom from such limitations. As Miller asserts, “Mac Low mobilizes 
the difference between sign systems, the paragrammatic-rewriting of a set of written instructions 
into a set of actions that at once realize and transpose the text, setting in play the text’s ‘code’ 
while asserting the ‘independence’ of performers from that code” (74). The “action” of these 
texts serves as an activism, an opening-up of the choices individuals are able to make, both in the 
literal performance of pieces like The Pronouns, where instructions are vague and open to 
potentially limitless interpretation, and in the reading-performance of asyntactical pieces like The 
Stein Poems, where exegetical interpretation is revealed as similarly limitless. Mac Low always 
viewed this allowance of reader-performer choice as an anarchist activism, arguing that 
the ‘audiences,’ as well as the performers, … exercis[e] many kinds of choice—
both perceptive and meaning productive. And this is equally true of readers and 
hearers of my so-called solo poetry. Most of my work in the arts provides for 
many types and areas of freedom. And I hope furthers freedom in the world. (Art, 
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Performance 271) 
In this way, Mac Low’s work invites a postanarchist reading that recognizes how language and 
deleuzoguattarian overcoding work to limit freedom at the level of the individual. 
These elements of The Stein Poems are exemplified by “Time That Something Something 
(Stein 18),” a poem that not only invites and embraces the potentials of multiple meanings, but 
also relies heavily on aurality (on rhythm, silence, and repetition, elements that Mac Low 
retained from the Stein source texts). This emphasis on aurality foregrounds the reading of this 
poem as a performance, and the excessive use of blank space to denote silence, acts as a 
reminder for the reader to meditate on the potentials of the language therein. The poem begins, 




One and one is is, 
The. 
The juxtaposition of the specificity of the definite articles, “That,” “This,” and “The,” stands in 
stark contrast to the extremely vague “Something Something” of the title, and the emphasis on 
the multiple inherent in “One and One is is,” which is repeated throughout the poem, identically 
on line sixty five, as “If is one one” (50), as “One, / and one is, / is one” (77-9), and as “One and 
one, / is ís then there,” (118-9). The multiple variations of the line, and its suggestion that the 
multiple (“one and one”) cohere incompletely, reinforce Mac Low’s suggestion that the 
individual linguistic unit carries with it multiple potential readings. On line nineteen, when the 
line is repeated with an added emphasis on the second “ís” (via a stressor accent, recalling Mac 
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Low’s interest in sprung rhythm, and Hopkins’s privileging of stressed syllables), the poem 
reminds its reader that the message, the object of the verb “to be,” is not encoded in the poem. 
That, instead of the burden of syntactical meaning, the poem presents its reader with an 
emphasized but emptied “ís.” The rest of the poem is littered with pronouns without antecedents, 
definite articles without clarifying nouns, progressive verbs without clear acting subjects, and the 
almost frustrating repetition of vague pronouns such as “something” (27, 28, 42, 43) and 
“anything” (87, 89, 105). The final four lines of the poem display the potential frustrations of a 
reader seeking expression, unaware that the poem requires that s/he take the role of meaning-




discovering something something. (142-5) 
While the reader may hope to interpret and thus “discover” something previously “covered” by 
the text, s/he is met with illogic and anticlimax. As the implied acting subject of these 
progressive verbs, the reader fills in the emptiness of the words, accepts the potentials of their 
meaning, and as such, performs the piece. S/he enacts something something. 
Cage approaches the role of the reader in the production of meaning in a similar fashion. 
In order to discuss how this process occurs in the Cunningham mesostics, I should first take a 
moment to discuss the poems themselves. “62 Mesostics re Merce Cunningham” is made up of 
sixty-two mesostic poems (a mesostic is like an acrostic poem, but where the spine is in the 
centre rather than left-aligned) that repeat Cage’s partner’s first and last names throughout. The 
poems were produced, as Cage outlines in his “Foreword” to M: Writings ’67 – ’72, by 
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subjecting selections Cunningham’s own book, Changes: 
Notes on Choreography, and “from thirty-two other books 
most used by Cunningham in relation to his work” to I 
Ching chance operations (ii). As such, the results are 
illegible (or, perhaps better, unintelligible) poems 
constituted by nonce or nonsensical words arranged 
according to the name-spine, as seen in the first poem of the 
sequence (see fig. 1). While some words contained in the 
poem are fairly clearly legible (lines three through seven 
read, for example, “once / in / premise / on,” lines nine and 
ten read “short / stead”), they in no way form cohesive 
sentences, or even phrases. The text is readable, but nonsensical. The few scholarly discussions 
of the poems, such as in Andy Weaver’s “Writing through Merce: John Cage’s Silence, 
Differends, and Avant-Garde Idioms,” and Sean Braune’s “Cage’s Mesostics and Saussure’s 
Paragrams as Love Letters,” attempt to read or to interpret the poems in pieces. All three of us 
note the semantic complications, but, nonetheless, our attempts to read intimacy or love into the 
poems, however “protosemantic,” court exegesis in a poetic sequence that repeatedly reminds us 
that this process is doomed to fail. The Cunningham mesostic sequence is, above all else, a 
metapoetic series that rails against exegesis, against hermeneutics in general, and against the 
inherent overcoding of semantic language. The poems seek pure communication (repeating my 
turn to the heart of the term, the comunis or communal), rather than a limited expression based 
on militarized language. 
Weaver elsewhere labels another of Cage’s mesostic sequences, “Writing for a Second 
Figure 1 
John Cage. “Mesostic 1.” M (4) 
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Time Through Finnegans Wake,” a “text of noise, not of communication (in terms of 
communication theory). As far as meaning goes, a text that is all noise is basically nonsense, or 
non-communicative—and therefore silent” (Indeterminacy 160). I would argue here, instead, that 
the Cunningham mesostics do indeed communicate, but rather more like a virus (to borrow from 
Dworkin’s metaphor that will follow) than a coded semantic message. Inviting its reader into a 
comunis, a communicative field, the sequence brings its constitutive words to the very edge of 
semantics, and conveys, instead of sense, affect. Instead of quantitative meaning, qualitative 
intensity.12 This is an easy observation to make, perhaps, but a much more difficult one to 
explain. Dworkin makes the same concession in his own discussions of noise and 
communication in Howe: 
Even critical and scholarly work that pays close attention to the disruptive 
possibilities of [noise] runs the risk of neutralizing the very disruptive potential it 
identifies. Such work must try to avoid co-opting those disruptions for its own 
rhetorical ends, and might instead attempt to communicate noise in the way one 
might communicate a disease. … This chapter, indeed this entire book—is itself a 
prime example of the way in which noises get accepted into the system, get inside 
us, become, in short, les parasites: infecting, spreading, and disabling, but also 
structuring, adapting, mutating, mimicking, colonizing. (49) 
As such, attempting an exegetical reading of Cage’s linguistic noise betrays the goal of a 
postanarchist literary theory. Instead, the work invites us as readers to be attentive rather than 
                                                
12 I use this term much in the same way Brian Massumi uses it in Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, 
Sensation. He writes: “Intensity is qualifiable as an emotional state, and one that is static—temporal and narrative 




Attention to noise (be it disruptive noise, background noise, semantic noise, white noise, 
etc.) has long been a major feature of Cage’s work musically. He makes this much clear in his 
“The Future of Music: Credo,” collected in Silence (1967), when he writes: “Wherever we are, 
what we hear is mostly noise. When we ignore it, it disturbs us. When we listen to it, we find it 
fascinating” (54). Cage’s decision, then, to incorporate noise into his compositions is a political 
one that seeks to defamiliarize our relationship with noise, as it allows his audience to pay 
particular attention to those sounds that make up music.14 Despite his phrasing in the lines quoted 
above, this use of noise in composition is indeed disturbing—it disturbs the status quo of musical 
                                                
13 Comment by Andy Weaver (19/08/13): “While I take your point about avoiding exegetical readings of the ‘62 
Mesostics,’ do Cage’s comments about the sequence in his introduction invite or privilege certain readings?” 
 
 
Response (20/08/13): “I have been thinking a lot about how these descriptions of the indeterminate or chance 
produced texts by the author necessarily shape/limit potential readings. In Jackson Mac Low’s work, for example, he 
places a good deal of privilege on these procedural descriptions. Cage is somewhat less interested in guiding the 
reading process in that way. On the one hand, these descriptions emphasize process over end-product, and that is 
positive and postanarchist. But, they also close off potential readings so long as we understand them as external 
markers guiding textual readings. Poetics, such as Cage’s forward, can actually open up potential readings, though, 
as long as the reader always understands them as doors to new available readings rather than skeleton keys that 
unlock exegetical secrets. A task easier said than done, to be sure, but one that move reading away from a 
hermeneutical privileging of authorial intent. It’s tricky, but when Cage tells us he failed but liked the poems 
regardless, he’s urging us to note process without looking for the answers it may provide.” 
 
Comment by Andy Weaver (21/08/13): “Poetics as a proliferation of possible meanings? That’s an interesting idea. I 
suppose it depends on who is writing the poetics?” 
 
Response (22/08/13): “Definitely true. Marinetti’s poetics, for example, close off his poetry (and make is morally 
difficult, too). But, Marinetti’s work and the mandates of Futurism are really instructions. I still firmly believe (and 
perhaps this is my own preference at play) that the poetics of the vast majority of the authors in my project open up 
their poetries rather than limit them.” 
 
14 Comment by Andy Weaver (19/08/13): “You write that ‘Cage’s decision, then, to incorporate noise into his 
compositions is a political one that seeks to defamiliarize our relationship with noise, as it allows his audience to pay 
particular attention to those sounds that make up music.’ How is this decision ‘political’? Is there a dismantling of 
hierarchies at work?” 
 
Response (20/08/13): “Certainly, Cage’s defamiliarization of noise is political in that it breaks down hierarchies of 
what is and is not music (art, poetry, meaningful, etc). It also disrupts the hierarchical relationship between 
author/reader, composition/situation, text/interpretation. And it also, in a sense, seeks to disrupt a hegemony of 
subjectivity: if all noise is always already music, the listener must then interrogate how social institutions have put in 
place the same limiting processes of naming and designating.” 
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composition; of our expectations of what a musical piece should and should not include; of our 
understandings of compositional organization.15 This noise translates to linguistic (rather than 
semantic) noise in the Cunningham mesostics in part as a result of the visual form of the poems, 
wherein each letter is given a unique font and size, which at times obscures the letters 
themselves. Additionally, as Cage himself notes in an instalment of his “Diary” series of poems, 
“Diary: How to Improve the World (You Will Only Make Matters Worse) Continued 1970-71,” 
this emphasis on each letter invites the reader into a particularly attentive reading process: 
           To raise language’s 
temperature we not only remove syntax: we 
                   give each letter undivided attention, 
                        setting it in unique face and size; 
                           to read becomes the verb to sing. (107) 
In this attentive reading process, the reader is invited into affective relationships with the words, 
letters, phonemes, and morphemes that make up the mesostics. In a sense, then, the poems 
become notations for a reading public,16 who perform the piece (who “sing” it) as they read. For 
Cage, this division of text as notation and reading as performance is one that adds an additional 
                                                
15 I will admit that Cage seems particularly uninterested in redefining music in order to allow for the inclusion of 
these sounds. In “The Future of Music: Credo” he writes: “If this word, music, is sacred and reserved for eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century instruments, we can substitute a more meaningful term: organization of sound” (55). This 
said, in his earlier percussive work, Cage had a stronger interest in redefining the musical field, as evident in Pence 
James’s “People Call it Noise – But He Calls in Music” (a review of a percussion concert composed and delivered 
by Cage and others in 1942), wherein Cage is quoted in saying that his music was not an “end in itself, but we are 
trying to make all the field of audible sound available for music” (62). In his later work, however, Cage seems much 
happier to have the audience/reader focus his/her attention, than to dismantle the categorical structures that govern 
the genre-placement of his work. 
 
16 I’d be remiss if I didn’t mention here that the poems also literally serve as notation, and are performed as a 
musical piece for solo voice, famously performed by Demetrio Stratos, and later by Eberhard Blum. The 
performance of the piece uses the size and font of the letters to denote volume, tone, and length of each letter’s 
pronunciation, thereby enforcing an affective reading of the text. 
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level of chance or indeterminacy in the 
production of textual meaning. That is, 
“[c]omposition becomes distinct from 
performance. One cannot determine exactly 
what effect the notation causes—thus, 
indeterminacy” (“Form is a Language” 135). 
So, the chance-determined form of the poem17 
plays a role in the chance-determined affective 
meaning of the text for its readership that is 
similar to the unbiased coin-toss of the I Ching 
chance operation. The various-sized letters 
perform their noise-function, disturbing exegetical or interpretive reading habits, but remaining 
fascinating all the while. 
“Inging” is Cage’s endearing neologism that appears in “Mesostic 19” (M 82, see fig. 2). 
While semantically nonsensical—there is, of course, no Oxford English Dictionary entry for 
“inging”—the word functions in Cage’s context as a sort of 
urverb, that implies something like perpetual doing, on the 
one hand, and on the other, a pure linguistic transience, a 
mis en abime verb that folds in on itself, repeats itself, 
means itself. A feedback-loop of noise. Repetition is one 
means of robbing a signifier of its semantic meaning; a 
word gets repeated so many times that the Saussurian arbitrary relationship between signifier and 
                                                
17 From the “Forward” to M: “ I used over seven hundred different type faces and sizes available in Letraset and, of 
course, subjected them to I Ching chance operations” (ii). 
Figure 3 
John Cage. “Mesostic 19.” M (82) 
Figure 2 
John Cage. “Mesostic 19 (detail).”  
M (82) 
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signified gets pulled apart. “Inging” is indefinite repetition. It sits in the mesostic as a fulcrum: 
towards the centre of Cunningham’s name, the first “g” holds it in place. The letters themselves 
increase in size (see fig. 3); the first “ing” is much smaller than the second, suggesting that the 
noise of “inging” gets louder, more disturbing, as it continues. Interestingly, the final “g” is 
written in a cursive font (the only cursive on the page), connoting both interconnectivity between 
letters and an expected continuation. The lack of another letter after the final “g” suggests 
emptiness, invites a rereading of the word. This is especially striking in light of the sheer size of 
other letters in the poem; the “ea” in the first line, the “bro” in the third, the “hou” in eight, and 
what appears to be an overlapping “d” and “h” on line nine, are all enormous, demanding the 
reader’s attention away from the blank space, and the otherwise unassuming “inging.” I leave 
you my own pen-marks. I want you to pay attention. 
The Role of the Author in Mac Low and Cage 
As I have suggested, there is a dearth of scholarship on the Cunningham mesostics, with 
the exception of the recently published articles by Weaver and Braune. The only author to give 
more attention than a few sentences to the Cunningham mesostics is Cage’s fellow poet Jackson 
Mac Low, who writes of this sequence, albeit still quite briefly, in “Something about the 
Writings of John Cage,” and its later, heavily revised version, “Cage’s Writings up to the Late 
1980s.”18 Mac Low describes the poems as Cage’s first foray into “writing asyntactical 
                                                
18 Most texts make only brief reference to the sequence: Peter Dickinson’s volume, Cagetalk, mentions the 
Cunningham sequence only once, and this in passing, as part of a list of concerts involving half of Cage’s work, and 
half of the composer David Tudor (186). Richard Kostelanetz’s collection of interview excerpts makes only one 
reference to these mesostics, and then only as a performance piece (Kostelanetz 171). Where more than a passing 
reference is made, discussions of these poems tend to remain very much limited to Cage’s own discussion in the 
foreword to M. For example, James Pritchett’s The Music of John Cage, notes that this sequence acts as a “precursor 
to [his writing-through] method, with its words drawn at random from Cunningham’s writings and other books” 
(178). Pritchett revisits the sequence a few pages later, only to refer to what Cage notes about the chance-operations 
he used to decide the sequence’s idiosyncratic typefaces, and to quote Cage’s argument that the poems look like 
“waterfalls” or “ideograms” (Pritchett 182-3). Even David Revill’s celebrated biography of Cage, The Roaring 
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mesostics, employing I Ching chance operations, and ‘writing-through’ methods” (“Something” 
289). In its first incarnation, Mac Low’s essay moves from this statement to a lengthy quotation 
from the foreword to M, culminating, as references to the mesostics are wont to do, in Cage’s 
statement that the poems looked like “waterfalls or ideograms,” which is followed by a note 
about their eventual performance (289-90). In its later revision, however, the essay moves from 
this sequence to other, often earlier, poems by Cage which are also “asyntactical,” most notably 
“Mureau,” which is also collected in M. Mac Low then returns to the Cunningham mesostics to 
use the same lengthy quotation as the earlier version, ending again with the reference to 
“waterfalls” and “ideograms” (“Cage’s Writing” 215-220). 
This minimal discussion of the Cunningham mesostics in Cage scholarship is especially 
significant because what little scholarship exists tends to be preoccupied with Cage’s own 
explanation of the sequence. This shift from analysis of the text to analysis of an author’s 
explanation marks an important facet of the scholarship on Cage, specifically that as the poems 
become indeterminate, largely illegible, and interested almost completely in form, the 
scholarship moves away from the poems themselves, and towards the poetics. One justification 
for this shift might be that by studying Cage’s poetics rather than studying the poems themselves 
as end results, the focus of the scholarship shifts from product to process, and this would be a 
shift in line with Cage’s poetics more generally. This emphasis on production is important. But 
as criticism moves away from the texts at hand, and focuses instead on the work of the author’s 
production of the text, these examples reify the writer and his process, which runs counter to 
Cage’s work more general, and is counterproductive to a postanarchist reading practice. A 
                                                                                                                                                       
Silence, fails to discuss these mesostics in any more depth than Cage’s foreword (234-235), and completely shies 
away from making any connections between the mesostics and Cage’s relationship to Cunningham, in an almost 
New Critical aversion to reading the author’s life into his work. 
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postanarchist methodology for reading these mesostics looks to authorship in the poems as an 
integral part of the text and invites readers to take part in that very process as they read. 
As I have previously indicated, a discussion of authorship in the Cunningham mesostics 
is extremely difficult, and must be at the very least tentative, because, in the conventional sense, 
Cage has not written these poems. In terms of content, the “syllables and words” found in the 
poem were, as Cage writes in the foreword, “obtained from Merce Cunningham’s Changes: 
Notes on Choreography and from thirty-two other books most used by Cunningham in relation to 
his work” (ii). The order in which the words appear was decided, not by poetic diction, but by 
chance. The source texts were subjected to I Ching chance operations, “a process which brought 
about in some cases syllable exchange between two or more of them” (“Foreword” ii). The form 
of the poems is also outside of Cage’s control to some degree. While Cage decided on the 
mesostic form, and on Cunningham’s name as the poems’ “spines,” the poems are composed in 
“over seven hundred different type faces and sizes available in Letraset and, of course, subjected 
… to I Ching chance operations” (“Foreword” ii). In this deference to chance and indeterminacy, 
the image of the author, even in abstract or experimental art, gets critically complicated. There is 
little correlation between Cage subjecting Cunningham’s books, and later Letraset typefaces, to 
chance operations and the more traditional notions of poetic production (sprezzatura, Romantic 
inspiration, etc.). 
However, it would be inaccurate to claim that Cage’s use of the I Ching, or of chance 
more generally, was designed to eradicate the role of the author. While chance is certainly one of 
the most often studied aspects of Cage’s work, it is also, as Constance Lewallen writes in “Cage 
and the Structure of Chance,” the most often misunderstood: “misunderstood because it is often 
mistakenly believed that Cage used chance to avoid making choices” (235). Of course, Cage 
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made many choices in the production of the Cunningham mesostics, not only selecting the 
source texts but selecting them based on the intimately personal criteria of those “books most 
used by Cunningham.” In this way, Cage’s use of chance is not a way to avoid making decisions 
about the poems he is writing, but rather a way to change the kind of choices the author makes. 
In this sense, he “use[s] chance as a discipline … to circumvent personal taste and memory so 
that he would be more open to outside experiences” (Lewallen 236). Cage identifies this 
misunderstanding himself in an interview when he says, “Most people who believe that I’m 
interested in chance don’t realize that I use chance as a discipline. They think I use it—I don’t 
know—as a way of giving up making choices. But my choices consist in choosing what 
questions to ask” (Kostelanetz 17). In this way, Cage’s role as author of these poems becomes 
destabilized. Instead, the poems are written by a sort of collective involving Cage, who asks the 
questions, and Cunningham, whose work 
dictated the source texts Cage would choose 
from, and which books he ultimately chose, but 
also including the I Ching and the Letraset 
typefaces, all working in tandem. Additionally, 
the authors of the source texts play a role in this 
collaboration, albeit without their consent or 
awareness. Most importantly, a postanarchist 
reading of the poems includes the reader in this 
collaborative view of the poems’ production. As 
the reader enters in the comunis of 
communication with the texts, and takes value 
Figure 4 
John Cage. “Mesostic 44.” M (150). 
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from the intensities of the noise produced in the ansyntactical poems, s/he engages in this 
production in a manner that Cage as author can neither control nor predict. 
Indeterminacy notwithstanding, the poems themselves seem to advocate this communal 
authorship, with repeated references to collection and combination: “mix” (23), “crossing” (29) 
and “cross” (154), “sum” (39), “inter” (136), “series” (139), “between” (148), and an especially 
significant “we” twice (9, 71). At times, the words themselves even intermingle due to the 
varying sizes of the characters, making it difficult to separate characters from each other, or tell 
which letter belongs to which “word.” For example, the “h” “i” and “n” in the word “(behind” in 
one poem (see fig. 4) blend so that there is no space on either side of the “i” (150). Further down 
this poem, a “g” is so attached to a hyphen and a comma that the three appear to make one 
unique character together. In the poem just following this, an enormous “o” takes up two full 
lines, and it would be unclear which line the “o” was meant to start were it not for the fact that 
both lines consist of actual English words: “people” and “other” (151). In this way, form and 
content work to support a collaborative authorship that destabilizes the traditional understanding 
of the expressive self as artist. 
Perhaps the most important element of the writing of the Cunningham mesostics, one that 
necessarily influences the poems themselves, is that of ease and practicality. These issues of 
practicality are not often discussed in terms of Cage’s work, despite their importance. The 
romantic, anarchic, and experimental reasons why Cage would structure his poems in this way, 
are certainly more seductive, but the practical elements that inform these decisions are worth 
noting, especially because they provide additional readings to a work that already provokes 
multifarious readings. I am speaking here specifically about the critical issue of the length of 
Cunningham’s name. Cage gestures towards this issue himself in the foreword to M. According 
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to his account, he initially “tried to write syntactically as [he] had in the case of the Mesostics Re 
and Not Re Marcel Duchamp, but the length of Cunningham’s name proved an obstacle” (i). 
Instead, he writes the poems using chance operations, and avoids syntax altogether. Moreover, 
the decision to have the letters touch, which I have read as a poetic decision throughout my 
work, was also made out of practicality, wherein Cage could turn the length of Cunningham’s 
name “from obstacle to utility” (“Foreword” i). Discussing the practicality in this way, and 
especially in using the term “utility,” Cage brings the focus away from purely poetic readings, 
and forces the reader to engage in the production of the poems on a real, material level. 
It is perhaps not very interesting, even potentially mundane, to note such practicalities, 
but the issue of the length of Cunningham’s name is of great importance to any study of the 
work, and more generally, the issue of practicality is very important for Cage’s poetics. In fact, 
when asked in an interview what his “greatest legacy to future generations” would be, Cage 
replied in his characteristically axiomatic way: “Having shown the practicality of making works 
of art nonintentionally” (Kostelanetz 26). In view of the painstaking, laborious process of 
subjecting so many books to I Ching operations, and then subjecting each letter in the poem to 
these operations to decide the typeface, the idea that this manner of “making works of art” is 
practical seems improbable. But, the practicality here is not in the production of the poems so 
much as in the poems that are produced, and how these poems could come to be read. In this 
way, Cage has succeeded in the creation of a poem that is practical, easy to read (in the sense 
that there is no singular but hidden interpretation), and indefinite in the reading processes it 
evokes. Without the power over both reader and writer innate in expression (however abstract), 
the militarized language of syntax, or even the limitations of pre-existing words, Cage creates a 
poem that is indefinitely multiple in the ways it can be read and, perhaps even more importantly, 
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by whom. The goal of creating literature that can be read by anyone (although he remains 
unclear about who “anyone” would entail) seems to have been a preoccupation of his. As Cage 
says in an interview in 1971, the same year the Cunningham mesostics were first published: “I 
am hoping to find a language in which people can read in their own way, no matter where they 
come from” (Kostelanetz 143). 
 In terms of a refusal of exegesis and this interest in practicality, the Cunningham 
mesostics mark an important starting point for Cage’s indeterminate, or chance-produced, poetry. 
They are, as Mac Low asserts in the passage quoted above, the point at which Cage “began to 
write ‘asyntactical’ mesostics” (“Cage’s Writings” 220, emph. mine). They thus serve as an 
important jumping-off-point for a postanarchist discussion of the relationship between 
indeterminate poetics and authorship. Moving to Mac Low’s own work, my focus shifts, and I 
begin here not with Mac Low’s early poems in which he pushes the limits of chance, 
spontaneity, improvisation, deterministic methods, and computer systems designed to produce 
diastic19 poems, but with his poetic sequence The Stein Poems, composed between 1998 to 2003, 
ending just a year before Mac Low’s death. Among some of the last poems Mac Low ever wrote, 
The Stein Poems serve as a kind of combination20 of a lifetime of experimentation with 
                                                
19 The term “diastic” refers to a paragrammatic procedure Mac Low developed in order to produce deterministic 
poems. In a diastic poem, a source text is selected (sometimes at random), and then a seed text is used to select 
certain words from the source text. Words are selected based on the placement of the letters, so the first letter of the 
first word of the seed text is used to find a word in the source text with the same letter at the start of the word. 
Subsequently, the second word is chosen provided it has the second letter of the seed text in its own second-letter-
position. “Stein 72,” for example, uses as its source text, Part I, Stanza VI of Gertrude Stein’s “Stanzas in 
Meditation.” Its seed text is Mac Low’s son, Mordecai-Mark’s, name. The poem reads: “more not more to-day 
forget.” The poem ends here because the system was unable to find a word after “forget” in which the “e” was in the 
fifth position (Thing of Beauty 401). 
 
20 Comment by Michael O’Driscoll (23/08/13): “I think that the nuancing of JML’s deterministic methods that 
accounts for the tensions he so deliberately developed between choice and chance is an important and more recent 
component of our understanding of his diverse body of work. The Stein poems seem an excellent locus for such 
considerations. However, rather than framing them as return or culmination, it might be more productive to give 
some thought to how this series “broadens the medium” of language (to paraphrase Bernstein) in the way that 
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indeterminacy and chance. As Mac Low himself asserted in a cover-letter sent accompanying a 
submission of some of these poems for journal publication: “I returned to using a deterministic 
procedure in April 1998, when I began writing the poems in the Stein series, but now I always, to 
some extent, modify the results of the procedure, making personal decisions of different kinds. 
My writingways [sic] came together” (Thing of Beauty 376). In The Stein Poems, Mac Low 
returns to deterministic methods of writing, which he had more or less abandoned, only to adapt 
these chance-based procedures by making clear (and unapologetic) the moments in which his 
individual taste intervened in, or added onto, the deterministic process. Importantly, it would 
seem from his publication history that his writings about and discussions of Cage’s chance-based 
work had a direct influence on the decision to produce The Stein Poems in this fashion. 
Published in Richard Kostelanetz’s 1993 Writings about John Cage, Mac Low’s article 
“Something About the Writings of John Cage,” examined, specifically and critically, the role of 
taste and authorial intent in Cage’s chance-based work. He then revised and expanded the article 
as “Cage’s Writings up to the Late 1980s” for inclusion in David W. Bernstein and Christopher 
Hatch’s Writings Through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, + Art in 2001. At the same time, he was 
engaged in the composition of 154 Forties, poems written in a more traditional compositional 
method, incorporating an emphasis on prosody (specifically on stressed syllables, again recalling 
                                                                                                                                                       
captured JML’s attention when he discovered new procedural methods. JML never left anything behind, but I also 
don’t think he would have thought of any one method as summary. In other words, what do the Stein poems achieve 
or open on to that furthers our understanding of his work? What is singular about their contribution to his corpus?” 
 
Response (27/08/13): “Yes, regarding The Stein Poems as ‘culmination’ is unhelpful. Anne Tardos, in the forward to 
Thing of Beauty, calls it a ‘combination of ways’ (xxii), which is maybe more open to the broadening to which 
you’re referring. And it also helps to capture the ‘coming together’ Mac Low suggests in the cover letter that 
accompanied some of these poems. I’ll change the language I use in this entry when I revise. I think that this 
‘coming together’ or ‘combination’ is a part of what makes these poems important, especially in light of the other 
retro-avant-garde pieces Mac Low produced (for Schwitters, for Pound, for Woolf, for Dickinson). While less 
elegiac than either the Schwitters or the Pound sequences, and less an exercise in diastic experiment than the Woolf 
or Dickinson poems, The Stein Poems seem to occupy a mediatory space, not necessarily tied to any one element of 
Mac Low’s general poetics.” 
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Hopkins’s “sprung rhythm”) and caesural spaces. In 1998, between the two Cage articles, Mac 
Low, as he stated in the quotation above, “returned” to deterministic methods, but under the 
caveat that he no longer pretended that this was not ultimately an egoic or ego-centric process. 
This decision was clearly triggered, at least in part, by Mac Low’s work on Cage, in which he 
rails against those who misinterpreted or misunderstood Cage as having refused or eliminated the 
presence of the ego and its concomitant authorial intent via indeterminacy. For Cage, Mac Low 
writes, “[c]hance was always constrained, to a greater or lesser extent, by his intentions” 
(“Cage’s Writings” 231), and later: “He knew very well that if he did anything at all, it would be 
done by or through his ego” (232). For Mac Low, the complete removal of the ego, of the 
Author, was impossible. He maintains in his work on Cage that the absolute refusal of the 
individual ego in a chance-based text was not only impossible, it was also not the goal of such 
work. “The point is not whether [Cage] ever entirely evaded his individual ego and its 
predilections,” he writes, “but that he diminished to some extent the value-judging activity of the 
ego that excludes possibilities, and that he thereby let in, to some extent, ‘the rest of creation’” 
(“Cage’s Writings” 227). 
To be sure, Mac Low was, at least in part, aware of the egoism involved in chance-based 
and deterministic writing methods. In his two seminal poetics pieces, “Statement” and “Some 
Remarks to the Dancers,” both collected in the highly influential The Poetics of the New 
American Poetry in 1973, he touches briefly on the role of choice in chance-based texts. In 
“Statement,” he asserts that the author is not a dictator over a text, but rather a co-initiator of 
action, and is thus encouraged to produce, even (or especially) by means outside of his/her 
control, “absolutely unique situations” (385). In “Some Remarks to the Dancers” he notes that 
although his acclaimed sequence The Pronouns: A Collection of 40 Dances for the Dancers used 
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“chance” to create the poems, by way of a filing card system he devised, some “crucial features” 
were matters of free choice (390-1). While these brief pieces demonstrate that, even in 1973, 
Mac Low had begun to think about the relationship between chance and authorship, it wasn’t 
until after Cage’s death in 1992, and his subsequent work on Cage’s use of chance, that Mac 
Low was able to re-evaluate his views on indeterminacy. This is demonstrated most clearly in 
“Making Poetry ‘Otherwise,’” when he asserts “that the choices [Cage] and many of us made 
when we devised systems would be egoist in the very absolute Zen sense” (n.p.). 
The Stein Poems, then, stand at a mediatory position between chance and choice, between 
nonintentional and intentional writing.21 Mac Low’s discussions of authorship in Cage’s chance-
produced texts forced him to re-evaluate what precisely constitutes a nonintentional text, or a 
deterministically produced text, asserting that the two terms are actually quite different. He notes 
that, sparked by a discussion with his son, he realized that though his systemic reading-through 
text-selection procedures were “nonintentional”—“in that [he] cannot predict to any extent what 
will be brought into a text through using them” (“Cage’s Writings” 224)—they are also 
“deterministic” in that “[i]f followed out to the letter, they must find, and bring into the work 
being written, the same linguistic units in the source texts each time” (225). The element of 
chance, of the indeterminate, is further a third term, represented in the procedures by way of 
“human errors (and when these methods are automated, computer errors),” which “provide an 
unlooked-for but inevitable element of chance” (225). While the author has relative control over 
the procedures, as co-initiator of their actions (to use Mac Low’s own terms), and while this 
process is, as Mac Low asserts, necessarily born out of the ego, it also at the same time works to 
destabilize the position of the writing subject. Akin to the excess of meaning produced by noise, 
                                                
21 From “Cage’s Writing up to the Late 1980s”: “Procedures operating from any level of the ego, in the Zen sense, I 
call ‘intentional’; ‘nonintentional’ refers only to those procedures that do not do so” (226). 
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the many elements of authorship innate in Mac Low’s deterministic/unintentional methods 
produce an excess of authorship. It is this excess that he refers to, but seems unable to define, 
when he writes, “You realize that making a chance system is as egoic, in some ways, or even as 
emotional, as writing a poem spontaneously. But at the same time you realize there is something 
more than just yourself doing it” (“The Poetics of Chance” 175). That “something more” is, at 
least in part, an anarchic politics of communality and the need to defamiliarize subjectivity. 
As Miller observes in Singular Examples, Mac Low’s work looks to destabilize 
subjectivity, especially those ways in which subjectivity is defined and solidified in/through 
language. Miller argues that by accepting the inability of a text to be completely devoid of ego, 
of an Author, Mac Low gives his work the unique opportunity to expand the field of play of 
authorship within and outside of chance-based methods. This is to say that, for Miller,  
the different instances of the subject in language (grammatical, intentional, 
incarnational) are still operative, in part at least, in Mac Low’s acrostic-chance 
poems, but relate to one another asymmetrically, making the hypostasis of a 
single thinking/ speaking/ acting self impossible. (51) 
To put this more succinctly, in his discussions of Mac Low’s Stanzas for Iris Lezak, poems 
composed in 1960 and identified by Mac Low as his “first deterministic yet nonintentional 
system” (Thing of Beauty 49), Miller asserts that “[t]he self is not so much absent from this text 
as it is ascetically chastened” (61). While necessarily politically charged, Mac Low’s decision to 
disrupt authorship in this fashion is also aesthetic. In “Making Poetry ‘Otherwise,’” he asserts 
that in his early deterministic methods, he “felt that whatever was given should be accepted.” As 
such, he notes that his later nondeterministic writings, such as 154 Forties, and the merging of 
these two ways of writing in The Stein Poems demonstrate “a real change” in which he “started 
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thinking that what was made by the systems was not necessarily better.” Mac Low’s intentional 
interventions in the systemic text-producing processes mark his own desire to make the products 
of these systems “better.”22 
This notion of betterment is intrinsically tied to Mac Low’s eventual decision that there 
can be no writing truly outside of sense (semantics, syntax). This is best demonstrated, too, in his 
writings on Cage, in which he takes Cage to task for his use of the term “nonsyntactical.” Mac 
Low asserts that Cage sought to free language from conventional, normative syntax, “freed from 
‘the arrangements of an army,’ which Norman O. Brown told [Cage] was the original meaning of 
‘syntax,’ derived from the Greek σύνταξις [syntaksis]” (“Cage’s Writings” 212). Mac Low 
himself preferred the term “asyntactical.” He writes, “[t]here is some question, of course, as to 
whether any arrangement of language elements, no matter how different from normative syntax, 
doesn’t in itself constitute a new, non-normative syntax. (For this reason I never use Cage’s term 
‘nonsyntactical.’)” (212). Similarly, Mac Low came to believe that there was no such thing as 
                                                
22 Comment by Andy Weaver (23/08/13): “I wonder if Mac Low’s edited/‘better’ deterministic poems are very 
different from Cage’s many ‘writing through’ works, most of which he explicitly altered after using 
chance/deterministic procedures to develop a text from which he would remove words as he liked—are Cage and 
Mac Low really that far apart at these moments? Is the most important difference Mac Low’s greater emphasis on 
and specificity about his interventions? I guess what I’m asking is, is the difference here more a matter of degree 
than of kind?” 
 
Response (27/08/13): “On the difference between Mac Low’s interventions and Cage’s, this is an interesting 
intersection between the two. Certainly as I oppose them, I recognize that this division is academic, and that there 
are multiple important shared concerns between them. I agree that part of the difference here is degree, because Mac 
Low certainly engages more often, more freely, and more significantly, with the outputs of his systems. He also 
talks about it more candidly than Cage (this is something that should, and will, be cited in a later revision). But I also 
think that the two authors approach these moments of personal taste/choice in different ways. While Cage terms 
these moments ‘interventions,’ as you have, or moments of ‘cleaning’ or ‘organizing’ the results to fit an end-goal, 
Mac Low instead uses terms like ‘mining,’ which I’ve quoted above, or, more tellingly, ‘interacting with the 
products of non intentional systems’ (Art, Performance 268). Additionally, he remarks further down that interview 
that he thinks he most often edits more thoroughly in computer-generated texts because he feels as though the work 
was all done for him. All of this is a long-winded way of saying that I think there is, if minute, still a difference in 
the ways in which Cage and Mac Low alter the products of their indeterminate systems. Mac Low sees himself as 
entering into a sort of deleuzoguattarian assemblage with the text, the machine, the source/seed texts, &c. Cage, 
instead, is a sort of poetic butcher, trimming away excess fats, and cutting out the right sizes and shapes of poem-
flesh. (From one vegetarian to another, I’m sorry that comment went that way).” 
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complete randomness, especially not in deterministic or computer-based systems of textual 
production:  “There’s no randomness if it’s computer generated. ... No, I never like randomness. 
I want specific things” (“Making Poetry” n.p.). Accepting finally that a nonsyntactical, entirely 
random, and authorless text was a clear impossibility, Mac Low produced The Stein Poems as a 
culmination of a lifetime of experimentation with all three terms. 
It is for this reason that the brief explanatory endnotes included after each poem in the 
Stein series includes, for the most part, detailed accounts of how he altered or played with the 
products of the systemic procedures. Ranging in level of intervention, some poems, such as “And 
One That Clear (Stein 15)” get “accepted” as they are produced (Thing of Beauty 382). “Stein 
11-13” are included, each with “minimal subsequent editing” (379-81). “Pleasant to be 
Repeating Very Little of This (Stein 32)” is published after having been “revised a number of 
times” (397). And, “Be Gentle to a Greek (Stein 53)” gets included after having been “freely 
revised and edited” (400). Additionally, some of the explanatory notes are extremely vague, but 
suggest a good deal of editing, revision, and clear authorial intention, such as the note that 
follows “Something Important Could Certainly Be Enough (Stein 76),” wherein Mac Low writes 
that the poem was produced by “‘mining’ what remained of the output of this procedure and 
producing normative sentences from the words elicited thereby” (402). These late poems, and 
their explanatory notes, are thus invitations to a postanarchist reading practice that engages with 
the one proposed by Cage’s Cunningham mesostics, but also deviates from it dramatically.  
If the primary concern of the Cunningham mesostics, then, is to engage the reader not in 
narrative or even logical sense, but rather in a comunis of acute attention to language, then this 
raises a number of questions: what is the purpose of such a poem, if not to communicate a 
message? and, if Cage refuses communication or engagement with his readers, is this not akin to 
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holding these readers in contempt, or distrust, or both? These are the questions I am most 
frequently asked about Cage’s work by those who lack a familiarity with Cage or with the avant-
garde in general (my mother asks these questions most often, in a sometimes confrontational, but 
always legitimately curious, manner). But, surprisingly, I almost never deal with these issues in 
my work, and have very rarely seen these issues approached in other scholarship. When my 
mother asks for the purpose of the text like the Cunningham mesostics, it is often followed by the 
oft-used retort to experimental texts: “anyone could do that” or, perhaps more strikingly, “even I 
could do that.” This charge was laid against Cage’s work most often in his earlier years, when 
the apparent shock-value of his work was becoming publicized, and when his work was 
garnering public attention alongside the rising popularity of the other artists in the New York 
School. Responding precisely to these concerns, and anticipating my mother’s confusion, Jill 
Johnston, in her contemporaneous review of Silence, writes: 
What is the point of making anything at all, since at any moment the world is 
teeming with possibilities for experience? For Cage, the answer is that there is no 
point, it is simply something to do, which means that living and making a thing 
are not two separate acts. And if everybody can do it, then let everybody. (148) 
For some, I suppose that Johnston’s rationale for Cage here would be unsatisfying: a lack of 
purpose is not wholly addressed by saying “who needs a purpose”? But her observations are in 
kind with Cage’s own recorded ideas about his work. He often shied away from addressing 
purpose in interviews, maintaining instead that “Emptiness of purpose does not imply contempt 
for society, rather assumes that each person, whether he [sic] knows it or not is noble, is able to 
experience gifts with generosity, that society is best anarchic” (“Form is a Language” 135).  
An “emptiness of purpose,” then, is Cage’s egalitarian breaking language down to its 
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constituent parts, and to refuse what he views as a capitalist, consumerist understanding of 
language (when militarized) as purposeful, as useful. These mesostics are gifts in a gift-economy 
of artistic practice, where each page as place is privileged equally. It is this view of art that Cage 
affirms in his mesostic “Overpopulation and Art,” when he writes: 
we have nO idea 
what’s beiNg seen 
or heArd 
the quaNtity 
is beyonD count 






woRks of art 
in which no Place 
is mOre 
imPortant than another (“Overpopulation and Art” 95-108) 
What this excerpt explains is that by focusing attention on the individual letters, as the 
Cunningham mesostics force our reader to do, we approach reading in a demilitarized, anti-
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exegetical manner.23 Language becomes a gift we give each other in the comunis, for no other 
purpose save that we can. To avoid enforcing the ego of the Author as arbiter of this gift 
exchange, Cage produces the Cunningham mesostics by way of experiment.  
While I have endeavoured, in my introduction, to define the experimental poetic text for 
my project, Cage works throughout his career with a definition of the experiment that is uniquely 
his, and one that is thus an important function of reading his work. This work has been done, 
with some success, by critic William Brooks in his article “In re: ‘Experimental Music,’” where 
he puts Cage’s discussions of the artistic experiment in contrast to those of Cage’s contemporary 
composer, Lejaren Hiller. While Brooks discusses Cage’s music specifically, the definition of 
the experiment he produces is equally valuable to Cage’s poetic works. Cage and Hiller both 
published articles working to define the artistic experiment in the late 1960s, and both did so in 
radically different ways. Brooks summarizes the difference in their respective definitions by way 
of a hypothetical anecdote, which I will summarize. Let’s say, then, that I am bicycling home 
from work, and notice a different route I could take. Taking this new route is my experiment. If I 
follow Hiller’s definition, I pose a hypothesis: this route will get me home faster. I take the route, 
and end up home much later than usual. My hypothesis is incorrect, but I learn about the new 
route’s value upon my arrival. If, instead, I follow Cage’s definition, and ask “what will I 
                                                
23 Comment by Andy Weaver (19/08/13): “You write that ‘by focusing attention on the individual letters, as the 
Cunningham mesostics force our reader to do, we approach reading in a demilitarized, anti-exegetical manner.’ That 
makes sense. My question is, can we encounter these mesostics also as a performance or examination of the act of 
concatenating, of letters joining together into a series of communities/groups? Does attention have to focus on the 
individual letters as individual letters, or can we also talk about the letters in concert?” 
 
Response (20/08/13): “Absolutely! And this is something I will have to make more clear in later revisions. In my 
vision of the Cunningham mesostics, this attention to the individual envisions a molecular (rather than molar or 
monadic) understanding of letters. To give each undivided attention, then, is to make note of the intricacies of 
linguistic connections. This avoids the individualism of more strident anarchists. And now I am also reminded of 
what Kurt Schwitters says in ‘The Artists’ Right to Self-Determination,’ that experimental poetry ‘plays off values 
against values. One can also say “words against words”’ and thus produces ‘a word-feeling’ rather than a meaning 
(213).” 
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encounter if I take this alternate route?” I cannot fail. I see a new coffee shop, a park, and a 
market I would like to visit later. I do not gain any “use value.” I do not prove or disprove a 
hypothesis. I merely make observations. Cage makes this clear in his “History of Experimental 
Music in the United States” when he writes: “What is the nature of an experimental action? It is 
simply an action the outcome of which is not foreseen” (69). As experimental texts according to 
Cage’s definition, the Cunningham mesostics, products of chance operations, encourage readers 
to pay attention, to make observations about the language rather than to interpret a message (or 
in a more passive conception of the reading practice, to read and decode an encoded message). 
This turn in reading practice provoked by the Cunningham mesostics is even more 
striking once one learns that as experiments proper, the mesostics have failed. That is, Cage 
writes that printing the poems so that the various-sized letters would touch both horizontally and 
vertically would give the poem “a spine” and thus each poem could “resemble Cunningham 
himself, the dancer” (“Foreword” i). Despite the fact that, for Cage, this desired outcome did not 
come to fruition—that instead, the poems more closely resemble “waterfalls” or “ideograms”—
he notes that “this is how they came to be made” (“Foreword” ii). Eschewing even those 
scientific connotations of the term experiment, Cage begins with a small semblance of a 
hypothesis, and then when even that fails him, what he uncovers is an even greater gift in its 
refusal to provide answers. Cage’s inclusion of the failed experiment in his publications, and his 
subsequent decisions to turn the poems into musical compositions, emphasized again not only 
this interest in observation, but additionally, and in this case more importantly, the egalitarian 
potentials of a lack of purpose, a composition that gestures beyond linguistic use value, that 
privileges noise above semantic function, and that expresses a deep discomfort with language. 
Cage’s discomfort with language, and with written language specifically, is well-
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documented in his work and the criticism surrounding it. One 
only needs to consider how frequently Cage references Norman 
O. Brown’s argument that “Syntax … is the arrangement of the 
army. As we move away from it, we demilitarize language” 
(“Foreword” ii). In the Cunningham mesostics, this discomfort is 
represented most clearly by the nonce word  “sicductor,” which 
appears as the second line of the very first mesostic (see fig. 5). 
“Sic,” the Latin adverb meaning “so” or “thus” first appears as 
an English word meaning “intentionally so written” in the mid-
1800s and is subsequently used, as we as academics are so used 
to seeing it, to denote an error reproduced in a quotation (Oxford 
English Dictionary). “Ductor,” in Latin “one who leads,” refers 
to, in a printing press, “A roller which conveys the ink from the 
ink-fountain to the distributing-rollers” (OED). It is responsible 
in part, for getting the ink onto the 
page, and thus metonymically represents the materiality of 
language.24 So, “sicductor” suggests that the ductor is sick, that the 
use of language in the Cunningham mesostics fails because Cage’s 
hypothesis seeks to represent, to literally present Cunningham’s body in the poems. “Sicductor,” 
                                                
24 Comment by Sean Braune (21/11/13): “‘Ductor’ is also an extinct species of prehistoric fish and its remains can 
now only be read through the trace of the fossil. What I love about Cage’s nonce words found through the mesostics 
for Merce is the plurality of virtual readings: on the one hand (the historian’s or etymologist’s) we have ‘sic’ and 
‘ductor’; on the other hand (the combinatorist’s) we have ‘sicductor’ as its own entity; yet another, the different 
readings suggested by each font variation and script size, thus really pointing to the permutational quality of the 
mesostics; yet another, the ‘u’ of ‘sicductor’ that feeds into the overall mesostic spine of ‘cunningham’ … the 
plurality of this seemingly simple nonsense word is really jarring. A punning poet may homophonically play and 
find a sick doctor; also where are these ducts? (ducts are like rhizomatic channels). Is this nonce-word also a 
conductor? or is it a ‘sic’ ‘duct’ … ‘or’?” 
Figure 5 
John Cage. “Mesostic 1.”  
M (4). 
Figure 6 
John Cage. “Mesostic 1 (detail).” 
M (4). 
 80 
then, also means that Cage’s work demonstrates an acute awareness of these errors. Additionally, 
following the original Latin meaning of “sic,” Cage’s work demonstrates a movement beyond 
the limitations of representation and exegesis, a “thus” from which Cage’s experimental work 
follows. The “sicductor” encourages Cage’s readers to look beyond interpretive reading, beyond 
use value. In this way, Cage’s work points us to Steve McCaffrey’s scriptive adaptation of 
Georges Bataille’s theory of general economy. That is, the chance production of “sicductor” in 
the first mesostic sets the tone for the sequence as one of waste and excess. For McCaffrey, 
“meaning … is staged as the telos and destination of the de-materialization of writing,” which is 
to say that “the physical act of speaking or writing must withdraw so that what has been said or 
written can appear meaningful” (204). In a sense, then, we can understand Cage’s prioritization 
of the physical act of the sequence’s production as a refusal to withdraw. Subsequently, the 
Cunningham mesostics do not produce meaning, do not satisfy a logical hypothesis, but rather, in 
their noise, they make observations about the problematic tension between semantic meaning 
and the materiality of language. 
Cage and Mac Low on Love and Pleasure 
All this said, it has become more common to read the Cunningham mesostics as 
experimental love poems. Weaver argues that the sequence “openly enacts Cage’s love for 
Cunningham” since the poems both “show Cage’s intimate knowledge of Cunningham’s 
aesthetics (since the generant books are those ‘most used by Cunningham’)” and “mimic 
Cunningham’s dancing, as lines and letters tumble into and over each other, gracefully 
accentuating their movements across the page” (“Writing Through Merce” 30). Additionally, 
Weaver notes that the poems are littered with sensual, physical, and potentially sexual diction. 
Acknowledging that he attempts to read hermeneutically a text that actively resists and refuses 
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this reading, Weaver reminds his readers that this is an “impossible-to-prove feeling” rather than 
a close exegetical reading, but one that is no less valid and important for its lack of provable 
evidence: “Such a claim is not provable in the understandable idioms of everyday discourse, but 
one must note that these everyday idioms are precisely those in which, due to the differend, Cage 
cannot speak his homosexuality” (32). In a similar vein, Braune also maintains that “the 
mesostics exist within a poetic or syntactic space that signifies the love shared between Cage and 
Cunningham,” and that “the mesostics not only enact a love, but rather encode a love within a 
particular textual practice that, through the heterogeneous dispersal of letters organized through a 
strict conceptual rule, erases the binary of homosexual or heterosexual in favour of the 
experience of love itself” (“Cage’s Mesostics”). Both of these readings, it would seem, fit in line 
with Cage’s larger ethics and poetics of breaking down categorizations that necessarily limit. 
With this in mind, it should come as no surprise that, in an interview with Thomas S. 
Hines, Cage asserts that he does not want to be categorized as a “gay composer” because such a 
designation “takes the relationship between art and sex very seriously,” adding “I do not. Once I 
am doing something serious, I don’t think about sex”25 (Hines 98n43). The surprise, then, comes 
in the sentences that follow, when he tells Hines he is actually opposed to love: 
I am entirely opposed to the emotions. … I really am. I think of love as an 
opportunity to become blind and blind in a bad way. … I think that seeing and 
hearing are extremely important; in my view they are what life is; love makes us 
                                                
25 While some may take exception to my reliance here on Cage’s own arguments about his work, especially since 
both Cage and I have worked to complicate authorship and distance it from the text, I would like to remind my 
readers that by entertaining the notion that the Cunningham mesostics are love poems at all, we are already 
superimposing the Author’s life onto his work. Indeed, if we were not privy to this knowledge of Cage’s biography, 
we would not read these as love poems at all. In fact, other dedicated mesostic sequences Cage produced, such as the 
“36 Mesostics Re and Not Re Marcel Duchamp,” or the “Sixty-One Mesostics Re and Not Re Norman O. Brown,” 
are decidedly more adoring. 
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blind to seeing and hearing. (98n43) 
Both Braune and Weaver, in their own ways, indicate that Cage’s love for Cunningham, as 
demonstrated in the Cunningham mesostics, denotes a kind of blindness to the outside world. 
Braune indicates, in his article, that the sequence is written in “asyntactic signifiers” that “take 
on the form of a private and personal homage that indicates a state of reverence and love.” That 
is, in their secretive intimacy, the poems undermine meaning-making which, as I’ve noted, 
McCaffrey argues is “the telos and destination of the de-materialization of writing” (204), in 
favour of an antiexegetical language that shows love’s tendency to make people “irrational and a 
little bit obsessive” (Braune n.p.). Weaver suggests in his reading that the manner in which the 
brief references to Cunningham punctuate the sequence (both within and without the nominal 
spines of the mesostics) mimics the author’s love for his beloved, “seemingly interrupting Cage’s 
thoughts as determinedly as the thoughts of anyone lovestruck” (31). Love in the Cunningham 
mesostics, then, closes lovers off from attentiveness to the outside world (it “makes [them] 
blind”), even as Cage in his interview with Hines demonstrates an aversion to this very process. 
And yet, Braune’s reading of the Cunningham mesostics as love poems appears with one 
important caveat: that Cunningham as the beloved does not, in any sense of the term, dominate 
the poems. He writes: 
Merce’s name is very often hard to decipher. The varied spacing, size, and font-
type of the Letraset choices encode and hide the spine-word or name in the 
presentation of the mesostic. For this reason, … Merce’s name does not dominate 
the mesostics, but rather exists tenuously and contingently within the 
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experimental structure of the mesostics’ presentation on the page.26 
The refusal of traditional authorship, the alteration of traditional syntactical language and formal 
organization, and the reliance on non-traditional visual appearance in the poems is a way for 
Cage to negotiate his way out of the potential blindness of love. The love demonstrated in this 
sequence is not the romantic, emotional love that Cage voices indignation for, but rather the love 
of flux that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue is constitutive of the common. Rather than 
the generic marker of love poetry, the love encoded in the Cunningham mesostics is metapoetic. 
This is all to say that while both Braune and Weaver clearly identify the importance of 
the nonsemantic in their work, something is lost when we read these poems as love poems, rather 
than relying instead on the metapoetic drive that seems to be suggested by the first-poem 
sicductor. One way of surmounting this is by 
discarding the problematic term “protosemantic” that 
Braune takes from McCaffrey and replacing it with 
the perhaps more apt “extrasemantic.” The “proto-” 
prefix, with its connotations of “first” and “before” 
does not adequately describe the excessive semantics 
of the Cunningham mesostics; they make (or 
complicate) meaning decidedly after or even external 
to a more traditional, logical process of meaning-
making that occurs in the source texts Cage uses, and 
                                                
26 Part of the reason Braune finds Cunningham’s relatively down-played presence in the poem so striking is that he 
is reading the poems as examples of Saussure’s “paragrams.” In this reading, it is especially important to note that 
Cunningham’s appearances in the sequence are sporadic and brief, thus refusing the god-like dominating presence of 
the nominal paragram that Saussure asserts. 
Figure 7 
John Cage. “Mesostic 25.” M (100). 
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within the poetic tradition in which Cage is 
necessarily working. In this way, the 
Cunningham mesostics carry out the physical, 
material processes of language, but without that 
telos of meaning McCaffrey refers to. They act 
out language’s denotative, communicative 
functions without reaching their logical conclusion. This element of the poems is suggested by 
“Mesostic 26”’s hidden command “you / … / start / mimes.” In the poem itself (see fig. 7), it is 
important to note just how occluded the command is. Here are those final two “start / mimes” 
lines isolated to make them clearer (see fig. 8). The process of this poem’s production is a kind 
of miming wherein the physical trappings of material language are acted out, but are not carried 
through to semantics, and where use value is discarded in favour of performance and excess. 
Reading this as a sequence of love poems, this command to start miming certainly echoes those 
trademarks of Cunningham’s own choreography that mimes or distorts the quotidian, but also 
animal actions. Indeed, much of Cunningham’s avant-garde 
choreography recalls this process of miming. Additionally, 
much of Cage’s work involves miming or reconfiguring the 
use of quotidian objects or the carrying-out of everyday tasks, 
as best demonstrated by his now notorious piece, “Water 
Walk.” But we also cannot forget that “start / mimes” is 
preceded, if at some distance, by the second-person pronoun. 
Who is “you”? 
If we follow in Braune and Weaver’s footsteps and read 
Figure 9 
John Cage. “Mesostic 31.”  
M (125). 
Figure 8 
John Cage. “Mesostic 25 (detail).” M (100).  
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this sequence as a set of love poems, then the “you” in question is 
most certainly Cunningham, Cage’s beloved that permeates the text. 
But, if we also read this as a metapoetic sequence, one that is 
interested in making observations about how language functions 
outside of the semantic realm, we must also read this “you” (and the 
many other second-person pronouns scattered throughout the 
sequence) as a call to the reader. This is perhaps most evident in the 
pronoun’s appearance twenty-five pages later, as the possessive “your” in “Mesostic 31” (see fig. 
9). This mesostic begins with the also somewhat obscured “facts / your / find” (see fig. 10), 
where Cage most clearly refuses the logical, scientific discourse privileged by Hiller’s definition 
of the experiment and his reliance on hypotheses. The “facts” are our find, our ways of proving 
and knowing. And yet, I wonder how one could read a text such as this one and come away 
feeling as though they have found “facts.” The Cunningham mesostics serve, however 
unintentionally, as a command to the reader, a writerly text that openly engages with the reader 
to discard the facts we find, to refuse reading the poems as a treasure hunt, to acknowledge the 
error of the printing press, and to embrace the failures that instead produce new ways of 
knowing. 
We can observe a similar interest in Mac Low, especially via his assertion that exposing 
potentialities in art is a means of alleviating the pain of social institutions, and that this is an 
important point of creating art, and in his admission: “I do not think that this ‘point’ is at odds 
with pleasure” (“Poetry and Pleasure” xxviii). In fact, the elements of joy27 and pleasure in the 
                                                
27 Comment by Sean Braune (22/11/13): “In your previous post you make reference to ‘jouissance’ and this post 
meditates at length on the notions of ‘joy,’ ‘pleasure,’ and ‘!’ in Mac Low. The Lacanian in me needs to (or is driven 
to) ask: how do you mean ‘jouissance’ in relation to Mac Low? For Lacan ‘jouissance’ is distinct from pleasure 
 
Figure 8 
John Cage. “Mesostic 31 
(detail.)” M (125).  
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production and reception of the formally experimental text actually enables, and potentially 
increases, the effectiveness of the text as anarchist activism. Despite the role of computers, 
deterministic methods, and chance procedures in the production of much of Mac Low’s work, he 
maintained throughout his career that engaging with the outputs of these procedures, and 
ultimately producing the texts themselves, was an enjoyable process not unlike the more 
traditional means of writing poems. For example, in “Poetry and Pleasure,” he writes that 
“[w]riting in ways that combine method, contingency, and free composition and the poetry and 
other work produced by doing so not only surprise me. They often give me pleasure” (xxxvi). 
This is perhaps not surprising; it would be unlikely that Mac Low would continue to produce 
texts in this manner for so many years if he did not at least enjoy the process. 
What may come as a surprise, however, is that Mac Low also maintained that the 
mechanical, systemic, or chance procedures used to produce his deterministic texts were not 
without some emotional elements. In response to a question posed by Gil Ott on the subject in 
“Interviews and Correspondence” in Paper Air, Mac Low asserted that even these procedures 
were necessarily impacted by the emotions of the initiator of the process, and the perceiver of its 
results: “Nonhuman means are, so to speak, shaded and modified by people’s feelings” (18). 
Later in the interview, he also admits that emotion and personal enjoyment come into play in 
these procedures in the selection of the source and seed texts, which he, for the most part, 
decides on “impulsively” (19). What is perhaps most striking about this interview is that, shortly 
                                                                                                                                                       
(‘plaisir’) in that pleasure is actually a feeling or sense of contentment. ‘Jouissance’ is the opposite of contentment—
Lacan relates it to trauma. Jouissance is like overeating, Sadean excess, cutting, Cobain-esque heroin use, etc. (Now, 
of course, Barthes defines ‘jouissance’ differently as does Cixous and many other French theorists, so it need not be 
psychoanalytical) … For the moment though I was wondering how psychoanalytical jouissance could be 
incorporated. To me it seems like Mac Low’s ‘!’ has nothing to do with Lacan’s jouissance—his play is more 
childlike, almost like a Dadaist—but I wonder if constraint-writing has something of jouissance in it; i.e., pleasure is 
a finished text, but jouissance would be the constraint or writing-machine that cannot stop and is compelled to 
continue, ad infinitum to exhaustion or death.” 
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after meditating on the subject of the joy of producing deterministic poetry, Mac Low likens the 
use of constraint to playing a childlike game. He tells Ott that the use of constraint allows him to 
discover linguistic possibilities he would not have otherwise entertained, saying, “I find myself 
saying things I might not have thought of without such a wall to bounce off of. I’m referring to 
the difference between just throwing a ball into the air (although, of course, even then one’s 
limited—by gravity) and bouncing it off a wall” (22). Clearly these systemic methods of 
producing poems are, at least for Mac Low, not without the very human element of emotional 
engagement. And, what’s more, these methods are not simply work; they are, despite their 
mechanical nature, a game. 
The notion that poetry (or any art) should be enjoyable, and especially that it should 
produce a sense of pleasure in its perceiver, is by no means new. Mac Low himself dates this 
back to Longinus’s “On the Sublime,” wherein the sublime in art is defined by the production of 
“ekstasis,” or ecstasy, in its beholder (“An Essay Begun in 1965” 30). While Longinus does not 
tie this ecstasy or pleasure to a political goal, Mac Low cannot help but make the connection 
between the true meaning of “ekstasis”—the state wherein one is momentarily ‘beside oneself’ 
… a significant & valuable break-thru or ‘jail-break from the prison of the self’” (“An Essay 
Begun in 1965” 30)—and his interest in poetry’s anarchic ability to make malleable the 
regimented borders of selfhood, to open up the possibilities of subjectivity.28 And yet, despite 
this reliance on an entirely classical understanding of the role of art here, Mac Low’s approach to 
these concerns was still quite radical. While other experimental authors like Cage sought to 
                                                
28 I should note here that the sublime, for Longinus, is a product of authorial genius, a trace of the greatness of the 
author that is left behind in the text. For Mac Low, this sublimity is determined by the text itself and not the 
greatness of the producer of the text, which he argues (and I would have to agree) is much more fitting considering 
the fact that we actually do not know who authored the Longinus text, and that all we have is the text itself through 
which to be “moved” (“An Essay Begun in 1965” 31). 
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break down traditional understandings of art and beauty, Mac Low understood that his 
experimental, groundbreaking, and sometimes chaotic means of producing poetry was not at 
odds with a desire to make poetry that was pleasurable (to produce and to read), or poetry that 
was beautiful. Tardos makes this abundantly clear by titling his posthumous selected works 
Thing of Beauty and by clarifying in her “Forward” to the text that 
[Mac Low’s] intermittent work with nonintentional and indeterminate methods, 
such as chance operations, never precluded or interfered with his attention to 
beauty, even when he was looking to free himself from allowing individual taste 
and other artistic value judgments to interfere with the results. (xvi) 
There is perhaps no Mac Low text that better demonstrates this interest in pleasure and beauty 
better than The Stein Poems. 
Owing to the nature of the source text—Stein herself often dealt with the pleasurable or 
joyful in her own work—Mac Low’s The Stein Poems is littered with references to pleasure and 
joy. On the level of diction specifically, the word “pleasant” itself is repeated innumerable times. 
Here are some of the more lovely examples: “Pleasant the deranged rhubarb pudding permitted 
stay” (“Little Beginning (Stein1)” 6); “Pleasant time discussing celery bread” (“Pleasant to be 
Repeating Very Little of This (Stein 32)” 12); “Pleasantly deranged” (“Pleasant to be Repeating 
Very Little of This (Stein 32)” 17, 160); “Pleasant permitting makes for louder excess” 
(“Pleasant to be Repeating Very Little of This (Stein 32)” 227). The poem also makes a number 
of references to singing (“And sing more” [“And Sing More Very Loudly (Stein 11)” 1]), 
laughing (“friendly, / been quickly laughing, / laughing sounding is” [“Time That Something 
Something (Stein 18)” 21-3]), and love (“lovesong piece / … / mentioning what love permitted” 
[“Pleasant to Be Repeating Very Little of This (Stein 32)” 21-3]). Part of what makes this diction 
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so striking, and ultimately so much fun on the level of reading these poems, especially aloud, is 
the fact that these words are repeated so many times throughout the sequence, and within each 
poem itself. Mac Low draws particular attention to this repetition by occasionally arranging the 
words so that they repeat back to back, or else allowing this repetition where it already appears in 
the systemic output. For example, “laughing” is repeated in the reference quoted above, albeit 
separated by a line break (which also makes the twined words even more noticeable). This 
occurs with the word “laughing” two more times in the same poem: “That being quickly 
laughing, / laughing sounding talking” (46-7), and again without the enjambment on line fifty-
two with “then quickly laughing laughing.” The effect is laughable (excuse the repetition here) 
not only because the words are repeated, but because of the sheer absurdity of the frequency with 
which the texts repeats itself. 
Owing to the new possibilities Mac Low notes that deterministic methods make 
available, The Stein Poems are filled with absurd instances of words or ideas juxtaposed by the 
deterministic methods used to produce the poems. The first example of “pleasant” that I quoted 
above, “Pleasant the deranged rhubarb pudding permitted stay,” is an excellent example of this, 
but other examples of this (usually involving references to food) abound in the poem. For 
example, in “Pleasant to be Repeating Very Little of This (Stein 32),” Mac Low includes the 
lines “There nothing clearly sings / that celery is happy” (105-6). Or, even funnier, “Pointing Out 
Your Silvery Song (Stein 122)” includes the inexplicable but hilarious line, “If anything, be 
joyful that the pigeon in the kitchen isn’t a kind of turkey” (14). Additionally, Mac Low also 
plays with absurd juxtaposition in the titles of the poems, which are constructed by joining the 
beginning of the first line of each poem with the end of the last line. This typically results in 
paradoxical strangeness, as is the case with “Time That Something Something,” but is 
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occasionally hilarious in its absurdity, as in “Be Gentle to a Greek.” I find these absurd titles 
especially endearing, and especially significant for my own purposes, because they are instances 
where we can be absolutely sure that the juxtaposition, and the humor derived thereof, follows 
from Mac Low’s own decisions based on the system’s output, and not simply the output alone. I 
imagine that deciding on the titles of these poems is one of the instances in which Mac Low took 
both surprise and pleasure from the experience. 
I would like to also point out two ways in which Mac Low’s own interaction with the 
systemic output produces humor and pleasure in the poem: in his playing with punctuation, and 
in his use of sexual innuendo. Mac Low often used punctuation as a means of interacting with 
the outputs of his systemic outputs, significantly because it allowed him to alter the flow of the 
words without disrupting the diastic pattern, which he, at times, did not want to disturb. One of 
the funniest and most interesting ways that Mac Low uses punctuation in The Stein Poems is in 
his use of the exclamation point, which he often employed to draw attention to absurdity, or to 
make a seemingly innocuous semantically correct sentence into something strange. Of the latter 
type, there are a few examples in The Stein Poems, such as in “Mercy Entirely Astonishing 
(Stein 94),” where Mac Low includes an exclamation point on line thirty-nine: “It’s not even 
extreme!” The contradiction here is apparent, and thus even more humorous; the exclamation 
point makes extreme a sentence that would otherwise not be. Of the former type, examples 
abound. I will include for you only my two favorites: also from “Mercy Entirely Astonishing,” 
line thirty-five reads, “You’re worse than an oyster!”; in “Mercy Can’t Give a Girl Much 
Pleasure in Things (Stein 108),” line twenty-one reads, “Suppose you revise that mutton!” In one 
rare instance, the exclamation mark and the repetition I discussed earlier are used together to 
great comedic effect. “Something Important Could Certainly Be Enough (Stein 76)” has Mac 
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Low arranging the output into a bizarre conversation in which the morbidity of a death threat is 
undercut by exclamation points: “You will certainly not be living any longer!” (22), which is 
bookended by lines that simply read “Ugh!!” and which increase in size as they are repeated. The 
result is hilarious in its absurdity and morbidity. Of the sexual innuendos I mentioned, I have 
only two examples, and both appear in “Mercy Can’t Give a Girl Much Pleasure in Things (Stein 
108).” Line two of the poems reads, “She was pleased, nay, delighted to be put on the table,” 
which is perhaps a very veiled reference to sexual activity, and one that appears to align the 
absurdity of female sexualization with the absurdity of food in the previous examples. I will say 
more about this, but for now am interested only in the funny and enjoyable aspects of this 
reference. The second sexual innuendo appears on line forty-two, which reads, “Cucumbers are 
occasions in more ways than nuts,” which is a not-so veiled reference to male genitalia. I cannot 
help but assume that in these moments of interacting with and arranging the outputs, Mac Low 
took great pleasure in constructing these lines. He thus opens up mechanical means of producing 
poetry as both radical and enjoyable. 
John Cage and Experimental Satori 
Despite its prominence in scholarly criticism of Cage, the influence of Zen Buddhism on 
his work cannot be overstated. It may, at first, seem strange to read the Cunningham mesostics as 
a particular example of the influence of Zen Buddhism on Cage’s poetry; certainly other more 
semantic poems, such as the poems in the “Diary: How to Improve the World (You Will Only 
Make Matters Worse)” series demonstrate a clear link between Cage’s politics and ethics and his 
affinity for Zen practice and Buddhist thought. These poems are written in short anecdotal stories 
or meditations that are borne out of the Zen tradition of the koan. A koan is a brief story (in 
literary tradition), or, more commonly, a saying, phrase, or sometimes even a word, that conveys 
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an impossibility or a paradox, and is used as a meditative tool by Buddhist monks. As Kay 
Larson, in her excellent, and exhaustive, book-length study of the role of Zen in Cage’s work, 
Where the Heart Beats: John Cage, Zen Buddhism, and the Inner Life of Artists, asserts 
Cage appreciated the koan’s cryptic storytelling style, which allowed him to say 
amusing things. Each koan-like story was a fragment, self-contained, gleaming 
like a jewel in its setting. The setting itself—the gold that holds the jewels—was 
the Cageian principle of Indeterminacy. (19) 
Cage’s koan-like fragments vary in nature. Some are expressly political, as in “Diary: How to 
Improve the World (You Will Only Make Matters Worse) Continued 1968 (Revised),” when he 
writes: “Protest actions fan the / flames of a dying fire.   Protest helps to / keep the government 
going” (12). Some are more purely amusing: “Farting, don’t think, / just fart” (22). Some, 
interestingly, are merely quotations from other people, as in this striking recounting of a 
conversation with fellow poet Robert Duncan: 
Robert 
Duncan told me his poetry was picked up 
from other people.     The only time he 
felt, he said, like using quotation 
marks was when the words he wrote 
were his. (13) 
These examples demonstrate that Cage was certainly influenced by the koan structure, and the 
meditative possibilities of its repetition, and we can see the koan’s influence clearly in the 
Cunningham mesostics.  
In section seventy-five of Cage’s Indeterminacy, he meditates briefly on the Zen 
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argument regarding repetition: “In Zen they say: If something is boring after two minutes, try it 
for four. If still boring, try it for eight, sixteen, thirty-two, and so on. Eventually one discovers 
that it’s not boring at all but very interesting.” In this brief quotation, we are forced to 
immediately contend with Cage’s view of repetition: rather than a meditation on what is being 
repeated, Zen (and by proxy Cage) see repetition as a means of discovering something present, 
but latent, in what gets repeated. It is unsurprising, then, that Cage’s work (his poetry, prose, 
music, and visual art) are all marked by distinct and prolonged repetition. Consider, for example, 
4’33,” a piece that repeats, insistently and incessantly, the silence of a refusal to perform. And, 
yet, as nearly every scholar has noted of 4’33,” the piece is virtually unrepeatable. The sounds of 
audience, environment, and ambience, make each performance unique. 
Similarly, the Cunningham mesostics are marked both by persistent repetition and the 
unique or unrepeatable, a paradox particularly relevant to the koan. To begin, of course, the 
poems repeat Cage’s partner’s first and last names throughout. Additionally, the process of the 
poems’ production, the very repetitive throwing of the I Ching coins, adds another meditative 
repetition.  But, even on the level of the morphemes, 
phonemes, words, and even phrases that appear in the poem, 
there appears another level of repetition. For example, 
“Mesostic 30” (see fig. 11) shows one of the most important 
features of repetition in the Cunningham mesostics: the 
repeated references to movement, shown here in the especially 
paradoxical “rooted / run,” a koan in its own right.  While the 
“run” in this poem suggests a movement, the “rooted” that 
precedes it implies a stasis, one that necessarily grounds the 
Figure 9 
John Cage. “Mesostic 30 (detail).” 
M (123). 
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movement, and, in turn, makes it cyclical, a run that forever repeats itself. The cyclicality recalls 
the “inging” I’ve discussed previously; “inging” is itself a koan, reminiscent of the famous koan 
“mu” (which cannot be adequately translated into English, but very roughly translates to “not”) 
which is often given to young monks. 
I provide this example not only because “rooted / run” perfectly summarizes the repeated 
tension of movement and stasis within the poem, but also because of the necessarily arborescent 
connotations of the word “rooted,” which provide an important link between Cage’s poetic work 
and the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who, in A Thousand Plateaus, present 
the rhizome as an alternative to the totalizing principles, binarism, dualism, and linearity of what 
they term aborescent thinking.29 While Cage’s sequence predates Deleuze and Guattari’s work 
by some seven years, he grapples with a similar concern, 
opposing the “rooted”ness of arborescent thinking with the 
anarchic “run” of repetition and movement. “Rooted / run,” 
then, serves as our jumping-off-point, from which we must 
then understand the repetition of this poem as, in so many 
ways, attempting to reconcile the stasis of the poem with the 
movement and process Cage wishes to capture. In re-
encountering these concepts throughout the sequence, 
repeating their koan-like nature as though meditating 
constantly on this tension, Cage’s reader is forced to reconcile 
                                                
29 They write: “Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centers of significance and subjectification, 
central automata like organized memories” (A Thousand Plateaus 18). In rhetoric more characteristic of their style 
of writing: “We’re tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees, roots, and radicles. They’ve made us suffer too 
much. All of arborescent culture is founded on them, from biology to linguistics. Nothing is beautiful or loving or 
political aside from underground stems and aerial roots, adventitious growths and rhizomes” (17). 
Figure 10 
John Cage. “Mesostic 46 (detail).” 
M (162).  
 95 
this relationship between the repeated and the unique, the moving and the static, what is written 
in ink and what Cage’s work endeavours to place in flux. But, “rooted / run” is not an isolated 
occurrence in the poem, and Cage’s work constantly returns to these tensions. Consider, for 
example, the ending of “Mesostic 46” (see fig. 12), a Cunningham mesostic in which the final 
four lines, organized by the letters GHAM, read an uncharacteristically semantically sensical “go 
/ there / and / move.” “Go / there / and / move” quite literally signals this tension between 
movement in “move” but complicates it slightly with “go / there”—the poem commands its 
reader to situate his/herself in a specific spatio-
temporal location, a “there,” and subsequently 
instructs him/her to “move” either within, or from, 
that location. Importantly, “go / there / and / move” is 
only one of a number of direct references to 
movement within the poem. “Move” itself appears 
again on its own once more, on page eleven. The word “movement” appears in full twice, first 
also on page eleven, and then again on 112. Additionally, on page 125, “Mesostic 31” (see fig. 
13) includes the especially interesting portmanteau “movegram,” which links this “movement” to 
the linguistic realm. With “movegram,” Cage’s work highlights the crux of this tension between 
movement and stasis, between the unique and the repeated: that language, in its attempts to 
organize, categorize, and communicate, works to make the moving static, to make the unique 
repeatable, to regularize and make same the different. “Movegram,” for us as readers, is a koan 
especially difficult to conceive of.30 
                                                
30 Comment by Andy Weaver (21/08/13): “But I’m wondering if there’s more for you to say about ‘Mesostic 30.’ 
Your discussion of ‘movegram’ is helpful, but does your point about the linguistic turn actually begin in ‘Mesostic 
30’ (or maybe even earlier?), ‘I’m / rooted / run / dicartiony / ple,’ since ‘dicartiony’ is an anagram of ‘dictionary’? 
 
Figure 11 
John Cage. “Mesostic 31 (detail).”  
M (125).  
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In its invitation to the reader for active engagement with the mesostics, Cage’s chance-
produced text is still just as full of paradoxical, thought-provoking koans as his more 
traditionally composed work. Indeed, the subtle or implicit, but nonetheless irreconcilable, 
                                                                                                                                                       
What do you make of that? And what about the waste/excessive/remainder ending ‘ple’? Those moments of 
linguistic excess seem important.” 
 
Response (22/08/13): “Well, that’s just perfect. If we read ‘dicartiony’ as an anagram of dictionary, then ‘rooted / 
run’ becomes a linguistic line of flight. Already disrupted by the dislocation of letters, the dictionary is still in plain 
view, cannot help but be read. Here again is the inescapability of language, and it might lend credence to Mac Low’s 
observations in my most recent section that even nonnormative syntax (and here spelling) still falls into the trap of 
sense, of semiotics, of that language-game of giving information. But “ple” is more difficult. It does not (and really 
cannot) make any sense on its own, at least not in the manner that the rest of the poem does. In an otherwise 
semantically sensical (ish) poem, the ‘ple’ is, perhaps, a moment of noise in which the earlier arguments of the poem 
(you’re stuck here, but you have to run; you keep trying to read this, but you can’t) give way to this transient 
moment of waste, but also possibility. ‘Ple’ starts more words than I could list here. From the Greek πλείων, the 
prefix means ‘more,’ suggests indefinite potential readings, leave us as readers to fill in the blank. If the first four 
lines of this poem are wrought with tension, the silence after that final line is a resounding argument for the 
possibilities of a reading that moves away from the dictionary (as a metonym for overcoding at its finest). It’s 
lovely!” 
 
Comment by Andy Weaver (22/08/13): “‘ple’ also seems to exist on the boundary between morpheme and 
phoneme–and it’s interesting that you thought about it as a word beginning, because I thought of it as a word ending 
(‘multiple,’ ‘people,’ etc), probably because it functions as the ending to the poem. But, yes, that turn to 
excess/waste is such a successful way to end an unusually normative mesostic. It also exists, not just as 
waste/excess, but perhaps as a grounded presence of language, in that it does not allow (at least in and of itself) the 
reader to move away from its materiality towards a signified. It is a linguistic body that would seem to be whole in 
and of itself (without a signified) at the same time that it can also be read as a proto-prefix or -suffix, which would 
again move it away from the singular and towards the communal?” 
Response (23/08/13): “I like this idea of the materiality of ‘ple,’ too. Going back to McCaffrey, who, as I’ve quoted 
elsewhere, says that meaning is the telos of language only insofar as a dematerialization occurs. ‘Ple,’ especially 
after ‘real words,’ refuses to dematerialize, only gestures towards it, ‘mimes’ it.”  
Comment by Sean Braune (18/11/13): “Princi-ple-s of noise. I like the direction that you and Andy take in the 
discussion section where ‘ple’ begins to adopt the valence of noise. In the context of Claude Shannon’s information 
theory a fragment like ‘ple’ would manifest as the noise that structures the signal or message. As well, within every 
layered screen of noise there are sub-fields of concretization; i.e., of ‘meaning’ as such, but this meaning itself 
contains further noise, and so on, or as Vonnegut says, so it goes. The mesostics are like a ‘movegram,’ which is 
itself a lovely term connoting dynamism, change, and dancing. Maybe the mesostics are like an informatic drug: a 
‘movegram’ has a certain weight, coming from ‘gramma’ meaning letter – i.e., ‘you can buy 3.5 grams of letters’ 
and with these grams you can permute a plane (or plateau) of satori. As well, I like to think of the mesostics as 
infinitely fractured and fragmented: they are koan-like as you point out, but they are also like infinite aphorisms—
(Derrida has a lot to say about aphorisms)—and every aphorism defines, but also cuts from a whole to create its own 
whole. A ‘ple’ here and a ‘rooted / run’ there returns the stillness of meditation and the fragmented noise of life.” 
 
Addendum: As Stephen Cain also pointed out during the oral defense of this project, “ple” also recalls the French 
“plié,” the past participle of plier, to bend, but also referring to the fundamental ballet move in which the dancer 
bends the knees outward while his/her back remains straight. It is an exceptional demonstration both of a rooted 
movement and an homage to Cunningham’s dancer’s body.   
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paradox of “rooted / run” or of “movegram” (or even of the “sicductor”), seems a more apt 
meditative koan than Cage’s slightly less provocative thoughts on passing gas. Providing a 
reader with the irresolvable koan requires that s/he undertake a shift in mental state from a 
Westernized privileging of dualism and logic (Deleuze and Guattari’s “arborescent thinking”) to 
what the Zen Buddhists call satori. D.T. Suzuki, a friend of Cage’s renowned for his role in 
bringing Japanese Zen Buddhism to the West, defines satori as “an intuitive looking into the 
nature of things in contradistinction to the analytical or logical understanding of it. … [W]ith 
satori our entire surroundings are viewed from quite an unexpected angle of perception” 
(Essentials of Zen 154). Reaching satori, a kind of enlightenment, is possible only when one 
accepts that dualism and logic is flawed. In these brief moments of koan, the Cunningham 
mesostics encourage readers to accept the noise that occurs in silence, the kind of uselessness 
that provokes new meaning, and the kind of blindness that opens up new ways of seeing. 
Jackson Mac Low’s Gendered Retro-Avant-Garde 
Returning to Mac Low, I have suggested throughout that The Stein Poems serve as a 
“coming together” or “combination” of various elements of Mac Low’s larger poetics: 
deterministic methods, authorial intervention, the intersections between asyntactical writing and 
prosody, and, most importantly for this section, an interest in forging the unique while at the 
same time engaging in homage to poetic tradition. I also noted, in my response, that The Stein 
Poems stand apart from Mac Low’s other retro-avant-garde pieces, thus making them uniquely 
well-suited for my own study. In a brief mention of Mac Low’s reading-through poems on 
Virginia Woolf (The Virginia Woolf Poems [1963]), Miller observes that the Woolf poems are 
“neutral” (97), appearing to be less political and less difficult than Mac Low’s other homage 
pieces, such as his Words nd Ends from Ez (1983, from Ezra Pound’s Cantos) or the 42 
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Merzgedichte in Memoriam Kurt Schwitters (1993). He does not mention The Stein Poems in 
this discussion. My question becomes in light of Miller’s observations: where do The Stein 
Poems fit in this spectrum of neutrality? And, how does Mac Low’s use of Stein’s writings 
contribute to our understanding of his work? 
Mac Low’s engagement with Stein’s poetry and prose differs dramatically from his 
engagement with Pound in Words nd Ends from Ez. The series of poems, which he composed for 
a journal publication at the same time that Cage was composing his “Writing-Through The 
Cantos,” were composed by diastically reading through the entirety of Pound’s cantos and 
producing poems that meditate on his name as paragram. Miller describes Mac Low’s 
engagement with Pound in these poems as “equal measure critical and mournful of their 
oversized modernist predecessor” (66). The looming presence of Pound’s persona in the poems 
is striking, as Pound’s capitalized name seems to dominate, providing an element of nominal 





hOrt om? (“VI. From the Pisan Cantos: LXXIV-LXXXIV” 22-26) 
Pound’s authorial presence in these poems owes both to the magnitude of Pound’s authorial and 
political persona, and to the fact that Mac Low had been corresponding with Pound via letters (as 
he himself discusses in an e-mail sent out to a poetics listserv, available in the SUNY Buffalo 
Electronic Poetry Center). Mac Low’s engagement with Pound on a personal level (via letters 
exclusively, the two never met in person), complicated his readings of Pound’s poetic work, 
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making it impossible to separate or compartmentalize the various facets of Pound’s influence on 
him:  a formal poetics he respected; a friendly correspondent with whom he enjoyed conversing; 
a fascist politics and anti-Semitic worldview he despised; a domineering authorial persona he 
tried to avoid in his own work.31  In comparison, The Stein Poems rarely use names as their seed 
texts and when a nominal paragram is used the name is only occasionally Stein’s (as is the case 
with “Green Completers So [Stein 13]” or the third line of “And One That Clear [Stein 15]”). 
Other times, the nominal seed text is Ulla E. Dydo, the editor of A Stein Reader, which Mac Low 
often used as his source text. Or, the nominal seed is one of personal significance to Mac Low, 
such as the name of his wife, Anne Tardos, or his son, Mordecai-Mark. More often, the seed text 
is a section of Stein’s own writing run diastically through another longer selection.32 The result is 
an exploration of Stein’s poetics rather than a predominantly elegiac reflection on the author of 
the source text. 
And yet, naming is an important facet of Mac Low’s reading-through homage poetry. 
While the personal undertones of mourning present in Words nd Ends from Ez are not as clearly 
evident in his other poems, Miller notes in his discussion of the Schwitters poems that Mac 
Low’s reading-through procedures of canonical works function as “retro-avant-garde elegies” 
                                                
31 Mac Low believed that his own sympathies toward Pound accounted for what he viewed as the success of Words 
nd Ends from Ez, as opposed to Cage who seemed displeased with the results of his writing-through of the Cantos. 
In his discussion of Cage’s writing-through of Pound, Mac Low postulated that “the difference in our results [ie. that 
he was pleased with his end-product, but Cage was not] may have been due to the fact that he was basically much 
less in sympathy with Pound—aesthetically as well as politically—than with Joyce, Thoreau, and the other authors 
from whose work he often drew” (“Cage’s Writings” 223). 
 
32 Tyrus Miller argues that naming in these writing-throughs of Pound, both Mac Low’s and Cage’s, is linked to 
death: “It indicates—even for the living—a sheer potential for being dead, for participating as dispersed textual 
bodies in the global interpenetration of discourses and languages” (68). It should be noted that the other homage 
pieces I have referenced are, for the most part, nominally-driven. The “Quattorzains for Emily Dickinson” repeat 
Dickinson’s emboldened first and last name diastically. The Merzgedichte repeat Schwitter’s name for his one-man 
artistic movement, Merz, often and unapologetically. The one notable difference is found in The Virginia Woolf 
Poems, where the poems, such as “Ridiculous in Piccadilly,” included in Thing of Beauty (163), repeat a title phrase 
diastically as opposed to a name. This lack of nominal dependence may account for what Miller describes as 
neutrality in the poems. 
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that recognize the anxiety of influence but also work to break down the structural elements of 
poetic tradition. Miller argues that this writing-through of Schwitters (as well as Pound, Woolf, 
Dickinson, and Stein) is, in effect, “performing the work of mourning that will let the avant-
garde’s claims on the future be at long last over; allowing the dead to be dead and be one with 
our fading memories of them” (105). In this reading, Mac Low’s work is positioned as a retro-
avant-garde that refuses the hierarchical vanguardism of the traditional avant-garde in favour of a 
looking-back, a consistently revisionist outlook on literary tradition, and is thus perfectly in line 
with postanarchism. As Miller also notes of the Merzgedichte, these reading-throughs 
“represent[] an evident gesture to an avant-garde predecessor, both intertextually and 
methodologically, an act of neo-avant-garde repetition and recapitulation of the historical avant-
garde” (95). And yet, if the Pound poems are “equal measure critical and mournful,” and the 
Schwitters poems are mournful as “an element of the celebratory attitude he chose to strike” 
(Miller 113), then the Stein poems appear to be purely celebratory, devoid of the work of 
mourning and relying instead on the celebratory nature of praise. 
In discussing Stein, Mac Low has never been short on celebratory praise. In fact, when 
Zurbrugg notes the influence of Stein on Mac Low’s early work, Mac Low first denies the 
influence, but eventually concedes: “I had read a little of Stein’s writing, mainly in bookstores, 
but didn’t come to know her work well till later. By the middle ‘40s I already considered her a 
great poet. Now I think she’s the greatest American poet of the twentieth century” (Art, 
Performance 255). It is, perhaps, this reverence that allows Mac Low to capture so much of 
Stein’s own style in The Stein Poems. If Words nd Ends and the Merzgedichte enact the work of 
mourning, if their reliance on naming serves as elegy, then The Stein Poems serve as a repetition, 
a re-enactment of Stein’s work that maintains the lively elements of her own writing. As she 
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herself notes in “Composition as Explanation,” the text does not simply “go dead” once it has 
been written (25), but instead remains alive and in flux by the very process of its being read. 
While the text on the page is materially static, time alters it by way of a changing audience who 
has read different texts and thus approaches the text with differing views (“Composition as 
Explanation” 22). The Stein Poems are not a work of mourning, but rather a celebration of the 
potentials and flux that can be involved in reading and rereading the canon. The Stein Poems, 
then, are acts of remembering in the absolute-Stein sense of the term, wherein “remembering is 
repetition” (“Portraits and Repetition” 178), and repetition is flux, variance by the repetition of 
one thing in a new time or place or context. 
These elements of The Stein Poems are perhaps most clearly evident in “Mercy Entirely 
Astonishing (Stein 94),” where the source text is one of Stein’s most famous and widely read 
works, the “Objects” section of Tender Buttons, and the diastic seed text is “Mildred’s 
Umbrella,” the title of the eighth poem of “Objects.” The poem reads, more so than most of the 
other Stein Poems, as though it could have been written by Stein herself, with lines like “A purse 
is a purse and nothing is nothing” (4), or “Next best is a little pencil” (24). The poem becomes 
even more reverent once one discovers, in the notes, that while Mac Low was working from the 
1914 edition of Tender Buttons published by Donald Evans (in its online version published in 
The Bartleby Archive/The New Bartleby Library), he has also “modified [his] copy of the online 
edition by incorporating corrections to it made in ink by Stein in Donald Sutherland’s copy” 
(Thing of Beauty 407). By incorporating Stein’s own corrections, Mac Low includes Stein in the 
revisionist process of his reading-through, making her doubly-undead; both her text and her 
authorship are alive and well in Mac Low’s writing process. 
But this reverence does not keep Mac Low from engaging with the output of his diastic 
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procedure. The same note signals that he “revis[ed] the program’s output by changes of word 
order, suffixes, pronouns, and structure words, but ke[pt] its lexical words’ root morphemes in 
positions close to those they occupy in the raw output” (408). By viewing Stein’s words, 
subjected to his deterministic methods, as the “raw output,” Mac Low is then free to organize 
and engage with the text as he pleases. His loyalty shines through in his desire to retain the (at 
least approximate) positions of the root morphemes of the selected words from the source text. 
While Schwitters, Pound, et al. exist named, mourned, and, in this sense, solidified by Mac 
Low’s other pieces, Stein’s active presence can be clearly noted throughout The Stein Poems. It 
is in this sense that The Stein Poems provides us with a unique view into Mac Low’s overarching 
poetics, and especially the coming-together of the larger issues he seemed to struggle with in the 
earlier parts of his writing career: all language is repetition, and all poetry more so; but, if we are 
doomed to repetition, we might as well revel in it. 
I would also like to spend some time looking at the gender politics at play in Mac Low’s 
use of Stein’s work as both source and seed text in The Stein Poems. Stein’s work, especially on 
both political and epistemological levels, has long been studied as a feminist response to the 
otherwise highly masculinized writings of the other modernists (most notably Pound and T. S. 
Eliot), and against the very masculine discourses of war writing and historical writing that 
became popular at the time. In Stein scholarship, the trend has been to read Stein presenting a 
feminized writing that works against the history, narrative, and logic that marks 
phallogocentricity. For Maria Diedrich, in “‘A Book in Translation about Eggs and Butter’: 
Gertrude Stein’s World War II,” Stein works against the patriarchal tropes of “rationality, 
linearity, and hierarchical order” by rejecting history and historical temporality, instead 
privileging domesticity and what Diedrich terms “daily living” (92). In this sense, when Stein 
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focuses her work on the domestic (clothing, food, household objects, and the quotidian in 
general), and when she also rejects the linearity of traditional narrative, she in turn “rejects the 
canonized paradigms of the war discourse [and thus] reconstructs a reality which in its 
destruction of the past and its negation of the future consists exclusively of the moment” (101). 
Though Diedrich looks at Stein’s WWII-era writings, and Mac Low, for the most part, deals with 
Stein’s earlier work (the two texts he deals with most are A Long Gay Book [1911-12] and 
Tender Buttons [1914]), a similar preoccupation with everyday life as a counteraction against 
phallocentric modes of narrative and history are still certainly at play in Stein’s early texts. 
On a metapoetic level this is a move for Stein from the detached and naturalized concept 
of “history” to the personal, affective, and highly constructed concept of “literature.” As Phoebe 
Stein Davis writes in “‘Even Cake Gets to Have Another Meaning’: History, Narrative, and 
‘Daily Living’ in Gertrude Stein’s World War II Writings,” “Stein makes ‘history’ (‘what goes 
on from time to time’), become ‘literature’ (‘what goes on all the time’)—what happens every 
day” (575). A similar model (if less clearly gendered) is at play in Mac Low’s poetics generally; 
his move to asyntactical writing and his use of systemic and deterministic methods breaks with 
the same conceptions of rationality, historicity, and linearity. Moreover, the highly stylized 
manner in which Mac Low constructs and presents his texts, and his “attention to beauty” 
(Tardos xvi), show that he is, alongside Stein, an author who privileges the constructed over the 
natural or naturalized. And yet, Mac Low’s interest in producing “minimally egoic” texts 
(Tardos xviii), texts that attempt to break from the subjectivity of the author, seems to run 
counter to Stein’s manifestly feminist and feminized mode of writing that depends in no small 
part on the author’s gendered subject position. As feminist critics of postmodern and 
poststructural writings have long argued, the erasure or reduction of the writing subject is 
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alluring as a literary practice, but it is at best unhelpful and at worst problematic to dismantle a 
voice that is necessarily minoritarian. Language, Stein’s work tells us, is necessarily gendered, 
and as long as legible words exist, even if syntax, narrative, and sense have been doctored, there 
will always be the issue of gender at play. 
The potential gendered problems of Mac Low’s use of Stein in The Stein Poems stems 
from the politically neutral or unproblematic ways in which Mac Low uses the Stein texts he 
chooses. This is especially transparent once one considers the clearly political manner in which 
Mac Low writes-through Pound and Schwitters. As Miller explains, for Mac Low, Pound 
“represented a powerful negative exemplum of the way in which art and politics could be 
linked—an authoritative and authoritarian model that it was crucial for the anarcho-pacifist Mac 
Low to come to terms with and defuse” (97, emph. Miller’s). Mac Low’s use of Pound’s work is 
a process by which he comes to terms with, and potentially counteracts, Pound’s fascist politics 
and poetics. His use of Schwitters is less critical but no less political. Miller writes instead that 
Schwitters “is a profoundly positive figure for Mac Low, artistically and, through his art, 
politically as well” (97). Rather than a point of contestation, “Schwitters is presented by Mac 
Low as his political alter ego as well as his aesthetic precursor and exemplum” (Miller 98). Thus, 
the Merzgedichte are anticapitalist, anticonsumerist pieces that join Schwitters’s political 
concerns with Mac Low’s own. In contrast, Mac Low’s use of Stein is almost purely aesthetic; 
while his overall poetics and politics are clearly influenced by Stein’s writing, The Stein Poems 
are less a political argument either for (as in Schwitters) or against (as in Pound) her politics, and 
more a joyful appreciation of what he views as the affective or emotional potentials of her work. 
This move is, from a gendered perspective, a problem insofar as Mac Low reads Stein as an 
aesthetic poet, almost completely ignoring her feminist and political interests. 
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In fact, Mac Low actually identifies Stein’s work as moving away from the quotidian or 
ordinary, even in her presentations of domestic ordinariness. This is best demonstrated in Mac 
Low’s discussion of Stein, “Reading a Selection from Tender Buttons,” collected in The 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book. Mac Low writes: 
Is the whole poem then a “pointing” from the ordinary transparent carafe 
(“nothing strange”) to one “not ordinary”—one that is “blind”—an orderly (“not 
unordered”) movement “spreading” from transparency & clarity thru the “single 
hurt color” to the implied darkness & opacity of blindness, a movement 
condensed & made explicit in the title? (204) 
Here Mac Low extrapolates from Stein’s “All this and not ordinary,” from the first poem of the 
collection, “A Carafe, That is a Blind Glass,” that the poem looks to move from the ordinariness 
of a transparent carafe to one made different (and thus “not ordinary”) by virtue of its being 
filled, and thus made “blind”—no longer transparent. What he fails to identify anywhere in this 
reading is the political import behind Stein’s use of these images of domesticity, and the blatant 
references to “violence” as indicative of the limitations of the domestic sphere. Instead of the 
clear political responses he has to Pound and Schwitters, his response to Stein is markedly 
aesthetic and affective; he describes the process of reading Tender Buttons as both “inward” and 
“emotional” (203). 
For Elisabeth Frost in “Signifyin(g) on Stein: The Revisionist Poetics of Harryette 
Mullen and Leslie Scalapino,” this affective but apolitical or neutral response to Stein’s work is 
what marks Mac Low’s reading, and the other readings compiled in The 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book, as problematic. She writes, “The entries in The 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book’s ‘Readings’ section—all appreciations of Tender Buttons and all 
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written by men—bear witness to Stein’s importance to this particular ‘movement’” (par. 2). But 
she also adds that where “recent feminist avant-garde poets linked to L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 
writing” admit to owing a great debt to Stein’s poetics, they do so reservedly, in that they 
“contest them—and her—as well” (par. 2). For Frost, the readings of Stein in The 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book amount to “simply acknowledg[ing] Stein’s language 
experiments” (par. 2), without adequately critiquing or contesting the politics therein. This lack 
of political engagement is perhaps best demonstrated in one of the sexual innuendoes I discussed 
earlier that appears in the first four lines of “Mercy Can’t Give a Girl Much Pleasure in Things 
(Stein 108),” and reads: 
Mercy can’t give a girl much of a costume. 
She was pleased, nay, delighted to be put on the table. 
If things were resolved by analyzing redness, wouldn’t that make some ordinary 
things a little fancier? 
More tables are designed than made. 
In this section of the poem, Mac Low mines the results of his systemic use of Stein, producing a 
poem that seems to detach Stein’s interest in the ordinary from her source poetry. Mac Low’s 
poem suggests that theorization (“analyzing” and “design[ing]”) works to remove the quotidian 
from its place, making it “a little fancier” and thus not “ordinary.” Analysis and design fall 
squarely into the designation of logic, sense, and, ultimately, history; it is thus unsurprising that 
these activities seem to directly follow the process of laying “she” (an unnamed female 
character) on the table, and are followed by the potential sexual pun of “made” at the end of the 
fourth line. This reorganization of Stein’s work moves the feminized writing-subject position to 
the quotidian object itself, and instead shifts its focus to the very discourse Stein’s poetics 
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worked against, especially considering the move of the female voice from Stein’s assertive 
activity to the passive unnamed “she” of these poems. If “[m]ore tables are designed than made,” 
and if “analyzing redness” (perhaps the very redness that renders a carafe blind—a “hurt color”) 
makes ordinary things fancier, then certainly this text is not interested in using “daily living” as a 
recourse away from the grand narrative of logic and history. This is not to say that Mac Low’s 
poetics more generally do not oppose these structures; I hope to have demonstrated that this is 
the case. What I want to show is merely that there are gender issues with Mac Low’s seemingly 
apolitical engagement with Stein, and I would be remiss if I did not, in the end, point them out.
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Chapter Two: Writing to the Common: Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov 
I begin this chapter with a fairly contentious statement: that a politics of anarchic, 
communal love1 is central to the political poetry of both Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov.  
This statement should read as contentious for two reasons: first, that love is not typically 
considered a valid topic in literary criticism; second, because Levertov is not an anarchist poet 
(certainly not in the way that Duncan is). In this chapter, I will address these contentions, 
beginning with the first. Love, I argue, is a major feature of Duncan’s Passages poems, a series 
that punctuates his well-known collection, Bending the Bow and both volumes of his final work, 
Ground Work. In Passages, Duncan envisions love as an outside of, or alternative to, 
conventional politics and poetics. He achieves this, in his poetry, through his incessant and at 
times troubling use of intertext, requiring that in order to navigate or make sense of Duncan’s 
borrowing from other texts all the reader really needs is love, to echo the famous Beatles song. I 
anticipate that, in the culture of detached, scholarly work, such a claim reads as laughable, but I 
maintain that a politics of love is the driving force behind the Passages series. Before I discuss 
how love factors into Duncan’s poetry and his poetics, the fact that such a claim feels out-of-
place or discredited in literary studies merits some discussion. I have called the scholarly work 
behind the study of literature detached,2 by which I mean to draw attention to the largely 
                                                
1 While I do not have the space to adequately discuss it in much length, I do want to point out that the politics of 
love in Duncan’s work (and its absent correlative in Levertov’s) is historically significant. As my committee 
member Art Redding pointed out to me, the “free love” of anarchists like Duncan in the middle of the century was 
part of what separated the “hippies” and their attacks on normalcy from the staunch seriousness of Marxism, 
Leninism, and the kind of protest politic that Levertov seems to align herself with. Although, as I will demonstrate 
throughout this chapter, the differences between these two poets’ politics is not so great.  
 
2 Comment by Jonathan Vandor (23/10/13): “I’m not sure if I buy the idea of literary criticism being emotionless: 
what about the endless pursuit of ‘tone’? Granted, the language around tone is certainly not as formalized or 
specific, indicating that pinpointing how it works hasn’t been an academic priority. But then again, what about 




patriarchal politic behind the fact that sentiment (characterized by the emotions of love, empathy, 
and care) is typically associated with the feminine, which leads scholarly work to ignore these 
emotions in favor of objectivity, thought, and reason. 
It is this observation that leads Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in the final installment 
of their Empire trilogy, Commonwealth (2011), to observe that, in philosophy, theory, and even 
literary criticism, “[w]hat is missing is love” (179).  Hardt and Negri claim that “[l]ove has been 
so charged with sentimentality that it seems hardly fit for philosophical and much less political 
discourse” (179). Instead, they assert that the normative assumption is that philosophers should 
“[l]eave it to the poets to speak of love” (179). Throughout his poetry and his prose, Duncan 
speaks of love incessantly, but not with the kind of lower-case-r romantic zeal associated with 
the poet. Rather, Duncan articulates a politics of love strikingly similar to the one Hardt and 
Negri discuss decades later. For Hardt and Negri, as for Duncan, “love is not, as it is often 
characterized, spontaneous or passive. It does not simply happen to us as if it were an event that 
mystically arrives from elsewhere. Instead, it is an action … planned and realized in common” 
(180). Also like Duncan, Hardt and Negri condemn an identitarian love (a love of the same, to 
borrow from Luce Irigaray), remarkably similar to Duncan’s condemnation of the 
contemporaneous gay-rights movement in “The Homosexual and Society.”3 Instead, Hardt and 
Negri advocate a politics of love that “composes singularities, like themes in a music store, not in 
                                                                                                                                                       
Response (18/11/13): “I tend to think that ‘tone’ and how a text conveys or expresses an emotion is quite different 
from affect. Sure, affect is garnering some good attention these days, but I think it’s valuable to note that the 
experimental text is not often considered for its affective merits in the same way as, say, a Dickens novel. Which is 
interesting because I also think that the experiment has a more direct affective relationship to the reader than its 
narrative/content based counterparts.” 
 
3 In “The Homosexual and Society,” Duncan refutes an identitarian rights-based discourse, instead opting for the 
celebration of each individual’s “share in universal human experience” (45). In a footnote, he clearly links this sort 
of politics to his writing, arguing that “[t]he principal point is that the creative genius of a writer lies in his 
communication of personal experience as a communal experience” (45n5).  
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unity but as a network of social relations” (184). Thus, a politics of love would entail the search 
for similarities (as opposed to the differences sought out in an identitarian politics), and would 
privilege all singularities equally. 
What is perhaps most important for Hardt and Negri is the fact that love both produces 
the common and functions as a part of it (xii). It is a physical force and a political action, but one 
that embraces flux, seeks alternatives, disrupts representation and expression, and engages the 
social in collective responsibility. Love is responsible to, and part of, the common; it does not 
rely on the binarism of individual and society, of self and other, but rather embraces the varied 
connections between individuals that exist exclusively in flux. Duncan, too, is interested in the 
idea of love as disorder, as demonstrated in “Such is the Sickness of Many a Good Thing”4 when 
he writes of “Eris5 in Eros / key and lock” (5-6), lamenting “I could not speak / the releasing / 
word” (7-9). “Eris,” the Greek goddess of strife and discords, features prominently in Duncan’s 
work. For him the instability of eris is necessary for a communal and anarchic eros. The eris in 
eros is something just beyond articulation, a kind of divinity (charitas) that expresses itself for 
Duncan as a natural order beyond our imposed order, and it results in the common (communitas). 
Duncan eventually sums up this definition of love in a letter to Denise Levertov, arguing that 
“Eros or Eris (that strife Heraklites has in mind, a striving for a higher order of things that casts 
existing orders into the aspect of disorder)” demand the sacrificing of identitarian markers (“30 
                                                
4 While “Such is the Sickness” is not a part of the Passages series, its inclusion in Bending the Bow demonstrates 
that the relationship between eros and eris was a feature of Duncan’s writing at this point in his career. Moreover, 
Duncan’s repeated assertion that the weaving of Passages into other poems in Bending the Bow and Ground Work 
similarly assert that they cannot adequately be extracted from their surroundings. “[W]hat I aimed at,” he tells an 
interviewer, “is a weaving that would be at the same time loose enough” that they would be separate but tied to their 
context, even lamenting “how little I am able to break up my close weave” (A Poet’s Mind 92).  
 
5 Comment by Andy Weaver (25/1/14): “As an aside, I think you’re going to have to discuss Duncan’s use of, and 
faith in, eris/Strife sooner or later. I think that it is a central part of Duncan’s anarchism, and would go hand in hand 
with the notion of ‘intervention’ that you very productively include.” 
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March, 1968” 607). This sacrifice is central to his poetry and poetics, which constitute a search 
for a commonality, for equality, and for an ethics of love that values each example not for its 
artistic, but its emotional value. In this politics of love, language is crucial. As Stephen Collis 
notes in his essay, “A Duncan Etude: Dante and Responsibility,” for Duncan, “language is the 
commons: we all have equal rights to enter there—permission to return to the common source” 
(n.p). Collis goes on to observe that for Duncan the language of poetry occupies an important 
place in the language of the common: “Poetry is a gift of the givenness of language and no poet 
holds property rights over it, but owes it his or her service and responsibility. Poetry is radically 
communal, and the modernist development of collage—the quoting poem parading its ‘reading-
writing’—is one expression of this” (n.p). Thus Duncan, in his Passages series, moves freely 
from source text to his own, misquoting (either intentionally or unintentionally), paraphrasing, 
and refusing citation in order to foreground the fact that language cannot be owned. Despite the 
discourses of intellectual property, language is inherently communal. This communal approach is 
also a critique of self-interested individualism. As I will demonstrate later in this chapter, 
Duncan also sees Passages as enacting a breaking of boundaries between the writing and the 
reading subjects, especially by way of a poetic common, implicitly suggesting that a “Self” is 
only one node in a multiplicity, opposing the liberal humanist monadic individual that suppresses 
as it divides and orders. In a common concerned with “the fulfilment of human potentialities,” 
this breaking of boundaries occurs in the interstices of language and love.  
Anne Day Dewey, in her article “Creeley, Duncan, and the Uses of Abstraction,” makes 
clear the links between Duncan’s poetry, language, and love. Dewey postulates a “lovers’ 
common ‘language of daily life’” as “the creative centre from which cosmic order ‘expands,’ 
redefining the new natural order grounded in the lovers’ harmony” (106). This “private speech 
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community” reinvigorates language with love and with sameness that “gives language new 
meaning” (106). This appears to be largely an aesthetic choice until one considers Dewey’s 
claim that, for Duncan, “love is the source of change” (104), adding that “[t]his changing 
perception of language implies a shift in the conception of the public sphere that poetry 
addresses” (112). Thus it becomes extremely important that, in a footnote to “The Homosexual 
in Society,” Duncan argues that “[t]he principal point is that the creative genius of a writer lies in 
his [sic] communication of personal experience as a communal experience” (45). As the personal 
becomes communal, the poetic becomes political, inciting the reader to relinquish the identitarian 
politics of difference in favor of a new politics of empathy. 
This rejection of identitarian politics is integral to Duncan’s poetics and politics of love. 
Michael Palmer sees it clearly enacted in Duncan’s work when he writes in the introduction to 
Ground Work that the “[f]orces formed within the Ego … must be channelled toward the 
obliteration (or else possible overcoming) of that ‘I’ or self” (x). In “The Homosexual and 
Society” Duncan makes clear the link between this poetic choice and its political implications, 
writing that: 
only one devotion can be held by a human being seeking a creative life and 
expression, and that is a devotion to human freedom, toward liberation of human 
love, human conflicts, human aspirations. To do this one must disown all the 
special groups (nations, churches, sexes, races) that would claim allegiance. (47) 
Here, he makes reference to the aforementioned sacrifices he describes to Levertov. Even 
Duncan’s most overt claims for what we would call gay-rights do not fit into such an identitarian 
category; he is not particularly concerned with “rights” either, viewing them as another 
imposition onto the otherwise egalitarian natural order. This liberation is driven, more than 
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anything else, by love. “Love is dishonored,” he writes, “where sexual love between those of the 
same sex is despised; and where love is dishonored there is no public trust” (49). His poetry, and 
especially his poetry of erotic love, tends to shy away from the identitarian designation of 
“homosexual,” instead preferring to focus on the intersubjective connection of eroticism. In one 
of the most famous poems of the Passages series, “The Torso, Passages 18” (Bending the Bow 
63), he even displays a deep skepticism for the term, following the third-line’s phrasing “Is 
he…” with the delayed and italicized “…homosexual?” nine lines later. The term “homosexual” 
designates a third-party voice (neither speaker nor beloved) who imposes the subject position on 
the lovers judgmentally. The lovers, however, are not concerned with naming. Instead, the 
speaker of the poem focuses on his desire to “pour forth my soul /   his soul   commingling” (14-
5), eventually noting that in their erotic union6 they complicate (or perhaps collapse) the 
individualized subject positions required to be labeled “homosexual” so derisively. “Gathering 
me,” he tells his lover, “you gather / your Self” (51-2). Though the poem states defiantly in its 
penultimate line, “For my Other is not a woman but a man” (53), the identitarian label of 
“homosexual” is forfeited in favor of the “commingling” that defines love in the common.  
By shifting the focus from the identity politics of the gay man in those gay-rights 
movements he condemns and towards the love itself (both the sexual love between members of 
the same sex and communal love for all individuals), Duncan enacts precisely the kind of politics 
of love that Hardt and Negri would later posit. “What we are looking for—and what counts in 
love—” they insist at the end of their chapter on love, “is the production of subjectivity and the 
encounter of singularities which compose new assemblages and constitute new forms of the 
common” (186). Ultimately, Duncan composes these new assemblages of love, just as the 
                                                
6 I will return to this poem later in this chapter to discuss the importance of erotic attention. At this point, I am 
interested only in how the poem substitutes love for identity politics.  
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Passages series creates new assemblages as well: new assemblages of readers, of texts, and 
between the poems themselves. This communal love gets articulated, first and foremost, in 
Duncan’s process of writing as first a reading, a process that attempts to link the practices of 
reading and writing as closely as possible. Duncan envisions his text as being situated in a 
discursive practice where language is held in common, and all texts are innately joined in “new 
assemblages” that articulate “new forms of the common.” With the incessant and often troubling 
use of quotation, borrowing, and a kind of expropriation or “plagiarism”7 that litters Passages, 
Duncan argues that texts exist in bonds with each other, and that in this sharing they demonstrate 
the same communality and public love/trust that he articulates in his politics. I will examine this 
politics and poetics of communal love throughout, looking at the various ways it enacts itself in 
the Passages sequence, and how it gets altered in the work of Levertov, Duncan’s contemporary.  
In light of Duncan’s approaches to active readership, we must then read Levertov’s work 
as engaging an active readership, surely, but one that does so in a radically different way. For the 
most part, scholarship surrounding the well-publicized rift recorded in the correspondence 
                                                
7 Comment by Andy Weaver (18/1/14): “I don’t know about ‘plagiarism.’ I take your points in the footnote as 
completely valid… but, as you suggest, the term’s entrenching of ownership is problematic (so I guess that problem 
is more fundamental to me than it is to you). I wonder if a term like ‘expropriation’ might work better? If we take 
Duncan at his word, he expects others to rework his poetry, and so Duncan’s borrowing/stealing can also be viewed 
as a way of placing lost elements back into the intellectual commons, of resuscitating ideas/words that have been 
forgotten by readers and giving them new life.” 
 
Response (18/1/14): “I think expropriation is an excellent term for what Duncan does, but I also feel a personal 
desire to add it to plagiarism rather than remove the latter completely. I guess I just really like the idea of discussing 
plagiarism in a way that foregrounds how Duncan’s work still directly contests contemporary intellectual property 
issues.” 
 
Addendum: The use of the term plagiarism in my work is inherently problematic because in order for there to be 
“plagiarism” there must also be concomitant ideas of intellectual property, copyright, and some designation of the 
ownership of language. This, of course, runs counter to Duncan’s argument that language, and especially poetic 
language, is held in common and that we all, as readers and writers, have equal rights to it. I use the term still 
because it demonstrates the degree to which Duncan’s project runs counter to the dominant ideologies of intellectual 
property and language rights of juridical discourses both when he wrote and when I do. I recognize that my use of 
the term can also be taken as entrenching the very system it critiques. 
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between Duncan and Levertov has set the two authors in opposing schools of political poetry: 
Duncan’s enacts an individual freedom, whereas Levertov’s prescribes a revolutionary mode of 
activism which privileges communal responsibility over individual freedom. I would like to 
reposition Levertov’s poetry as one that necessarily enacts a communal politics that 
complements, rather than contradicts, Duncan’s push for individual freedom. In order to do so, I 
would like to focus on the collection that truly marks Levertov’s shift from the organic lyric poet 
of her earlier collections, to the stark realist politics of her Vietnam War era poems: The Jacob’s 
Ladder, published in 1961.8 At this time, American troops stationed in Vietnam were increasing 
dramatically, but the war had not captured the attention of the American public in the way that it 
would in the mid- to late-sixties.9 For this reason, Levertov’s political poems deal less with 
politics directly10 and instead enact a poetry of the communal that encourages her readers to be 
active in their engagement and specific in their perception of the world around them; this 
communality recalls, rather than rebukes, Duncan’s own advocations. Levertov envisions this 
                                                
8 Comment by Andy Weaver (26/1/14): “Dani, this is an interesting entry point into discussing Levertov, and I think 
the broad distinctions you make between Levertov’s and Duncan’s sensibilities is solid. I do wonder a bit, given the 
frame of the Duncan-Levertov controversy that you use as a hinge to move from Duncan into Levertov, that you 
chose The Jacob’s Ladder as a crucial text. I remember Duncan being more or less fine with that book (and perhaps 
the next?), and not really criticizing Levertov until her late ’60s books. My memory is always dodgy—am I wrong 
on that point? If so, then all is well—but if I’m right that Duncan and Levertov didn’t really part poetic company 
until later, I think it might be problematic to suggest a split that isn’t there at the time of The Jacob’s Ladder. This is 
a concern that might be rendered moot merely by acknowledging and contextualizing your points more specifically. 
Is it because the obvious split isn’t there yet that makes focusing on The Jacob’s Ladder so important to your 
argument? Perhaps clarifying your stance in the first paragraph or two would help?” 
 
Response (27/1/14): “My interest in The Jacob’s Ladder is that it really sets up the paradox of self/perspective and 
dissolution in her work, and while it does predate the vast majority of Duncan’s criticisms, I see it as, really, the 
foundation text for her mid-career work that angered Duncan so much.” 
 
9 America was preoccupied, instead, as Levertov’s poetry often critiques, with the Camelot of the newly inaugurated 
Kennedy administration, and, by the time of The Jacob’s Ladder’s publication, the failure of the Bay of Pigs 
invasion. 
 
10 Save the important exception of “During the Eichmann Trial,” which discusses the war crimes trial of former SS 
officer Adolf Eichmann. 
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common as one in the material, political world, but also and perhaps more importantly, one in 
the linguistic realm, and thus advocates the commonality of the poetic and literary imagination. 
Of course, it must be added that The Jacob’s Ladder predates the vast majority of Duncan’s 
criticisms of Levertov, so it is a bit unfair of me to use this particular collection in order to 
contradict Duncan’s critiques. The reason that I find this collection to be the most appropriate 
site for my discussions of Levertov’s politics is that it really sets up the paradox of self or 
perspective and the dissolution of the self that would become so central to her work. Though The 
Jacob Ladder predates the major rifts between the two poets, it sets the foundation for 
Levertov’s midcareer work that angered Duncan so much. It also sets the tone of active, engaged 
readership, which remains the clearest similarity between the two.  
A Common Readership 
In “Relearning Denise Levertov’s Alphabet: War, Flesh, and the Intimacy of Otherness,” 
Lisa Narbeshuber argues that Levertov’s theories of authorship are “[t]ypical of the Black 
Mountain orientation” in that “her poetry wants to engage in a direct dialogue with the outside 
world rather than withdraw from such a worldly world into a removed aesthetic sphere” (138). 
But, her poetry does not converse with its reader in the same manner as Duncan’s palimpsestic 
Passages, or as Charles Olson’s sweeping invitations in The Maximus Poems. Instead, while 
promoting conceptions of a political and a poetic common, the form of the organic lyric that 
Levertov constructs throughout her career (especially in The Jacob’s Ladder) functions more as 
a Romantic lyric than a direct engagement with the reader. Marjorie Perloff notes this much in 
her article on the Duncan/Levertov correspondence when she writes that Levertov’s wildly 
popular anti-war poem, “Tenebrae” (1972), does not adequately engage with her readership: 
“The poem leaves the reader no freedom to interpret.” What Levertov hoped, instead of a 
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“freedom to interpret,” was that her poetry would affect her readers into more direct and specific 
attentiveness and engagement with the world around them.11 
Narbeshuber attributes this desire, in part at least, to the popularization of television, 
which Levertov viewed, contrary to many popular understandings of its role in the Vietnam war, 
as something that “severs a difficult reality from the senses” (133). While the media frenzy 
surrounding the American occupation of Vietnam had not yet begun at the time of The Jacob’s 
Ladder’s publication, we nonetheless see this call for worldly attentiveness in action in the 
collection right away. The collection begins with an epigraphic poem, “To The Reader,” in 
which Levertov encourages attention to the world surrounding the reader, outside the text. The 
last stanza of the short poem reads: 
and as you read 
the sea is turning its dark pages 
turning 
 its dark pages. (7-10) 
Here, Levertov aligns her poem (and by its epigraphic nature, the whole collection) with the 
external world, reminding the reader of his or her position in the common, even in the secluding 
act of reading a book of poems. 
In fact, it is precisely this turn to the common or the collective on the political level that 
Levertov suggests Duncan’s politics of individual freedom sorely lacks. According to Perloff, 
                                                
11 Comment by Sean Braune (25/11/13): “So Perloff writes that ‘Tenebrae’ ‘leaves the reader no freedom to 
interpret.’ This claim has interesting political implications I think: namely, what is the difference between poetry 
and propaganda? When ‘freedom to interpret’ is removed, then the poem becomes propagandist because it has a 
direct message that becomes forced onto the reader. Part of what makes poetry such an effective postanarchist or 
anarchist medium is that it is open—poetry lives in a very broad commons (I think you imply this somewhere). The 
danger of delimiting interpretation is that poetry becomes a ‘sell,’ ‘message,’ or ‘slogan.’ I guess this has always 
been part of my problem with Levertov’s Vietnam War poems: they lose the anarchism of poetry and become 
political archaisms.” 
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Levertov says that Duncan’s anarchic upbringing caused him to rely too much on individual 
freedom, and thus to “mistrust group action.” Perloff goes on to quote Levertov as arguing that 
because of the radical and anarchic politics of his parents, Duncan “did not experience the 
comradeship, the recognition of apparent strangers as brothers and sisters” (SM 111-12 qtd in 
“Poetry, Politics” n.p.). Conversely, Levertov’s Anglican upbringing has apparently prepared her 
for such collective political and poetic thinking. Dewey, in her article about the Duncan/Levertov 
correspondence, notes that this Christian approach to communality allows “[h]er poetry of the 
early 1960s [to] use[] the language of literature and tradition to frame epiphanic experience of 
the everyday, shifting inspiration from concrete objects to a community of literary kindred 
spirits” (“Poetic Authority” 114). In a turn that recalls Duncan’s poetic common, “Levertov roots 
her imagination in a spirit world nourished by poetic tradition” (ibid). In this manner, Levertov 
employs the quotidian, and especially the colloquial, to embrace this linguistic conception of the 
common. Dewey goes on to write that 
While leveling the hierarchy (although not abolishing the distinction) between 
poetic and colloquial diction, Levertov admits both as essential elements of her 
expression. As one in a continuum of individual utterances that establish 
consensual public meaning, poetry can engage colloquial idiom directly and 
transform it. (117) 
In contrast to Duncan’s critiques of Levertov in their correspondence, which I will detail 
momentarily, Dewey argues that her determined “embrace of group language represents not loss 
of [individual] freedom but a positive, mutual transformation of self and community” (117). 
This, too, is represented in the language of The Jacob’s Ladder as early as the first poem 
following the epigraphic “To The Reader,” a poem appropriately titled “A Common Ground.” In 
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this poem, Levertov begins by foregrounding the unity implied. The first line reads: “To stand on 
common ground.”  This thematic conceit is carried throughout, as in lines seventeen through 
twenty which read: 
to eat and sweet 
to be given, to be eaten 
in common, by labourer 
and hungry wanderer… 
Throughout the collection this political, populist common is extended to the artistic imagination, 
albeit less explicitly, as in the direct address to a fictional “Homer da Vinci” (“The Part” 1). In 
The Jacob’s Ladder, commonality abounds. 
Levertov’s work is also persistently interested in an authorial writing-self that navigates 
this rhizomatic common space, and this is something that many critics of her work have noted. 
Narbeshuber, for example, argues that Levertov’s work functions to “carefully rethink the nature 
of self and community, ambitiously attempting to mend the classic subject/object dualism, while 
simultaneously constructing a vision of a self able to think and act in the world” (133). This 
reliance on the self is perhaps most evident in Levertov’s later poetics pieces in which she often 
defers to a personal and even subjective relationship between the writing self and poetic form. 
Her “On the Function of the Line” (1979), for example, contains the following passage: 
Then the student poet can decide, or feel out, whether he or she wrote it down but 
read it right, or vice versa. That decision is a very personal one and has quite as 
much to do with the individual sensibility of the writer and the unique character of 
the experience embodied in the words of the poem, as with universally 
recognizable rationality—though that may play a part, too. (85, emph. mine) 
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Later in the same piece she argues that open or free poetic forms “build unique contexts” (86, 
emph. Levertov’s). In “A Poet’s View” (1984) she goes as far as to say that the construction of a 
clearly defined writing self is integral to an “honest artist,” writing that “an honest artist is, and 
needs to be, conscious of having a point of view, a philosophy or a constellation of opinions and 
beliefs which inform his or her work in some degree” (239). While this conception of an 
authorial presence might seem to run counter to a postanarchist reading and writing practice, it is 
valuable here insofar as it allows Levertov to put emphasis on affective reading strategies, “in 
order to make readers understand what is happening, really understand it, not just know about it 
but feel it” (“Poetry, Prophecy, Survival” 146, emph. Levertov’s). Nonetheless, this “self” 
immediately lends itself to a speaking for or on behalf of the other. While uncritical of this, 
Levertov herself notes it when she writes that this affective relationship with the reader “has the 
obvious functions of raising consciousness and articulating emotions for people who have not the 
gift of expression” (“Poetry, Prophecy, Survival” 144). Thus, it is unsurprising that the second 
person singular pronoun of “To The Reader” shifts later in the collection to the collective “we” 
in “The Tide” when Levertov writes “While we sleep” (1). But, we are also not shocked when, 
only a few lines later, the prescriptive poetic voice, with her clearly defined point of view, 
emerges in separation from the “we” when Levertov writes “I hear” (14). In the end, despite 
Levertov’s gestures toward the political and poetic common, the poet still envisions herself as 
hearing, and speaking, for those who do not have these “gifts.” 
While The Jacob’s Ladder, a mid-career collection for Levertov, best demonstrates her 
relationship to a postanarchist literary theory, Duncan’s relationship to it can be best 
demonstrated by his later work, exemplified by the aforementioned Passages series. Passages 
seems to me to be the best example of the way Duncan’s politics of borrowing, of anarchism, of 
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active readership, of a refusal of integration, and of a politics and ethics of communal love. I say 
this especially because the series is, as Palmer writes, “perhaps the most radical example of his 
poetics” (x), most notably regarding Duncan’s use of allusion and intertext. The word Clément 
Oudart, in “Genreading and Underwriting: A Few Soundings and Probes into Duncan’s Ground 
Work,” uses to describe these Passages poems, “palimpsestic” (par. 6), is especially apt, with its 
connotations of rewriting, re-visioning, and expanding. While many of the other poems Duncan 
wrote throughout his career also contain similar allusions and quotations, the Passages poems 
are set apart because of the distinctly revisionist nature of the serial poems themselves. 
Seemingly aware of this, Duncan ends his poetics piece, “Some Notes on Notation,” by 
explaining the Passages series and why it must, necessarily, be set apart. He writes: 
In Passages verses may be articulated into phrases or tesserae of utterances and 
silences leading to a series of possible sentences. As Passages themselves are but 
passages of a poem beyond that calls itself Passages and that is manifest only in 
the course of the books in which it appears … phrases have both their own 
meaning and yet belong to the unfolding revelation of a Sentence beyond the 
work. (5) 
The similarities between this poetic series and the singularities involved in the poststructuralism 
and postanarchism I have outlined in my introduction are clear; in each case, the singularities 
(poems or persons) “have their own meaning” and at the time belong to a greater commonality. It 
is the same politics of common, of love, that unites “all humans” in Duncan’s politics and that 
unites the poems of the Passages series. For him, the individual elements, and the connections 
that join them, are just as important as the assemblage as a whole because the individual 
elements are manifestations of the “whole.” Indeed, the only way to approach the whole is 
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through the individual part. This means that he is not particularly concerned with an end-product, 
which would present an image of “wholeness” that would be untrue. So, his interest shifts to 
process.  
In terms of the Passages poems, this process is most clearly evident in the “reading-
writing” that Duncan uses throughout. The process of reading through a vast array of original or 
source texts becomes evident in the poems, which Oudart insists we should read as emblems of a 
process rather than end-products: “The published poems,” he writes, “ought … to be read as 
notebooks, as a groundwork for an illusory Book to come” (par 55). An example of this reading-
writing process is “The Concert, Passages 31 (Tribunals)” (Ground Work 15-31), a poem whose 
title puns on two important themes in the series: at once a public performance by many artists, 
and a suggestion of harmony or agreement. The performers in this concert are represented by the 
various allusions Duncan makes throughout, beginning almost immediately with a reworking of 
the concepts of Jakob Boehme. Duncan’s use of Boehme is sporadic, ranging from an allusion on 
line four to Boehme’s concept of “Salitter” (the essence of God), to a quotation that lasts from 
lines eight through eleven. As readers, we should be thankful for the fact that Duncan cites 
Boehme so we do not confuse the two voices, saving us from Oudart’s warning that “unwary 
critics [may] quote him when they are in fact unwittingly quoting Duncan quoting [someone 
else]” (par. 25). Instead, Duncan and Boehme write in concert.  
“The Concert” also has its share of unquoted borrowings. The “MUST MUST MUST” on 
line fifty-six, and the “MOVE, INSTANTER, ON ANOTHER!” later (58-59), are from Charles 
Olson’s “Projective Verse.” While uncredited, these are easily identifiable due to Olson’s 
characteristic and confrontational capitalization and the way that Duncan attributes these words 
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to “the Poet” (57). More difficult to decipher,12 though, are lines fifty-nine through sixty-three, 
and lines sixty-six through seventy, which are both quotations from Rudolf Karl Bultmann’s 
Theology of the New Testament (1955). Bultmann’s name does not appear anywhere in the poem, 
and Duncan’s choice to refer to him as “the scholar” does nothing to make clear the allusion 
(66). What is perhaps more interesting about this example, however, is the way it is rewritten. 
The changes are minimal: where the original text reads “songs and especially ecstatic speaking in 
tongues” (Bultmann 161), Duncan changes the “song” to the singular, and where Duncan places 
an ellipsis between “prayers” and “song,” only one word is actually removed, and this the word 
“and.” This kind of disrespect for the original source copy may, at first, be interpreted as 
irreverence, but it is precisely his politics of the commonality of language that enables him to 
work so freely with his source texts. If his reading-writing is valued as equal to its source text, if 
language is valued as common and thus never owned, then the manipulation of the source text, 
however minute, is an act of love. The collage of quotations and references is in concert, a 
“concerting” of multiples to eventually form a kind of whole (the poem, Passages, the larger 
Book that Duncan imagines but cannot complete). Additionally, the definite article, the fact that 
it is “The Concert,” signals a link to his spiritual understanding of a “Grand Collage,” or, as 
quoted above, a “Sentence beyond the work,” of which this poem is only one manifestation.   
In “Transmissions (Passages 33)” (Ground Work 23), the quotations become even more 
difficult to decipher as polyvocality shifts to multilingualism. While a reader may be tempted to 
                                                
12 Comment by Andy Weaver (21/1/14): “You imply throughout the entry a slight annoyance or frustration with 
Duncan’s elusive allusions. I think that’s fair, but, at the same time, I think Duncan’s primary reason for including 
those allusions (and in the fashion he does) is because he is following the tenets of his poetics, meaning he is 
discovering what needs to be written as he writes, not before. In this sense, Duncan is always the first reader of his 
own writing (and much more so than that could be said about most authors)—there is an aspect of surprise or 
unknowing in Duncan’s act of composing, so his reading of his work is an active process. Along these lines, and 
following off of Oudart’s thoughts, Duncan doesn’t need to cite quotations for himself. So, although they are often 
frustrating for us as readers, it’s important to note that Duncan’s allusions aren’t intended as exclusionary, as, say, 
Pound meant his.” 
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dismiss these quotations, when one attempts to follow these “intertextual clues”—as Oudart 
called them—the content of these quotations proves integral both to the individual poems, and to 
the serial project as a whole. “Transmissions” begins with two lines of Greek, “όνοµα βίος / 
έργον δέ θάνατος,” both uncredited and untranslated. The Greek is the famous line from 
Heraclitus, “Its name is life, its work is death.” The phrase is a play on words, where the “it” in 
question is a bow (as in, a bow and arrow), the Greek word for which is “βίός,” remarkably close 
to the term for life, “βίος, the only difference is an accent on the “o” (§48). The word for life 
needs only an accent to become a symbol of death, exposing the arbitrary nature of the signifier, 
the mutability of the signified, and the importance of connection and context. Duncan does not 
necessarily include these uncredited and untranslated passages in an exclusionary manner as we 
might expect from modernist allusions. Rather, as a quotation from Dante suggests in “Before 
the Judgement (Passages 35)” (Groundwork 32), the reader is told “Guarda, guarda” (7), that is, 
“watch, watch.” And, the importance of detail recurs in “Transmissions” when Duncan quotes 
Philo’s On the Creation of the World with the lines “Under the graver’s hand /    the minutest 
seal     takes in / the contours of colossal figures” (68-70). It’s not a test of literary history; 
Duncan writes for a reader to pay attention, and for himself to pay attention, too. The poems 
make manifest connections between and within texts that we (or he) may miss without careful 
attention to detail. And throughout his work, this attention to detail is closely aligned with 
(especially erotic) love.  
In fact, if the reader does not maintain this attention to detail, much of a poem like “The 
Torso” is lost. The poem, unlike the Passages poems of Ground Work, maintains one thematic 
intertext, quoting Gaveston’s lines from Christopher Marlowe’s Edward II throughout. As with 
the slight changes to Bultmann’s text, Duncan alters one of Marlowe’s lines slightly, changing 
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the poem’s last line from the original, “the king, upon whose bosom let me die” (I.i.14), to “the 
King upon whose bosom let me lie” (54, emph. Duncan’s). With one letter, Duncan overturns the 
death sentence for the homosexual, and emphasizes again the act of love over the subject 
position. This important change is only available to a reader with an eye for detail, and perhaps a 
cursory knowledge of the Marlowe (or, a willingness to follow the clue). This eye for detail is 
mimicked as the poem itself looks, moving its gaze gradually from one specific, singular body 
part to the next: “the clavicle” (20); “the nipples” (23); “the navel” (28); “the pubic hair” (31). 
The torso that is the poem’s namesake is never represented in its entirety; it exists only, and can 
be loved only, as an assemblage and manifests itself through the particulars. 
Images of singularities that form assemblages abound in the Passages poems. In “The 
Concert,” Duncan writes that 
                                            the stars also 
are and remain    severe and distinct, 
each being of the universe     free to itself 
     having its own law (15-18) 
The lawless, anarchic stars are “distinct” from each other, but are bound by sameness in the 
universe. Thus it is not surprising that when the Ego of the speaker encroaches on this image 
towards the end of the poem, his attempts to own or to take the magnificence of the stars is 
doomed to fail. The speaker bemoans his “man’s share of the stars’ / / majesty [is] thwarted” (79-
80). Similarly, “Transmissions” is filled with references to singularities and multitudes, 
exemplified by lines ninety-seven and ninety-eight which read: “Not one     but many energies 
shape the field. /    It is a vortex.   It is a compost.” The reappearance of the common Black 
Mountain term “field” here is important because it is shaped by those singular “energies” that 
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inhabit it; even the field is only an assemblage, reducible to parts but never really able to be 
disassembled. Similarly, the likely reference to Pound and Lewis via Vorticism (the vortex) 
brings another reading of the “field” into play and forges another connection. It should come as 
no surprise that the Ego in “Transmissions” suffers the same pitfalls of the Ego in “The 
Concert”; it attempts an appearance on line thirty, when Duncan writes of “the ‘I’ passing into 
sIght.” The personal pronoun loses stability as it is reduced to a singularity in the assemblage of 
“sight,” but also because the word “sight” transforms the upper-case “I” into the “eye” which can 
see the singular only as a part of a larger field of multiplicity.  
The materiality of language also plays an important role in this politics of love. Duncan 
sees individual words as separate entities, operating as the singular operates in relation to the 
multiple. He makes this clear in “The Concert” when he writes that “each / ‘word’ [is] a severd 
distinct thing” (54-55). A similar argument is suggested by the disjunctive form of the opening 
and closing sections of “The Fire, Passages 13” (Bending the Bow 40-5), where individual words 
are literally shown connected but isolated from each other. The lines carry no narrative or even 
syntactical function, but rather present the image of a seaside landscape, and an important human 
intervention into it:  
  jump  stone  hand  leaf  shadow sun 
  day  plash  coin  light  downstream fish 
  first  loosen  under  boat  harbor  circle 
  old  earth  bronze  dark  wall  waver 
  new  smell  purl  close  wet  green 
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  now  rise  foot  warm  hold  cool 
       blood  disk 
     horizon            frame (1-8) 
The individual words do not, and cannot, operate on their own. Instead, all words function as a 
sort of reference to a greater meaning, one that cannot be grasped in its entirety, only understood 
through its constituent parts. The contradiction between “warm” and “cool,” “old” and “new,” 
and  “light” and “dark” in this tableau, as well as the sonic implications of “waver” (to “wave”), 
“purl” (to “pearl”), and “plash” (to “splash”) suggest that much of this scene is contained in the 
stark and suggestive spaces between these words. Much of the significance of this opening scene, 
for example, is contained in the multiplicity it suggests by drawing explicit attention to the 
singularity of the words themselves.  
This is why Duncan is so resistant to the idea of owning language, and why his poems are 
always (re)visions or expansions, working towards a greater “Book,” or “Sentence.” He explores 
this concept most clearly in “Transmissions” when he writes: 
  –no one 
  nor poet 
  nor writer of words 
  can contrive to do justice to the beauty of that 
       design he designs from 
                           We pretend to speak.    The language is not ours 
and we move upward beyond our powers into 
                       words again     beyond us      unsure measures 
               the poetry of the cosmos (56-64) 
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Duncan’s work never “contrive[s]” to do such a justice—he acknowledges throughout that this is 
impossible. Instead, Passages tries to capture this mystical whole in parts, to stress connection 
throughout, and to value (or love) each incarnation equally. The serial poem is, for Duncan, an 
act of love, both poetic and political. Its statement is that we can only understand the world 
through its bits and pieces, and so we must value those pieces. Duncan’s reading-writing, re-
writing, misquotation, and borrowing show that his poetry works in this same way: he can only 
understand and communicate this greater poem in these small parts. Thus every small part 
deserves inclusion.13 
(Dis)Integration and Defamiliarization 
When I write about Duncan’s assertion, in “Some Notes on Notation,” that the poems in 
the Passages series “are but passages of a poem beyond that calls itself Passages” and that they 
ultimately “belong to the unfolding revelation of a Sentence beyond the work” (5), I do not mean 
to suggest that these poems, while dispersed throughout the Ground Work and Bending the Bow 
collections, unite into a larger textual whole. In fact, to suggest such a thing would do a great 
disservice to Duncan’s poetics at large, wherein, in terms of both authorial subjectivity and 
textual production, Duncan was vehemently opposed to such visions of unity or integration. He 
makes this clear in many interviews. For example, in an interview for The Sullen Art in 1960, 
Duncan explains that his interest in the multiple is rooted in this discomfort with integration and 
unity; he says, “since I’m quite the opposite of what would be called an integrated personality (I 
                                                
13 At this point, a note on Duncan’s mysticism seems necessary, in that his understanding of the relationship 
between a singular part and an inarticulable whole are directly related to his understanding of an incomprehensible 
divine order of which we are only a part. For Duncan, the production of a poem was one articulation of this 
relationship between the individual and the divine order. “Our consciousness,” he writes, “and the poem as a 
supreme effort of consciousness, comes in a dancing organization between personal and cosmic identity” 
(“Towards” 78). While I do not discuss it in depth here, I do want to point to Ross Hair’s recent article, “Fallen 
Love: Eros and Ta’wl in the Poetry of Robert Duncan,” which does some excellent work in connecting this 
mysticism Duncan’s concept of eros. 
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dislike personality and I dislike integration), I tend to cultivate—not a disintegration, because 
that’s a part of the same subject as integration—call it a multiphasic possibility” (9). Similarly, 
his “Naropa Institute Interview” weaves this opposition to an integrated or unified personality (or 
subjectivity) with an opposition to a unified or integrated text by arguing that when a poem is 
produced in a manner that leaves itself open to the multiple, we (as writers and as readers) 
“disappear in the poem” (51). For Duncan, the unintegrated or multiphasic text is necessarily 
political in its desire to “disappear” (but not to “disintegrate”) the individualized self, as well as 
the monadic text. What all of this means is that when Duncan refers to his work as a part of a 
larger “Sentence” or an external Book called “Passages,” what he is really referring to is a larger 
project that he can never even articulate, let alone complete. The suggestion is that Duncan’s 
work is a part of a larger whole, Grand Collage of Literature in which his entire oeuvre is only 
one small part. He also suggests that there is a larger Poetry that all writing will never exhaust or 
capture in its entirety. In a Yale interview, he remarks: “I do feel I’m working on a very large 
poetic and that it never gets stated” (A Poet’s Mind 20). The Passages series is an attempt to 
articulate this inarticulable larger poetics, and thus is free from the boundaries that would 
otherwise govern a project that prioritized consistency, integration, and unity. 
Duncan posits the Passages poems as the primary site of his articulation of this larger 
poetics, arguing that they seem to exist elsewhere, and that they come into being by way of his 
producing them through an apparently infinite process of reading, writing, rereading, and 
recontextualizing insofar as he re-presents what he has already read. He discusses this sequence 
most candidly in an interview for Unmuzzled OX, wherein he argues that Passages serves as a 
“test point” for this larger poetics “in which, theoretically, everything can coexist. It doesn’t have 
any boundaries supposedly” (86). Duncan describes the process of writing a Passages poem as 
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entering into the field14 of Passages by way of writing, which, for him, is an entirely unplanned 
experience. As he asserts in the same interview: “when I return to ‘Passages’ I find out what’s 
going on in it. The poem’s dependent, in the first place, on a particular tone from which I 
recognize that ‘Passages’ is ‘on.’ I don’t sit down and say, ‘Now I’m going to write a Passage’” 
(91). The seemingly spontaneous nature of the production of a Passages poem signals two 
important things about the series: first, that the poems gesture towards this larger poetics; second, 
that they cannot possibly complete it. What they share in their serial relationship to each other is 
tonal (and thus formal) rather than thematic. Duncan’s discussion of the series in the Unmuzzled 
OX interview provokes interviewer Howard Mesch to ask why the poems, then, are not united, at 
least, into their own collection. Duncan’s response seems to summarize the discussion rather 
well: “But they’re not in a book of their own any more than I’m in a world of my own. … So, in 
this sense, they’re not part of a great poem at all. They’re part of a tapestry” (91-2).  
It is entirely fitting that early on the sequence—the second poem named as part of the 
Passages series—takes up this image of the tapestry, and aligns the poet with the weaver at 
his/her15 loom. “At the Loom (Passages 2)” (Bending the Bow 9 – 10), uses the image of the 
tapestry as a metapoetic device; in this poem, the poet as weaver is more concerned with the 
loom itself, and the process of the weaving, than with the image constructed. While Duncan does 
take a moment at the beginning of the poem to note the “luminous soft threads” (9), the bulk of 
the poem is concerned with the “back of the images, the few cords that bind / meaning in the 
                                                
14 The use of the term “field” here is loaded, as the term carries with it important connotations of Duncan’s method 
of “composition by field.” I use it to denote a space, but also hope that it carries Duncanian echoes. 
 
15 Because I have privileged the author’s own voice throughout this chapter, from this point I will use the masculine 
pronoun to discuss the figure of the artist in Duncan’s work, and in this way, to align this figure with him. I 
acknowledge that rhetoric and brevity are taking the place of gender neutrality here. 
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word-flow” (12-3). Later in the poem, Duncan foregrounds this interest in process rather than 
end-product, arguing that “art shall never be free of that forge, /     that loom, that lyre–” (26-7), 
and that these tools are more central than “the fire, the images, the voice” (28), which are 
secondary conduits, but ones that are necessary to bridge the gap between art’s meaning and its 
form. Tapestry, in this vein, refuses integration in the way that other media, for example 
painting, do not.16 
The image of the tapestry is brought to the fore in this poem by way of Duncan’s allusion 
of George Gascoigne’s “The Complaint of the Green Knight” (Posies, 1575). Duncan’s intertext 
spans three lines: “‘O weaver, weaver work no more,’ / Gascoyne is quoted: / ‘thy warp hath 
done me wrong’ ” (42-44). The lines describe a scene in Gascoigne’s original, in which the 
Green Knight bemoans his fate in the form of fabric: 
The fatal sisters three which spun my slender twine 
Knew well how rotten was the yarn from whence they drew their line 
[…] 
Yet must I wrap always therein my bones and body both, 
And wear it out at length, which lasteth but too long. 
O weaver, weaver, work no more; thy warp hath done me wrong. (21-29) 
The “warp,” the threads that form the basic structure or netting on which the tapestry is woven, 
the “threads twisted for strength” that Duncan refers to (40), is blamed for the “wrongness” of 
the “tapestry” of the Green Knight’s life.  For Duncan, the warp is the underlying structural 
                                                
16 Painting, for Duncan, is a process of integration in a way that weaving is not. In “The Fire (Passages 13),” also in 
Bending the Bow, he writes: “He [Piero di Cosimo] inherits the sfumato of Leonardo da Vinci — / there is a 
softening of outline,   his color fuses” (30-1). It might also be worth noting that his partner, Jess’s, collage artworks 
similarly resist integration in the way that painting seems to court it.  
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element that allows for the joining together of the separate threads of a tapestry. As the 
etymological lists he includes indicate, “warp, wearp, varp: ‘cast of a net, a laying of eggs’ / 
from *warp ‘to throw’” (38-9), the warp is also a netting that is designed to collect and to gather. 
The poem begins, on line three, with a direct reference to Ezra Pound, and to the Cantos 
specifically, as a similar kind of netting or warp, the “twisted sinews underlying the work” (11), 
with Duncan functioning as a “shuttle among / set strings of the music” (5-6). Duncan relishes 
the sound of the shuttle’s movement, “the clack of the shuttle flying / forward and back     
forward and / back” (35-7), a musicality that makes his work transient in contrast to the timeless 
tome Pound envisioned for the Cantos. In Passages, the process of “reading to ourselves” or 
“reading aloud / sounding the music” (30-1) destabilizes “the stuff” (32) that eventually 
“vanishes upon the air, / line after line thrown” (33-4). It is a way of (dis)integrating the tight 
netting of Pound, allowing Duncan to be able to include and use Pound’s work despite those 
elements of Pound’s work that he found problematic.  
It is also significant that “At the Loom” ends with a condemnation of the state and of a 
nationalist discourse in general: 
                                                     each side 
facing its foe for the sake of 
       the alliance, 
allegiance, the legion, that the 
       vow that makes a nation 
one body not be broken. 
 
Yet, it is all, we know, a mêlée 
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       a medley of mistaken themes (58-65) 
This characterization of the nation as “mêlée” is loaded, denoting at once the violence of close 
combat and the theme of mixture or “medley” that fits in squarely with this issue of 
unintegration. As Andy Weaver also pointed out to me,17 a lesser, older definition of “mêlée” as 
mixture, “A confusion, jumble; a medley, a mixture” (OED), links the terms of mêlée and 
medley. Even more fitting is the fact that an obsolete meaning for the word “medley” is “[a] type 
of cloth made of wools dyed (freq. in different shades or colours) and mixed before being spun” 
(OED), echoing the image of the tapestry. So, writing is both a weaving, gathering together 
disparate parts, and a battle, allowing these parts to exists as separate and in conflict, or eris. All 
of this is summarized by the image of Achilles’s shield at the poem’s end, an impossible 
ekphrasis meant for battle but praised as craft and art. “At the Loom” functions as a critique of 
allegiance and of imposed organization and this critique inevitably ties to his anarchism. 
Evidently, Duncan’s work was much more affected by the rise of poststructural ideas 
about politics and integration than Levertov’s. This, too, is a contentious claim, and one that 
contradicts much of the scholarship surrounding Levertov’s work. In fact, owing to her 
relationship with Black Mountain, and to the work of many of her other contemporaries, 
Levertov’s work is often uncritically accepted as postmodern. Perloff allows Levertov’s defining 
                                                
17 Comment by Andy Weaver (24/1/14): “I’m not sure of your interpretation of the section describing the battle, 
ending in a mêlée. Especially given the line that follows your quotation (‘a medley of mistaken themes’), Duncan 
seems to be at least partially using ‘mêlée’ in the sense of ‘mixture,’ rather than ‘confused battle.’ I think that the 
punning he uses here actually moves the discussion away from a literal battle and back towards weaving (as a 
metaphor for creativity): an obsolete meaning for ‘medley’ is ‘A type of cloth made of wools dyed (freq. in different 
shades or colours) and mixed before being spun’ (OED), and a lesser, older definition of ‘mêlée’ also pushes the 
word in this direction: ‘A confusion, jumble; a medley, a mixture’ (OED). So, then, it is possible to read the ending 
as about a battle, but also as a discussion of weaving/life/creativity as metaphorical battle/struggle/eris. A final 
suggestion that the battle alludes at least partially to creativity is the final image of the poem, that of Achilles’s 
shield, which is a magnificent example of artistry, created by Hephaestus and containing the world in all its 
complexity (see The Iliad, the last few pages of “Book 18”). That reading doesn’t discount or disprove your 
interpretation, but it does make it a lot richer, I think. (Don’t forget that, while Duncan was a pacifist and was 
absolutely against physical violence, his anarchism also required conflict/strife (‘eris’) in order to keep things from 
reifying.)” 
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“agitprop” to admit her to the postmodern school, and leaves it at that. Donna Hollenberg accepts 
Levertov as postmodern particularly because her work can be read clearly through Alicia 
Ostriker’s conception of the “postmodern witness” (520). Lisa Narbeshuber offers some 
deliberation, arguing ultimately that while postmodern in essence, Levertov’s work fits uneasily 
into the school as a whole. She writes that “Levertov’s poetry has never fallen into either the 
playfully anti-referential postmodern stream best represented by Jacques Derrida or the mournful 
postmodern stream best represented by [Jean] Baudrillard” (135). What I would like to argue is 
that Levertov’s work does, indeed, fall into postmodernism in some counts, particularly in her 
treatment of the defamiliarization of language, her embracing of polyvocality, and her 
conception of organic form as rhizomatic. But, these traits are overshadowed by her opposition 
to the radical politics and poetics of LANGUAGE poetry (which often surfaces in her 
correspondence with Duncan) and her ultimate belief in a divine truth innate in everything, up to 
and including language. Ultimately, while often pulled towards a postmodern tradition, 
Levertov’s work, especially in The Jacob’s Ladder, necessarily falls victim to a universalizing 
truth that betrays her organic poetics. 
To begin, I would like to touch on Levertov’s opposition to the radical poetics of 
LANGUAGE poetry, which were crucial to Duncan’s progression as a poet.18 Levertov’s distaste 
for LANGUAGE poetry seems to stem from their radical interest in the individualized utterance 
and the materiality of language, which moves poetic language too far from its function as 
expressive and meaningful. Even when Levertov’s work dwells on materiality and defamiliarizes 
                                                
18 Levertov’s opposition to the poetics of LANGUAGE poetry are well-documented, especially in the two popular 
biographies (Hollenberg’s and Greene’s) mentioned above. Mark Jarman goes as far as to suggest, in his review of 
both biographies for The Hudson Review, that her disagreement with the stylized LANGUAGE tradition, which in 
her view “valued style over content” (n.p.), is in part responsible for her current relative obscurity. I also do not 
mean to suggest that Duncan’s relationship with the LANGUAGE tradition is uncomplicated.   
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language—an important feature of her work, actually, which I will discuss in more depth in the 
paragraphs that follow—she is always primarily interested in the meaningful and metaphorical 
potentials of the lyric. In The Jacob’s Ladder, this is perhaps best demonstrated by the poem 
“The Necessity” (56), which courts a LANGUAGE poetry investigation of defamiliarization 
only to return to more “meaningful” and more traditionally lyric-poetic pursuits. The poem opens 
with the dismantling of the clichés of love and nature poetry, arguing that “From love one takes / 
petal to rock and blesséd” (1-2, emph. Levertov’s), eventually leading “away towards / 
descend” (3-4, emph. Levertov’s). The bolded words are defamiliarized from their traditional 
uses in lyric poetry, and instead Levertov seems to hold these words responsible for their 
progressive abstraction, their ability to distance poetry from its access to love. The poem ends 
with the saving assertion that despite our formalization and our focus on materiality, “all we have 
led away returns to us” (24). That is, although the poem does admit that “each part / of speech 
[is] a spark” (17-8) a moment of form and flourish, these parts are also “awaiting redemption” 
(19), a divination that is a return to the representational function that is more meaningful, more 
thoughtful, and ultimately, more politically effective. For Hollenberg, this turn to narrative and 
the expressively meaningful is “analogous to Levertov’s rejection of the captious wit of 
LANGUAGE poetry, notwithstanding the related political goals of its advocates” (“Ekphrasis” 
523). While Levertov may have felt a political affiliation with the ultimate goals of the 
LANGUAGE tradition, she felt there was a dramatic formal divide between her work and theirs. 
Keith Norris, in “Openmouthed in the Temple of Life: Denise Levertov and the 
Postmodern Lyric,” characterizes this divide as one of safety rather than disturbance. That is, 
while LANGUAGE poetry sought to defamiliarize and disturb language from its quotidian 
function, Levertov sought an attentive, responsible space from which her poetry could speak. 
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Norris explains it in this way: 
Language poetry is, in a sense, the extreme example of a connection with the 
disturbing multitude of images present in the contemporary world; Levertov 
asserts a poetry that not only can recognize and reproduce that miscellany with a 
joyous intensity, but can also achieve a safe place from which to critique such a 
world. (344) 
It is precisely this concern that Hollenberg echoes when she writes that Levertov “deplored the 
prevalence of fracture and obliquity as poetic techniques in contemporary poetry” (530). The 
radical postmodernism of LANGUAGE poetry, and the other more radical avant-garde 
movements at the time, provokes Levertov to distance herself from the formal poetics of the 
other Black Mountain poets (of Olson and Duncan, less so of Creeley), and instigates a return to 
what Hollenberg almost uncritically terms a return to an “ut picture poesis” where “art is prized 
less as an imitation of reality … than as an expression of the human spirit” (532). In a move that 
gestures toward her affinity for an authorial, egoic writing-self, Levertov thus detaches herself 
from the high-modernists and her contemporaries who “stress the impersonality of art. Instead, 
she makes art an analogue of the artist it expresses, and encourages our identification with the 
artist’s point of view” (533). Despite these objections, Levertov’s organic lyric is often 
concerned with the defamiliarization of language and its (often natural) materiality. 
Many critics note Levertov’s defamiliarization, but often do so as a means to prove an 
activist, political end. This is the case, for example, with Narbeshuber when she observes that, 
“[a]s with the poetry of Robert Duncan or Charles Olson, language itself is a particularly charged 
object that can be re-seen and that can open up a defamiliarized (fresh) vision of the world, one 
not reduced to cliché, packaged images, or sound bytes” (135). While The Jacob’s Ladder is a 
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collection that is less concerned with agitprop politics than her later work, examples of this 
defamiliarization abound, and most are centred on the linguistic realm itself, and on language’s 
ability to occasion non-referential meaning, as in “A Common Ground” when she writes of “a 
language / excelling itself to be itself” (“Part iii” 9-10). But the whole concept of agitprop, or of 
the organic lyric, depends on language’s referential function, and various examples of Levertov’s 
defamiliarization demonstrate that she is actually extremely skeptical of its effectiveness. 
Unsurprisingly, in light of Levertov’s ecological and environmental affinities, these examples 
often defer to the “language” of the natural world as inadequate to support a poetic language that 
requires referential meaning in order to remain valuable. For example, the first stanza of “Six 
Variations: iii” reads: 
Shlup, shlup, the dog 
as it laps up water 
makes intelligent 
music, resting 
now and then to 
take breath in irregular 
measure. (1-8) 
The dog’s sounds in the water may produce “intelligent / music,” but its “irregular / measure” is 
not innately meaningful as Mac Low understood animal sounds to be. Instead, it remains a 
nonsensical “Shlup” requiring our attention, perhaps, but not inviting the reception of expression. 
Instead, it is our language that must gesture towards the meaningless sounds of the natural, as 
evidenced by “Matins” in which Levertov writes: 
The cow’s breath 
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not forgotten in the mist, in the 
words. Yes 
verisimilitude draws up 
heat in us, (“Matins: iv” 3-7) 
So, cow’s breath inflects language, but it is up to the poet to generate verisimilitude. For 
Levertov, affect is produced through mimesis and in order for mimesis to function as affective 
language must return to the narrative function from which LANGUAGE would distance it. 
Norris notes that Levertov’s organic lyric is postmodern “in its ability to move quickly 
from one perception, or anecdotal narrative we might say, to another, all the while crossing great 
gaps of meaning, and coming to understanding in how we cross those gaps” (346). Levertov’s 
parataxis is centrally the juxtaposition of multiple voices, multiple irreconcilable perspectives. 
The hallmark of postmodernism, polyvocality is present in Levertov insofar as various voices are 
represented (including the cow’s), but what is inarguable is that her poetry reifies one viewpoint, 
the author’s, as powerful and integral to the affective meaning-making of the poem. These 
variant viewpoints are necessarily linked in Levertov’s work to a divine truth, even if, as Norris 
attempts to argue, the “truth isn’t stated here, but is the process itself” (346). To be sure, the truth 
is unapproachable and fragmented, but as with her oppositions to LANGUAGE poetry, this 
fragmentation of the truth is regrettable. As the postmodern turns to the material conditions of 
linguistic production and prefers the concrete image to the abstraction, it fragments the truth, a 







is ever enough. Images 
split the truth 
in fractions. (“A Sequence: iii” 11-16) 
Levertov attempts to return language to this divine function, where the materiality of language 
gives way to a more meaningful embodiment: “Cold, fresh, deep, I feel the word ‘water’ / 
spelled in my left palm” (“The Well” 38-9). 
Nevertheless, the critics that I have mentioned maintain that Levertov’s gestures towards 
the postmodern solidify her position as a postmodern poet. At the risk of sounding exclusionary, 
I cannot help but disagree. I cannot help but wonder if, as Norris maintains, Levertov’s 
“organicism isn’t a form, but a constantly evolving formation” (346), a move that recalls the 
rhizome of deleuzoguattarian thought, then what are we to make of lines such as “The poem 
ascends” (20), from the collection’s titular poem? The ascension of the poem is a move beyond 
materiality and fragmentation, and a move towards an external, divine truth, as opposed to the 
“descend[ing]” abstractions in the example from “The Necessity” quoted above. Norris 
concludes that “[i]n Levertov’s theory we are individually responsible for pursuing the universal, 
not particularly responsible for the individuation of accepted universal truths” (351-2). Where 
scholars have tended to see saving grace in this somewhat individualized realization of the 
universal, Levertov’s representations of it are no less universalizing than the Romantic tradition 
she prizes. When she writes “I saw / not what the almost abstract / / tiles held” but instead “a 
shadow of what / might be seen there if mind and heart / gave themselves to meditation” (“A 
Letter to William Kinter of Muhlenberg” 3-5, 7-9), she implies not an individuated truth, but a 
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Platonic one. Yes, it is external and perhaps even in flux, but it remains a divine and divined 
truth that the poet has prime access to, and one that art cannot capture, but should strive to do so.  
The question of (dis)integration and defamiliarization in these texts is, in the end, a 
question of whole and of part, another example of the ways that Duncan and Levertov have been 
positioned as oppositional when, in actuality, their work articulates two important facets of a 
larger whole that neither fully develops on his/her own. That is, Duncan’s preoccupation with 
disintegration and the singular suggests, above all, that we cannot and should not attempt to 
experience the whole (the Sentence, the Book to come). Instead, we act as weavers, moving our 
singular stories along a much larger loom than we could ever envision. Levertov, on the other 
hand, suggests that a divine, external truth is available to us in parts (individuated shadows 
accessed by the meditative mind). Through language, which is itself always part (momentary 
sparks) the poet gestures towards this greater whole or truth, and through language the reader can 
connect with (but never fully understand) this external truth. These are two slightly variant views 
of the same tension: a Platonic understanding of whole and part enmeshed with a postmodern 
skepticism of truth and wholeness. Though Duncan’s radicalism never lets him associate his 
Sentence or Book with a truth, Levertov’s assertion that our understanding of the “truth” is 
always in fractions is at least as tentative. Once again, the distance between their politics and 
their poetics is not so vast as either poet may have claimed.  
Duncan, Levertov, and the Writing Self 
While previously I dealt with Duncan’s refusal of integration in terms of an integrated or 
cohesive text, he also clearly opposed integration in terms of selfhood or subjectivity.19 When he 
                                                
19 Comment by Andy Weaver (25/1/14): “I don’t know how helpful or relevant this point is, but the notions you’re 
drawing out of Duncan seem really similar to Fred Wah’s concept of ‘synchronous foreignicity,’ which he works 
through in several essays in Faking It. I suspect that Wah, as a fan and ‘early adopter’ of Duncan/Black Mountain 
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says in The Sullen Art interview that he is the “opposite of what would be called an integrated 
personality” (9), he also refuses a monadic conception of the self and its relationship to 
authorship; this fraught relationship with authorial power is made manifest in what Eric 
Keenaghan terms Duncan’s “radical humanism” (109). This, too, is expressed uniquely in 
Passages, which he describes as a form of writing that allows him to “lose [him]self in the 
hearing of the voice of the work itself” (“The Self in Postmodern Poetry” 227), and thus to 
oppose what he terms a “cult of American individualism” (226). Nowhere does Duncan grapple 
with notions of “the self” as freely as in the Passages series, and his complicated relationship 
between self and other therein must first be understood as emerging from an already complicated 
political climate. 
Keenaghan makes this political climate the primary focus of his essay, “Robert Duncan’s 
Radical Humanism; or, On the Crises of Reading and Falling in Love.”  He argues that Duncan’s 
work “implicitly critiques the midcentury’s new paradigmatic understanding of ‘the human’” 
ushered in by the United Nations’ adoption in 1948 of the “Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” (110). While this is widely held to be a move in the progressive direction of global 
responsibility, Keenaghan argues, alongside many critics of contemporary (neo)liberalism, that 
the document is inherently hegemonic; “‘hegemonic’ because it depends on, and promulgates, a 
liberalist tradition that posits the free and sovereign individual as the basic political unit” (110). 
While this, on its own, does not necessarily read as damaging, one must also consider that it is 
precisely this conception of the “free and sovereign individual” that postanarchism works against 
in its interest in connection rather than separation. In other words, as Keenaghan goes on to 
demonstrate, the monadic self is understood as an “autonomous, liberal subject [that] result[s] in 
                                                                                                                                                       
poetics, would see his concept allied to Duncan’s notion of subjectivity (though Duncan doesn’t really deal with 
race, which is why Wah’s ideas are so helpful).” 
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competitive nationalism, ethnic conflict, and factionalist pluralisms based on identity politics” 
(111), which stands in stark contrast to Duncan’s politics of love and communal responsibility, 
especially one that is markedly anti-Statist. Instead, writing under “this new epoch of the human” 
(Keenaghan 120), Duncan insists that these notions of “rights” are attempts to impose an external 
order upon what is already inherently ordered in the natural world. Put explicitly, Keenaghan 
writes that, for Duncan, “rights-bearing subjects are constructed; no a priori human person with 
secured natural rights exists” (121).  
What does this mean for Duncan’s complicated relationship with authorial power and the 
persona of the poet? For Keenaghan, Duncan’s writing is a process through which he is able to 
separate himself, in some form, from his political subjectivity. “Poetic composition,” he writes, 
“is not a willful self-expression; rather, it separates the poet from his personality, from what 
makes him socially recognizable” (112). For Weaver, Duncan’s poetic composition is a process 
through which the poet opens the self to external influence: “In order to be responsive to [the] 
organic order flowing through all creation,” he argues, “the individual must open herself to the 
influence of others but also to the underlying order of language itself” (“Promoting” 84). And 
yet, as Graham Lyons is quick to note, no matter how critical Duncan is of the self and the 
notions of authorial power, he cannot ever fully escape the writing subject that is, despite 
philosophical arguments to the contrary, nonetheless a separate being in the world by virtue of a 
literal body, of skin. He argues, instead, that “the structure of Passages ... simultaneously saps 
and reinscribes authorial power: it gives him a say in the interaction of his corpus, if only to 
express what might seem to be vague equivocations (or productive contradictions?)” (101). 
Lyons argues that these “vague equivocations” of the issue of selfhood arise because his deferral 
of the self, in poetics pieces such as “The Self in Postmodern Poetry,” collected in Fictive 
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Certainties, do not adequately account for some fundamental questions of authorial choice: 
“Who is making these choices? Who decides (‘selects’) when the poems begin and end, what 
gives them ‘consistency’?” (Lyons 101). Duncan’s abdications of the power of the authorial 
position can only ever be partial, despite his arguments to the contrary. 
When Lyons catalogues these oppositional questions against Duncan’s conception of a 
self in the Passages series, he is directly confronting the issues taken up in “The Self in 
Postmodern Poetry,” where Duncan characterizes the series as one in which these notions of the 
monadic self are sacrificed in the name of the larger inarticulable Passage beyond. As I have 
quoted briefly above, Duncan discusses Passages as “a work in which [he] seek[s] to lose 
[him]self in the hearing of the voice of the work itself, a work not of personality or oneself but of 
structures and passages” (227). Lyons takes exception, arguing that the forfeit of the “self” 
cannot adequately account for the particularities of the text’s production. However, it is integral 
to note that Duncan does not argue that this loss of “self” in Passages is complete or permanent. 
Rather, he demands a separation of the “self from Self” (230). For Duncan, the “self” is socially 
and politically constructed, and as such it is an example of the anti-communal, anti-anarchist 
imposition of order upon natural beings. Conversely, the “Self” is open, a gesture towards a 
larger ontological and teleological conception of the individual as a single node in a larger 
connectivity. If the distance between these two terms (“self” and “Self”) seems unclear, it is 
because Duncan never explicitly or clearly differentiates between the terms himself. My 
understanding of it is that the socially constructed nature of the self is an imposition designed to 
create isolated individuals. The Self, on the other hand, is more difficult to describe, largely 
because it is, for Duncan, both mystical and impossible to contain. In clarification, he writes: 
“One of the possibilities or potentialities kept alive for me (in the open question, ‘Who is the “I” 
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of “Passages”?’) derives from the “Self” proposed by Vedanta … and Jungian depth psychology. 
In what ‘Voice’ or ‘Mode’ or ‘Mind’ it is written, is very close to this ‘Self’” (230). Much like 
the Jungian collective unconscious, or radical understanding of self-realization suggested by 
Vedantic philosophy, the “Self” achieves openness precisely through its refusal of closure. The 
socially constructed self as anti-communal may, at first, appear to be a contradiction, but for 
Duncan it is absolutely not. Instead, the “self” is constantly written-upon by the codes of the 
social, and is thus the public manifestation of an external Self that—by remaining unknowable, 
undefinable, and open—always remains partially detached from the codification of social 
institutions. If the social closes off individual selves, the communal has the capacity to resist 
closure and develop an open Self.  
Closure is one particularly significant feature of the traditional text that reinscribes 
traditional notions of authorial power and monadic selfhood. The experimental text resists 
closure in favor of an open-endedness that allows for radical reconceptions of the self as infinite 
and interconnected. Duncan’s disinterest in integration is part and parcel with this refusal of 
closure. I have already detailed a number of examples from the Passages poems that advocate 
for a refusal of the closed and separated, but Duncan also approached the materiality of print 
culture with a similar refusal. Consider this brief passage from Duncan’s “A Prospectus for the 
Prepublication Issue of ‘Ground Work,’” previously unpublished until its 2011 appearance in 
(Re): Working the Ground: Essays on the Late Writings of Robert Duncan: “GROUND WORK 
is to be unfinisht copy, immediate copy—having no middle men between the reader and the 
writer” (17). By avoiding the “middle man” of the publishing house, Duncan viewed this early, 
prepublication-copy of Ground Work as a more direct address to the reader, in which errors and 
departures from printing convention open up that relationship to new possibilities.  This passage 
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is also clearly indicative of Duncan’s well-documented distaste for publishers,20 which is the 
reason for the nearly fifteen-year gap between the publication of Bending the Bow (1968) and the 
first volume of Ground Work (1984) (there were, of course, a number of chapbooks in the 
interim). Through this flawed but more immediate communication, Duncan sees his poetry as 
enacting a breaking of boundaries between the writing and the reading subjects, suggesting a 
“Self” that is only a node in a multiplicity, rather than the liberalist and humanist conception of 
the monadic individual that suppresses as it divides and orders. 
Similarly, Levertov’s conception of a poetic writing-self behind her poetry is integral to 
both the aesthetic and political dimensions of her work, but she approaches this issue rather 
differently than Duncan. In terms of a postanarchist reading practice, Levertov’s reliance on a 
seemingly monadic idea of the authorial self is one that, in many ways, runs counter to the 
politics of fragmented and illusory selves that was enacted in the poetries of Duncan, Cage, and 
Mac Low. In the process of reading and writing through The Jacob’s Ladder, I often struggled 
with Levertov’s reliance on this distinctly not postanarchist or poststructuralist notion of 
selfhood, and found myself siding occasionally with Duncan’s critiques of her idea of a closed 
self. In a letter dated June 1968, Duncan writes to her that he sees in her political poetry a giving 
over to a “righteous Conscience—what Freudians call the Super Ego, that does not caution but 
sweeps outside all reservations.”  And yet, as many critics of her work have noted, there is still 
something redeemable about Levertov’s intensely personal, self-driven poetics insofar as her 
conception of the authorial self is one of many in a pseudo-rhizomatic web of communal 
                                                
20 Peter Quartermain’s introduction to Robert Duncan: The Collected Later Poems and Plays discusses Duncan’s 
issues with publishers, and the importance of the fifteen-year break from publishing in detail, noting that this 
interrum period between Bending the Bow and Ground Work was intentional and disruptive. He writes that Duncan, 
fed up with publishing errors and inattention to detail during the printing and publication of Bending the Bow, 
“swore to publish no new books for fifteen years, and to take control of publication himself” (xxx).  
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responsibility, as I will explain in more detail later. It is from this jumping-off-point that a 
postanarchist reading can look beyond the apparently monadic representation of an authorial 
point of view in Levertov’s work. That communal responsibility, especially through its reliance 
on attentiveness, breaks down the monadic self even as it relies on it for its politics. Of course, 
this is a move that runs counter to the minimally egoic poetics of writers like Cage, Mac Low, 
and Duncan. In addition to this communal responsibility, I argue that Levertov’s reliance on the 
personal is also clearly gendered.  It implies that the minimally egoic poetic text is made more 
easily available in a masculinist framework that already has a strong tradition of poetic voice 
from which it can depart. 
While by no means a radical feminist writer, Levertov nonetheless relies on the personal 
for her organic, political lyrics in a highly gendered manner, insisting on the presence of a 
feminine or feminist voice in poetic tradition. Of course, by the 1960s in the US there was 
already a plethora of contemporaneous and predecessing feminine literary voices from which 
even (or perhaps especially) her male peers were working. These feminine voices often provided 
for these male writers a point of departure for their minimally or anti-egoic poetics, as in Mac 
Low’s use of Stein, which I have already discussed. Duncan’s work is also particularly indebted 
to a series of female literary predecessors including Stein, and more famously H.D. As Dewey 
notes in her article on the Duncan/Levertov correspondence, Levertov was actually quite drawn 
to the ways that Duncan appealed to H.D.’s work as part of a literary common in his The H.D. 
Book. Dewey writes: 
While not changing her belief that poetry is grounded in the personal, she admits 
increasingly the influence of forces beyond deliberate craft in poetic composition 
and praises Duncan’s formulation of H.D.’s gift as a transcendence of the 
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personal, ‘no longer her art’ but ‘The Art.’ (113) 
But, what Levertov envisions in her communal responsibility is not quite an Art from which we 
all borrow, but rather an identity that we all share. In this manner, her approach to the common is 
less linguistic than Duncan’s (or Cage’s or Mac Low’s for that matter). Instead, her holistic 
approach to the self gestures towards an identity which is always already problematized, picking 
up on a major thread of feminine and feminist poetics before her. 
It is this facet of Levertovian identity that Narbeshuber focuses on in her analysis of 
Relearning the Alphabet, one of Levertov’s most famous and most overtly political works. 
Narbeshuber writes that Relearning the Alphabet follows a long tradition of women’s poetry in 
that she “writes passionately about the problems of identity, placing the self within the public 
sphere” (132). For Narbeshuber, Levertov’s problematizing of identity or selfhood in her 
political work comes in the form of embodiment, a term that frequently comes up in recent 
analyses of Levertov’s work. Levertov’s political and poetic common confronts the disconnect 
between the linguistic and material realm, and uses the materiality of language (which I have 
already identified as a point of skepticism in her work) as a means to approach the necessary 
interconnectedness of human and ecological existence in the real (which is to say, non-poetic) 
world. In Narbeshuber’s words, Levertov “presents a self very personally considering its relation 
to the world” (143). While focusing on the material, and particularly on flesh and the physical 
connection between beings, one might expect that Levertov would privilege separation. But, 
actually, this stressing of materiality in turn stresses the materiality of connection, making all too 
real the communal responsibility Levertov advocates throughout. 
This move is clearly evident in The Jacob’s Ladder, wherein the authorial or writing self 
is multiple, fragmented, and attempts to see from many viewpoints, many “I”s/eyes. This occurs 
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most obviously in the second of the “Three Meditations,” when Levertov grammatically 
dismantles the speaker and, by proxy, the viewpoints expressed by the author. She writes: 
I, I, I, I. 
I multitude, I tyrant, 
I angel. I you, you 
world, battlefield. (16-19) 
The segmentation of the self occurs as a part of interconnection, where the second-person “you” 
of the reader is enjambed and enmeshed with the speaking subject. Here the common of the 
“world” is a clash, a cleaving of subjectivity on a battlefield that provokes the reader to 
recognize his or her subjectivity alongside his or her place in the “public sphere,” to recall 
Narbeshuber. Norris gestures toward this interconnection, but fails to note it outright, when he 
discusses the politics of Levertov’s “shifting, changing nature of the subject/poet/speaker” that 
attempts to maintain a point of view while necessarily moving with perception (346). Much like 
the separation of “self” and “Self” in Duncan’s work, Levertov sees the potential for an open 
“Self” beyond totalizing social structures. It is also interesting to note that the four “I”s back-to-
back recall Sylvia Plath’s “Ich ich ich ich” in “Daddy,” reminding us again of the feminine 
poetic interest in linguistic subjectivity and its complications. 
Returning to The Jacob’s Ladder, the most striking, and most political, example of this 
cleaving of the monadic self appears in what is perhaps the collection’s most famous and most 
frequently anthologized poem, “During the Eichmann Trial,” where Levertov meditates on the 
war crimes trial of former SS officer Adolf Eichmann. In light of Duncan’s eventual criticisms of 
Levertov’s overtly political work, one might expect this piece to reek of dogmatism, but it is 
actually a striking example of the ways that Levertov’s position as gendered Other in a vastly 
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male-dominated school of poetry afforded her the opportunity to engage the personal politically, 
and to do so in a manner that brings to light the radical potentials of selfhood and its possible 
permutations. “During the Eichmann Trial” begins with an epigraph from Duncan which reads 
“When we look up / each from his being,” and suddenly the masculine pronoun offends. I do not 
mean to suggest that the poem is purposefully or overtly feminist, but rather that Levertov’s 
position as one of the few women associated with Black Mountain, or one of the two women 
brought in to speak at the 1963 Vancouver Poetry Conference, afforded her a position as 
outsider, and one for whom the minimally egoic was less available, and even less alluring.21 
Instead, the poem speaks from an “I” that is forced to confront her inherent connection with 
Eichmann by virtue of the humanity of both. The first page of the poem contains the strikingly 
bolded lines: 
Here is a mystery, 
a person, an 
other, an I? (“i  When We Looked Up” 16-8, emph. Levertov’s) 
Linked by humanity, and by an apparently natural desire to ignore and to obey, Levertov’s 
speaker faces a connection with Eichmann, a man she finds abhorrent, but with whom her 
subjectivity eventually becomes enmeshed, first through pronouns (“he, you, I, which shall I 
                                                
21 Though it is a little late in this chapter to make a claim about its approach, it is important to note my choice 
throughout to read Levertov as a lyric poet with a clear politics whereas I approach the male poets of my first 
chapter (Cage and Mac Low), and to an extent Duncan in this chapter, as formal poets in whose works I find a latent 
politics. I do this not to differentiate gendered poetic voices but rather to demonstrate the difference between the 
highly formalized poetics of these three male poets and the less overt formal innovations of their female colleague. 
One might argue that Levertov’s form remains less overtly experimental because she, as a marginalized female 
voice in a male-dominated field, may have felt the need to clearly and explicitly voice her politics in order to be 
taken seriously. These male poets, without the added burden of needing to assert themselves as voices that needed to 
be taken seriously, were perhaps afforded greater freedom to experiment formally. There was, of course, a tradition 
of female poets doing radical and formally innovative work before Levertov, but they also had historic difficulty 
being considered important and effective political poets in their time, for example Stein. I do not have the time or 
the space to do justice to such a claim, but it seemed pertinent enough to include.  
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say?”), then through identification (“we are members // of one another.”) So, when the “windows 
of history” are smashed near the poem’s end, Levertov smashes subjectivity along with them. 
“During the Eichmann Trial” still preaches in some form; it teaches its readers the importance of 
conviction rather than blind obedience and it reminds us all of our communal responsibility to 
each other. With its reliance on images of “looking up” and watching the trial (watching other 
humans, looking into their eyes), it also relies quite heavily on a predetermined speaking/writing 
point-of-view. But, it also works in some small way to dismantle subjectivity, to smash it like a 
window until it stutters again with its “I, I, I, I.” A self, to be sure, but always in fragments, and 
thus not minimally egoic, but multiply so; a rhizomatic public sphere in which we as selves 
collide into responsibility like the molecules we are.22 
 Ultimately, the self for Duncan is unknowable, indefinable, and open, and this conception 
of the self helps to produce the common that is so integral to Duncan’s poetics and to my own 
postanarchist literary theory. If the socially constructed self is overcoded to the point that it 
becomes closed off by its identification with social institutions, then the self that Duncan 
                                                
22 Comment by Andy Weaver (27/1/14): “I wonder if you could clarify where you see Duncan on the ‘minimally 
egoic / multiply egoic’ continuum? It seems to me that he would fall more into the latter, through his use of 
allusion/quotation–but quotation also downplays one’s own ego (so would he fall somewhere more in the middle)? I 
also wonder if, in slightly later poems (like ‘Staying Alive’) where Levertov quotes fellow protesters quite a lot, if 
her use of quotation also works to multiply and/or minimize her ego? (I suppose these questions are slightly outside 
the area of your discussion, but maybe you could drop in a few thoughts on these points?)” 
 
Response (27/1/14): “I would say that Duncan’s relationship to this continuum I’ve set up is a bit more complicated. 
I would suggest, actually that while he’s a little closer to the middle than the other author’s I’ve discussed, I think he 
leans more towards the minimal. While I take your point that quotation downplays the ego (of course, that’s part of 
what I argue in the Duncan plateaus), I would also not say that the use of quotation makes Duncan multiply egoic 
either. That is, unlike Levertov’s attempts to represent the self as multiple, always viewing through various 
perspectives, Duncan’s collage-like work (just read an article on Jess, been using that term to apply to everything 
lately…) uses a multitude of voices to dismantle perspective almost entirely. For that reason, while there are quite 
clearly multiple voices in Passages poems, they rarely constitute perspective. For example, the reader is not 
encouraged to momentarily see the world from the point-of-view of Boehme, or Gascoyne, or Pound, or Olson. To 
rely on a cheesy metaphor I just made up: in the common, Levertov passes around binoculars, Duncan the 
microphone. In my head it’s the coolest protest/sit-in ever.”  
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develops in his poetry helps to create the common by virtue of its fluidity, its lack of parameters, 
and thus its ability to forge new assemblages and connections with other selves, other texts, and 
other authorial positions. Levertov’s conception of the self is radically different, but no less 
integral to the common proposed here. Her work suggests a self that is multiple, and in its 
multiplicity it includes not only alternatives but also the very social institutions from which 
Duncan would distance himself. Levertov’s shared multiplicity with the common creates what 
I’ve called the multiply egoic, a conception that I believe both contrasts with and complements 
Duncan’s (and in my earlier chapter, Cage’s and Mac Low’s) minimally egoic work. The result 
is a conception of the common in which selves do not entirely refuse the coding of social 
institutions, but rather seek out radical postanarchic alternatives, forging new connections that 
rely equally on communal responsibility and radical singularity.   
The Writing Anarchist 
In 2008, when Andy Weaver published the aforementioned article “Promoting ‘a 
community of thoughtful men and women’: Anarchism in Robert Duncan’s Ground Work 
Volumes” in ESC: English Studies in Canada, he noted that “when it comes to Duncan’s poetry, 
[the] underlying political anarchism often goes unnoticed” (75). And yet, a look at this anarchism 
is crucial. For Weaver, Duncan’s formal anarchism is a means through which we can understand 
his turn from a more didactic political engagement in his Vietnam War-era poems, exemplified 
by the Passages poems included in Bending the Bow, to the anarcho-communism implied by the 
form in the Ground Work volumes. “Specifically,” he writes, “I would like to suggest that the 
writing in the Ground Work volumes is effective political poetry because it avoids (for the most 
part) the oppositional, polarizing attacks found in his Vietnam War-era poetry” (71). In this case, 
the poems collected in the Ground Work volumes provide readers with a more effective anarchist 
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poetics by virtue of their politics of communal engagement; they propose “a textual anarchist-
communist community, a community that includes Duncan himself, the diverse writers from 
whom he quotes, language itself, as well as the reader. The form of Duncan’s later poetry works 
to tear down the boundaries between individuals” (93). These late Passages poems, as I’ve 
demonstrated, propose an anarchist approach to language that resists notions of intellectual 
property in favor of interconnection between and within texts and readers/writers.23 In their serial 
nature, the Passages poems suggest an anarchism predicated on disrupting the traditional 
closure-based boundaries of the text: “serial poems, by their nature, are anarchistic because they 
call into question the boundaries between the individual and the surrounding community. … In 
other words, serial poems emphasize the openness of the writing and expose the arbitrary nature 
of textual closure” (82). But, as Weaver is quick to note, this lack of closure or cohesion does not 
at all imply formal chaos. Rather, it is a refusal to impose order upon the already natural or 
organic order that Duncan sees as pre-existing (83).24 In this sense, the openness of the serial 
poem embraces Duncan’s long-held belief that controlling, let alone owning, language is 
impossible. As Dewey points out, Duncan “came to perceive language as a force beyond the 
poet’s control” (“Creeley” 91). 
As Duncan’s contribution to anarchist publications like Direct Action, and his attendance 
of anarchist-activist group meetings attests, his anarchism was not limited to poetic form. 
Instead, his anarchic approach to poetry was born out of an anarchist desire for communal 
                                                
23 In Weaver’s words: “If, as Duncan believes, all language is owned and created by all individuals, then all 
utterances are also necessarily the community’s, not the individual’s, and can be used by anyone” (80). 
 
24 Duncan, in his interview for The Sullen Art, for example, argues that the world is ordered in natural and organic 
ways, as in atomic and molecular structures that govern all organic and inorganic life. Nonetheless, Duncan 
maintains that the imposition of order is unnecessary, and that, even more controversially, this natural order implies 
that “the disordered is literally impossible” (A Poet’s Mind 11). 
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responsibility in a very real sense. Weaver notes this link when he draws a clear parallel between 
Duncan’s activist anarchism and his poetic one, writing: “if, as anarchists hold, non-hierarchical 
equality is an organic characteristic that exists in the natural world, then this equality must 
stretch beyond the human world—all creatures are, if not equal, then equally necessary in 
anarchistic thought” (90). Similarly, Duncan often spoke candidly about the intersections 
between his activism and his poetry, noting that while these two concerns are necessarily linked, 
he actually takes a radically different approach to each; his poetry is clearly responsive, while his 
political activism is what Duncan calls reactionary (which has for him a very specific meaning). 
As he explains to Melnick, these two concepts (reaction and response) are quite different from 
each other: “In reaction, imagination doesn’t have to come in. Old habits govern. In politics and 
many things, I would say I would be ‘reactionary,’ because I have a blind ‘reactionary’ fury and 
a hatred at what goes on in politics, which is hardly known as a response” (A Poet’s Mind 40). In 
light of what I (and countless other scholars) have noted about Duncan’s pacifism, such an 
endorsement of “fury and … hatred” seems quite out of place, and in the interview Melnick, too, 
is taken aback. But, as Duncan goes on to explain, there is a significant time and place for 
reaction. Reaction serves, in his politics, as a momentary break from the activity of 
responsibility, rather than a kind of unthinking knee-jerk reaction. “Responsibility is not a total 
kind of thing,” he argues, “because there is a point at which reaction will set in and we see why 
reaction exists, because otherwise we’d be exhausted by responsibility” (A Poet’s Mind 41). So, 
to temper the potential exhaustion of unrelenting responsibility, the anarcho-pacifist Duncan 
advocates brief moments of blinding rage. It would be inaccurate to suggest that his politics were 
wholly reactionary, or worse, that his poetry is indicative of a similar political vein.25 
                                                
25 Duncan’s brand of anarchism began as more openly activist, but eventually moved, as he got older, to a distinctly 
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What I would like to suggest instead is that Passages should serve as an intermediary 
between the anarchic formalism noted by Weaver, and Duncan’s raging endorsement of a 
reactionary politics. In doing so, I would like to pick up a word Dewey uses to describe 
Duncan’s poetic involvement in issues of social change when she argues that he “renders poetry 
an intervention in culture” (“Creeley” 103, emph. mine). Understanding Passages as 
intervention, as a poetic series that intervenes in the lives of its readers, is one that requires that 
we re-envision Duncan’s ethical poetics as one that advocates, as many critics have argued, for 
an active and responsive readership (that, he hopes, will extend well beyond textual practice), but 
that also invites its reader to be angry, to resist even as s/he responds. The positioning of 
Passages as intervention is best understood through a close look at how the series makes use of 
the second-person pronoun, especially in Bending the Bow. 
The appearance of the second-person pronoun in the Bending the Bow Passages poems 
can be loosely organized into two main groups: the first group emphasizes connection, especially 
between the reader and the author; the second group comes in the form of questions, especially 
ones about the reader’s knowledge. On the first group, these connections are typically 
characterized in the form of romantic love, wherein the direct address to the reader comes in the 
very traditional manner of the poet addressing the beloved. In each case, and in keeping with the 
politics and poetics of love outlined above, the connection between the speaker and the beloved 
is prioritized above emotion or desire. In “The Currents (Passages 16)” (Bending the Bow 58-9), 
this connection is linked to language when Duncan writes, “I loved all the early announcements 
of you, the first falling / in love” (40-1). Here romantic connection is tied to “announcement,” to 
                                                                                                                                                       
anti-revolutionary activism, owing both to his realization that the only revolution that could be effective must occur 
on the singular and psychical level, and to his own aging process.  As he was once quoted in saying, “at fifty-seven I 
don’t look forward to participating in some revolution; it wouldn’t have even begun by the time I would be kind of 
getting more tired and crawling into a corner” (A Poet’s Mind 34). 
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the process of transcribing the lover in order to make real the connection. This link to language 
quickly becomes a link to logos, when the lovers’ connection is related, in “The Torso,” to the 
discourse of knowledge: “I know what you desire / you do not yet know   but through me” (44-
5). In these cases, a direct relationship is formed between author and reader, where the author 
speaks to the reader through the traditional address to the beloved, an important generic feature 
of the lyric love poem. And yet, this is also inherently an anarchist political act, as these direct 
addresses seek to destabilize epistemology (“you do not yet know”) in favor of an affective 
connection between poet and reader (“but through me”).  
This first group of pronouns is inherently linked to the second, a series of direct addresses 
to the reader in the form of questions about his/her knowledge. In “The Fire (Passages 13)” (40), 
the reader is addressed when Duncan’s speaker asks for his/her linguistic familiarity, only to 
concede his own ignorance: “Do you know the old language? / I do not know the old language. / 
Do you know the language of the old belief?” (12-4). In this case, the “old language” is not 
necessarily prior knowledge, and it is certainly not a knowledge that is being tested. Rather, it is 
a logos hedged on “belief,” an epistemology that devalues factual or scientific knowledge in 
favor of an affective knowledge of belief and feeling. These direct addresses work to engage the 
reader with the text and its methods of “tear[ing] down boundaries between individuals,” to 
return again to Weaver. In this sense, the Passages series functions as an intervention into 
epistemological (and ontological) boundaries that would seek to impose an order on what, for 
Duncan, would otherwise function just as well. He addresses us as anarchist in these moments, 
desiring an attentive, responsive reader, a reader ready to resist these boundaries.  
In light of Duncan’s anarchist address to us as readers, I should at this point address the 
fact that my very inclusion of Levertov in this project, especially in this section alongside the 
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self-professed anarchists like Duncan, Cage, and Mac Low, is both contentious and strange, and 
requires, I should think, some explanation. It is probably inarguable that Levertov was never an 
anarchist, although she was certainly an ardent pacifist, which is where her politics most 
obviously overlaps with the three aforementioned poets. And yet, I maintain that she lends 
herself to a postanarchist reading just as well as the first three poets did. I know that including 
Levertov in this list aligns her with a radical avant-garde in a way that, historically and critically, 
is unprecedented. When I first proposed her inclusion to my supervisor, he was appropriately 
surprised; he eventually conceded, and I continued to work on her, imagining her originally as 
the straw-man to Duncan. After sufficient time spent reading and writing about Levertov, 
however, I have come to the conclusion that Levertov’s communal approach to identity and 
poetic voice is an important contribution to my postanarchist project in its own right. I was elated 
to find, then, as I read more about Levertov as a woman, that she actually has some important 
anarchist ties. That is, alongside a brief working relationship with George Woodcock (one of the 
most famous names in contemporary anarchism), Levertov had a rather long and fortuitous 
friendship with Herbert Read, whom she credits as being a major influence on her early career, 
both in terms of her poetry (which he graciously read and critiqued) and making useful contacts 
in the literary and activist fields. Read, whose Poetry and Anarchism is a foundational text in 
anarchist literary theory, wrote extensively about both poetry and anarchism to general acclaim 
throughout his career. 
While Levertov admits that she was very clearly and heavily influenced by Read in her 
youth and into the early parts of her career, their friendship is rarely discussed in criticism of her 
poetry. That said, it is clearly present in the biographical work on her, as in Donna Hollenberg’s 
A Poet’s Revolution: The Life of Denise Levertov or Dana Greene’s Denise Levertov: A Poet’s 
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Life. Part of the reason behind this critical neglect is that Levertov herself often characterizes her 
relationship with Read as a deeply personal friendship, and one based on her early reverence for 
him. Hollenberg, however, suggests that Read’s role in Levertov’s life (as poet/critic and as 
anarchist) shapes Levertov’s poetics and politics from very early on. In fact, in an article on 
Levertov, Hollenberg goes as far as to characterize their relationship as a mentoring: “[a]s a 
novice she was mentored by the art critic and poet Herbert Read, to whom she dedicated her first 
book, The Double Image” in 1946 (519). When Levertov first encounters Read in her young life, 
his status as an established poet and critic would make him a candidate for a mentor-like role. 
In 1939 or 1940, when a sixteen-year-old Levertov worked up the courage to approach 
Read, he was already one of the biggest names in the convergence of anarchism and poetry in the 
twentieth century. Like Levertov, however, Read’s position in political and activist poetry was 
(and remains) fraught with contradiction and controversy, culminating most directly in his 
acceptance of a knighthood in 1953, which effectively alienated him from the vast majority of 
anarchist political philosophers at the time. In a contemporary framework, Read’s views on 
anarchism and poetry have largely fallen out of favour, and he is typically characterized as 
archaic and outmoded. It is interesting to note that, as the poetics of Black Mountain gains 
contemporary critical attention, Levertov’s own politics and poetics have not garnered similar 
critical attention.26 As a testament to this, I recently attended a conference at the University of 
                                                
26 Comment by Andy Weaver (29/1/14): “I think there’s a crucial typo in this sentence: ‘It is interesting to note that, 
as the poetics of the Black Mountain school gains contemporary critical attention, Levertov’s own politics and 
poetics have garnered similar critical attention.’ I believe you mean to say ‘Levertov’s own… have NOT 
garnered…’?” 
 
Response (31/1/14): “Yes, I meant to say that Levertov has not garnered similar attention. In fact, the criticism 
surrounding Levertov (especially as, like we’ve discussed, Black Mountain is becoming cool again in scholarship) is 
pretty disappointing. It pretty much follows Ostriker’s line of thought, or puts Levertov in a continuum with Bishop 
and Plath and Rich and Rukeyser. That’s some nice company, I’ll admit, but I don’t think it does justice to 
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East Anglia on the poetry and poetics of the Vancouver Poetry Conference in 1963, and wherein 
(with Michael Palmer as the keynote speaker) the writings of poets such as Duncan, Olson, 
Robin Blaser, and Jack Spicer were the topic of numerous papers and discussions. My own 
paper, an analysis of Duncan and Levertov’s correspondence, was the only one to deal with 
Levertov’s work at all, and in the discussion period, her side of the debate was almost entirely 
ignored in favor of Duncan’s more radical (and thus apparently more appealing) work. As I 
supposed she would function in my own work, Levertov’s spectral presence at the conference 
seemed a straw-man, meant to provide the outmoded politics of resistance that would, through 
opposition, support Duncan’s anarchist claims. In this way, Levertov and Read serve as well-
suited bedfellows. 
Returning to Read, Levertov treated his influence on her life and work as hero worship. 
She writes about Read’s influence most directly in a short essay entitled “Herbert Read 
Remembered,” which is included in the poetics collection Light Up The Cave, but was originally 
published in Herbert Read: A Memorial Symposium (which was itself originally a special issue 
of the Canadian magazine The Malahat Review). The essay is largely autobiographical, and is 
tellingly glowing, beginning from the point of view of a juvenile Levertov (when she first meets 
Read at sixteen) and referring to him as a kind of celebrity throughout: “I would gaze at him, my 
hero, so intensely that it must have embarrassed him had he not been too modest to notice it” 
(233). But, beneath the teenaged Levertov’s worship of Read’s status, “Herbert Read 
Remembered” also demonstrates the political and poetic point at which Read’s influence can be 
most clearly noted in Levertov’s work. Amongst the autobiography of the essay, she also repeats 
Read’s words that she transcribed into her own journal in 1942. She quotes him saying: “What 
                                                                                                                                                       
Levertov’s work (or to the work of any of those poets) to line those ladies up like that. It’s an issue I’ve been 
actively pursuing in my Mullen research right now.” 
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history demands in its long run, is the object itself—the work of art which is itself a created 
reality, an addition to the sum of real objects in the world” (237), to which she adds “[t]hat 
definition … gave me, at eighteen, floundering in the beginnings of my life as an artist, a ground 
to stand on, a measure to try and fill” (237). True to Read’s self-professed convictions, this 
definition of the art piece is supremely anarchist, and, in some sense, truly egalitarian insofar as 
it demands that the poem become an object in the world rather than a window, a viewpoint, or a 
mouthpiece, from which the poet expresses his or her point-of-view.27 This runs counter to the 
critiques of Levertov demonstrated above, especially as articulated by Duncan. 
In The Jacob’s Ladder, this understanding of the art piece as viewpoint and object is 
brought to the fore in the poem “The World Outside” (4), in which the speaker is deliberately 
positioned as a viewpoint, a set of eyes peering out a window and observing the multiple and 
cacophonous world external to him or her. In the final part of the poem any discussion of the 
point-of-view or the evaluations and judgments of the viewing individual give way to the 
multiplicity of voices; here Levertov juxtaposes the “Groans, sighs, in profusion, / with 
coughing, muttering” (1-2) with the painful silence of “solitary grief” (5). This poem’s final 
section exalts in the joy and the noise of the common that cannot be reduced, the envy of the 
solitary speaker looking in on it. The world outside the poem is “a commonplace” (6), a place 
where the noises are heard 
                                                
27 Comment by Andy Weaver (29/1/14): “I’m curious about your discussion of Read’s influence and Levertov’s 
adoption. Specifically, you write ‘this definition of the piece of art is supremely anarchist, and, in some sense, truly 
egalitarian insofar as it demands that the poem become an object in the world rather than a window, a viewpoint, or 
a mouthpiece, from which the poet expresses his or her point-of-view.’ My question is, how does this differ from a 
New Criticism view of the text? There seems to be an uncomfortable overlap here between Read/Levertov’s position 
and the New Critics. Any thoughts on that? (And, to perhaps partially answer my question, would a turn to Olsonian 
“Objectism” help to clarify the distinction, or would that just muddy the water?)” 
 
Response (31/1/14): “Am I guilty of New Criticism? I suppose a bit. What a terrible thought. Yes, something like 
Olsonian ‘Objectism’ or, maybe more anarchically, Object Oriented Ontology a la Graham Harman.” 
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  from other windows, 
  the effort to be merry—ay, maracas! 
  —sibilant, intricate—the voices wailing pleasure, 
   arriving perhaps at joy, late, after sets 
  have been switched off, (7-11) 
When the passive, silent activity of watching television ends and the individuals become active 
participants in their world, they can potentially arrive at the joy of the “commonplace.” The 
speaker in this poem borders on the passivity of watching television, a passivity that is broken 
only by his or her refusal to remain silence about the multiplicity he or she observes: to remain 
silent would amount to an inability to see this common at all because perhaps, the poems final 
lines question, “silences / are dark windows?” (11-2). The speaker, and really this poem as a 
whole, encourages active and vocal participation in the common; producing noise is positioned 
as the only way to actively engage in this world, to collapse the solitary self into the multiplicity 
of the common. The poem is one viewpoint among many viewpoints, all of which, it argues 
through its cacophonous representations of “muttering” joy and grief, is and must remain 
incoherent.  
Understanding Levertov’s work in this way, gives us a way around the critiques that I 
have detailed throughout, and moves us towards a reading of Levertov that redeems her politics 
as in keeping with the shifting conceptions and modes of operation of postanarchism. The work 
of art as a self-contained reality that is contributed in addition to those other objects of the world 
refuses a call to truth or to righteousness. While I argued earlier that Levertov’s conception of a 
“truth / in fractions” runs counter to a traditional postmodern school of literary theory, especially 
by way of her turn to the divine, we might also read Levertov’s persistent call to witness and 
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vocalize our always fluxuating viewpoints as a move towards Read’s anarchic conception of the 
work of art as merely another object amongst many, another node in a rhizome of cultural 
production. The politics of witness is probably one of the most prominent and politically salient 
features of Levertov’s work, and one that has garnered a good deal of critical attention, 
especially in the last twenty years or so. The process of witnessing, and of understanding 
ourselves as merely a frame through which we see the world, is a profoundly postanarchist 
approach to politics. I would even go as far as to say that it runs counter to Levertov’s more 
socialist-leftist approaches to activism (via protest and affiliation with clearly delineated activist 
groups). As she repositions the role of the subject as one of viewing rather than of being viewed, 
she actually complicates the role of the poet-as-mouthpiece. Instead of producing a soap box 
from which to voice her leftist activist concerns, the idea of the subject-as-viewpoint produces 
instead a speaker that privileges the fluctuating position of the individual in the community, 
recognizing sameness while acknowledging that even this shared witnessing is temporary.  
I do not wish to pass judgment on this apparent contradiction in Levertov’s politics, nor 
do I wish to pass similar judgment on Read (although, an anarchist knight is a particularly 
bizarre notion, and one that even I have trouble reconciling). Part of a postanarchist reading 
practice is exercising a kind of negative capability in which we no longer demand cohesion and 
stability from language, from a poet, or from his or her body of work. In the end, this lack of 
cohesion in terms of a clearly defined anarchist framework is anarchist in and of itself, and 
characteristic of all the poets included in my project. As Palmer said during a discussion of the 
apparent contradictions in Duncan’s critiques of Levertov at the aforementioned conference, 
“[w]hen you examine the poets, it’s all a mass of contradiction.” He said this, as I repeat it now, 
without judgment, and instead with a kind of joviality that suggested the contradictions and 
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controversies actually make this approach to politics more enjoyable and more effective than a 
sterile and homogenous approach. What he meant was that while Duncan was angry at the self-
righteousness of Levertov, he also had moments of what Palmer termed Duncan’s “Blakean self-
righteousness.” In the end, Palmer concluded, like Read the anarchist knight, or the secretly 
postanarchist Levertov, that in a truly anarchic fashion: “It doesn’t cohere.” 
Reader as Active Witness 
I would do a disservice to the work of both poets if I didn’t end this chapter by talking 
more thoroughly about the well-publicized rift that occurred between them. The conflict between 
these poets, documented most thoroughly in The Letters of Robert Duncan and Denise Levertov 
(2003), has garnered a good deal of critical attention. However, owing to the largely political 
nature of each poet’s respective oeuvres, and the political basis for their critiques of each other, 
the vast majority of the scholarship surrounding their correspondence has relied on politics—and 
namely their political and poetic responses to the Vietnam War—to analyze this rift. I am not 
particularly concerned with the ways that their arguments are based in political disagreement, 
more with the idea that the core of this disagreement is actually also centrally poetic, owing to 
the two poets’ variant understandings of the relationship between the poet and his or her reader. 
This is to say, as Robert J. Bertholf notes in “Decision at the Apogee: Robert Duncan’s Anarchist 
Critique of Denise Levertov,” “the discussion comes down to the place of volition, individual 
choice” (5, emph. mine). The question of volition is largely a question of the role of active 
readership. In essence, Duncan opposes how Levertov relates to her readers on a poetic level as 
well as a political one. 
While typically understood as a political rift, Albert Gelpi argues that their feud is really 
about “different sense[s] of language and how we make meaning” (180), noting that both their 
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politics and their religious affinities influence their variant approaches to language and thus fuel 
the divide between them. Essentially, for Levertov language is “referential,” whereas for Duncan 
it is “self-reflexive” (181). Duncan, as a linguistic poet, understands that “language constitutes 
the experience of the poem” (185), whereas Levertov, as an organic poet, understands “language 
… as the medium of the poem, not its source and end” (187). While political on the surface, the 
feud between Duncan and Levertov is underscored by variant and mutually contradictory 
conceptions of the relationship between the authorial presence and the reader of the text. While 
both invite their respective readers to actively engage with the text and the textual community it 
incorporates, they approach the issues of reader volition, community, and active engagement in 
radically different ways. This disagreement provokes Duncan to critique Levertov’s political 
poetry, ultimately solidifying each poet’s views in an authoritarian manner that contradicts the 
communal poetics suggested by each.28 
Duncan’s critique of language’s representational function leads him to oppose any art that 
attempts to voice the concerns of the other. As Perloff argues, “the poet, in Duncan’s view, 
cannot become anyone’s mouthpiece, not even the mouthpiece of a righteous cause.” (“Poetry, 
Politics” n.p.). In this way, the polyvocality and communality of Duncan’s reading-writing 
approach to the Passages series serves as a refusal to speak in a unified voice, thus nullifying the 
potentials of his work to speak for or on behalf of a readership, the trademark of Levertov’s 
revolutionary politics. In a letter to her dated 8 November 1971, Duncan voices his 
disagreement, arguing that her viewpoint “belongs to the old Ptolemaic universe picture” (687). 
                                                
28 This fact is especially interesting once one considers the fact that, as this chapter demonstrates throughout, their 
respective positions are actually not as different as either poet maintained. As Peter Quartermain points out, 
“Duncan’s later strictures on Levertov, whom  he accused of serving political and not poetic ends in her poems 
arising from the Vietnam War, are curiously ironic in that he utters them at a time when similar charges were being 
laid against his own poetry” (xxix). 
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Understanding that revolution only ever reinscribes the notions of the society it sought to 
overthrow, Duncan viewed Levertov’s politics as siding with a leftism that is doomed to failure. 
Duncan is concerned with the potentials for meaning innate in language itself, rather than 
language gesturing towards a meaning that exists elsewhere. He argues in his lecture, “Crisis of 
Spirit in the Word,” that “no word refers. Every word is the presence of” (65). Thus the examples 
of singularities that punctuate Passages refer, additionally, to an anti-Saussurian semiotics that 
embraces the potentials of language to signify on its own. That is, he is interested in meaning29 
but not in expression; he makes this much clear when he says, “but it’s meaning I’m after, not 
expression. I’m anti-expressionist” (A Poet’s Mind 13). For Peter Quartermain, in his 
introduction to the newly published Robert Duncan: The Collected Later Poems and Plays, the 
distinction between expression and meaning in Duncan is indicative of a move beyond the 
limitations of traditional meaning-making in an expressive, authorially-driven text. Quartermain 
notes Duncan’s desire “to work beyond the boundaries of apparent meaning, [and] into the 
‘boundless creational field’—what in [his] essay on [French poet Edmond] Jabés he called 
‘language beyond language’ and ‘meaning beyond meaning’” (xxxi). To work towards a 
“meaning beyond meaning” is to understand “writing not as self-expression but as a matter of 
potential, of possibility, of process” (xxxiii). Passages is clearly a movement towards such an 
understanding of the writing process.  
Moreover, Duncan admits that he sees a counter-poetics in Levertov. As writes to her on 
16 July 1967: “It does seem clear, Denny, that you are more an expressive poet than a formalist: 
                                                
29 Comment by Andy Weaver (26/1/14): “A few prompts: would Duncan’s use/extension of Pound’s notion of tone 
leading of vowels, and Duncan’s notion of rime relate to your discussion of his interest in meaning over expression? 
Might Duncan’s well-known dictum (I believe from a letter to Levertov?) that the poet must not oppose evil, but 
imagine it be relevant to your discussion? The distinction you draw in your entry between expression and meaning is 
a particularly helpful one, and should set up the transition into Levertov’s work really well.” 
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the poem so often bears the burden of conveying the feel of something or the emotion aroused by 
something or a thought—giving rise to the poem instead of the poem giving rise to its own 
objects” (582). Ultimately, what he sees as a dichotomy between expression and meaning 
functions as the operative that invites active, engaged readers to his own work, whereas 
Levertov’s apparently dogmatic, prescriptive manner of writing political poetry functions as 
Perloff’s “mouthpiece” would. This division between expression and meaning is clearly evident 
in Duncan’s invective to Levertov that “the poet’s role is not to oppose evil, but to imagine it” 
(669), perhaps his most quoted line in their whole correspondence. This is all to say that 
Duncan’s anarchic privileging of the individual freedom of the reader is mimicked in his 
conception of the relative freedom of language itself. He tries to free language of the burden of 
conveying the expressions, desires, or ideologies of the poet-figure, who merely assembles the 
pieces of language. If language is already organized in accordance with a natural or naturalized 
order, as Duncan argues everything is, then the poet as weaver merely presents these words to 
the reader, who engages in an affective relationship (or assemblage) with these pieces. 
Attempting to convey a political message, as Levertov does, runs counter to his desire to engage 
his readers as such. Thus, it is entirely unsurprising that his ideal reader is one who does not 
actually know anything of Duncan the poet, the weaver of these word-tapestries. As he 
summarizes: “My real imaginary reader is someone who knows nothing of all of that … who 
picks up the book anonymous in a secondhand shelf and starts reading poetry, poems of whom 
he knows not” (A Poet’s Mind 53). Receiving this poetry in a free community of public trust and 
individual freedom, Duncan’s ideal reader is one who arrives without preconceptions, who is 
invited into the text and has no choice but to engage with the language therein; rather than 
understanding and agreeing with the poem, this reader is affected by it, invited to love it. The 
 166 
words Duncan weaves together function not as a map, but as the passages themselves that wind 
and at times even guide, but primarily allow the reader to pass through them at will, freely. 
This all leads me to a moment of affirmation, seeking finally to reclaim Levertov’s 
political work as viable and effectual within an alterglobalization movement that has tended to 
refuse any and all political art that depends on identitarian politics. What I want to argue here is 
not that Levertov doesn’t rely on identity politics for her poetry, but rather that what Levertov 
does with identity is postanarchist, and that it sets an important precedent for feminist poets like 
Susan Howe, Erin Mouré, Harryette Mullen, and Juliana Spahr, who would follow historically, 
and who follow here in my own project. Essentially, what we need Levertov for here (in this 
project, in a postanarchist literary theory generally) is a politics of witness that is leveling, and 
that has the potential to remove us from ourselves in order to realize the inherent connections of 
the common. I argue that her reliance on an identitarian point-of-view is redeemable insofar as it 
constantly recognizes itself as one node in a rhizome of common, and that her call to political 
engagement is a call to recognize ourselves in poetic/linguistic and in political common with 
each other. 
Recalling Levertov’s own quotation of Herbert Read, that the poem should function as 
one object in connection with a multitude of objects, we must now understand Levertov’s poetry 
as functioning similarly as singularities, as molecules in a larger structure of poetic common. 
While he does not employ the same deleuzoguattarian language that I do, it is precisely this 
singularity of the poetic object that Paul A. Lacey notes when he writes that in Levertov’s work, 
“[t]he fully realized poem is a world in itself” (153). He goes on then to quote Levertov as 
saying: “Because it creates autonomous structures … poetry is, in process and being, intrinsically 
affirmative” (ibid). I am most interested in this concept of affirmation, of affirming the position 
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of the self only to destabilize it moments later. If Levertov creates poems that exist as objects in 
a multitude of objects this implies that the occupation of a particular identitarian viewpoint 
amounts instead to the placing of the poem and the poet in rhizomatic connection with the rest of 
the world. This understanding complicates the issues of identity and point-of-view discussed 
above, and that plague critiques of Levertov’s work even still. What a postanarchist reading of 
Levertov’s politics suggests is that all viewing, all witnessing, needs a point from which to begin, 
but it also has the radical potential to destabilize those points through the very act of viewing. 
I believe that this is what Ostriker gestures toward in her theory of “the poetics of 
postmodern witness” which Hollenberg appropriately aligns with Levertov’s work (520), even 
though the poets Ostriker deals with are feminist in nature, and are working through the book-
length long poem as a response to the high-modernist tradition of The Waste Land, The Cantos, 
and Paterson. Ostriker focuses on Adrienne Rich’s “Atlas of a Difficult World,” Carolyn 
Forché’s Angel of History, and Sharon Doubiago’s South America mi Hija, and her critical 
discussion often reminds her readers that she is making note of a trend in these particular texts. 
Nonetheless, Hollenberg chooses to apply this concept of the postmodern witness to Levertov, 
but as a result seems to replay the same tired critiques of Levertov’s dogmatism, save for the fact 
that Hollenberg unreservedly sides with Levertov. I, too, am interested in the ways in which 
Ostriker’s theory of the postmodern witness applies to Levertov’s work, but in order to expose 
how the very premise of the postmodern witness is one of destabilization rather than purely 
reclamation. Ostriker begins by writing of the Rich, Forché, and Doubiago pieces as 
“ambitiously long poems or sequences of poems, global in reach, formally experimental, each 
quite different from the others, but sharing certain common assumptions” (35). Already, 
appending Levertov’s work to this list is tenuous, as she tended to shy away from the grandiose 
 168 
long poem30 (this was, of course, more the territory of her male peers, namely Charles Olson, but 
we might also view Duncan’s Passages in this way). At the same time, Levertov can be said—in 
her polyvocality, her often unconventional use of punctuation, and her fragmentary lineation—to 
court the formally experimental, and certainly attempts a global reach. I maintain that Ostriker’s 
concept of postmodern witness is useful in reading Levertov, especially because “[p]ostmodern 
witness …  is a marriage of opposites. It employs the fragmented structures and polyglot 
associations originating in … those epitomes of high modernism” (35). 
What is most important about the politics of postmodern witness, especially regarding 
Levertov, is that Ostriker asserts that “it is crucial that the poet is present and located in the 
poem. The poet is not simply a phantom manipulator of words but a confused actual person, 
caught in a world of catastrophe that the poem must somehow both mirror and transcend” (35, 
emph. Ostriker’s). Ostriker’s language here is telling: the presentness and locatedness of the 
poet-figure in the work is vital, but it is also necessarily complicated by the poem’s dual role of 
mirroring and transcending. Rather than adopting some Platonic understanding of the poem as 
mimetic mode, Ostriker’s postmodern witness makes present and locatable the subject, if only to 
transcend that location, and to thus destabilize the subject in its movement. In this way, 
postmodern witness functions something like the ekstasis of Longinus that so intrigued Mac 
Low; it moves you, and in so doing, it removes you. In this way, Levertov’s call to witness is 
doubly confrontational: it makes you to look, then it makes you to move from where you were. 
It is precisely this confrontational tactic that so many critics find objectionable in 
Levertov’s work. This apparently dogmatic confrontation is perhaps most overtly critiqued in 
                                                
30 Though many of her poems, for example “Staying Alive,” or the slightly longer “During the Eichmann Trial,” 
could be considered long poems, none of these approach the grandiosity or all-encompassing nature of the long 
poems that so defined the modernist movement, or that continue to define the poets influenced by it.  
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scholarship (which is to say, outside of Duncan’s quite overt critiques in his letters to her) in 
Cary Nelson’s “Levertov’s Political Poetry,” an essay excerpt included in Gelpi’s volume Denise 
Levertov: Selected Criticism (1993). Nelson describes Levertov’s poetry, exemplified for him in 
the collection To Stay Alive (1971), wherein “a perfectly commendable moral commitment to 
practical action outside poetry enters the poetry itself. Moreover, she demands that her visions 
prove equal to direct confrontation” (162). While I, coming from an anarchist framework, am 
obviously sympathetic to Levertov’s confrontational tactics, Nelson views them as unnecessary 
for, or worse unwelcome in, poetry. Instead, I propose that Levertov’s political confrontation in 
her work functions as deleuzoguattarian assemblage. That is, “[t]he book as assemblage with the 
outside, against the book as image of the world. A rhizome-book, not a dichotomous, pivotal, or 
fascicular book” (A Thousand Plateaus 23). So, when Nelson critiques Levertov, arguing that 
“she would create a world in which love is the greater power, but she cannot” (164), his 
argument is fundamentally flawed. In Levertov’s rhizome-book-world, love is the greater power, 
insofar as it is a love of flux. We must take what are commonly characterized as her modes of 
resistance and transform them into reclamation of the modes of production of subjectivities, 
producing experiment rather than resistance, confronting its readers into a love of common rather 
than a refusal of commonality. 
On this point I am somewhat conflicted and I admit this freely. While I do want to 
reclaim Levertov’s work by way of her confrontation of her readers into an experimental 
common of flux and love, I often wonder about her means. One perfect example of this is the 
poem “A Solitude” (The Jacob’s Ladder 68-70), which ends the collection with a resounding call 
for communal love and shared responsibility. While I, and the postanarchist literary theory I 
carry with me, support the poem’s end goal, this politics is articulated through a problematic 
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method. The poem tells a more or less narrative of a blind man character who is “in great 
solitude” (3) in his inability to view the world around him, but who—in the classic ableist figure 
of the disabled person—has access to a greater ethics and a greater sense of community by virtue 
of his not being hindered by the limitations of viewing imposed order. The speaker records his or 
her “good deed” helping the blind man out of a train station, giving particular attention to the 
assemblage formed when the two characters hold each other’s hands:  
his hand and mine 
know one another,  
 
it’s as if my hand were gone forth  
on its own journey. (50-3) 
The poem culminates in the blind man’s movement beyond the helpful stranger, who then 
observes that “he says he can find his way” (55). In the final stanza of the poem, Levertov moves 
beyond this narrative and into the striking observation that in asserting his oscillating 
dependence and independence from the speaker, the blind man asserts the speaker’s position as 
both separate from and tied to the outside world. The poem ends: “He says, I am” (57, emph. 
Levertov’s), a confrontational, propagandist ethics to be sure, but one that forces the reader into 
this assemblage, too. However problematic her methods in this case, The Jacob’s Ladder 
encourages the reader to read it as a rhizome-book without ever denying the authority of the 
writing-subject.  
In fact, I’d argue that one way to access Levertov’s protest as experiment rather than 
resistance is in her insistence on playing the oppressor rather than the oppressed. Despite the 
number of feminist poets (eg. Rich, Rukeyser) writing at the same time who were interested in 
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writing about how the feminine is oppressed within a Western society, Levertov used even 
gender oppression to show Western violence against the global South. Patricia Hampl writes that 
“Levertov maintained her identity as an outraged, frustrated voice, but as a citizen of the 
oppressive nation, rather than as a victim of it” (171). While it is still certainly possible to read 
these poems as polemical, dogmatic diatribes, Hampl suggests that the way out is through.31 We 
must then read Levertov’s political poetry, starting from The Jacob’s Ladder and moving onward 
into even her most Catholic, divining writing at the end of her career, as “poems without grace, 
full of confusion and sometimes misplaced anger” (Hampl 167). Even when Levertov gets angry 
at activists and poets who are apparently political, but refuse to take a side or adopt a clear 
position in times of crisis, we must read Levertov’s insistence on the political importance of 
witness as, more legitimately, a call to the common, to the comradery of political 
experimentation; we must see Levertov’s voice as “strong, clear, not self-righteous, comradely 
even” (Hampl 170). Her work, expresses a comradery, a desire for community, and a frustration 
when that community fails to manifest in the harsh light of American individualism, which, we 
can say now, Duncan falls victim to; his free individual is no less Thoreau and Whitman because 
                                                
31 Comment by Andy Weaver (30/1/14): “How do you think Levertov’s more explicitly ‘us vs them’ poems 
challenge or extend Hampl’s point that ‘Levertov maintained her identity as an outraged, frustrated voice, but as a 
citizen of the oppressive nation, rather than as a victim of it (171)’? It would seem to me that in poems like ‘Staying 
Alive’ and ‘Tenebrae’ (both from To Stay Alive, admittedly) Levertov carves out a sub-community (a polis?) of 
ethical people (including herself) within the nation, and so would seem to be both a member of the oppressive nation 
but also explicitly not really or fully a member of that nation (at such times, Levertov seems to present herself as the 
wise immigrant rather than a citizen). Thoughts?” 
 
Response (31/1/14): “Your question is a good one, and I think to give it a sufficient response, I need to spend more 
time with To Stay Alive than I have. What I will say is that her envisioning of a community of people who can see, 
who are paying attention more than everyone else, is troubling. I am often put off by it. It’s an insistence on 
difference, on separation in some form or another from the nation. And this is an important caveat that should be 
added to Hampl’s argument. But, the difference is spreading (goodness, all I ever really want to do is write about 
Stein). And by that I mean that Levertov’s pseudo-polis is also always seeking to grow, to expand and connect. It’s 
why she’s so frustrated all the time at the fact that hers remains such a strong group. In one sense, it is a pretty clear 
‘us vs them’ politic. In another, in ‘Staying Alive’ she writes: ‘No life / other, apart from.’ And then it’s all bodies 
and bodies and bodies.” 
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Duncan writes him (and I say “him” clearly) as radical. Perhaps this is what Palmer referred to at 
the conference at UEA as Duncan’s “Blakean self-righteousness.” If Duncan’s provocations fall 
short, it is because they rely too much on the importance of the individualized singularities and 
not enough on the sameness that unites them into the larger Book (a fractured truth, perhaps) that 
he still sees. If Levertov’s prescriptions fall short, it is because she does the opposite, relying far 
too much on sameness and failing to acknowledge the inherent disparity of the multiple. This is 
all to say that Levertov’s use of identity politics provides us with a way out, but only as long as 
we are willing to use identity, use subjectivity, as Hardt and Negri insist in Commonwealth, as “a 
weapon of the republic of property, but one that can be turned against it” (326). It is precisely 
this turning against violence (against the State), provoked by Levertov’s confrontational politics, 
that postanarchism requires to make the reading and writing of even the most overtly political 
poems an activist practice. 
In the end, what a postanarchist literary theory must take from looking at Levertov and 
Duncan alongside each other is that their respective desires for the location of sameness in each 
other and forging connections between disparate singularities is important for their own 
relationship to each other. What I mean to say here is simply this: that while historically treated 
as incommensurate and incommensurable, the politics and poetics of Levertov and Duncan 
actually represent two sides of the same coin. Whereas Duncan stresses the singular and the 
attention to detail (ultimately praising the connections between singularities), Levertov stresses 
the sameness of existence and the importance of communal responsibility. Although trends in 
radical poetics and politics may have sided with Duncan in their well-documented debate, a 
postanarchist literary theory understands that reading these poetics together proves the 
inextricability of these two concepts; the singular is not a negation of the communal, but rather 
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an integral facet of it. While radically different in both form and content, Passages and The 
Jacob’s Ladder demonstrate that it is through this understanding of the singular and its role in 
the multiple that the authority of the author is destabilized, the authority of the reader is 
recognized, and the site for (post)anarchist intervention is laid bare.  
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Chapter Three: [a reader culture prefers both: Juliana Spahr and Harryette Mullen 
 I begin this chapter on feminist poetics with Response (1996), the first collection of 
poetry by the now central experimental poet, Juliana Spahr. I begin with Spahr because I see in 
her work a clear intersection with Levertov’s: a refusal to entirely deny her subjectivity and a 
reliance on that subjective point-of-view to witness. These two preoccupations, and their tenuous 
relationship with how we make meaning using language in poetry, would become the major 
thematics of Spahr’s later work, such as collections like thisconnectionofeveryonewithlungs and 
Fuck You – Aloha – I Love You which have become mainstays in contemporary anthologies and 
course syllabi. In Response, these thematics are nascent, tentative. Response tests the waters of 
poetry’s potentials for resistance, for experimentation. In the sections that follow, I will look to 
issues of selfhood and subjectivity, a poetics of witness, and a conception of language as 
common in order to flesh out the experimental potentials of the collection and to analyze how the 
text fits in with the poets that make up my earlier chapters. I will also look at Spahr’s concern 
with linguistic expression and linguistic violence in order to expose the ways her work departs 
from these literary predecessors, and opens up a feminist poetics that, in true postanarchist 
fashion, envisions poetry as a space for activism and alternative voices. After all, as Katy 
Lederer’s review of Response exclaims: “If any act of poetic writing can be thought of as action, 
this is it” (140).  
 In sum, my work on Response strives to read against1 Spahr, which is her own term for a 
reader-centric reading strategy outlined in “A, B, C: Reading Against Emily Dickinson and 
                                                
1 Comment by Andy Weaver (1/1/2014): “As for Spahr’s notion of reading against, maybe you could clarify (in a 
footnote?) how/to what extent that differs from Barthes’s concept of the writerly? Is it that Spahr demands more 
agency for the reader (perhaps suggesting that Barthes’s notion, because it is implicitly a granting of power from the 
author to the reader, is still unintentionally author-centred)?” 
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Gertrude Stein.” In this essay, Spahr considers the connections between Stein and Dickinson, 
asserting that “[b]oth writers create a reader-centered poetics. One which, without denying that 
the author is an authority, denies that the author is the authority and establishes a similar 
authority for the reader”2 (281). Spahr uses this disruption of the authority of the writing subject 
to envision a new way of approaching literary texts; the strategy of reading against is decidedly 
insurgent. It takes as a starting point Mac Low’s eventual concession that all writing is egoic, but 
it also refuses the authority of a controlling writing subject. Reading against explicitly opposes 
the modes of traditional criticism. As Spahr contends, “[a]gainst is the bastard cousin of 
Bloomian ‘influence’ in that it denies or skews issues of originality and pursues misreading” 
(281). While this summary of reading against may, at first, sound reactionary or revolutionary, 
and thus in opposition to postanarchism generally, its conceptions of the multiple and its 
privileging of rhizomatic connection actually make it a mode of alternative and experimentation 
par excellence. As reading against forges and legitimizes anachronistic or improper connections, 
as it develops rampant and wonderful misreadings, it rewrites literary history. Reading against 
“is not a genealogy, but a rethinking of reading and the connection between texts” (283), and one 
that understands, in what I have established as a hallmark of postanarchist literary theory, that 
poetry—that all literature—is common.  
 While rarely explicitly anarchist, Spahr’s work in Response can be characterized by the 
same insurgent attitude that her concept of reading against suggests. In her article, “The 90’s,” a 
survey of experimental poetry from the nineties published in boundary 2 in the fall of 2009, she 
outlines a poetic climate fraught with debate between “writing that turns from standard English 
                                                
2 Spahr’s concept of reading against differs from Roland Barthes’s concept of the writerly insofar as it repositions 
the reader not as a substitute or additional author (as we might understand Barthes’s death of the Author-God to do), 
but rather to place particular emphasis on the radical potentials of a more free reader to engage with a text in 
controversial or counter-traditional ways. 
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and one that upholds standard English” (173). Spahr sees this turning from standard English as 
necessarily anti-imperialist and, in some ways, anti-capitalist, and argues that this vein of poetry 
was fuelled by the nineties’ “perfect storm” of political resistance and experimentation. That is, 
moments of collective resistance in the nineties, as in the Zapatista revolution and the WTO 
mobilization, sought large and overarching goals through multiple voices concerned with 
multiple projects and employing multiple tactics. They were, as she describes them, “successful 
thought experiments in what a universalism with room for particularity might look like on a very 
practical level” (173-4). For Spahr, the nineties in poetry saw these practical experimentations as 
intrinsically tied to the potentials of poetry for similar experimentation in language, generalized 
under Spahr’s wide-reaching notion of turning from standard English.  
 Response is littered with examples of a grappling with the radical experimental potentials 
of language and their correlative, the radical potentials of activism. The collection implies, at 
first, that the starting point of a politics of experimentation is a resistance that stems from anger 
not unlike Levertov’s. Spahr writes: “the anger is to draw attention to the way anger is a just 
response / to how they will be angry until just witness is begun” (“witness: VI” 40-41). Where 
Spahr departs from Levertov’s call to political action and engagement is that Response suggests 
that the most effective political content is marked by its enactment rather than its dogmatism.3 In 
the first section of “responding,” the speaker remarks on the reading of “a book that is so subtle” 
that “[its political content goes unnoticed” (“responding: I” 6-7, no close to square bracket), a 
book that eventually provokes the speaker to ask: “what is political content?” (8). As the 
boundaries of what dictates political content are blurred by what Spahr terms a subtlety, she 
                                                
3 In this way, Spahr’s suggestions in Response recall those of Andy Weaver in “Promoting ‘a community of 
thoughtful men and women’: Anarchism in Robert Duncan’s Ground Work Volumes,” where he argues that when 
Duncan’s politics move from prescriptive in Bending the Bow to enactive in Ground Work, the result is a more 
effective and useful anarchist politic. 
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advocates a poetic language that, in working against standard English, promotes an anarchic 
moment of insurgency, a Temporary Autonomous Zone (TAZ) where the inherent instability of 
language is allowed to flourish. In this vein, “responding” begins with the line, “This is a place 
without a terrain a government that always changes an unstable language” (“responding: I” 1). 
The ambiguity of Spahr’s syntax here is telling; the grammar of the line makes it unclear if the 
place is without both terrain and government, or whether the terrain-less place is also a 
government in flux. Moreover, the line might suggest that this “place,” both without physical 
boundary (terrain) and authority (government) changes an already unstable language, or else this 
“place” that is always in flux is an unstable language itself. This ambiguous syntax enacts the 
politics of the “place,” the primary situation of Response, embodying (which is to say, locating in 
the physical) while at the same time destabilizing activist movement.4 Additionally, the “This” 
that starts this line is a use of deixis with no contextualizing information, no object external to it 
to which it refers. “This … place” is intentionally ambiguous, a nonplace whose location in the 
physical realm is thus tenuous at best. 
 Lederer sees these dual goals of destabilizing and materializing as the most effective 
antitraditional tactics of Response. She sees these goals most clearly enacted in Spahr’s insertion 
of the generic, especially by way of her intrusive use of the bracket, into an otherwise particular 
work. Lederer writes, in the same review quoted above, that “[b]y inserting ‘the generic’ within 
[her margins], Spahr transmutes the ghostly—thus invisible—margins of the traditional book 
into the space of the ‘embodied’—thus vulnerable—textual center” (142). What Lederer points 
to in Spahr’s transmutation of the traditional book’s margins is that the bracketed generic 
                                                
4 Comment by Andy Weaver (1/1/2014): “Is it also possible to read that line as suggesting something less positive, 
that is, that it’s a place where a government always changes/manipulates to its benefit an unstable language? Is that 
another possible caveat against what you call, at the end of the plateau, the ‘potentially damaging role’ of ‘art in 
politics’? Or is my reading too extreme?” 
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insertions function as TAZs, moments of insurgency and displacement that are still necessarily 
encased within more traditional confines. In “responding,” these TAZs get characterized as 
Spahr’s “[New State],” in which poetry and art in general serve a crucial purpose. She writes, 
“we know art is fundamental to the [New State]” (“responding: II” 3). In this conception, “[New 
State]” is a TAZ, a future anarchy that is as unstable and undefinable as Spahr’s conception of 
the self. At times, these bracketed insertions even directly contest issues of nation as a means of 
definition, as in “documentary” when Spahr uses brackets to redact these terms: “[name of nation 
used as an adjective deleted]” (1).   
 Spahr is careful not to overstate the political potentials of poetry, and in this sense 
surpasses Levertov’s naïve view of political affect. In a few examples in “responding,” she 
writes of occasions when the political import of art fails against the physicality of real violence. 
This can be seen when “[name of major historical figure],” a still generic figure that speaks to the 
pervasiveness of this violence, “calls, authentically, for a more total, more radical war than we 
can even dream in the language of the avant-garde” (“responding: II” 5). Later, art proves not 
only ineffectual, but also potentially damaging in this material realm when “while overwhelmed 
by an opera [name of major historical figure] plans genocide” (“responding: II” 27). While these 
examples speak to the potentially ineffectual or damaging role of art in politics, the bracketing of 
the “major historical figure” sets him/her in flux, blurring the lines of history, politics, and even 
artistic tradition. As Spahr’s readers, we take on the burden not only of envisioning these 
violences on a very real level, but also of occupying the bracketed spaces ourselves. That is, 
because of the generic wording and the general vague, open, or bracketed way that Spahr 
presents the violences of the text, it is up to the reader to envision how and when these violences 
occur in the real, lived experiences of ourselves as subjects, and of subjectivities other than 
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ourselves. In this way, the reader occupies these bracketed spaces, becoming the various [generic 
pronouns] included therein, but also momentarily occupying the positions of “major historical 
figure” and the other slightly more specific subjectivities. This reader-envisioned violence and 
the incorporation of the reader in the process of meaning-making pervade Response, making it an 
ideal candidate for exposing the radical potentials of a postanarchist reading practice to allow for 
reading as activism.    
Recycled Aphasia: Non-exhaustive Readings of Harryette Mullen 
I move from Spahr’s clear anarchist sympathies to the work of Harryette Mullen who, 
while in no way anarchist herself, instead offers postanarchism a method of resistance that is 
highly experimental and interested in the radical alternatives offered to readers and writers in, 
and through, language. The connection between these two poets is clear; not only do the two read 
together frequently, moving in similar experimental circles, but also because Spahr has devoted 
much of her own critical scholarship to discussing Mullen’s work. For example, a chapter of 
Everybody’s Autonomy (2001), an adaptation of Spahr’s doctoral thesis, discusses Mullen’s 
Trimmings and S*PeRM**K*T. Spahr also provides the introduction for Barbara Henning’s 
experimental and hugely informative book of postcards and interviews, Looking Up Harryette 
Mullen (2011). In Everybody’s Autonomy, Spahr focuses on the connective reading practices and 
collective approaches to identity that she sees as encouraged by Mullen’s work. She begins these 
discussions by noting the clearly defined subjectivity of Mullen’s earliest work, Tree Tall 
Woman (1981), but by also asserting that Mullen’s later work moves away from this identifiable 
authorial subject-position. Ultimately, she argues that “[t]here is no clear ‘I’ in Mullen’s later 
books” (108). For Spahr, this disruption of authorial subjectivity shifts the focus onto the reader 
rather than the clearly delineated author, partially through complicating potential exegetical 
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readings. In more concrete terms, Spahr’s theory of connective reading argues that the disruption 
of the lyrical “I” in Mullen’s work is part and parcel with the loading of the poem with multiple 
and multifarious cultural information. “While this work allows readers to do the unpacking,” she 
writes, “it is always a provisional unpacking because the markers are so loaded with culture that 
one cannot come up with an easily exhaustive answer” (113). Essentially, Mullen’s work 
complicates exegesis by overwhelming or overloading the text—and thus the reader—with too 
many possible meanings. In this way, Mullen’s work is similar to that of Cage and Duncan, 
though admittedly these texts are all created in different fashions. An interest in radical 
connections within and outside of the text unites all three of these authors. But, unlike Cage’s 
nonsemantic meaning, we may say that Mullen’s work is supersemantic, overloaded—and thus 
not overcoded—with semantic possibility. And, unlike Duncan’s interest in linking his work to 
other texts through radical intertext and allusion, we may say instead that Mullen looks to 
inscribe her multiplied self onto existing texts. Or, to put this another way, where Duncan sought 
to position Passages as a series of rhizomatic nodes, Mullen instead works to create a 
multiplicitous authorial voice that produces texts that are deceptively rhizomatic. If Passages 
openly displays its multiplicity and complexity, the seeming simplicity of Mullen’s work in 
Sleeping with the Dictionary (2002) and elsewhere demonstrate the necessarily rhizomatic nature 
of all things we might otherwise consider singular, especially identity. In this way, the difference 
between Mullen and these two earlier poets is of degree rather than kind.   
 What makes this turn away from one clearly defined authorial position to the multiple in 
Mullen’s later works so fascinating is that, as Spahr indicates, the shift is political insofar as it 
critiques the very system of binarism that my project opposes, the binarism that Spahr and 
Mullen both assert makes oppression and domination possible. Approaching Mullen’s poetry as 
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a manifestation of the multiple or the common dismantles the structures of reading and writing 
that promote binary thinking. As Spahr writes, “[v]iewing works as sites of complication rather 
than exclusion avoids the either/or of thought that so pervades systems of domination” (118). 
Despite a lack of a unified authorial subjectivity, Mullen’s work articulates certain perspectives 
(however multiplied) that function simultaneously as inclusive and exclusive. This is a major 
feature of the discussions between Mullen and Henning, who frequently point out where the 
erasure of subjectivity succeeds in textual production, and where it fails. For Henning, Mullen’s 
work may function inclusively insofar as the lyrical “I” is complicated, but, especially in 
Sleeping with the Dictionary, the reader is also often made to confront his or her exclusion from 
the text and the various cultural experiences it seeks to represent. Henning tells Mullen, “[w]hen 
I was reading your poems, I always knew when I was an outsider, looking in from another 
cultural experience or even from my own purposeful alienation from everyday television & 
advertising” (16). My project interrogates this apparent borderland between inclusion and 
exclusion, between the identifiable authorial subject and the commonality of connective reading 
and writing put forth by Spahr and tacitly endorsed by Mullen.  
To do this, I would like to begin with a discussion of “All She Wrote,” the first poem of 
Sleeping with the Dictionary. The poem provides a good introduction to the major issues in 
Mullen’s poetics more generally, and to my own observations on how her work illuminates a 
postanarchist reading process. As a prose poem, like each of the poems in Sleeping with the 
Dictionary, “All She Wrote” already exclaims the multiple and its interrogation of traditional 
poetics. In its conversational tone, it signals to its reader that it looks to engage with him or her 
on a personal and potentially affective level. And yet, throughout the page, “All She Wrote” sees 
the speaker apologizing to his/her reader for, absurdly, not writing. S/he pleads with the reader 
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for forgiveness, complaining: “You know how scarce paper is these days. I admit I haven’t been 
recycling.” While this is, on the surface, an excuse for not writing, it is also a tongue-in-cheek 
way of demonstrating the line Mullen walks between borrowing/allusion and innovation, which I 
will discuss later. Additionally humorous and ecological, these sentences inaugurate the reader 
into the explosion of cultural markers that, for Spahr at least, prevent exhaustive reading. The 
poem sets the tone for the collection’s tenuous relationship with the authorial subject.5  
When Henning asks Mullen directly about this particular poem in the second part of 
Looking Up Harryette Mullen, Henning primarily questions the surface aspect of the poem, 
prodding at the inspirations for, and the material conditions of, the poem’s production. Mullen 
responds: “It is a litany of excuses for not writing. Not writing letters to friends and just not 
writing poetry, stories, or essays, or whatever I was intending to write. I also hear lots of excuses 
from my students and my writer friends” (43). I am interested in the extent to which Mullen’s 
seemingly impersonal and anti-subjective poetics—born out of the LANGUAGE tradition—also 
has clear grounds in the autobiographical, recalling Lyn Hejinian’s My Life in its simultaneous 
adoption and disruption of the lyrical “I.” I am also interested in Mullen’s description of the 
production of “All She Wrote” as pragmatic and practical, completely without the ephemerality 
of inspiration and musing. For Mullen, the poem is also about writer’s block, and about using 
experimentation, innovation, and constraint-based writing processes as a practical way out of the 
often debilitating issue of inspiration. Thus, Mullen’s frequent use of constraint in her work, in 
particular her adoption of the Oulipian n + 7 method in Sleeping with the Dictionary, functions 
                                                
5 Amy Moorman Robbins notes that, in contrast to the vast majority of Sleeping with the Dictionary, “All She 
Wrote” dwells suspiciously on the authorial subject and the lyric “I.” She writes: “The excessive presence of the ‘I’ 
in ‘All She Wrote,’ coupled with relentless references to the speaker’s inability, incompetence, unavailability, and 
state of general illness, work at one level to advance an idea of Mullen’s speaking subject as hyper-present in 
damaged form; indeed, up until the final turn, ‘I,’ ‘me,’ or ‘my’ saturates nearly every sentence” (358). 
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as a way to start writing when a “writer’s block” might have stopped you. She tells Henning, 
“[i]n a way, the Oulipians have a solution for the writer’s block problem.6 As they say—you 
never really have a reason for not writing. There’s always a constraint, always another possible 
project” (43). This is part of what Mullen suggests when she writes, “I suffer from aphasia.” 
And yet, true to Spahr’s observations, Mullen’s contradictory aphasia also functions on 
multiple levels that severely complicate exhaustive exegesis. One element of this is that silence 
is a major feature of her work. Sleeping with the Dictionary frequently interrogates who is given 
voice and who is silenced, and she reconfigures an inability to speak or a lack of access to speech 
as oppression and liberation, simultaneously recalling the stuttering of Spahr’s work and the 
silence of Cage’s. It is the beginning of a book-length interrogation of these issues, as Mullen 
herself notes to Henning. “It sets the tone,” she says, “announcing that writing itself is a subject” 
(44). “All She Wrote” positions “writing” as a subject alongside reader and writer; suddenly, the 
text itself occupies a fraught subject position, and the writer is only one part of the assemblage it 
forms with literary tradition, with cultural experience, and with the radical multiplicity of its 
                                                
6 Comment by Andy Weaver (5/2/2014): “I think this is an obvious question, but is there something about a writer’s 
block that is helpful in relation to Mullen’s work (and perhaps also the other writers and/or ideas you’ve been 
working through)? Is that blockage, so disparaged by most authors, something that can help bring about the 
postanarchist distrust of authorial subjectivity you’ve been discussing?” 
 
Response (13/2/2014): “I hadn’t thought about using writer’s block more, but I definitely agree with your suggestion 
here. I think that what we call 'writer’s block' is often the point when you realize, consciously or subconsciously, 
that your form (whatever it is) has limits, and that part of what you are trying to write (to offer your reader) is 
somewhere beyond those limits. I also think that the idea behind 'writer’s block' tends to reinforce the understanding 
of an Author as a medium, as if there is usually a path through which inspiration and artistic creation flow, and now 
something is blocking its way. The more I think about it, the more I realize there’s something really interesting 
going on there.” 
 
Response by Andy Weaver (14/2/2014): “This is really intriguing. Just don’t ignore all of those standard 
conceptions of writer’s block as something extremely tied to personal agency (that is, those cliches of the individual 
unable to connect with his or her–really, almost always his–own genius). This idea of writer as conduit is an 
interesting adaptation (and, really, return to the original meaning of the term). And thinking about it in relation to 
formal limits seems really fruitful, too.” 
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readership. This unique approach to authorship allows Mullen to interrogate these moments of 
recycling and aphasia, dual terms that will repeatedly surface throughout this chapter. After this 
interrogation of authorship and communication, I will take up these issues of recycling and 
aphasia—or, less metaphorically, tradition and silence—through the clear politicization of a 
LANGUAGE poetics, and an insistence on the infusion of identity politics into the writerly texts 
of the literary avant-garde. 
My work on Mullen will also navigate those spaces where one cannot speak, and what 
voices get silenced, refusing to, as Wittgenstein wrote, pass over them. Following Mullen’s lead, 
I look at the inherent linguistic, social, and material relationship between silence and violence, 
and how these two terms are intertwined and complicated in an experimental poetics. 
Additionally, my work here is interested in the ephemeral alongside the preserved, and looks to 
develop a Black experimental tradition out of Mullen’s work that moves adeptly between the 
speakerly texts of the Black Arts Movement and the writerly texts of LANGUAGE poetry and 
the avant-garde. As such, my discussions of Mullen are particularly concerned with the 
deleuzoguattarian concept of minor languages and minoritarian politic. I also pay particularly 
close attention to the race and gender issues innate in tradition, influence, and canon formation, 
all of which feature prominently in Mullen’s work and in the criticism surrounding it. Ultimately, 
my work positions Sleeping with the Dictionary as the recycling of aphasia, and the embracing of 
the impossible multiple inherent in that metaphor.  
 “Now you sound more like yourself”: Collapsing the LANGUAGE/BAM Dualism 
The description of Mullen’s work as avant-garde or experimental, or even as a part of the 
LANGUAGE tradition, is necessarily fraught with complications. To begin, the avant-garde 
designation tends to be treated as an exclusive club; at times, this “club” metaphor becomes 
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literal, as in the example of the Oulipo, which, as Spahr notes in her introduction to Looking Up 
Harryette Mullen, is a literally exclusive club that rarely admits women or people of colour.7 
Spahr is quick to note that one does not need to be a card-carrying member of the Oulipo to carry 
out their language games. As she writes, “Oulipo techniques are, obviously, frequently used by 
those who are not in Oulipo. But it is still hard not to read Mullen’s insistence on the Oulipian 
nature of this book as a polite claiming and insistence on an inclusive tradition” (iv). Mullen’s 
use of Oulipo explores the relationship between the individual and the communal in a number of 
complicated ways. To begin, Spahr observes that “Sleeping with the Dictionary has Mullen again 
exploring communolects, community, and her own subjectivity using what are sometimes called 
poetic ‘procedures,’ or various composition techniques” (iii). So, for example, Mullen’s use of 
the n + 7 technique is a gesture towards the communal, and away from an individualized 
subjectivity and a conception of authorial genius. Mullen herself, in the same book, admits that 
she finds the Oulipian constraints liberating: “I have found that using constraints in this way 
expands the possibilities for improvisation, as various textual operations may be tried at different 
points in the writing process” (27). Alongside a freed ability to improvise, Mullen also admires 
the way Oulipo allows her to place less emphasis on the poem as end-product, arguing that the 
“idea of ‘potential literature’ liberates the writer to concentrate on the process, rather than the 
product, of writing” (26), drawing an obvious parallel not only to Oulipo but also to Cage and 
Mac Low and their concepts of indeterminacy, and to the necessarily provisional nature of the 
serial poem demonstrated in Duncan’s Passages. I would like to move beyond the role of Oulipo 
                                                
7 While I cannot, in the space provided, discuss the gender and race exclusivity of Oulipo in sufficient depth, I 
would like to point out the publication The End of Oulipo? An Attempt to Exhaust a Movement (2013) by Lauren 
Elkin and Scott Esposito. Its is informative and thoughtful, particularly on the issue of the sexism of, and feminist 
responses to, Oulipo. It also provides some important discussions of the women writers of Oulipo that are rarely 
discussed in English criticism because they are rarely translated into English from the French. 
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in Sleeping with the Dictionary and look instead at how the liberation Mullen identifies in the 
“writerly” avant-garde is one important avenue into understanding her work as collapsing a 
division between the lyrical work associated with the Black Arts Movement and the avant-garde 
refusal of subjectivity,8 ultimately proving that these schools need not be so separate, let alone 
antagonistic.9  
To begin discussing this issue I would like to look first at the poem “Coals to Newcastle, 
Panama Hats from Ecuador” (16), a poem that is acutely aware of what exists in these two 
literary traditions with which Mullen has been associated. Of this poem, Mullen tells Henning, “I 
had the title before the poem, starting with the expression, ‘Coals to Newcastle.’ That’s a city in 
England that was known for coal mining, so this saying is about getting more of what you’ve 
already got” (58). While the poem need not necessarily be read in a metapoetic fashion, I cannot 
help but see it as a desire not to fit in with, or subscribe to, any one particular school of poetry, 
thus essentially providing readers with “more of what you’ve already got.” Though this 
metapoetic theme is never explicitly stated, it is suggested by the image of coal, a symbol that 
                                                
8 I should add here that any discussion of the influence of the writerly avant-garde on Mullen would be incomplete 
without mention of Gertrude Stein. The influence of Stein on Mullen, and Mullen’s frequent direct engagement with 
Stein’s work, has been well documented critically, and features most prominently in the three collections included in 
her Recyclopedia: Trimmings, S*PeRM**K*T, and Muse & Drudge. I will not attempt to do justice to the literature 
on this issue, but I would like to make note of the fact that Stein provided for Mullen, in both positive and negative 
ways, one example of the issue of language in race and gender politics from the point of view of privilege and 
oppression. Indeed, it was Stein’s “privileges that allowed her to romanticize and even ignore the implications of her 
depictions of characters like Melanctha,” and as such “Mullen seeks to reckon with, rather than dismiss, the power 
of language and ideology that enabled Stein’s experimentalism” (Mix 43). Accordingly, Mullen’s work is a process 
of “reckoning with” throughout, refusing to dismiss or ignore the problematics of the avant-garde that troubled her. 
For more on Mullen’s use of Stein, see Elisabeth Frost’s seminal article, “Signifyin(g) on Stein: The Revisionist 
Poetics of Harryette Mullen and Leslie Scalapino.” Postmodern Culture 5.3 (May 1995). 
 
9 Benjamin R. Lempert, in his article “Harryette Mullen and the Contemporary Jazz Voice,” bypasses the issue of 
the white avant-garde as separate from contemporary black poetry by arguing that in Sleeping with the Dictionary, 
Mullen’s collapse of the written/oral division demonstrates that this collapse occurs already in the form of jazz 
music. That is, she “achieves this figuration by setting its version of corporeality within a space and time saturated 
with the indeterminate temporality of jazz improvisation,” and this allows her to “refus[e] either the ossification of 
sound into text or the reduction of text to sound, …thereby offer[ing] a provocative reading of blackness as 
experienced in the multiple guises: sonic, temporal, visual” (1060). While this reading differs from mine, I do not 
find the two incommensurate. 
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contains within it this same duality that is persistently discussed in regard to Mullen’s work: coal 
as blackness, coal as progress. The coal, of which Newcastle already has too much, represents on 
the one hand industrial progress, city, machine, and innovation; it prioritizes the material and the 
successful. On the other hand, coal becomes a symbol of blackness, insofar as it is not only black 
in colour but that it also colours the skin of those mining it; additionally, coal mining has literary 
precedent as a symbol of poverty and of labour issues.  
The metapoetic elements of this poem are brought to the fore through Mullen’s emotional 
approach to authorship. The speaker insists on the belligerence of emotion, as when he or she 
states, “I’ll be emotionally disturbed for as long as it takes” (16). This interest in emotion takes 
an important political and metapoetic turn when it attacks the difficult, emotionless, and 
bourgeois side of avant-garde poetry, as when Mullen writes, “You’re too simple to be so 
difficult. Malicious postmodernism” (ibid). This opposition leads the speaker to turn in on his or 
herself, ultimately questioning the validity of the reliance on subjectivity and authorial presence 
representative of the Black Arts Movement and the erasure of subjectivity praised by the avant-
garde. The poem ends, “Now that I live alone, I’m much less introspective. Now you sound more 
like yourself” (ibid). The speaker, who “lives alone” and is thus separated from the social, argues 
that this separation allows him/her to be free of self-contemplation, to avoid constantly reviewing 
oneself and one’s subjectivity. The paratactic addition of “Now you sound more like yourself” 
and the sudden shift in pronoun from the first to the second undermine the first sentence. Who 
sounds like his/her self? The reader? Or is this an external voice directed at the speaker? This 
final parataxis brings into question one’s ability to sound like oneself at all. The suggestion of 
causality in these final two sentences implies contradiction; in supposing that we ever “live 
alone,” that we can ever become “less introspective,” we sound most like ourselves. We cannot 
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escape subjectivity;10 in discussing its potential erasure ad infinitum, as the avant-garde has 
tended to do, one simply increases the terms of one’s subjectivity.  
This dual interest in being less introspective and sounding more like ourselves is 
primarily what has been used, in criticism, to label Mullen as a “crossover” from a racialized 
poet of identity towards identity’s erasure in LANGUAGE poetry and the avant-garde. And for 
many, “Mullen’s crossover appeal is the prime reason for her popularity” (Hart 143). But her 
work never treats these two approaches to poetry as separate entities, and therefore the 
designation of “crossover” is inaccurate. More appropriately, Elisabeth Frost in an interview with 
Mullen tells her: “It’s as though your work is informed by poststructuralist ideas about language, 
but those ideas are not directly cited. Somehow, the theory is underneath or inside” (405). 
Mullen addresses the issue in “Poetry and Identity,” which Deborah Mix describes as her self-
identifying as “doubly marginalized” and “a member of two groups that have somehow been 
situated as mutually exclusive” (61). In this essay, Mullen warns against the idea of the 
crossover. She writes: 
                                                
10 Comment by Andy Weaver (13/2/2014): “‘We cannot escape subjectivity’; sure, I guess I’d agree with that. But 
does that mean that we are necessarily trapped within our subjectivity? To what extent does n + 7 (or Cage’s/Mac 
Low’s tactics) lessen or alter that subjectivity?” 
 
Response (13/2/2014): “I think I want to frame these texts as a momentary slippages of the ‘trap’ of subjectivity. As 
a good critical theorist, I have a lot of trouble conceiving of an outside of subjectivity (we’re always already 
interpollated and blahblahblah). But I also think that the subject in the common is something quite different; it is 
much more prone to slippages, and it’s always in flux. These ways of writing and engaging with readers are ways of 
lessening the terms of our subjectivity, lessening their rigidity, though. That’s for sure.” 
 
Response by Andy Weaver (14/2/2014): “Yep, I would agree completely. I also think that aspiration, which is often 
thought of as unproductive, might be useful here—I mean, if we don’t aspire to a different subjectivity, how can we 
possibly achieve a new subjectivity? Perhaps planting that seed is the greatest achievement any writer can claim? (I 
vaguely recall reading or discussing something years and years ago that suggested there was this type of value in 
‘strategic idealism’—that is, an aspirational idealism that you know is not feasible at the moment [and perhaps it 
never will be], but you argue for the idea regardless, in the hopes that it will move the discussion closer to that ideal. 
I’ve often thought of Cage in those terms.)” 
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the erasure of the anomalous black writer abets the construction of a continuous, 
internally consistent tradition, while at the same time it deprives the idiosyncratic 
minority artist a history, compelling her to struggle even harder to construct a 
cultural context out of her own racial individuality. (86) 
Mullen as the anomalous black writer resists erasure by, for example, writing as Oulipo without 
a sense of belonging to the literal Oulipo. While she acknowledges where she’s giving you more 
of what you already have, she also forces you to think about why you have so much of it.  
 This issue comes up again in the Frost interview, when Mullen laments the fact that 
“[w]hat people think of as ‘black poetry’ is set aside from what people think of as ‘poetry,’ in 
terms of tradition, history, how language is used. People have a very specific notion of what 
black poetry is” (417). To this, Frost responds by arguing, “there is a balance between two 
different forces. One is an assertion of identity. The other is what I think of as hybridity—the 
mixture, the different influences all occurring at once. There is sometimes tension, but there 
doesn’t have to be” (418). Despite Frost’s insistence on the rhetoric of balance and hybridity, 
what she actually proposes here is a way of approaching Mullen’s writing that sees her as not 
bridging two schools, but rather embracing the multiple. This is much more productive than the 
dualism of terms like “balance” and “hybrid,” which tacitly support the understanding that racial 
identity and experimenting with subjectivity are in opposition, or are at the very least separate.11 
And yet, despite the insistence in these terms and in much of the criticism surrounding Mullen 
                                                
11 The concept of the hybrid is theorized extensively in recent scholarship, and I cannot summarize it here. I would, 
however, like to make a point about its use in Mullen scholarship. The term is often applied to her work, as in 
Elisabeth Frost’s “Ruses of the Lunatic Muse,” where she argues that “like the poets of the Black Arts Movement, 
Mullen experiments with a speech-based idiom, but, like Language-influenced writers, she launches her cultural 
critique by rejecting the rules of syntax and fashioning a distinctively visual, punning, and allusive play with 
language” (465). While Frost does argue that this “hybrid” is “shot through with ambivalence” (469), or that it exists 
“in a realm not of fixed identity, … but of language in flux” (471), I still worry about what the term hybrid connotes: 
that these two perspectives were necessarily separate before, and that Mullen has merely brought them together.  
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that she bridges these two disparate poetic worlds, or that she merges two seemingly 
contradictory poetic forms, there is some precedent in the most recent scholarship that takes up 
the arguments Mullen herself has been making for two decades.12 
Mullen’s concept of the “anomalous black writer” foregrounds the assumption that the 
process of writing from the lyric “I,” a less experimental mode, is typically reserved for women, 
people-of-color, or queer subjects. This is a kind of marginalization that assumes that the white, 
male, heterosexual poet necessarily occupies a better position from which to critique identity.13 
Amy Moorman Robbins addresses this issue directly in “Harryette Mullen’s Sleeping with the 
Dictionary and Race in Language/Writing,” wherein she argues that this assumption 
draw[s] on a significant and still-operative contrast: that between experimental 
writing/poetry that is assumed to explicitly or implicitly contest the viability of 
any given lyric subject … and writing that foregrounds questions and problems of 
discrete, often racialized selfhood in specific cultural contexts. (341-2) 
For example, Robbins addresses LANGUAGE poet Ron Silliman’s assertions14 that LangPo, and 
its critiques of identity, has “origins within and for a particular group” and that understanding 
                                                
12 “Poetry and Identity” was published in the journal West Coast Line in 1996. 
 
13 Comment by Andy Weaver (13/2/2014): “I think you can push this point even further. Rather than “occupies a 
better position from which to critique identity,” is it possible that this split also implies that white/male/heterosexual 
people exist outside of those labels, outside of their physical bodies, while people of colour/women/LGBQT people 
are necessarily trapped within/subject to their physical bodies? In other words, doesn’t this split continue on the idea 
that white/male/heterosexual writers are writing about ‘humanity’ rather than about white/male/heterosexual 
people?” 
 
Response (13/2/2014): “I love your point re: bodies. I will definitely incorporate it. Also reminds me of an interview 
… where Mullen is talking about Alice Walker and The Color Purple and how one reviewer said that it wasn’t just a 
story about the black experience, but the human experience, as if the designation of ‘black experience’ isn’t already 
under the ‘human’ umbrella term.” 
 
14 Here Robbins is focusing primarily to the very frequently cited and contested observation that Silliman makes in 
his 1988 essay “Poetry and the Politics of the Subject” that “Progressive poets who identify as members of groups 
that have been the subject of history—many white male heterosexuals, for example—are apt to challenge all that is 
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this “significantly complicates our reading of the movement’s subsequent disavowal of a poetics 
of identity” (345). Robbins argues that “the eventual positioning of Language writing as opposed 
to lyric poetry, with the latter genre repeatedly linked to writing by people of color, subtly 
contributes to the impression that political poetry by the socially marginalized is historically not 
experimental” (349). Jessica Lewis Luck in “Entries on a Post-Language Poetics in Harryette 
Mullen’s Dictionary,” takes up a similar concern, arguing that “understanding experimental 
poetics solely within this paradigm affords a reductive picture of many avant-garde poetic 
projects that seem, like Mullen’s, to reveal not only a discursively constructed subject but also an 
embodied person or persons at work behind the poem” (360). I am interested in following their 
lead. As such, in order to discuss Mullen’s work without re-inscribing this unhelpful and 
inherently racist dualism, I will look at how her work similarly collapses the dualism of the 
writerly and speakerly texts, opposing the bourgeois conceptions of archive and preservation 
with the inherent ephemerality of the polyvocal, multivalent text. Ultimately, Mullen’s work 
shows us not that we can bridge the gap between the speakerly and the writerly text, but that this 
gap was always artificial, developed in order to continue to silence the voices of the marginalized 
in poetry, and to keep the reader at a safe and non-intervening distance from the text.  
The collapsing of the divide between experimental and racialized writing is grounded in 
the collapse of the supposed divide between texts that privilege aurality and orality (what Mullen 
                                                                                                                                                       
supposedly “natural” about the formation of their own subjectivity. That their writing today is apt to call into 
question, if not actually explode, such conventions as narrative, persona and even reference can hardly be surprising. 
At the other end of this spectrum are poets who do not identify as members of groups that have been the subject of 
history, for they instead have been its objects. The narrative of history has led not to their self-actualization, but to 
their exclusion and domination. These writers and readers—women, people of color, sexual minorities, the entire 
spectrum of the “marginal”—have a manifest political need to have their stories told. That their writing should often 
appear much more conventional, with the notable difference as to whom is the subject of these conventions, 
illuminates the relationship between form and audience” (61). Since then, Silliman’s observations have been 
repeatedly attacked, first by Leslie Scalapino (their communication is beautifully summarized in Bob Perelman’s 
The Marginalization of Poetry: Language Writing and Literary History), but since in criticism by Sianne Ngai, 
Nathaniel Mackey, and Timothy Yu.   
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calls “speakerly” texts) and formally/visually experimental text (which she terms, following 
Barthes, “writerly”). In “Poetry and Identity,” she not only argues that the anomalous black 
writer gets elided when we maintain these divides, but also that writing by black writers will be 
at a disadvantage if they continue to prioritize orality over writing. This is made even clearer in 
“African Signs and Spirit Writing” when she insists that “any theory of African-American 
literature that privileges a speech based poetics, or the trope of orality, to the exclusion of more 
writerly texts will cost us some impoverishment of the tradition” (671). Mix also brings this to 
the fore of her studies of Mullen, arguing that the marginalization of the experimental racialized 
author occurs “because of a set of assumptions perpetuated by scholars of experimental writing 
and scholars of African American writing; the former group seeks ‘writerly texts,’ while the 
latter seeks ‘speakerly’ ones” (38). Following Mullen, Mix also suggests that collapsing the 
divide between speakerly and writerly texts works to enrich both camps. For Mix, Mullen’s 
poetry and criticism “demonstrates what we risk losing if we don’t rebuild our frameworks for 
understanding experimental traditions” (39). Clearly, an analysis, and eventually a collapsing, of 
the divide between the speakerly and writerly text is central not only to an understanding of 
Mullen’s work, but also an understanding of her place in the field of contemporary poetry. A 
look to the issue of the speakerly and writerly text is necessarily a look towards where and how 
Mullen envisions a more primary space for her reader(s) in her poetry  
This is, to some degree, what Frost notes in the introduction to her interview with Mullen 
when she suggests that Mullen’s aversion to the rules of genre allows her greater freedom for 
improvisation and freeplay. She argues that Mullen “combin[es] a concern for the political issues 
raised by identity politics with a poststructuralist emphasis on language” (397), and that, in this 
combination, she is afforded a freedom unavailable to a writer seeking to follow any one school. 
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Frost uses the terminology of play throughout, arguing that in “[e]liding supposed divisions 
between ‘writerly’ and ‘speakerly’ texts, and rejecting Romantic ‘inspiration’ and authorial 
mastery” Mullen is afforded the childlike freedom to compose “by the rules of a game she makes 
up along the way” (398). To this end, Frost asserts that the results are poems that are “encoded 
but ultimately decipherable” (398); that—in keeping with the theme of this project—Mullen’s 
poems are meaningful, but are not necessarily expressive. Mullen’s work, especially in Sleeping 
with the Dictionary, complicates the role of the author precisely by breaking down the divide 
between the speakerly and the writerly text, between orality and visual form. She does this, in 
part, by approaching a poetics of aurality rather than orality.  
This distinction requires some explanation. Mullen’s engagement with sound, always 
already mediated by the visual appearance of the text on the page, is related to the argument, 
based in LANGUAGE poetics, that the orality of a text is necessarily preceded by aurality. This 
concern is articulated by Charles Bernstein in Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word 
(1998). Here, Bernstein writes that “[o]rality can be understood as a stylistic or even ideological 
marker or a reading style; in contrast, the audiotext might more usefully be understood as aural—
what the ear hears … Aurality precedes orality, just as language precedes speech” (13). By 
positioning the audiotext against the written text, Bernstein asserts that the aural precedes the 
oral; or, more particularly,  the way that a text sounds (the way it makes its sounds, its 
vocalizing, its orality) is contingent upon a preexisting aurality that necessarily precedes the text. 
In her article on Sleeping with the Dictionary, Luck sees this division in action. She writes: 
“Here is the aurality that precedes orality that Bernstein writes about, the experimental 
cacophony that precedes the voice, speech, and presence of a human self” (370). For Luck, 
Mullen’s work collapses the speakerly/writerly divide by being interested in aurality rather than 
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orality (although, of course, aurality in text is impossible—it is always mimetic, always mediated 
by written language), a choice that refuses the preservation and archivation of the writerly text in 
favour of the ephemerality and impermanence of the aural. She encourages the maintenance of 
some aurality in her work; gibberish and nursery-rhyme sounds, homophones and homonyms, 
rewritings and aural wordplays all relish in the temporary nature of the aural and resist the 
homogenizing tendency of the grapheme to reduce the aural to the oral, to a “stylistic marker” in 
Bernstein’s terms.  
As with nearly every discussion of aurality/orality in Mullen’s work, I must here defer to 
her often-quoted statement in the aforementioned Frost interview when she discusses the terms 
of her own orality. She tells Frost: 
I am writing for the eye and the ear at once. … When we talk about orality, most 
of the time we are not really talking about orality—we are talking about a mimetic 
representation. Poetry does come out of song. If it gets very far from song it is 
difficult for many people to connect with it. So I am always experimenting with 
how to be in that space, where it’s neither completely spoken nor completely 
something that exists on the page. (401) 
For Mullen, experimenting with a form that is neither purely writerly nor purely speakerly is an 
attempt to engage more fully with readers; in line with a postanarchist poetics, she looks to 
“connect” with her audience, to engage them affectively, rather than to express herself to them. 
But, as Matthew Hart is quick to note, Mullen also “admits to the ‘mimetic representation’ that 
underpins all textual representations of orality” (156). Nonetheless, Hart maintains that Mullen’s 
work still occupies “the productive space between the ‘completely spoken’ poem and the reified 
thing ‘that exists on the page’” (ibid). This desire to connect affectively rather than express 
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mimetically flourishes in the realm of the aural/oral; the ephemerality of aurality is vastly more 
open to multiple reader interpretations than the more traditional and closed off signification of 
the purely mimetic and thus exegetical text.  
The poem “Free Radicals” (29) brings this tension to the fore by way of the bizarre image 
of a dinner party in a museum, marked by the organizer making kimchee, the Korean fermented 
cabbage dish, for the guests. Mullen writes: “Now she’s making kimchee for the museum that 
preserved her history in a jar of pickled pig feet” (29). As with any quotation from Mullen’s, the 
potential readings of these two sentences are rich and inexhaustible. This passage stresses 
immediacy (begins “Now”), coinciding with the present-progressive action of “making” which 
must necessarily be read against the past-tense of the museum that “preserved.” Mullen 
juxtaposes the action of making kimchee and the preservation of a museum, drawing implicit 
attention to the fact that kimchee, as a fermented food, is already in a process of degradation, of 
rotting; moreover, kimchee does not keep long, and as it sits in the refrigerator its taste changes, 
becoming progressively more sour until inedible. Pickling, on the other hand, is the museum of 
food preparation; pickled or preserved foods are designed to keep well, easily and neatly 
compartmentalized on store shelves or in household pantries. “Her”15 history gets preserved in a 
jar of pig’s feet, the kind of meat traditionally discarded by Western culture, but notoriously 
consumed by cultural Others. Pickled pig’s feet, interestingly, are featured in both traditional 
Korean cuisine as well as Black comfort food of the American South. The sentence that follows 
seemingly paratactically makes this cultural reading metapoetic. Mullen writes, “They’d fix her 
oral tradition or she’d trade her oral fixation” (29). In this sentence, the museum as metonym for 
                                                
15 Mullen tells Henning that the “she” in this poem is also her “artist friend Yong Soon Min” who organized a group 
meal, called “Kimchi Xtravanganza” for the “Korean American Museum” (73). 
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tradition and canon, and particularly its interest in preservation of the writerly text, looks to fix16 
orality. Bookended by an either/or dichotomy, Mullen offers two options to the racialized 
experimental poet, her “anomalous black writer”: either oral tradition is stabilized and preserved, 
or we forfeit our desire for the oral. Neither option seems particularly viable, especially since the 
use of the psychonanalytic term “oral fixation” in this case signals both the fetishization and 
infantilization of the cultural traditions associated with orality and the speakerly text.  
The way out, she seems to suggest, is accepting a liminal space between the terms of 
speakerly and writerly text, a space marked by culture, and thus synthetic (but not in the 
Hegelian sense). Rather, Mullen asserts elsewhere that culture is necessarily synthetic, and the 
synthetic is best understood as the multiple: 
Culture, by definition, is synthetic. Human beings transform organic processes 
and synthesize natural resources in order to create cultural artifacts. … Culture 
changes continually in order to respond to changing environment. So, culture is a 
dynamic interaction of tradition and innovation. (“Everything” 1014-15) 
Synthetic culture is, to some extent, then, arbitrary and ephemeral, necessarily resisting the 
pickling preservation of the “museum.” This is what Hart talks about when he discusses the 
inherent impurity of Mullen’s vernaculars, writing that she “synthesizes different vernaculars—
all of them ‘black,’ but none of them ‘pure’—as part of a wider interest in the ‘cultural and 
discursive practices by which evolving identities are recognized, articulated, and defined” (155). 
The impurity is a gesture towards the aural, obscured always by mimesis, the representational 
function of print. This becomes clear in the reading process, which Mullen characterizes as a 
                                                
16 Comment by Andy Weaver (25/2/2014): “When you discuss ‘fix’ in Mullen’s, ‘They’d fix her oral tradition or 
she’d trade her oral fixation’ (29), I think you can work through the pun in ‘fix’ more directly than you do (both to 
correct and to pin down/stabilize).” 
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translation; when asked about the literal translation of her work, she responds: “Of course, 
meaning may be altered or lost as new readers are gained, but the translator’s work is not so 
different from what any reader does in the process of comprehending and interpreting a poem” 
(“Everything” 1015). Each reading is a translation, a connection with the poem that attempts to 
see through the mediating language of print, and of orality, and to work towards the aural that 
precedes it but can never be described. Reading towards the aural in its ephemerality, its 
intangibility, refuses the archive and its insistence on preservation. This destabilizes not only the 
impure oral that is mimetically represented, but the written language as well. So it is telling that 
when Frost asks Mullen about the apparent organization of the visual form of the quatrain poems 
in Muse & Drudge, asserting that “the visual form of the poem is fixed and very symmetrical—
those four quatrains per page,” Mullen quips simply, “[i]t looks more stable than it is” (411). 
This instability, I will assert throughout the remainder of this chapter, is precisely the locus of 
Mullen’s radical reader engagement; it is in the instability of form—both Muse & Drudge’s 
quatrains and Sleeping with the Dictionary’s prose poems—that the text is opened for the 
intervening, postanarchist reader to insert him or herself.  
Transporting the Reading Self: Spahr’s Response to Subjectivity 
 As my situation of Spahr alongside the other poets of my dissertation suggests, she is also 
writing both in and away from a tradition of experimental poetry that has long been preoccupied 
with the suppression17 of the self. But, owing to the fact that Spahr, like Mullen, is writing quite 
                                                
17 Comment by Andy Weaver (1/2/2014): “And a niggling little question: is ‘eradication’ the right word in your first 
sentence? Would your authors agree to that degree, or is it more an act of limiting or distancing?” 
 
Response (4/2/2014): “Yes, you are correct. Eradication is too strong of a word, and I used it to make the 




a bit later than the poets of my first two chapters, her work is also highly influenced by the 
LANGUAGE school of poetry that saw this suppression of individual subjectivity as one 
necessarily grounded in semiotics, form, and language itself. It is this preoccupation that Katy 
Lederer points to when she writes in her review that Spahr in Response is “a poet unwilling to 
clutter her writing with the signs of her own subjectivity” (140). It is inarguable that Response 
marks a clear grappling with the issues of subjectivity and the self. But rather than removing the 
signs of authorial subjectivity, as Lederer would have us believe, Response marks the initial 
moments of Spahr’s ongoing interest in a startling paradox of subjectivity in the experimental 
poem: that in order to be truly communal, we require individual subjectivity; that, in being truly 
communal, we disrupt and disfigure our individual subjectivities.18 This paradox, I argue, is 
central to the notions of community and the common that permeate her work; Response 
demonstrates Spahr’s first forays into this paradox, which she eventually satisfies via her use of 
this project’s titular [generic pronoun].  
 To begin looking at the paradox of subjectivity in Response, we must first look to Spahr’s 
concept of authorship, which recalls Mac Low’s arguments in my first chapter about the author 
as an initiator. In “A, B, C,” she outlines a concept of the author as an initiator of choices rather 
than the controller of a text, thus including the reader in the production of textual meaning on a 
radically communal level. “An author,” she writes, “is the person who originates or gives 
                                                
18 Comment by Andy Weaver (1/2/2014): “When you write ‘that in order to be truly communal, we require 
individual subjectivity; that, in being truly communal, we disrupt and disfigure our individual subjectivities,’ I’m 
curious how specific to Spahr you see this notion. I’d say the same could be said for at least Cage and Duncan, and 
probably your other authors, too. How much of a touchstone is this notion throughout your project (and theirs)? 
Perhaps you could expand on this point, either acknowledging a larger connection throughout the authors, and/or 
discussing the differences or nuances that separate the authors?” 
 
Response (4/2/2014): “So, yes. I think that in working through these plateaus I’ve come to realize that part of what 
postanarchism can do with literature is allow this seemingly paradoxical situation. It encourages us to look for 
subjectivity even as we look for its disruption. I definitely see it in the other authors in my diss. I’ll have to 
incorporate it into my introduction.” 
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existence to something” (284). As initiator, the author needs to involve readers in the production 
of meaning, and so leaves much of the process of meaning-making incomplete. In a radical 
poetics that embraces inclusivity, the terms of author and reader need, in some way, to be 
conflated, and the boundaries need to be blurred. Spahr sees this enacted in Stein’s work when 
she writes: “Here is a confusion of subject, address, and identity. Here a new poetics of the 
subject is scripted” (286). This scripting of a new, radical poetics of subjectivity is enacted, for 
Spahr, in Stein’s work par excellence. Spahr writes that in Stein’s reliance on readers to engage 
in meaning-making themselves, she relinquishes some of the authority of the author. Rather than 
a controlling presence imposing meaning upon the chosen words, Spahr observes that “[i]n 
Stein’s work the authority of the author is hiding behind the door, is translated, is denied” (287). 
Let us, for a moment, leave the finality of a term like “denied” and focus instead on Spahr’s 
diction in “translated,” a term that defines Stein’s approach to authorship as at once purely 
linguistic, moving, and altering.19 In contrast to this, “denied” is final, perhaps, but it also 
                                                
19 Comment by Jonathan Vandor (5/1/2014): “When you discuss Spahr’s reading that ‘[i]n Stein’s work the 
authority of the author is hiding behind the door, is translated, is denied,’ your analysis seems to take authority as 
itself constitutive of identity/authorship. Do you see a difference between a mobile authority and a mobile 
authorship, and if so, how do you see this playing out?” 
 
Response (17/1/2014): “So author and authority are intrinsically linked in the way that an author presumes to have 
control over a. the words that she uses, and b. the way those words mean/will be received.” 
 
Response by Jonathan Vandor (20/1/2014): “Ooh, [that’s] a doozy: it’s such a complicated issue in one seemingly 
simple statement. I don’t know if it’s that simple: for one, there’s the post-Freudian issues (his eponymous slips). 
For another, there are the poets who try to write without authority (I’m thinking of Stein and her attempts to be a 
conduit, rather than a scriptor: plus, there’s the issue that her style generally invites the ‘authority’ of the reader to 
make sense of it, even when it’s purposefully stymied). For a third, there are those who invoke authority without 
authorship (akin to Duchamp’s readymades). There’s also the issue of, for the lack of an accepted term, passive-
aggressive authority. I’m personally very interested by the end of Charlotte Bronte’s last novel, Villette: it’s 
purposefully left ambiguous for the sake of her father, who wanted a happy ending (she kills off the male object of 
desire in a shipwreck). Rather than change the ending (to obey his authority), she offers, in her protagonist-
narrator’s voice, the expectation of his return, a ‘generalist’ account of shipwrecks, and the following (penultimate) 
sentence: ‘Here pause: pause at once. There is enough said. Trouble no quiet, kind heart; leave sunny imaginations 
hope. Let it be theirs to conceive the delight of joy born again fresh out of great terror, the rapture of rescue from 
peril, the wondrous reprieve from dread, the fruition of return. Let them picture union and a happy succeeding life.’ 
Authority is deferred on two levels: to her father’s guidance, and the reader’s imagination. But of course, the latter 
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acknowledges the persistence of the lyric “I” in poetry, a persistence we must resist, must shut 
the door upon, must deny. The authorial subject in poetry seems to demand representation; a 
postanarchist reading practice, like the one Spahr proposes, seeks to unsettle these demands. That 
is, Spahr’s poetry may work to limit authorial subjectivity, but she also knows that, like the 
previous poets in this project did, the completely unegoic is impossible.  
 If Response teaches us nothing else, it shows us that the construction of the subject is 
inevitable. In fact, the collection takes this for granted, rather than grappling with this knowledge 
as Cage and Mac Low did. The unnamed speaker of Response states, plainly and 
conversationally, “we know we are all constructed” (“Responding: V” 8), as if the social 
construction of the self is a widely accepted (and easily accepted) truth. Once the text accepts 
social construction as a starting point, it is then free to move, supporting a conception of the 
individual subject that is in flux, always in motion, recalling the transformative suggestion of 
authorship as translation above. Supporting this reading, Spahr suggests, also in “A, B, C,” that 
“reading is an act of transport. Transport is a word of instability” (283). Recalling the ekstasis 
that so intrigued Mac Low, or the shifting point-of-view that destabilized Levertov’s political 
poems, Spahr here proposes a self as fold,20 turning in on itself and moving beyond. This is 
                                                                                                                                                       
authority is a spurious one. And I don’t think this is quite an ‘exception proves the rule’ scenario: it seems more 
likely to me right now that the fiction of authorship-means-authority has been forwarded for a long time (or vice-
versa: I think Pope argues that no poet can give more than he or she intends in his ‘Essay on Criticism’), but isn’t 
essentially true.” 
20 Comment by Jonathan Vandor (5/1/2014): “Do you mean ‘fold’ in terms of what you might do to a piece of 
paper, or in terms of the area for holding livestock? The latter has implications for the idea of the commons, I think, 
as well as for the idea of the self as a collection of identities and interdependencies. But I might be grasping at 
straws here.” 
 
Response (17/1/2014): “Hadn’t thought of this element of fold. Was using it in the way Deleuze does, especially in 
his work on cinema. I love this idea, though. Interdependent, certainly!!” 
 
Response by Sean Braune (27/7/2014): “I really loved your discussion of the fold here and while you mention in the 
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perhaps best demonstrated by the image of the woman in “thrashing seems crazy” with multiple 
personality disorder who comes to believe that one of her alternate personalities, a man, is 
stalking her. The image displays both the inherent splitness of the self, and the political import of 
physical bodies. The section displays perfectly Spahr’s dual comprehension of selfhood as “self 
turns on self / the knife enters at a point that the self could not have reached but did” (31-32). 
Both identitarian politics and the complete refusal of identity are too easy for Spahr, and lead us 
into the same problems that anarchist activists on both sides of the argument would avoid.  
 A way out of this binarism is proposed by Sophie Mayer in “Aggregators: RSS 
(Radically Subversive Syndication) Poetics,” wherein she discusses Spahr’s approach to 
subjectivity. Of course, the disruption of the self, Mayer is quick to note, is not new, and Spahr’s 
tools themselves are not new either. That is, Mayer observes that “Spahr … disperse[s her] lyric 
‘I’[] through postmodern poetics of quotation, repetition, and bricolage” (48), three of the 
mainstays of postmodernism that have become tired and ineffectual as a poetics and politics. 
What we need, Mayer argues instead, is a rethinking of the self, a concept she draws directly 
from Response: “as we rethink our selves, the political enters / and the issue twists to become 
about our ability to touch information / to make our own decisions” (“testimony: V” 33-35). For 
                                                                                                                                                       
comments section that you were working off Deleuze I guess I sort of wanted more of a Spahr-Deleuzean fold. This 
is especially the case because the fold reference comes shortly before discussing split subjectivity in Spahr (which is 
decidedly Lacanian) while the fold is decidedly Deleuzean. Considering the ancient war between the 
psychoanalytical and schizoanalytical camps I thought that Spahr may be acting like a sort of bridge (or Spahr’s 
conception of subjectivity). Deleuze first theorizes the fold after Foucault (particularly Foucault’s work on madness 
in which insides and outsides converge) and I wonder to what extent the Spahrian fold that you suggest is Deleuzean 
or Foucauldian and to what extend the split subjectivity is Lacanian?” 
 
Response (28/7/2014): “I like this idea of Spahr functioning as a kind of bridge between psychoanalytic and 
schizoanalytic camps, but I think that’s something I’m (and you’re?) putting onto the text because we both see the 
need for such a bridge. I think that more realistically, my use of ‘splitness’ and split subjectivity is a sloppy gesture 
towards Lacan that I can’t actually back up. I was thinking more about Deleuze (as I always am, always will be), 
after his book on Foucault. New folds, new subjectivities. (read: not that whole thing about Leibniz and the house 
and the attic and whatever—I totally didn’t understand that)…” 
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Mayer, in an effective and effectual radically political poetics we “need to ‘rethink our selves’ in 
light of the radical tropes of alienation and connection highlighted by global war and global 
media” (49). Supporting this, Mayer defers to Judith Butler’s concept in Precarious Life of a 
politics of interdependence and interconnectivity: “we’re undone by each other, … and if we’re 
not, we’re missing something” (23). Mayer observes that in Spahr’s poetry, poetics, and 
criticism, the “[r]eader, poet, and subject are interdependent, made vulnerable (in Butler’s term) 
by ‘shock and awe,’ by the rending violence that gently informs … Spahr’s swift changes of 
focus” (50). The very movement implied by Spahr’s shifts in subjectivity, in point-of-view, in 
authorship serve to disrupt the ordered, taking a particularly obvious page from Stein’s own 
mandates. And this process (of flux, of movement) is more valuable, for Spahr, than an 
identitarian politics could ever be: “more than identity our attraction is to puzzle / the lineage” 
(46-7). But, none of this answers the question Response asks so persistently. That is, “how much 
self can be removed and the self remain?” (“witness: V” 5). Or, can we disrupt subjectivity in 
order to expose a more useful conception of selfhood as interdependence? 
 In the end, for Spahr, it’s a question of pronouns, themselves literal representations of 
selves in language.  Pronouns preoccupy Spahr throughout Response and well after. In 2005, 
nearly ten years after Response was published, interviewer Michael Boyko poses a question to 
Spahr about subjectivity in her work, and she responds tellingly: “I keep thinking pronouns all 
the time. Somehow pronouns have become the most loaded parts of language for me” (n.p). 
Pronouns get complicated in Response through their turn to complete generic states, but it is 
important to note that the genericization of the pronoun is always complicated itself. For 
example, in “responding: 1” Spahr writes of a “[gendered pronoun]” who “wanders in this place / 
[searching / [waiting” (2-4). Despite the almost humorous lack of specificity, the [gendered 
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pronoun] is able to move between the localized “this place” and the flux of open movement 
denoted by “wanders,” “[searching,” and “[waiting.” The latter two progressive verbs are 
bracketed without close, implying even greater instability. They still represent transport, 
movement. The example that is my project’s namesake, “[generic pronoun] creates” (10), 
demonstrates that the blurring of subjectivity is, can still be, productive.  
 Spahr’s approach to the pronoun sees a dramatic shift in the nearly ten years between 
Response and thisconnection, where the pronoun “we” is used frequently in an almost Steinian 
repetition. Spahr explains this turn to “we” to Boyko in the interview, which I quote at length:  
I started with “we” because I wanted to start with together. … And I wanted 
everyone to be there in the poem. I wanted “we” to include those who read it. And 
then I wanted when I turn to “I” to talk about how that moment of becoming 
individuals, becoming distinct and disconnected, is part of the problem. And I 
wanted more specifically to talk about my own complicity with this. … I guess I 
felt I had to stand up and take responsibility and be there in the poem at some 
point. That I couldn't hide in the “we.” And I also wanted the reader to think 
about their individualism with me. (n.p) 
In sum, Spahr suggests in this passage, and throughout Response, that we need subjects in order 
to connect with other subjects, to be interdependent, complicit in each other’s individualism. 
That’s the core paradox of Response, and of her work more generally. In recognition of selves, 
we blur lines: rethink, translate, transport, read.  
 As I discussed at the start of this chapter, “The 90s” demonstrates a view of 
contemporary anglophone literary movements as either supporting a traditional view of standard 
English and upholding its values, or else attempting to disrupt the normative linguistic structures 
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of standard English. Unsurprisingly, Spahr’s article sides with those varied and various 
movements in poetry that work to disrupt traditional or normative structures of semiotics. Her 
own poetry, as demonstrated so clearly in Response, is always interested in the disruption of 
standardized language practices. Response is interested in transgression and fracture, especially 
of the signifying and representational qualities of language. This interest provokes one of the 
collection’s most resounding lines: “things that once meant nonsense now carry meaning” 
(“witness: III” 2). While more sensical than the asyntactic writings of Cage and Mac Low, 
Spahr’s interest in the disruption of standardized language practices is designed to disrupt the 
very signifying and representational functions of standard English to propose a new mode of 
articulation, and this practice, for Spahr, is also decidedly feminist. Her concept of new modes of 
articulation beyond the limitations of standard English begins, first and foremost, with a 
skepticism of the representational mode of Saussurian linguistics. She poses a need for new 
modes of articulation that are not purely representational, and therefore do not rely wholly on the 
authority of the author to imbue meaning into signifiers. In “A, B, C,” she suggests that this new 
process of expression must begin where traditional modes of expression fail: “As telling drains, 
what is spoken of here requires new modes of articulation” (285). Recalling Wittgenstein, she 
calls this mode of linguistic operation “telling,” characterizing it as the language game of giving 
information, and one she is weary of because it poses a danger of limitation and overcoding. But, 
rather than conceding that what we cannot speak we must pass over in silence, Spahr—like 
Mullen—refuses silence and opts instead for a breaking down of the constituent structures of 
“telling.” She takes up an interest in words as connectives, wherein they are recognized 
materially as conglomerates of letters: “A letter is part of a word. Only a and i have the status of 
words themselves—the beginning and the self. When anybody can name, it is not that there is no 
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authorization, but rather that what is authorized is the letter b (let her be), which is given to the 
reader” (“A, B, C” 287). In this formula, “let her be” complicates representation, and comes out 
of the relinquishing of “authorization,” of the process of authoritative authorship on which both 
expression and representation rely. This is a move to more material, politically effective and 
readerly affective poetry that refuses the guise of representation, of metaphor.21 Response 
demonstrates this move throughout, as when Spahr writes of “an unreal world called real because 
it is so heavily metaphoric” (“responding: II” 9). In Response, language’s metaphorical, 
representation mode affords it the power to create new realities in order to obscure material ones; 
by disrupting language structures and transgressing linguistic borders, we move to a new mode 
of articulation grounded in material and affect (grounded in the reader rather than the author). 
 This new mode of articulation is an inherent feminist practice in that it is necessarily a 
grappling with phallogocentrism and the inherent gendering of language. But, it is too simple to 
characterize Spahr’s work as anti-expressive or anti-phallogocentric; instead, we see in Spahr an 
attempt to navigate a paradox not unlike the paradox of the self that I discuss above. The paradox 
of the feminist experimental writer is one that Sianne Ngai has examined closely in her book 
Ugly Feelings (2009), and Ngai even uses Spahr as one of the examples of a contemporary writer 
who explicitly deals with this paradox. For Ngai, the paradox of language that the contemporary 
feminist avant-gardist faces is clear: s/he must decide either to refuse the binary (and thus ignore 
it) or to interrogate it and thus risk inadvertently supporting it. On the one hand, Ngai writes, 
                                                
21 Comment by Andy Weaver (2/2/2014): “I think a few of those points might need a bit of clarification. Early on in 
the plateau, there’s a bit of a confusion of terminology, I think. So, at one point you write that ‘In this formula, “let 
her be” functions as anti-representational, and is borne out of the relinquishing of “authorization,” of the process of 
authoritative authorship that both expression and representation rely on.’ But is ‘let her be’ actually anti-
representational? Or is it a different, punning challenge of normative representationality (to me, it seems more like 
an example of Duncan’s ‘multiphasic’ language)? Later on, you use the terms ‘anti-expressive’ and ‘anti-
phallogocentric’—I wonder if one of these terms (perhaps the latter?) would be more effective/precise? (Perhaps the 
problem stems from quickly name-checking Lyotard and then starting briefly down that path before swerving away, 
but not adjusting terminology to reflect that swerve?)” 
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“[f]or the feminist writer, the stance that form is political implies that there is no politically 
neutral language and, by extension, no language uninflected by gender and its ideological codes” 
(316). The choice becomes either to follow a “tradition dominated by male modernists and 
valorized by afeminist poststructuralist theorists” or else to engage in “a strategic 
reappropriation of ‘feminine’ form” (316). If these options are unsatisfactory, the alternative is 
to accept the position  
that the attachment, even the critical attachment of gender codes to language 
promotes the restriction of women to certain kinds of expression and in fact 
perpetuates binary gender divisions and the hierarchies inevitably accompanying 
them. This position culminates in a feminist need to insist that linguistic 
categories should not be gendered, even in aesthetic or critical efforts to challenge 
past ways in which forms and genres certainly have been gendered. (317, emph. 
Ngai’s) 
The goal here, of course, is to “do away with the concept of ‘feminine form’ altogether” (317). 
From this discussion, Ngai identifies the central paradox of the feminist experimental poet. “[I]f 
one adheres too strongly to either of the positions circumscribed by the ‘politics of form’ 
position,” she writes, “one runs the risk of asserting ‘no language is code-free’ to a degree that 
leaves one stuck with the task of constantly negotiating between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ 
categories, inadvertently strengthening them” on the one hand, and on the other, perhaps more 
dangerously,  “one runs the risk of dangerously underestimating the pervasiveness of gender 
ideology in all cultural forms” (317). Spahr grapples with this, too, as Ngai goes on to observe. 
She writes that in Response, Spahr “deliberately occupies the boundary between these 
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possibilities by using the ‘generic’ phrasing” (317-8), the same “generic” phrasing that gives this 
project its title.22  
I, too, would like to examine Spahr’s grappling with representation and genericism 
through one very interesting example; in the fourth section of “responding,” Spahr writes, 
“[generic pronoun] wished to reduce writing to the zero level where it is without meaning. When 
culture invades private life on a large scale [generic pronoun] said the individual cannot escape 
being raped” (33). A few lines later, this long line is separated into a list structure that sees the 
language sputter: 
[my zero-level writing 
[generic pronoun] said 
                 protest rape 
[generic pronoun] said 
my zero-level writing 
[generic pronoun] said 
dangerous cultural rape 
[generic pronoun] said 
my zero-level writing 
my zero-level writing (37-46) 
In order to begin discussing this section, I should first identify its obscure intertextuality. The 
                                                
22 Comment by Andy Weaver (2/2/2014): “I’m a bit confused by your description of Ngai’s points. I think your 
discussion slightly confuses the two sets of choices she offers: if I understand her argument, the larger choice she 
offers is whether to accept that language is gendered or to deny that; the second set of choices she mentions is a 
subset of the ‘accept language is gendered’ stance, which is to decide between working in a masculine modernist 
form or to reappropriate a feminist form. You understand this point much better than I do, but I think the discussion 
gets confused at several points (partly from a lack of clear definitions for each stance, I think, and so the descriptors 
shift a bit throughout your discussion). The confusion comes to a head, for me, in the section when you write ‘The 
goal here, … ideology in all cultural forms’” (317). I think you need to clarify Ngai’s options more precisely.” 
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wording here is borrowed from a quotation by Ni Haifeng, a Chinese avant-garde artist and 
writer that Spahr almost certainly came across through Andrew Solomon’s New York Times 
Magazine article, “Their Irony, Humor (and Art) Can Save China” (1993), which discusses the 
radical political potentials of the contemporaneous Chinese avant-garde. The full quotation from 
the article reads as follows:  
In 1987, he began to paint on houses, streets, stones, trees and he covered his 
island with strange marks in chalk, oil pant and dye. He has said that he wished to 
reduce writing to the “zero level” where it is without meaning. “When culture 
invades private life on a large scale,” he said, “the individual cannot escape being 
raped.” From this viewpoint, my zero-level writing can be taken as a protest 
against the act of rape. I also want to warn people of the dangers inherent in 
cultural rape. (par 46) 
By adapting Ni’s words and Solomon’s writing, Spahr seems to suggest that a “zero-level 
writing”—a writing with literally no meaning—is impossible and politically dangerous, running 
the risk of underestimating how the violence of social institutions like gender necessarily inflect 
language. Standing in stark contrast to the insertion of the bracketed generic pronoun, the 
specific and overtly political “protest rape” and “dangerous cultural rape” refuse to tip Spahr’s 
writing towards either side of the paradox: they neither insist on a feminine form, nor ignore the 
gendered inflections of language altogether. The lack of gender specificity of the generic 
pronoun repeated throughout this passage (nowhere in the collection is its use so pervasive) both 
suggests the openness and receptiveness that characterizes the feminine form for Ngai, and also 
refuses a clearly delineated binarism. In the end, the short, indented lines quoted above begin 
with “[my zero-level writing” which never sees its bracketing closed. Spahr suggests the radical 
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potentials here of a tightrope walk between two dangerous sides of the feminist experimental 
paradox; she neither supports nor refuses, embracing a postanarchic alternative rather than giving 
in to one side or another. It is the sputtering, the stuttering that produces a new mode of 
articulation.  
Writing the Minor 
The way that Mullen uses minor23 language24 has not been given adequate attention in the 
existing scholarship. Typically, critics tend to focus on the ways that Mullen concedes that, while 
there is a degree of arbitrariness to the codification of identity, these markers are still important 
elements of individual subjectivity. As Robbins notes in her discussion of Sleeping with the 
Dictionary, while we must understand Mullen’s work as “a direct response to those arguing for 
the abandonment of race as a topic inappropriate to discussions of avant-garde art,” we also find 
in her work a “concession that while racial identity is in a sense theoretically ‘arbitrary,’ every 
subject of the social order is nevertheless assigned a position and set of meanings based on these 
arbitrary markers” (361). It is clearly not enough for Mullen to either hold to an essential racial 
identity (a now outmoded practice) nor is it helpful for her to advocate the complete eradication 
of identitarian markers (which is, I should hope, similarly outmoded). As a way of negotiating 
                                                
23 Comment by Andy Weaver (16/3/2014): “I don’t think you’ve fully defined/explained/worked through the 
concept of ‘minor voice’ in the entry. That term keeps popping up here, but you don’t actually explicitly define it—
and you seem to use if for several allied but different things. For example, in the fourth paragraph (which begins 
‘Ondaatje’s work’), you seem to imply that there is something necessarily inclusive in the minor voice (though I 
might be misunderstanding your point here)—if so, why?” 
 
24 Deleuze and Guattari use the term minor (or minoritarian) literature in their work Kafka: Towards a Minor 
Literature. Minor language, for them, can be characterized by three important features: first, it is marked by a 
deterritorialization of a major language, written as the bastardized and appropriated version of a colonial language 
(16); second, it is designed “to connect immediately to politics” (17); third, and most importantly for my project, it 
is communal and collective, necessarily inclusive of those voices a major or colonial voice would look to silence 
(17).  
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the liminal space between these two attitudes, Mullen adopts the rhetoric and language of the 
minor especially via this collection’s use of the prose poem.  
 While I will argue that the use of the prose poem form in Sleeping with the Dictionary is 
a gesture towards a community of active readers, it is here only important to note that Mullen’s 
return to the form of the prose poem is motivated by both race and gender. That is, Mullen 
understands the prose poem, and its relation to the list poem, as a way of approaching the 
minoritarian voice. She tells Henning, for example, that “[i]t is a minor genre, the prose poem. 
It’s also a list poem, which I thought of as a form congenial to women, who are always making 
lists” (13). We must also understand the engagement of active readers as a feminist practice 
insofar as the clearly marked distance between a passive reader and an authoritative, creative 
author is a distinctly masculinist concept. It is at this point that I must acknowledge the fact that, 
up until this point, I have discussed the issue of race in Mullen’s work much more than that of 
gender. While this does, perhaps, ignore a crucial element of her work generally, I have chosen 
to limit my scope here primarily because Mullen offers a unique opportunity to discuss the 
intersections of racial politics and postanarchist reading practices that the other authors in my 
project do not. I am not suggesting here that the other authors I study here are raceless, but rather 
that a critique of race does not appear explicitly in their work.  
 Returning to the form of the prose poem, Mullen moves from organized verse in Muse & 
Drudge, to the supposedly less stable form of the prose poem in Sleeping with the Dictionary, 
fashioning this as an attack on tradition, but not a refusal of it. Instead, Mullen tells Henning that 
this collection in particular is interested in both “tradition and its rupture, the continuities and 
discontinuities of cultural transmission, the dissemination and preservation of language, of 
speech and writing, of meaning itself” (7). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mullen represents tradition 
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(and the site of its rupture) in Sleeping with the Dictionary through the image of the university. 
The university is most explicitly represented and critiqued in the poem “Naked Statues,” in 
which the University of California’s Los Angeles campus, where Mullen is a professor of 
English, is presented as the locus of an “anglophile race” where “[t]hey read all the great books 
and perform them in the garden of naked statues” (50). Throughout this poem, Mullen tells 
Henning, the irony of UCLA’s proximity to Hollywood, and to the concept of American 
celebrity, is seen as emblematic of the precarious position of the literary canon in a contemporary 
world where literature is viewed as a kind of minor language on its own. Mullen laments, “I’m 
continually reminded of our proximity to Hollywood, where books are raw material for movies, 
and the most recognizable nude statue is called Oscar” (79). The reduction of even the most 
canonical of texts to the “raw material” for a film is berated in the poem, as in the phrasing of 
“So romantic are the patient English” (50), where Mullen considers the fact that Michael 
Ondaatje’s acclaimed novel, The English Patient, had been adapted into a film some six years 
before the publication of this collection (80). The position of The English Patient is an 
interesting one; Ondaatje’s position as a Sri Lankan-Canadian author makes his novel, in some 
sense, a work of minor literature, and yet its incorporation into the Canadian literary canon and 
its subsequent inclusion in the syllabi for “Introduction to Canadian Literature” courses 
everywhere make it simultaneously an image of tradition. Additionally, the film was hailed as a 
modern classic, famously winning some of its very own “nude statue[s]” and bringing Ondaatje 
into the popular limelight.  
 Ondaatje’s work as minor and movie script is an appropriate image for Mullen’s work 
because, as Spahr observes in her introduction to Looking Up Harryette Mullen, Mullen’s 
engagement with canonicity and tradition is complicated by her unique use of allusion. Spahr 
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observes that the form of the prose poem, and the frequent use of literary and popular culture 
references, make the poems in Sleeping with the Dictionary particularly inclusive; she writes, 
“[t]his form lets Mullen suggest that allusion is everything and the poem is a sort of collection 
box” (“Introduction” i). To avoid a kind of utopian view of inclusivity Spahr is also quick to note 
“how deeply provisional and full of the everyday Mullen’s allusions are” (“Introduction” ii). She 
also notes that, for the most part, scholars of Mullen’s work have not really dealt with this issue, 
arguing that “the scholarship has managed to miss the importance of daily-ness in Mullen’s 
work” (“Introduction” iii), despite the fact that Henning’s collection of interviews is published in 
2010, nearly ten years after Spahr’s Everybody’s Autonomy, wherein she discusses Mullen’s 
allusive form as crucial to her minoritarian form. Mullen’s allusions function to encourage the 
kind of communal readership both Spahr and I prize by “emphasizing the unfaithful and 
unowned practices of reading” (102). While Everybody’s Autonomy is not an in depth study of 
Mullen’s allusive form, Spahr does make one interesting and ultimately integral distinction when 
she argues that we must read these allusions as a kind of sampling rather than a modernist-styled 
intertextuality (103). While on the surface this distinction may seem arbitrary, contemporary 
work on issues of sampling and intertextuality demonstrate that the division is clearly political. A 
closer look at these terms suggests that Mullen’s poetic practice is actually even more in line 
with a practice of appropriation than of sampling.  
 As Marcus Boon’s recent book on intellectual property and reproduction, In Praise of 
Copying (2010), suggests, the widespread practice (in music especially) of sampling is a 
different practice with different motives than the issue of appropriation. Boon’s definition of 
sampling, the term Spahr uses to describe Mullen’s poetics, is fitting in its association with 
analog rather than digital culture. He writes that “[t]he word ‘sample’ comes from the way in 
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which an analog impression of a sound or other source is made and then converted to digital 
data” (168). As a result, Boon characterizes the sampled text as montage, a term he employs with 
its implications of Eisenstein and political cinema at large. Essentially, “all sampled objects are, 
in effect, montages and partake of the same viral power that montage has—which is the power of 
the fragment, the unfinished, discontinuous partial object” (169). Even the most cursory look at 
the politics of sampling in Mullen’s work up to and including Sleeping with the Dictionary 
makes clear her fit with this definition. While I think a look at the politics of sampling in Mullen 
would be a fruitful endeavour, I argue that Boon’s definition of textual appropriation is actually 
vastly more applicable to Mullen’s most recent poetic form. As Boon asserts later in his book, 
appropriation is a more nuanced practice in that the “question of who gets to appropriate is a 
fundamental one” (213), and it is a question that is frequently innately tied to issues of racialized 
identity. Boon is quick to point out, while the colonial mimesis that is frequently discussed by 
postcolonial theorists is clearly oppressive and silencing, it is important to note that it is always 
necessarily incomplete. “The mimesis of the colonial subject,” he writes, “always ‘fails’; it is 
demanded but at the same time repudiated, ensuring that those who are governed but who lack 
rights are thrown back into the inauthenticity of the mere copy, empty of essence” (215). 
Drawing attention to the emptiness of this copying functions in the same away as the attention 
given to invisibility in Hardt and Negri’s conception of identity reclamation. In this sense, Boon 
asserts that the processes of appropriation can and should be affirmed as having a radical and 
anti-oppressive potential. As he writes, “[a]ppropriation should be affirmed not only as 
something done to such cultures, but as a vital and dynamic part of their own self-constitution” 
(217). I argue that the crux of Mullen’s allusive form is an affirmation of appropriation, the final 
blow in her attack against the anglophile university and its interest in canon and celebrity.  
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 Mullen’s affirmed appropriation in Sleeping with the Dictionary is explicit, especially in 
one of the collection’s most popular poems, “Dim Lady” (21), a not-so-subtle appropriation of 
Shakespeare’s “Sonnet 130.” In this prose-sonnet, Shakespeare’s language is reinterpreted 
through a bizarre mixture of racialized slang, intimate terms of endearment, synthetic stand-ins, 
and words that barely function as synonyms for those they replace, as in the poem’s first line, 
when “My mistress’s eyes are nothing like the sun” is translated into “My honeybunch’s peepers 
are nothing like neon” (ibid). I am not interested in dismantling Mullen’s line-by-line updating of 
Shakespeare’s sonnet, though that would be interesting and fruitful work.25 On “Dim Lady,” 
Mullen tells Henning that her drastic rewriting of the piece actually retains a good deal of the 
original information, arguing that the prose poem “remains closer to the meaning of 
Shakespeare, but I’ve substituted synonymous slang and commercial brand names. Shakespeare 
already had lowered the level of diction in his ‘Sonnet 130,’ which can also be seen as a parody 
of poetry conventions” (63). Here, Mullen tempers her antagonism in a way that suggests a 
kinship with Shakespeare, a figure of extreme canonicity who, one would imagine, would be an 
easy straw man for a poet looking to dismantle a tradition based on racialized appropriation. 
Shakespeare is an excellent representation of the postcolonial image of the “master’s house.”  
And yet, Mullen responds particularly unfavourably to the notion put forth by Audre 
Lorde that you cannot dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tools. She tells Henning, “I 
never thought this was a helpful metaphor. It seems to me that tools can be used to build or 
destroy. It all depends on who uses them for what purpose. … That statement doesn’t work on a 
                                                
25 I do want to add, however, that Mullen’s appropriation of Shakespeare here is radically different from her also 
obvious appropriation of Langston Hughes in “Dream Cycle,” the poem that appears on the next page. Because the 
racial politics of appropriation are radically different, Mullen’s allusion to Hughes is markedly less antagonistic (and 
is, I would argue, at times even reverential). But, Hughes does not get off without any criticism; instead, I would 
argue that Hughes’s appearance in Sleeping with the Dictionary is somewhat akin to Ondaatje’s. The two authors 
occupy a strange borderland between canon and minor. 
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literal level and doesn’t really work on the metaphorical level either” (80). Instead, she seems 
very optimistic about the revolutionary possibilities of appropriation: “You can ‘fight the powers 
that be’ by using the same language. Why not? Didn’t Audre Lorde speak and write English?” 
(81). Rather than a kind of colonial mimicry, a mimesis of the master on the part of the colonial 
subject, Mullen’s obviously intentionally imperfect appropriation of Shakespeare (a practice 
markedly different from both sampling and intertextuality) is a gesture towards what she 
describes as “Lorde’s writing about the power of the erotic and the transformation of silence into 
language and action” (81). Mullen’s appropriation of Shakespeare is, in the end, a transformation 
particularly because it refuses to buy into the binary logic of colonial language and minor 
silence. And, to reinvigorate the minor voice, Mullen suggests to Henning that such a 
transformation is necessary. Appropriation can be affirmed, as Boon suggests, as an integral part 
of anti-oppressive identity politics, but Mullen tells us that “it takes a kind of mental 
transformation, so if you buy into the logic of oppression, then you can’t see that you could use 
the language in that way” (Henning 81). At the end of Sleeping with the Dictionary, one cannot 
help but feel as though Mullen demands that kind of transformation in the minds of her readers.  
 Reading Spahr’s as a minor voice is much more difficult; instead, her work turns its 
attention to the concept of witness, and particularly of the notion of poetic witness which 
functions in Response as a key element of the text’s politics. Witness, which for Spahr is 
intrinsically linked to a politics of testimony, of needing to speak of real, personal experience, 
and to transcribe suffering, also inherently links Spahr’s work back to Levertov’s notorious 
poetics of witness, and the similar processes of recording, witnessing, and testifying that mark 
feminist poetics at large. Feminist poetics has long grappled with the issue of poetic witness, 
wanting to transcribe a politic of suffering while remaining aware (and sceptical) of a poetics 
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that represents or speaks for the other. This same concern features throughout Response, as early 
as its first line which reads: “how to tell without violating?” (“Introduction” 1). Later, Spahr 
nuances this question even further, asking: “how does one write the question of letters and not 
appropriate or make bland?” (“witness: III” 11). In a brief e-mail interview, I ask Spahr about the 
politics of witness in her work, citing specifically that first example. I ask: is it possible to tell 
without violating? and her answer shocks me. “Probably not,” she states almost matter-of-factly. 
Then, “That book feels so old to me now. I sort of want to be like wtf was I thinking writing such 
a dumb question” (n.p). I am taken aback. Why is this suddenly a dumb question? How has 
poetry changed so that posing such a question seems, to Spahr now, infantile?  
I realize that, at its heart, this question of witnessing without violating, about testifying to 
the lived experience of politic and suffering, is a question of authorship. It asks: can we speak of 
the other without speaking for the other? Or, more fully, can we speak without betraying what or 
whom we speak of? These are questions that theorists of various schools have grappled with for 
decades. Postanarchism responds to this question tentatively, acknowledging that the writing 
subject occupies a tenuous position of simultaneous solitariness and connectivity, making this 
process of “telling” both righteous and risky. In the same e-mail Spahr talks about her 
complicated relationship with the role of the author explicitly. She writes that she recognizes the 
isolation of individual writing and the inescapability of subjectivity, and that this is a shared 
concern of many contemporary writers: “Like many writers at the end of the century and the 
beginning of the next, I'm a little suspicious of the author. And yet I recognize that I write often 
in isolation and as a subject in late capitalism, or as an author” (n.p). She also recognizes that 
authorship is not something you can be completely rid of, even if she doesn’t particularly like the 
idea of the author much herself. She tells, conversationally, 
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I guess I see authorship as something that is there. I don't like it that much as an 
idea. And yet it doesn't feel always that one can get rid of it entirely. So I try to 
think about when to indulge in it and when not. I'm not sure I've made the best 
decisions. They feel more like they've been made for me. (n.p) 
One way of getting around this issue of authorship, Spahr’s work more generally tells us, is 
communal writing26 and a process of refusing an ownership of language. Despite its “wtf”-factor, 
Response insists on two related but necessarily separate things: that a subject position is required 
if there is to be some form of witness or testimony, and also that “when terrible things happen 
they must be witnessed” (“witness: I” 1).  
 It is this position that Alicia Ostriker takes in her notion of postmodern witness, which I 
also brought into my discussions of Levertov. Because Spahr lists Rukeyser as one of the poets 
who has influenced her in my e-mail interview with her, applying Ostriker’s concept of the 
postmodern witness is especially fitting as Rukeyser’s poetics of feminist witness is crucial to 
Ostriker’s theory. And yet, Spahr and Ostriker meet only halfway. They both agree that “for each 
time and place there may be appropriately new forms of response to the illness whose two 
feverish sides are private life and public sphere” (Ostriker 35). And, they both seem to argue that 
a politically-engaged contemporary poem (formally experimental or not) cannot be either purely 
written with a clearly defined speaking-self in mind, or purely opposed to conceptions of 
self/history/fact. Ostriker makes this much clear when she asks: 
But how is resistance to be poetically organized? Obviously not by a poetics 
purely of the self. The poem must include history. It must contain the news. But a 
poetics that denies self is also useless; for without a consciousness that desires, 
                                                
26 Collaborative or communal writing is something Spahr has turned to in recent years, as demonstrated by the 
collaborative authorship of 2013’s An Army of Lovers, which she co-wrote with David Buuck.  
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suffers and chooses, there is no ethical or political model for the reader. (35) 
In some sense, they both assert the importance of a present and located self in the poem, which, 
as I’ve discussed of Ostriker in my work on Levertov, is a major feature of her concept of the 
poetics of postmodern witness. For Ostriker, in a poetics of postmodern witness “it is crucial that 
the poet is present and located in the poem. The poet is not simply a phantom manipulator of 
words but a confused actual person, caught in a world of catastrophe that the poem must 
somehow both mirror and transcend” (35, emph. Ostriker’s). Though, it is at this point that the 
two begin to disagree.  
  While Ostriker seems to accept the possibility of a “confused actual person” in the text 
unproblematically, Spahr grapples with it constantly, asserting ultimately that this person in the 
text and his/her position as one of witness ultimately becomes a stupid question. And, it’s 
important to note that Ostriker patently refuses the politics of LANGUAGE poetry where Spahr 
holds it very important. Ostriker dismisses the radical political potentials of a LANGUAGE 
poetry that disrupts a writing subject, arguing that 
Language poetry, notwithstanding the political posturing of its advocates, seems 
to me politically vacuous not only because of its captious repartee, and its 
systemic abandonment of the lyric “I,” but because it denies that the morally 
responsible human subject is even theoretically possible. (35) 
In the end, what they can both agree on most clearly is the refusal to keep silent, positing that the 
only truly apolitical position is one wherein we accept silence in our speech and in our ability to 
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listen, a moment in which “‘our voices are made silent’ / ‘our ears are made deaf’” (“testimony: 
III” 28-9).27  
My own critiques of Ostriker’s theory of postmodern witness can be best demonstrated 
through Amy Robbins, who, in her discussion of Alice Notley, identifies the primary problem of 
Ostriker’s criticism. Robbins notes that Ostriker’s theory seems to accept unproblematically that 
the self can (and thus should) be represented in the text, an acceptance that needs to be at the 
very least problematized, if not ultimately refused, by a history of theory and literary criticism 
that confronts the ability of language to represent anything, let alone a person. Robbins writes: 
“to claim the presence of a person in language is not an unproblematic contention, as Roland 
Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and other poststructuralists have made clear” (77). Of course, as she is 
quick to explain, “[m]aterial subjects do not, and cannot, cohere in language—subjects become 
instead verbal constructs, accumulations of representations that in themselves are merely 
remnants of desire” (77). Instead, Robbins suggests that Notley’s work makes impossible this 
present and located “confused person,” by disrupting the “[a]bstract relationships to abstract 
                                                
27 Comment by Andy Weaver (4/2/2014): “I wonder what Cage would say in reference to this point: ‘what they can 
both agree on most clearly is the refusal to keep silent, positing that the only truly apolitical position is one wherein 
we accept silence in our speech and in our ability to listen, a moment in which “our voices are made silent” / “our 
ears are made deaf”’? Cage seems to suggest a politics of silence (at least in terms of his meaning of ‘silence’ as 
‘empty words’), or at least that’s how I like to read his work. Would you agree? If so, is this an impasse, or is there a 
bridge between Cage’s and Spahr’s stances?”  
 
Response (4/2/2014): “Cage on silence vs Spahr not wanting to be silent. Maybe the bridge is listening, attention, a 
way out of normativity by finding what one wouldn’t otherwise… But for Cage we get there silently, and for Spahr 
we get there stuttering. In the end, they’re both noise, just differently (though, to be fair, Spahr is noisY whereas the 
Cunningham mesostics are noise). Spahr doesn’t want empty words (doesn’t see them as helpful), but she wants 
them opened.” 
 
Response by Andy Weaver (5/2/2014): “Cage is also working from an Eastern/Zen stance towards silence as 
necessary for contemplation/connection. Listening/attention would seem to be a possible bridge… but it’s not 
necessary to have them agree. I’m just curious about how they might/might not overlap.” 
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notions of the self, one way of describing the reader/text interaction that takes place at the site of 
Language poetry” (88). Spahr’s work follows in a similar vein. 
In the end, Ostriker’s suggestion of representation (and especially the representation of a 
person) is false, misinformative, and Spahr’s testimony adamantly works against it; “this is about 
the role of testimony / the claims of truth in the age of cover-up and misinformation” 
(“testimony: I” 3). The collection posits testimony as a means of working against a poetics of 
witness, and as a remedy for it. Spahr’s poetics of testimony, which follows through Response 
and continues throughout her work, is made manifest in the intrusion of news, historical, fact, 
and testimony in her later collections, Fuck You – Aloha – I Love You (2001), 
thisconnectionofeveryonewithlungs (2005), and well then there now (2011), a collection of 
seamlessly intertwined confession and found language that seems to say that telling is a 
violation, and thus the only politically viable text is one that stutters as it violates (a stuttering 
that is suggested by the collection’s very title). Ultimately, well then there now demands a shift 
not just away from a process of representation that assumes its potential to witness without 
violating, but a shift away from that discussion entirely. It offers instead testimony as 
representation that folds in on itself, becomes so distanced from any real person, no matter how 
confused, that it is analogy without reference to the real: “analogy from analogy / analogy of 
analogy” (well then 58). Testimony of testimony. 
While their poetic projects might seem to be at odds with each other, what we see in 
Mullen’s radical use of appropriation and in Spahr’s radical repositioning of the postmodern 
witness is that both women return—albeit sceptically—to the realm of identity. While I will, in 
my next section, carefully study the complex relationship that each author has with identity and 
its relationship to her authorial presence, it is at least clear now that both authors see the 
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complete refusal of subjectivity, of identity, as impossible and as ineffectual as politics or 
poetics. If it is indeed impossible to tell without violating, as Spahr’s e-mail response to me 
proclaimed so blatantly, then the role of the radical, experimental female poet is a difficult one. 
She must offer instead testimony and appropriation, knowing full well that some degree of the 
violence of witnessing will come into play. Nonetheless, these tactics of testimony and 
appropriation fuel each poet’s desire to feel out the fissures and the moments of weakness in a 
phallogocentricity that would seek to silence them both on gendered and racialized lines. These 
are both, above all, tactics working at once with and against authorial subjectivity.  
Renegade Authors and Reclaimed Identities 
 At this point I am compelled to turn to the important discussion of how Mullen and Spahr 
construct their respective authorial identities. Beginning first with Mullen, I argue that her 
relationship to authorship and authority is complicated in some obvious ways, for example 
through her use of “sampling” and allusion. What I find most fascinating about selfhood and 
authorship in this collection in particular is the way the identity politics are simultaneous 
embraced and put under erasure. The result is an identity politics that recalls the tactics Hardt 
and Negri discuss in Commonwealth. That is, identity in this text seeks flux, but knows that in 
order to be moved from the oppressive structures of categorizing and overcoding, one must first 
take control of the means of producing identities, and in so doing turn against those structures. 
Hardt and Negri describe this process in three steps. The first is to attack invisibility, “to reveal 
the violence of identity as property and thereby in some sense reappropriate that identity” (327). 
The second is a “struggle for freedom”28 (330), a new relationship to identity that is no longer 
                                                
28 It is important to note that, in contrast to many activist movements predicated on identity politics, Hardt and 
Negri are careful to distinguish “freedom” from “emancipation.” They write that “whereas emancipation strives for 
the freedom of identity, the freedom to be who you really are, liberation aims at the form of self-determination and 
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viewed as property. The final is the “self-abolition of identity” which (332), in an anarchist 
fashion, “fills the traditional role of the abolition of property and of the state” (333, emph. Hardt 
and Negri’s). While this third step is suggested by the multiplicity of experiential communities, I 
am most interested in the ways that Sleeping with the Dictionary enacts these first two tasks. 
Robbins seems to suggest these processes when she observes that “Mullen turns from encoded 
descriptions of the culture’s aggression toward bearers of these various identity markers toward 
the question of agency, asking how a marked subject can effectively regain control of her 
personhood in such a hostile climate” (362). I argue that through erasure and exclusion Mullen 
works to regain control of the production of identity. 
Regaining control of “personhood,” or the production of subjectivity, thus involves 
foregrounding those aspects of identity production that make the marginalized subject invisible 
or silent. Part of the way that Mullen does this is by putting the lyric “I” under erasure, as many 
scholars of her work discuss. For example, Luck observes that “[t]hese poems are not the product 
of a traditional lyric ‘I’ shaping the language to evoke the epiphanies of an essential self. Instead, 
Mullen conspicuously puts that ‘I’ under erasure” (357). For Luck, this in turn foregrounds the 
constructedness of political subjectivity, a process that she sees most clearly enacted in Mullen’s 
collections Trimmings and Muse & Drudge, collections that “illustrate a shift from writing the ‘I’ 
to considering the subject and language itself ‘not as transparent but constructed’” (358). This 
leads her to read “Choice voice noise,” the frequently referenced line in Muse & Drudge, as a 
reference to gaining personal agency, a choice to voice noise, or what would be otherwise passed 
over. But, we must also read this as a decision to speak in the language of noise, which, as Craig 
Dworkin argues, moves this politics beyond issues of witness and testimony in that noise has the 
                                                                                                                                                       
self-transformation, the freedom to determine what you can become” (333). This element is precisely what 
distinguishes this form of reading and writing from identitarian politics and classical anarchism in general. 
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“potential to disrupt the message, to unsettle the code of the status quo, [which] is what makes 
noise more than simply the record of violence” (39). “Choice voice noise,” in its similarity to 
slang and baby talk, is one way that Mullen moves towards noise.  
While Mullen’s work is never “noise” in the way I argue that Cage’s is, she definitely uses 
nonsense and marginalized voices that are typically considered to be illiterate or barbaric. This is 
a way of opening up her work to more potential readers, which she theorizes in “Imagining the 
Unimagined Reader.” She begins this essay by foregrounding the reader who is silenced before 
s/he reaches the text because s/he is never imagined, and is thus excluded. She admits to feeling 
this silencing herself: “There is another kind of experience I sometimes have when reading the 
words of authors who never imagined that someone like me might be included in the potential 
audience for their work” (199). This process typically reifies identity through the process of 
exclusion, in that the text provokes the reader to identify with the markers of their subjectivity 
that cause their exclusion. Mullen describes this process clearly, writing: “When I read words 
never meant for me, or anyone like me—words that exclude me, or anyone like me, as a possible 
reader—then I feel simultaneously my exclusion and my inclusion as a literate black woman, the 
unimagined reader of the text” (ibid).29 This exclusionary process is based on language itself, 
which is often used to create a divide between literacy and illiteracy, a divide designed to 
perpetuate systems of domination. Mullen’s inclusion is equal parts interpolation and 
                                                
29 Comment by Andy Weaver (12/3/2014): “You seem to ignore half of Mullen’s point in the quotation you offer 
from ‘Imagining…’ in your 3rd paragraph. Mullen says that ‘… I feel simultaneously my exclusion and my 
inclusion as a literate black woman, the unimagined reader of the text’—what about that feeling of inclusion, which 
Mullen seems to find liberating and/or affirming (almost as a form of literary trespassing)? I think there’s something 
to work through there in relation to your ideas.” 
 
Response (13/3/2014): “You’re right. My interest in exclusion here has led me to basically ignore inclusion here. I 
think that probably comes from a very non-utopian project that leads me to point out moments of erasure or 
exclusion first before approaching moments of affirmation and inclusion. This is also the pessimist in me. But, these 
issues of affinity and inclusion are things I’ve been working through in my readings on Susan Howe lately; I can 
pretty clearly see how they’d apply to Mullen, though, and I will incorporate them into this section in my revisions.” 
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intervention; in her reading she works to reclaim the means of producing and interpolating her 
identity as a “literate black woman” in texts that never imagined her at all. The result is a new 
relationship to identity that is produced by Hardt and Negri’s “struggle for freedom” (330), an 
identity that is no longer bound by the concept of property.  
Indeed, as Mullen goes on to observe, “[w]hat constitutes literacy has always been 
determined by the powerful, while illiteracy as an attribute to the disempowered” (ibid). This is 
part of the reason why she tends towards slang, baby talk, nonsense words, and onomatopoeia, 
foregrounding “the quirks, contradictions, even the inanities, in the language of the declining 
Anglo-American empire” (203), an “inclination … to pursue what is minor, marginal, 
idiosyncratic, trivial, debased, or aberrant in the language that I speak and write” (202). By 
opening up language in this way, and trying to disrupt its exclusionary process, Mullen tries to 
envision as many readers as possible, but she knows that a completely inclusive text is totally 
impossible. And yet, as Hardt and Negri insist, Mullen’s politics and poetics are predicated on 
drawing attention to this exclusion and the silences and invisibilities it creates. She describes this 
issue at the close of “Imagining the Unexamined Reader,” which I quote at length because I 
understand it as so central not only to her project but to my own. She writes:   
Not when I am writing, but after I have written, I consider who would be left out, 
excluded from the poem. Although it’s not necessary or possible to include 
everyone, I find that it is useful to me as a writer to think about the fact that 
language, culture, and poetry always exclude as well as they include potential 
audiences. One reason I have avoided a singular style or voice for my poetry is 
the possibility of including a diverse audience of readers attracted to different 
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poems and different aspects of the work. I try to leave room for unknown readers 
I can only imagine. (203) 
One element of exclusion that Mullen does not discuss here30 but that I find hugely important is 
the issue of the materiality of the text and its distribution. In fact, I would argue that the digital 
humanities, the process of online self-publication (like my own), and the hypertext model work 
towards not just imagining unimagined readers, but also placing the text within their reach.31  
One of the most striking ways that Sleeping with the Dictionary foregrounds this process 
of exclusion is by way of what the poetry itself puts under erasure, what words it conspicuously 
does not speak. A perfect example of this is the poem “Denigration” (19), a poem that suggests, 
but refuses to articulate, the racial epithet “nigger” throughout. Instead, the poem repeatedly—
                                                
30 Part of the reason that Mullen does not discuss this issue is because the essay is written in 1999, when these 
digital possibilities did not exist. Another part of that reason is that Mullen tends to dislike technology. For example, 
while she does note that digital publication of poems, on the “Worldwide Web,” may “virtually expand[] the 
potential  audience beyond those who see my work in books or periodicals,” she also laments the fact that these 
poems appear online “with or without [her] permission” (“Imagining” 201). Additionally, Looking Up Harryette 
Mullen sees both Mullen and interviewer Barbara Henning lamenting the increasing technologization of writing 
communities, preferring “snail mail” to e-mail, and typically understanding the digital as inferior to print. 
 
31 Comment by Andy Weaver (12/3/2014): “Finally, this is where I get to ‘pretend’ to be a cranky old man. You 
write that ‘I would argue that the digital humanities, the process of online self-publication (like my own), and the 
hypertext model work towards not just imagining unimagined readers, but also placing the text within their reach.’ I 
don’t disagree, but I feel that you’re being just a bit Pollyannaish here, because you imply that hypertext doesn’t 
have any material limitations. Not everyone owns, likes, or can afford a computer, nor does everyone have easy 
access to the internet. Granted, small press has a very limited reach, but it is possible that someone could lend or 
give away a printed book, which can’t really happen online. Finally, it’s theoretically possible for an author to write 
or type out a copy of a text and disperse it for free—I don’t think the internet (and you should correct me if I’m 
wrong on this point) has such areas that escape the material costs and demands of telecommunications companies et 
al (by that, I mean that the internet isn’t free of charge for readers, outside of libraries and such). So, okay, bring it 
on Dani–school me on the glories of the internet!” 
 
Response (13/3/2014): “OKAY, fine, maybe I’ve been too long in discussions with the crazy people in DH who 
always blabber on about the revolutionary potentials of the hypertext &c. And you’re correct to note that there are 
(of course) material limitations to the digital project, not just the economic and preferential ones you’ve pointed to, 
but also literal material limitations (such as the inherently more transient nature of the digital project). These are 
limitations I’m willing to embrace—and that I certainly prefer over the limitations of more analog mediums—but I 
know that I can be a bit utopian in this regard. AND OKAY OKAY, there was an internet (a series of tubes, if I 
remember correctly) in 1999. … But I would ABSOLUTELY say that the revolutionary potentials of digital projects 
had not been realized at the time.” 
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almost incessantly—recalls the epithet through words linked to it etymologically and sonically: 
“niggling,” “nigrescence,” “niggardly,” “enigma,” “neglect,” “negligible,” “niggling,” 
“negotiate,” “renege.” On one level, this poem is deliberately not exclusionary in its refusal to 
speak a word constantly associated with violence. But, it also points out how we talk about issues 
of censorship and exclusion, preferring political correctness above an actual abolition of 
oppression. Mullen says here that she’s responding to an event in which a staff member of the 
American government was pressured to resign after people misheard his use of the word 
“niggardly,” a word that Mullen correctly identifies as having no etymological relation to the 
epithet. “So,” she goes on to say, “this poem was a commentary on the power of language, even 
when it’s misheard or misapprehended” (Henning 60). But, interestingly, Mullen also notes that 
relating concepts sonically rather than etymologically is a distinctly poetic task, and thus the 
individuals who called for his resignation “were listening more like poets than lexicographers” 
(ibid). This suggests that poetry has the ability to conflate words, and thus to bastardize a 
language in both positive and negative ways. 
The poem seems to suggest that ignoring or refusing the power of language to oppress 
contributes to that oppression. Consider, for example, the extreme awkwardness required in this 
poem to avoid saying certain words. One of these cases is the absurdity of the question, “How 
muddy is the Mississippi compared to the third-longest river of the darkest continent?” In this 
case, the speaker of the poem cannot say “Niger,” the river that is the third-largest in Africa, the 
continent in this poem that dare not speak its name. It is not a violent word that cannot be 
spoken, but rather words that name the places specifically for fear that speaking these names 
would make loud the silence of typically excluded readers and make manifest the structures of 
oppression that function globally. The poem suggests that there is nothing innate in the language 
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itself that is oppressive, but that language is often used as a force of oppression. This is 
something that Spahr also observes in Mullen’s work, arguing that “language and narration are 
not by themselves responsible for categorical oppression; rather, they at times walk hand in hand 
with the forces of oppression enabling and justifying these practices by providing a grammar of 
categorization and hierarchy” (Everybody’s Autonomy 90). Mullen constantly engages with this 
hierarchy, making manifest the processes of labeling certain languages illiterate, of refusing 
alternative literacies, of devaluing whole sets of beliefs, and of silencing the marginalized. In 
noting the violence of invisibility and silence, Mullen also draws attention to the paradox of her 
successes in speaking a language of illiteracy to an academy that relies on literacy to exist. In 
“Denigration,” she also asks: “If I disagree with your beliefs, do you chalk it up to my negligible 
powers of discrimination, supposing I’m just trifling and not worth considering?” Alongside a 
critique of literacies, this also draws attention to the ways that radical voices are silenced, an 
issue Henning connects with the word “renegade.” Their exchange on this is telling:  
BH: I was thinking as I read this that I like being called a renegade … the beats, 
the black arts, it was a plus to be a renegade. 
HM: Yes, there’s power in that. Negation can be empowering in a certain sense, 
when you are free to define yourself against the dominant culture and not be 
crushed by it. 
BH: But not when you think that your “self” has been erased before you know 
that there has been no erasing, that there can be no erasing. (60-1) 
In this case, both Mullen and Henning seem to articulate precisely the tactics Hardt and Negri 
advocate. Self-abolition or a self in flux, a self that you can determine yourself, is impossible 
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unless we first make visible the invisible, make loud the silenced, and refuse ownership of 
identity as property. Sleeping with the Dictionary seems to do precisely this.  
Spahr’s work with authorial identity can be similarly illuminated by a turn to 
Commonwealth. Hardt and Negri provide us with a means of alterglobalization resistance and 
experiment that does not entirely dismiss identity from the beginning, a useful turn considering 
how often (mainly rights-based) activist groups oppose anarchism and poststructuralism on the 
grounds that it discounts the politics of these struggles. Following Hardt and Negri, 
postanarchism views identity politics as a means to an end rather than an end in itself (to be 
either reified or discounted depending on the perspective). They maintain that a “revolutionary 
politics has to start from identity but cannot end there” (326). Therefore, while they advocate the 
eventual abolition of identity as a marker of biopolitical production and overcoding, they 
concede that, as I quoted before, “[i]dentity is a weapon of the republic but one that can be 
turned against it” (326). One example of this, for Hardt and Negri, is the activism taken up by 
queer activists who embrace the term queer as polyglot and multiple in nature, thus implicitly 
critiquing identity politics through the very use of the term “queer” (335). I am tempted to argue 
here that Hardt and Negri’s observations are especially apt to Spahr, whose life is marked by 
queerness via her polyamorous relationship. But, I am hesitant to make such a claim. First, 
because Spahr tends to avoid speaking of her personal life in relation to her work; she is by no 
means closeted, but she does tend to avoid making direct links between her romantic, sexual, and 
domestic life and her poetics, save the important example of the pseudo-memoir The 
Transformation (2007). Additionally, I worry that here I am also relying too heavily on an 
autobiographical reading, long held to be inappropriate in English studies (despite its always 
lingering somewhere in the background of literary analysis). I also wonder if this gesture is the 
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very kind of misbehaving Spahr advocates. Nonetheless, queerness is made manifest in her work. 
In Response we see it in the poem “thrashing seems crazy,” wherein the body with multiple 
personalities is made queer by virtue of its containing male and female identities 
simultaneously.32 What is most important about this example is that it functions somewhere 
between a reclamation of the means of producing subjectivity, on the one hand, and queerness on 
the other, insisting on a specificity that opposes the abstraction of identity.33 
While their step-by-step guide may read as an oversimplification, Hardt and Negri 
maintain that this abolition of identity is a grotesque violence; it is “monstrous, violent, and 
traumatic” (339). Similarly, while Spahr advocates the complication of identity and authorship, 
particularly by way of her refusal to “self-identify,” she also acknowledges in her work the 
trauma of abolishing identity. It is this trauma and violence that Lederer identifies when she 
discusses the violence of the form in Response, as when she argues that Spahr’s insertion of the 
                                                
32 I do not wish to suggest here that the body with multiple personalities, or a body with any “disorder” labeled so 
by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) is inherently queer. Instead, I merely suggest 
that the body represented in Response, drawn from the lived experience of the woman who appeared on Oprah’s talk 
show, is one representation of queerness in the text. I do with some discomfort about the appropriation of mental 
illness, acknowledging that while it may be impossible to tell without violating, as my last post suggests, that some 
means of appropriation are more violating than others, and that using one person’s lived experience as a metaphor 
for queerness and activism without consent is one such move. I consider here the poetic metaphor only, and do not 
wish for my observations to be taken any further out of context. 
 
33 Comment by Jonathan Vandor (5/1/2014): “How does the multiple-personality disorder of the speaker (or 
speakers?) undermine the idea that a fluidity of the self or its authority would be a positive/desirable thing? Is it just 
the limiting example, is it indicating a yearning for the unitary self, or does it aim to show how the ‘diagnosis’ of 
MPD and its quotidian analogues would be helpful to understanding ourselves and others? And how does this 
connect to or differ from the Modernist interest in madness, in unusual psyches?” 
 
Response (17/1/2014): “As a good pomo junkie, I believe that the construction of the subject is inevitable. BUT, as 
I’m working through in my work right now (it’s still in its baby stages), perhaps language gives us one way of 
doctoring those ways that we are constructed as subjects? Or, I’m too hopeful?” 
 
Response by Jonathan Vandor (20/1/2014): “I don’t think you’re too hopeful at all. On the simplest level, isn’t the 
act of reading a re-writing of the self (albeit on a temporary basis), through identification or what-have-you? Or even 
though the questioning of one’s own politics? There’s a phrase nagging at the back of my head from an early 
nineteenth century piece that I read for my comps, which I can’t recall properly. But! George R. R. Martin got the 
gist of it recently: ‘A reader lives a thousand lives before he dies. The man who never reads lives only once.’” 
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generic (by way of this projects titular quotation, for example) “uses brackets violently” (143). 
Alternatively, she also argues that the book’s “white space functions invasively causing the page 
itself to become livid with terror” (ibid). However violent Lederer reads Spahr’s form, Response 
doesn’t make the process of abolishing identity violent so much as it uses it as an invitation to 
the fragmentary communal. The common is indeed monstrous insofar as it is amorphous, lacking 
firm outlines and therefore frighteningly unbounded. Response works to let this common stand in 
for the highly individualized traditional readings of violence and trauma. This is best 
demonstrated in the following passage: 
a voice stutters in the background of our waking mind 
 
[generic possessive pronoun] stutter is our stutter 
 
or is it the way we define our difference? 
 
                                                                   stutter is nation (“responding: v” 1-4) 
Here, the concept of “stutter” is central to this relationship to identity. In our fragmentation, born 
out of Hardt and Negri’s processes of reclamation, of making visible the invisible, and of 
refusing to possess our identities, we form community that is beyond the traditional boundaries 
of nation, of identity, and embrace a kind of queerness in our processes of identification. Spahr’s 
speaker asks the reader to question how we define difference, concluding that the stuttering 
differences of the multiple, never fully articulable in language, is what defines a reading 
community. The stutter is, as Dworkin’s “The Stutter of Form” tells us, the “murmur of [the] 
materials” (168) of language in which language “refers back to the material circumstances of its 
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own production” (167-8). For Dworkin, the stutter at once blocks communicative speech by 
“impeding the facile consumption of language” (182) as well as allowing for new and unique 
literary production free from the limitations of communicative articulation. In this way, the 
nation of stutter that Spahr puts forth is a common united by the freedom from articulation. We 
all stutter together, though we may do so in different ways. We are invited to misbehave in our 
readings. We all stutter as anarchist, as postanarchist, in our refusal to self-identify.   
Readers’ Common and Experiential Communities 
If my project has dwelled too long on the relationship between the individual and society, 
it’s because this divide is historically fraught in the study of poetry. And, certainly, this 
relationship is a recurring theme in all of Mullen’s work. Spahr, in her introduction to Looking 
Up Harryette Mullen, observes that historically, criticism has tended to argue that a poet, or a 
poem, has to value one over the other. That is, “[a]mong the many clichés that haunt a genre as 
old-school as poetry, there is the one that poetry is either about the community or the individual” 
(i). While it is clear from this chapter that Mullen problematizes issues of individuality and 
subjectivity, it is also not so easy to say that she has, thus, sided with the community. Rather, as 
Spahr contends, this dichotomy doesn’t help us much with Mullen. “It is not,” she argues, “that 
Mullen disowns … concerns with individual subjectivity…. Rather she explores how community 
and individualism are in dialogue through modernism” (ibid). Even if, as Mullen herself argues, 
her “poetic language is more public and social, less private and hermetic than Stein’s” (Henning 
13), the distance between these terms is blurred by her poems’ relationship with their readers. 
Mullen’s audience is envisioned as a community founded neither on individual subjectivity nor 
consensus on interpretation, but rather an experiential community of readers who are encouraged 
to alter the text as they read. 
 232 
Demonstrating this requires, first, a look at how Mullen’s authorship, particularly in 
Sleeping with the Dictionary, is disrupted in order to make room for the multiple readings of an 
audience the text approaches as common. In her look at the collection through the lens of 
cognitive theory, Luck argues that the authorship therein is less an act of Romantic authority and 
more a process of editing an inner voice. This process disrupts traditional authorship because the 
“act of editing the inner voice, whether for verbal or written communication, is … both passive 
and active and constituted by forces inside and outside of the subject herself” (361). As a result, 
Mullen does not work towards a uniqueness, what Luck’s cognitive theory recognizes as a form 
of “emergence,” but rather concedes that “emergence is an impossible task, and perhaps beside 
the point” (362). Instead the prose poems in Sleeping with the Dictionary draw from “multiple 
influences of the language system, the poet’s passive submission to the push of her body and 
unconscious mind, and her active tweaking and shaping, or simple ‘recording,’ of the ‘dictums’ 
of these influences” (379-80), an act that, as the collection’s title suggests, is both linguistic and 
corporeal.  
What this means is that we as readers are invited to understand the author more as editor 
and less as Author who, as Barthes observed, limits our engagement to the text by encouraging 
readers to interpret and thus “decipher” it (Image – Music 147). Because she is an editor of an 
inner voice (or, to be more accurate, a multiplicity of inner voices), we are able to understand 
Mullen’s decisions as somewhat arbitrary, and this causes us to reflect on our own reading and 
editing decisions, which are arbitrary too, the text reminds us. For Andy Weaver, it is this 
“emphasis on the arbitrary nature of the reader’s interpretive decisions” that essentially “forces 
the reader into an awareness of the arbitrary nature of her/his decision-making process” 
(Indeterminacy 109). For Mullen, this understanding of writing and reading as editing is a way of 
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approaching the common of her readership as such. Instead of opposing Saussure, as we saw in 
Mac Low, Mullen repurposes him, arguing that though “the relation of the signifier and signified 
is arbitrary, … our habitual usage builds all sorts of associations between them” (82). The 
communities produced by this “habitual usage” demonstrate that “[l]anguage isn’t the property 
of any one person or group. It belongs to everyone who uses it” (82), and need not form 
oppressive or exclusive communities. 
In our variant readings of Sleeping with the Dictionary, we form experiential 
communities rather than interpretive communities. While Mullen often talks in interviews about 
this element of her work, it is rarely taken up in the criticism, and when included it’s often left 
underdiscussed, as in Emily P. Beall’s “‘As reading as if”: Harryette Mullen’s ‘cognitive 
similes,’” which approaches the experiential community in Mullen by way of critiquing 
Cognitive (or Conceptual) Metaphor theory and its oversimplification of reader interpretation. 
Beall argues that the Cognitive Metaphor model (represented in this article by Peter Stockwell’s 
Cognitive Poetics) does not and cannot account for the multiphasic and active engagement of 
open readers. That is,  
while he [Stockwell] specifies that a reader must intervene and interpret to a 
greater degree in open text, he does not consider the possibility that this radical 
openness could be such that the intervention and interpretation is potentially 
endless—and in fact will end only when a reader chooses to end her reading under 
constraints of time and not due to constraints of completion. (136-7) 
Weaver sees these potential inexhaustive/inexhaustible readings as inherently communal in that 
they promote active readership and readerly engagement well above interpretation and exegesis, 
allowing for disagreement that is necessarily political. He writes that “[t]hese moments of 
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irreconcilable dissensus suggest a political philosophy behind Mullen’s text (a text that 
uncharitable readers might disregard as nonsensical and thus apolitical in its refusal to offer an 
easily consumable set of ideas)” (108). Readers are united in their experience of the poem, and in 
affective relationship with the text (an assemblage of readers and texts). Readers form affective 
communities based on the experience of reading the text largely because exegetical or exhaustive 
interpretive communities are rendered impossible by the multiple potential meanings.   
He observes too that this greater freedom afforded to the reader allows him or her “to 
continue the process of self-determination after s/he has finished reading the text” (123), thus 
encouraging both the individual and the common at once. As Weaver observes, “[a]t one and the 
same time, the text acknowledges the individual’s inclusion in the group, but also shows that 
there is an essential individual identity that remains outside the group’s influences. This idea 
impacts not only the individual subjectivity, but the group as well” (136). Both inclusion and 
exclusion of the reader occurs on the level of language that, in its openness, functions, Frost 
adds, “like the text of ‘bliss’ described by Roland Barthes as evoking in the reader a crisis of 
language,” in that “these citations provoke both pleasure and discomfort” (468). While both 
Weaver and Frost are referring to Muse & Drudge here, Sleeping with the Dictionary functions 
in a similar manner. 
Both collections serve as excellent pedagogical tools in their production of a readers’ 
common, an element of which Mullen is well aware.34 In an interview with Frost, she explains 
                                                
34 I should add that Mullen is also concerned, in Muse & Drudge especially, with her literal “audience”—the people 
who attend her poetry readings. Noticing that her physical audience changed from predominantly black and 
nonacademic, to predominantly white and academic, she wanted to create a work that would speak to a community 
that included them all. “I think of myself and my writing as being marginal to all the different communities that have 
contributed to the poetic idiom of my work,” she says, “but at the same time it is important to me that I work in the 
interstices, where I occupy the gap that separates one from the other; or where there might be overlapping 
boundaries, I work in that space of overlap or intersection” (Henning 22). She explicitly states that she wants Muse 
& Drudge “to bring the various readers of my work together” (“Solo Mysterioso” 664). 
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that “Muse & Drudge was written to create an audience. It was very deliberate. And when you 
talk about your class having a collective experience, I think that’s great—that is exactly what I 
was hoping for” (416). Additionally, she talks throughout the interview about the importance of 
“different meanings in the multivalent references,” where the processes of reading and writing 
aren’t so distinct. “This is about me reading too,” she maintains, “getting what I get and passing 
it on” (407). Echoing Duncan’s conception of poetry as the commons, Mullen knows that her 
book, while emblazoned with her name, is not hers. She tells Frost, 
I think that it’s mine. And I realize that I have to share it. … This whole book is 
about being possessed by others. It is very much made up of the voices 
themselves—words of others that I’ve read, heard, or overheard. … If it is me, it’s 
just generic. … The individual and the collective merge, as in the blues. (408) 
While she too is referring to Muse & Drudge, we see the collective merge in Sleeping with the 
Dictionary; in fact, I would argue that Mullen’s return to the prose poem—and move away from 
the quatrains of Muse & Drudge—makes the collection experiential in a more effective way.   
For one thing, in the prose poem, the shape and size shift with the materiality of the 
poem, whether viewed in print or digitally, and on the specific printed edition; additionally, a 
shift in materiality would also alter the line breaks, revealing them to be arbitrary, at the mercy 
of the margin only. The prose poems in Sleeping with the Dictionary are also organized 
paratactically so the sentences don’t necessarily require a linearity or a causality to their reading; 
despite being prose, these are not narratives. So when two sentences are juxtaposed, as in the 
lines “The agency tapping my telephone heard my pen drop. Now I’m walking out of pink ink” 
in “Natural Anguish” (52), the seeming dichotomy of an “agency” and an “I” is different 
depending on how we read the sentences’ relation to each other. The “agency” as government 
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and surveillance is aligned with “pink ink” which the speaker leaves behind, her “pen drop” a 
refusal to write on their terms. And yet, the “agency” is so named to recall personal agency; 
individual autonomy is also necessarily communal and connected (via telephone and their 
extreme attentiveness). The “pink ink” recalls Hélène Cixous’s “white ink” that ends “The Laugh 
of the Medusa” as if to say that a new écriture féminine (both infantilized through the internal 
rhyme and feminized through the colour pink) needs to be coloured, literally. It’s this view of 
writing that the speaker leaves behind.35 The radically different content of the sentences (which, 
as sentences and not lines of verse, are expected to follow causally) make us suspect of even the 
connection between the first-person pronouns. A few lines before this the poem is situated on a 
theme of language when Mullen writes “On the way back when I saw red I thought ouch. Soon 
when I think colored someone bleeds.” So, the “pink ink” is also diluted blood drawn from the 
violence of language (“ouch” and “colored”), and especially the racial and colonial oppression 
language can enforce. And “pink ink” is also a lightening of blood, a move to make it slightly 
less “colored.” And, if we are refusing linearity and causality here, can we not read this “On the 
way back” as a suggestion that the speaker is returning to the place she was “walking out of,” 
although they appear in reverse order in the poem? I would argue that the phrasing of both 
demands it. And, my readings can go on… 
Much like the materiality of the page, the experiential communities formed in reading 
these poems are also determined by space, as in Frost’s classroom that she discusses with Mullen 
in the interview quoted above. Text also invites corporeal engagement to form these experiential 
                                                
35 Robbins provides the following interpretation of these sentences: “Mullen’s very invocation of the term ‘agency’ 
[in “Natural Anguish”] to allude to cultural practices of surveillance suggests the disadvantages faced by the objects 
of this surveillance, for the operatives of dominant culture’s systems of control in fact tune in to Mullen’s silence 
and her loss of agency, both points figured in her dropping of her pen, playing on the common ‘pin-dropping’ 
metaphor for total silence” (362). 
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communities which are tied into the very poems themselves as they encourage a reader’s 
intervention. This is involved in how we connect in our readings, whether in a classroom, 
through this thesis, or even in conversation well after the physical book has left our hands. But, 
it’s also involved in how we physically adjust the poems themselves. So, Weaver suggests that 
the author as “incomplete” and “non-authoritative” thus “allows the reader to take a more active 
role, a role that could not only include writing additional verses, but also rearranging the verses 
of the text” (106). I too have rearranged even the sentences within the poem. And Mullen knows 
that once she realizes she has to “share it,” she relinquishes domination over readers, who can 
then intervene in whatever way they see fit. So, when Frost asks her: “Do you like the idea of 
someone just opening it and starting anywhere?” (413), she avoids responding to that question 
directly. After all, the order of the poems is another process of editing, the arbitrariness of which 
is amplified in Sleeping with the Dictionary’s alphabetizing. And, of course, what she “likes,” 
she knows, has no place in the reading of her poems.  
 Spahr’s work has also seen a longstanding interest in the notion of the common and in 
connectivity or collectivity. This interest in the common is necessarily linked to both notions of 
the self, as I have already indicated, and also in issues of language and expression, and is clearly 
informed by her engagement with the major currents of literary theory and criticism. Marjorie 
Perloff uses Spahr’s Everybody’s Autonomy as an example of a text that champions the 
intersections between the theory that has become so pervasive in the English department and 
creative poetry (especially in the example of LANGUAGE poetry), citing the text as one of “a 
number of scholarly books … already appeared on feminist language poetries and other facets of 
the ‘new poetics’” (“Avant-Garde Tradition” 129). And yet, true to Perloff’s propositions in 
Unoriginal Genius, her article upholds a kind of authorship that Spahr clearly works against, 
 238 
asserting throughout that an influx of theoretical issues into poetry does not negate issues of 
individual talent and authorial genius. Spahr’s own characterization of LANGUAGE poetry in 
“The 90s” is rather different. She ignores issues of individual talent and authorial genius in 
favour of a conception of experimental writing founded on “a return to the idea of a literary 
commons” (179). The article sees Spahr asserting confidently an anarcho-communist approach to 
literary criticism: “No one owns literature” (180). Despite the many connections between Spahr 
and Perloff in the literary community, their approaches to authorship and the literary commons 
are diametrically opposed.  
 In “A, B, C,” Spahr similarly posits a theory of literary criticism that is vastly more 
concerned with connections and commons than it is with an individual author or oeuvre. “What 
is here,” she writes, “is not a genealogy, but a rethinking of reading and the connection between 
texts. These are connections of against” (283). The very process of reading against that Spahr 
develops in this essay, and which I have discussed in detail already, disrupts notions of the 
authority of the author, preferring instead misreadings and connections. Mayer, in 
“Aggregators,” similarly emphasizes the role of connection and common in Spahr’s work, noting 
that this, too, is something she’s adapted from Stein.36 Mayer sees enacted in Spahr’s poetry an 
                                                
36 Comment by Andy Weaver (2/2/2014): “To play devil’s advocate in relation to Stein and reader autonomy: I 
agree that there is a large amount of interpretive freedom in a Stein text, and this certainly leads to more interpretive 
freedom than with the huge majority of texts—but, when I read Stein, I am always constantly aware that Stein has 
created this document. Her virtuosity never lets me forget her own hand in creating the text and allowing me, as a 
reader, this freedom. Is that a problem when arguing that Stein allows for reader autonomy, as you and Spahr 
assert?” 
 
Response (4/2/2014): “This is something I’ve been wondering about Stein, especially as she’s become this kind of 
larger-than-life figure. I agree that Stein’s looming presence (over everything in this project, it seems—perhaps it’s 
because I visited her grave in Paris? did she follow me back?) makes reader autonomy quite complicated. And I also 
think that her work directly invites the reader to decode and interpret, which complicates it further. But I still think 
she made a crack in the wall that keeps readers out of the text, and I think that’s what Spahr picks up from her 
most.” 
 
Response by Andy Weaver (5/2/2014): “I think the way you describe Stein’s stance (as starting to break down the 
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understanding of the “relation of bodies and languages as systems of connection,” demonstrated 
best in Spahr’s “use of the Steinian principle of repetition to provide a non- or anti-narrative 
thread or trace. Often, the repeated word or phrase is about the nature of language, form, and 
narrative itself” (44). Spahr most clearly articulates this politics and poetics of common in 
Everybody’s Autonomy, a revision of her doctoral thesis. In the book she presents connectivity as 
a “politicized model of reading” (53), which is based on and in the common, and which 
privileges the reader and his/her connections to the text well above any writer’s authority. While 
her work in this text focuses on formally experimental poetry, she posits that the very act of 
“reading is more communal than individual—more resistant than complicit—than one finds in 
most reader response theory” (161). Central to this is her theory that the meaning of a text is 
produced, especially in the case of the formally experimental text, through an “abandoning of 
authorial privilege” (53) on the one hand, and the reader producing meaning on the other. That 
is, she argues that “meaning is tied to community and is necessarily collective. The creative 
economy here emphasizes talking through reuse and recombination” (103). The approach runs 
counter to Perloff’s adherence, throughout her academic work, on lineage, tradition, and 
individual talent, and instead proposes a radically egalitarian mode of criticism.  
Importantly, Everybody’s Autonomy is an explicitly anarchic text, proposing an anarcho-
communist approach to reading that is not unlike the postanarchism that I propose in this project. 
She presents it, in the text’s introduction, as a mode of “anarchic reading” (13), and later 
develops this concept into an “anarchic democracy” (49). Her concept of communal autonomy 
is, for her, a kind of “anarchic autonomy” which stands in contrast to the “liberal humanism” that 
                                                                                                                                                       
wall for the reader) is absolutely accurate. I like that discussion more than the discussion of Stein as having 
completely succeeded in breaking down that wall. Along those lines, she seems in a position similar to Pound, in 
that both started the respective revolutions that eventually outstripped them.” 
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traditional conceptions of author and reader uphold (154). The text is also particularly concerned 
with the practical and activist elements of this understanding of readership, constantly returning 
to how these particular authors (Stein, Bruce Andrews, Lyn Hejinian, Mullen, and Hak Kyung 
Cha) function in the classroom. It is this aspect of the text that reviewer Logan Esdale finds most 
interesting, writing that the texts Spahr discusses “are inclusive … involving readers in the 
production of meaning; these texts encourage collective reading, as in a classroom, so that the 
experience of reading them is a shared one” (93). Esdale’s review, however, is one of the more 
generous ones.  
Everybody’s Autonomy, published in 2001, met with a good deal of resistance. A number 
of reviews in journals at the time of the book’s release criticized her as well-meaning perhaps, 
but idealistic and, ultimately, much more conventional than Spahr would have her readers 
believe. First and foremost, reviewers such as Jennifer Ashton viewed the text as not very 
controversial. Ashton writes that “Spahr imagines herself to be making a controversial and 
corrective argument, claiming that deconstruction failed to recognize the degree to which 
reading—no matter how much we invest it with the power of ‘authorship’—is itself a learned 
and regulated act” (388). Jonathan Monroe’s review is more scathing, characterizing Spahr’s 
work as not only outdated but delusional. He writes: 
If it can be claimed, as Spahr writes, that in some sense “reader autonomy … 
dominates avant-garde literature of the late twentieth century” (as it also 
dominated that century’s earlier decades?), it has nevertheless been convincingly 
argued—by critics and theorists as diverse as Theodor Adorno, Louis Althusser, 
Hans Robert Jauss, Terry Eagleton, Frederic Jameson, and Pierre Bourdieu—that 
the idea of “reader autonomy” (as also the supposed autonomy of writers) is an 
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ideological delusion in need of critique and demystification. (754) 
Monroe later in his review argues that Everybody’s Autonomy actually runs counter to its own 
politics in that it “displays ambivalence toward group formations and identifications—
aesthetically, socially, politically—and a strong sense of conflicted insularity,” and that “Spahr 
tends too easily to equate difficult or innovative formal structures with the capacity for 
complexity and richness of response, as well as cultural and political consequentiality” (759). 
And, Ashton eventually argues that the text opposes the very process of reading in general: 
But of course, as soon as the difference between readers becomes a difference 
between their experiences rather than a difference between their interpretations of 
the text (why they can never form an interpretive community) we have to say that 
what Spahr wants readers to resist is not the hegemony of reading but reading 
itself. (388, emph. Ashton’s) 
I would like to end this chapter by addressing these concerns—that the text is not controversial, 
that it is delusional, that it opposes group formation, and that it opposes reading in general—by 
looking to three specific examples from Response that demonstrate that Spahr’s poetics, despite 
these reviewers concerns, are effective postanarchist strategies for reading as activist. 
The first example I would like to look at is the line “the social always holds us back” 
(10), which would seem, at first, to counteract Spahr’s interest in connection, and in social 
commonality. Instead, the line carries with it dual meanings, another paradox in Response: that 
we fear social communion, on the one hand; that we are held back by social institutions that seek 
to govern individuality on the other. Contrary to Monroe’s review, Spahr does not ignore the 
work of writers like Adorno and Althusser who work to demystify the cultural influences on an 
individual’s supposed autonomy. Instead, she understands these cultural influences as a jumping-
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off-point, making the argument that the construction of the self does not mean that we do not, in 
turn, exert relative autonomy over our lives and the choices that we make. If “the social holds us 
back,” it does not stop us entirely; connective reading and a view of literature as the common is 
one way of approaching autonomy. Monroe, in guarded poststructuralist fashion, sees the 
argument that there is no complete autonomy and reads “there is no autonomy.” Reader 
autonomy is not a delusion any more than the social itself is.  
 Later in “responding,” Spahr writes, as I have quoted previously, “stutter is nation” 
(“responding: V” 4), another quotation that seems to directly address Monroe’s concerns. In 
“stutter is nation,” and in other similar phrasings throughout the collection, she does not oppose 
group formation, but rather promotes afiliative and porous groupings rather than filiative and 
clearly-defined borders. Filiation and border are the means by which, as many of the writers 
Monroe lists argue, the individual is governed by social institutions; they are the very weapons of 
ideological state apparati. Formal experimentation, by way of stutter, is a means of breaking 
down generic conventions and traditional boundaries. If Everybody’s Autonomy tends to 
prioritize the formally experimental text, it is because these texts most clearly oppose the 
filiations and boundaries that are death to true commonality.  
 Finally, I would like to add one more example from Response, also from “responding,” 
when Spahr envisions “[a reader culture” without a close to the square bracket, arguing that 
“[generic plural pronoun] prefer both” (“responding: I” 11-12). By asserting that “[generic plural 
pronoun] prefer both,” Spahr not only emphasizes plurality and commonality, but also proposes 
a valuation of reading as experience rather than interpretation, an anti-exegesis, which is, to grant 
their points, not entirely new, as my project has demonstrated, but is still clearly being treated as 
a radicalism that opposes the very process of reading a poem. Preferring both is an exercise in 
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embracing alternative rather than binarism or dualism; it is supported by the various 
manifestations of paradox that I have discussed throughout. At the heart of tradition (and 
individual talent) is a hegemony of reading founded on exegesis, hermeneutics, and semiotics. [a 
reader culture does not form interpretive communities, but rather experiential communities. It 
embraces readings rather than just reading; it prefers both.  
 Everybody’s Autonomy suggests, above all, that preferring both—itself a tactic of reading 
against—is the contradiction that stands at the centre of any effective community of readers. If a 
text is to encourage a reader’s common at all it must leave itself open to the radical potentials of 
dissensus, of the disagreement inherent in the multiple potentials of the reading process. This 
chapter has demonstrated that both Mullen and Spahr have made this a primary concern in the 
texts that I have focused on but also, I hope to have shown, in their entire careers as poets and 
theorists of literature. While Response and Sleeping with the Dictionary are quite different 
collections on first read, this study has suggested that at the core of both books is a desire to 
connect with the poet’s readers on as direct a level as possible by allowing the readers to realize 
their own autonomy through the sheer multiplicity of potentials available to them. The critical 
backlash that Everybody’s Autonomy received should not serve to discredit this desire for a 
reader’s common, but should instead foreground how radical this conception of a readership is 
even now. Its suggestions are anarchist, are postanarchist, and they demand that we relinquish 
our critical authority as much as these poets worked to relinquish their creative authority over the 
text. It suggests, too, that we relinquish our identities as individual readers, instead approaching 
the “freedom” that Hardt and Negri insist is central to the common. Though their poetics may 
differ, as I have shown, their tactics remain the same. Both appropriate voices that would seek to 
silence them. Both collapse the binaries that serve to reduce the autonomy of reader and writer. 
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Both look to ephemerality and openness to counteract the dangerous tendencies of our world to 
overcode. Both crack open language, allowing the reader to enter in those fissures. And both 
insist that this process is always only ever incomplete: there is no completely authorless poem, 
no completely infinite potential, no completely exhaustive reading, no completely removed 
subjectivity. But neither lament this incompleteness. Instead, it is in the way neither poet looks to 
hide these incomplete processes that these texts function best as the locations for postanarchist 
reading-as-activism, where the reader finds himself or herself confronted with these fissures and 
is asked to fill them on his or her own, with his or her self.  
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Chapter Four: Sleeping in the Library: Susan Howe and Erin Mouré 
Beginning work on Susan Howe is a daunting task because she has garnered so much 
critical attention. My own scholarship on Howe focuses on one of her most popular works, A 
Bibliography of the King’s Book, or, Eikon Basilike (1989), a text that has frequently been the 
subject of critical scholarship. For the most part, the scholarship on Eikon Basilike has stressed 
the visual, the historical, and the violent, as well as the ways that these terms intersect in the text. 
The book works through the dubious authorship of The Eikon Basilike, The Pourtraicture of His 
Sacred Majestie in his Solitude and Sufferings (1649) (a book simultaneously attributed to 
Charles I and John Gauden, but probably produced by an amalgam of unidentified and 
unidentifiable authors), as well as Edward Almack’s A Bibliography of the King’s Book; or, 
Eikon Basilike (1896),1 which tries in vain to ascertain clear authorship by Charles I. Located on 
a highly complex and contested site of authorship, Howe’s text negotiates sites of historical 
documentation, historical violence (by way of Charles I’s execution), and the complex 
relationship between external “truth” and the visual markers of print. My work will not ignore 
these issues; indeed, they will surface throughout this chapter. But, I do want to point to the fact 
that the scholarship on Eikon Basilike, and on Howe more generally, has tended to overlook 
some important political and poetic issues in favour of repeatedly discussing these concerns.  
While I will offer a thorough analysis of the literature surrounding Eikon Basilike, I 
would first like to demonstrate this critical oversight by way of the example of Mandy 
Bloomfield’s 2009 article, “‘Aftershock of Iconoclasm’: Ambivalence of the Visual Page in 
Susan Howe's Eikon Basilike,” where it is clearly evident. In this essay, published nearly twenty 
                                                
1 To avoid confusion among these three texts, all references hereafter of Eikon Basilike refer specifically to Howe’s 
text. Any reference to the 1649 text will be signalled by the definite article, The Eikon Basilike. Any reference to 
Almack’s bibliography will be referred to as such.  
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years after Howe’s Eikon was first printed, Bloomfield crafts a beautiful analysis of the visual 
disruptions of print in the text, linking this visual prosody to issues of historical accuracy, 
colonial violence, and the Puritan use of iconoclasm. This culminates in an astute analysis of 
Eikon’s epigraphic poem that, in the Paradigm Press edition (1989), appears on an unnumbered 
page before the falsified frontispiece. In the text’s later inclusion in Howe’s collection The 
Nonconformist’s Memorial (1993), this epigraphic poem appears on page fifty-one2, with the 
frontispiece removed. The epigraphic poem initiates the 
reader into the visual disruptions that permeate the series 
as a whole; it begins with an askew, nearly toppling-over, 
“Oh Lord / o Lord” and continues to upturn and erase 
letters and words throughout. Bloomfield notes that a 
number of the words on the page would read as complete 
or nearly complete save for one or two tiny adjustments: 
“Omne” becomes “O mine” with the addition of the letter 
“i”; “envions” becomes “envious” when the “n” is 
flipped over into a “u”; “nnfortunate”3 offers the same 
                                                
2 Because the pages of the original edition of Eikon Basilike are not numbered, all numerical designations from the 
long poem are references to the version of the poem in The Nonconformist’s Memorial. Any differentiation between 
editions will be noted via footnote. 
 
Additionally, the entirety of the poem will be referred to as a series throughout, and when such a reference appears it 
designates the poem itself in both its editions. Individual pages or groups of pages are hereafter referred to as 
“poems” within the larger “series” of Eikon Basilike in its own book-length publication as well as its appearance in 
The Nonconformist’s Memorial. 
 
3 In the 1989 edition, the word Bloomfield quotes (“nnfortunate”) appears with the two “n”s at its start. When the 
poem is revised for inclusion in The Nonconformist’s Memorial, however, the first “n” is dropped, leaving the word 
as “nfortunate,” which loses the first “n”/”u” completely rather than simply missing it. The fact that Bloomfield fails 
to note this editorial choice demonstrates even further her interest in the generalities of Howe’s wordplay rather than 
the singular implications. 
 
Figure 12 
Susan Howe. From Eikon Basilike. The 
Nonconformist’s Memorial (51).  
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potential fix. While she is both attentive and interested in making observations about Howe’s 
visual play, it is clear that Bloomfield overlooks one crucial element of these manipulations: the 
elided letters are most often “i” and “u,” implicitly destabilizing identity and subjectivity 
alongside the print grid.4  
I do not mean to suggest here that subjectivity and identity in Howe’s work have been 
completely critically ignored; I note only that critics have tended to elide these issues in favour 
of more provocative academic trends that look at material conditions, textual violence, and 
iconoclasm. As such, I begin my study of Howe by arguing that Eikon Basilike, a text that begins 
with the extremely personal and anecdotal description of Howe’s son purchasing Almack’s text 
at a library sale, actively resists the “biography that trivializes” (523), as Perloff observes in a 
1989 article. Howe instead inserts the personal (rather than the biographical) into larger and 
more traditionally impersonal structures, like history, language, and government. But she also 
persistently undermines the “personal” as a closed-off entity. As a result, the text continues a line 
of ego-disruption that each poet in my project has followed in his or her own way.  
Kathleen Crown’s “‘This Unstable I-witnessing’: Susan Howe's Lyric Iconoclasm and 
the Articulating Ghost,” published in 1998, is one such article that approaches the issues of 
authorship and subjectivity before Perloff seemed to have her last word on the subject. Crown’s 
study interrogates the ways in which Howe sees her poems, even those unified in a numberless 
and narrativeless seriality such as Eikon Basilike, as singularities or parts of a multiplicitous 
whole (485). Crown characterizes Howe’s serial project as anti-telos (486) in a manner not 
                                                
4 Comment by Andy Weaver (19/3/14): “I wonder if it’s worth drawing a connection between the displaced ‘u’ and 
‘I’ in Howe’s work and the eliding of ‘u are’ in the title of Mullen’s S*PeRM**K*T? Or is that too tangential?” 
 
Response (26/3/14): “Okay, don’t kick me out of the program for this, but I definitely never realized that the letters 
missing in S*PeRM**K*T are ‘u are.’ It’s worth noting in a footnote though, for sure!” 
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unlike my earlier descriptions of Duncan’s Passages series. For Crown, the complicated 
authorship of the text demands relocation rather than rejection of authorial agency (489), 
resurrecting rather than denigrating the radical potentials of the lyric “I” as eye-witness (484). 
This should recall my discussion of Levertov too, who emphasized the role of witnessing 
throughout her work. But, Levertov was never concerned with resurrecting the witnessing-“I” 
because it had not, by then, experienced such a denigration. Crown proposes a radical rethinking 
of authorship in Howe: a kind of “ecstatic” (488) challenge to a linear view of history and the 
unity of the lyric subject.  My project takes up Crown’s reading of an authorship in Eikon 
Basilike that hears “voices” (490), a spectral noise that echoes the violence and error of the 
general scholarship, but one that also acknowledges “language’s agency exceeds one’s control” 
(493). Howe’s authorship is thus a speaking subject that is formed by these voices, by the 
polyvocality of disparate voices coming together.  
I also want to acknowledge Nicky Marsh’s article, which appears around the same time 
as Crown’s, that warns against reading Howe’s work as purely radical and anti-author. While 
Marsh is more concerned with Howe’s work before Eikon, her point that Howe’s eventual 
mainstream success affords her a greater opportunity for authorial control (124) is crucial. While 
Marsh notes Howe’s movement between the personal and the historical leaves readers 
“scrambling” for meaning (125), she also insists that  
reading the deconstructed self in the experimental text solely as a reaction to the 
mainstream and expressive poetic constructs a dichotomy from which we are 
unable to contextualize the specific historical and social impetus behind 
experimental writing. (126) 
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It’s not enough to say, then, that Howe works against expression. Instead, Marsh argues that 
“Howe’s acceptance of alterity … seems founded upon her ability to write a language that can 
transcend the limitation of a single subject position” (134). At times, however, her desire to 
relinquish her self in literature leaves her blind to issues of privilege, as in what Marsh describes 
as Howe’s problematic discussion of captivity narratives (135). To avoid the pitfalls Marsh 
discusses, my work instead follows Gerald L. Bruns, who often discusses issues of anarchism in 
poetry, and who is particularly concerned with the ways that Howe’s work (mainly in her work 
after Eikon) entails a process of  “self-formation through the appropriation of the writing (and 
therefore the subjectivity) of others” (28). Bruns characterizes Howe’s work as multiplicitous 
authorship, an “assemblage of found texts” (42). This process, which he terms “intersubjectivity” 
to distinguish it from the modernist practice of “intertextuality” (43), is radically postanarchic. 
 Taking up the seemingly ignored prods of these critics, my work on Howe is interested 
primarily in those moments of awkward complication when the text directly confronts the issues 
of unilaterality and genius that Perloff retains even as she condemns. In the pages that follow, I 
will study ecstasy and its relationship to static, to the virtual illegibility of much of Eikon 
Basilike; I will politicize this polyvocality via the Derridean concept of hauntology, trying to 
differentiate between the many spectral noises at play; I will interrogate Howe’s physical and 
intellectual relationship with her readers, whose subjectivity she quite literally seeks to 
destabilize; and, I will situate Howe’s work in terms of a literary canon, at once problematizing 
her alignment with the genre of LANGUAGE poetry, and proposing instead her inclusion as a 
kind of concrete poet concerned with textual embodiment. In the end, I hope to demonstrate the 
ways in which reading Howe’s now canonical text through the lens of postanarchism can 
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reinvigorate her work from the categorization and oversimplification that Eikon Basilike has 
suffered under the detached and often inattentive academic gaze.  
 Issues of subjectivity, textual embodiment, and illegibility synergistically also extend 
through and are central to my discussion of the other text I will focus on in this chapter, 
acclaimed Canadian poet Erin Mouré’s Pillage Laud.5 Like Eikon Basilike, Pillage Laud seems 
to flaunt its experimental and unique authorial practices, and thus the issue of authorship and 
subjectivity has not gone unnoticed in the minimal scholarship surrounding the book. For 
example, Andy Weaver’s discussion of the text in his doctoral thesis takes as its starting point 
the fact that the computer-generated authorship of the book might lead some judgmental readers 
to discredit its authorship, or the text as a whole. Weaver notes that the apparent contradiction of 
the title of Pillage Laud addresses this concern immediately, rendering the text “a stolen object 
worthy of honour or thanks” (266). He argues that alongside the text’s “constant tension between 
sense and nonsense” (268), there is a consistent deferral of authorship proper. This is clearly 
evident, Weaver observes, in the paratextual notes in the 1999 printing that tell us “the text 
selects” from the computer-generated output, rather than the author doing her own selecting 
(273). This is, Weaver adds, and I must concede, a bit of a misnomer—the text itself has not, of 
course, done anything agential in its selection. Instead, Mouré’s collaborative authorship with the 
computer indicates that “we are passive inheritors of language, and … our subjectivity is formed 
and maintained not only through language, but by language” (283). But, where he may see some 
radical formal experimentation in Mouré’s book of computer-generated love poems, Weaver is 
quick to argue that while Mouré may boast some philosophical similarities to LANGUAGE 
poetry (287), she upholds “the normalization of capitalist thinking in language” (290) by using 
                                                
5 All references to Pillage Laud signaled by page numbers refer to the 2011 BookThug reprint. I will explicitly note 
where this edition differs with the 1999 original Moveable Type printing. 
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typical or traditional grammar. By rejecting Silliman’s New Sentence, Mouré appropriates the 
image and aesthetics of LANGUAGE writing, but does so—for Weaver—both uncritically and 
apolitically, essentially downplaying the content of the text (309). I will return later to Weaver’s 
criticisms of Mouré’s politics in Pillage Laud. At this moment, I would like to instead point out 
that the heart of Weaver’s criticism is in the choices made by the author in relation to the 
indeterminate output of the MacProse program.  
 Instead of seeing it as uncritical, I would like to reposition Mouré’s authorship in this text 
as one of collaboration with an external force (the computer, MacProse, technology in general). 
In this sense, Pillage Laud is produced by cyborg authorship, which is, I would like to argue, 
inherently social. Social authorship is the primary concern of Rachel Blau DuPlessis in her 
recent essay “Agency, social authorship, and the political aura of contemporary poetry.” In this 
essay, DuPlessis argues that our contemporary discussions of authorship must move beyond the 
poststructural insistence on the death of the Author, searching instead for ways of theorizing 
authorship that recognizes the impossibility of individual expression but still ascribes a kind of 
agential role to the producer of a text. The argument is clearly postanarchist, though DuPlessis 
never names it as such. “Authorship is neither dead nor singular,” she argues, “neither all 
discursive mediumship nor all individual expression. Authorship occurs in being possessed, not 
mystically, not sublimely, but precisely by sociality as a part of a work’s dissemination and 
reception [and] its production” (987). This possession by the social, the inclusion of the author in 
social assemblage, is neither an uncritical adoption of Foucauldian discursivity nor a utopian 
view of collaboration. Instead, DuPlessis presents a theory of authorship that revives Foucault’s 
author-function from the dust-coverage of old poststructural philosophy. She writes that  
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Far from denying agency, far from barring the possibility of social authorship in 
the production of literary texts, Foucault’s somewhat quaint assumption of author-
disappearance-and-death opens the space for a proposal of post-personal 
authorship and a discussion of the rhetorical modes that such authorship might 
choose to deploy. (988) 
Moving beyond Foucault then, DuPlessis wants to open up a space for the author as agential 
within an assemblage of subjectivity (990), a place where we as readers and critics can envision 
a “non-expressivist, not explicitly personal, goal for writing” (989). In this realm of social 
authorship, the author is not an a priori figure, not “the biographical person walking around in 
the world,” but rather a figure produced by the text itself and by “what that person ‘announces’ 
of her formal, ideological and discursive agency at the writing table” (990-1). The poem is thus a  
“complex matrix” (992) where social authorship is a representation of plurality as and not of the 
enunciation (993). Acknowledging the utopian, communistic dangers of suggesting the pure 
radical possibilities of social authorship, DuPlessis adds at the end of this essay that, of course, 
“[n]o form has any intrinsic content, any intrinsic politics” (997), and that, therefore, social 
authorship is only radical because of the extant Author-god hegemony.  
 As if in support of DuPlessis’s arguments that we cannot disown or dismiss the author so 
wholly, Pillage Laud is littered with examples of the text attempting to refuse the subject 
position of the author, only to have it prove itself either unable or unwilling to come apart 
completely. Page thirty-one states, “My subject wouldn’t split.” And later “The writer orbits me. 
My line (article) has sighed” (52). Unlike other, perhaps more radical, disruptions of authorship 
(as in Cage or Mac Low, for example), Mouré’s work in Pillage Laud does not just admit the 
impossibility of the completely unegoic text, it admits this impossibility as a starting point for a 
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more effective and more nuanced study of authorship and subjectivity. The writing “I” of the 
text, the line (article), is not rejected, it “sigh[s],” opening itself to external forces, taking in the 
social, and embracing the extralinguistic possibilities for communication. Her conception of 
authorship here is more in line with Black Mountain than LANGUAGE poetics insofar as she 
envisions authorship as an entrance into a field of interconnectivity with other texts rather than 
an individualized rethinking of semantics. Mouré’s authorship constitutes a radical rethinking of 
subjectivity, and her destabilized but still necessarily present voice creeps into the computer’s 
output, producing an “Erín Moure”6 by virtue of its enunciations. The speaker, or more truthfully 
the text itself, boasts: “my field had owned me” (24). The speaker of this collection is an 
assemblage, a cyborg authorship that is produced by a rhizomatic field that encapsulates the 
computer and its output, the human Mouré, and the resultant text.  
 The authorship of Pillage Laud is also social by virtue of Mouré’s many different writing 
personas, made manifest in her various and varied uses of differing names.7 This is a concern 
many critics have addressed in their scholarship on her. For example, in Isabel A. Moore’s article 
on “Lyric Fever,” she writes that Mouré’s use of many pseudonyms8 is a direct challenge to the 
                                                
6 Mouré’s name appears on the cover of the 1999 Moveable Type edition of Pillage Laud as “Erin Mouré” in 
quotation marks, retaining the usual spelling of her name but adding the distancing quotation marks that signal the 
performativity of the authorial persona. The 2011 BookThug reprint reproduces the quotation marks of the original 
author name but shifts the accent to the “i” in “Erín Moure.”  
 
7 The “Erín Moure” is not the only persona Mouré develops to author her texts. Her name appears often without any 
accent (perhaps typographical error, perhaps heteronymic, perhaps both). Her translations (or transelations, as she 
terms them, frequently appear attributed to a pseudonym.  Sheep’s Vigil by a Fervent Person is published under 
Eirin Moure, and others are attributed to Elisa Sampedrin or Calgarii Mourii. Under Elisa Sampedrin, Mouré also 
collects the poems for Lisa Robertson’s Magenta Soul Whip (2010).  
 
8 Comment by Andy Weaver (3/6/14): “I like the section where you work through Mouré’s use of pseudonyms. I 
wonder if bringing in Fernando Pessoa’s term ‘heteronym’ might expand this point. Mouré’s names seem somewhat 
stronger than a mere pseudonym, though not as strongly developed as Pessoa’s heteronyms. Might there be a middle 
ground between these two poles here, as well? (A pseudo-heteronym?) It might also be worth mentioning/thinking 




very genre of the lyric and its implication of a speaking- and writing-subject. She writes, “[a]s it 
is, their [the pseudonyms’] mobility and their multiplicity sound their author’s repeated 
challenges to that genre” (35). In a text they write together, Caroline Bergvall also notes that as 
Mouré’s work proliferates, so do her names (167). Bergvall terms the pseudonym in this case a 
“social-authorial name” in which “each new spelling is a signature in the narrative and structural, 
rather than the performative sense” (168). Bergvall suggests, then, that the multiple nature of 
Mouré’s poetic voice points to the impossibility of a clearly defined feminine or feminist voice 
to adhere her work to the tradition of Canadian feminist poets, to which Mouré responds in 
agreement: “My mother tongue is silence” (174). Thus the “Erin Mouré”/“Erín Moure” who 
authors this book presents her name with a shifted accent, and, more importantly, leaves her 
name on the book’s cover in quotation marks, admitting that even this varied act of naming is 
arbitrary, and that it suggests much more closure than the reality of social authorship permits. 
The suggestion is that authorship only ever arises out of collaboration and communication, and 
in this way Mouré refuses the essentialism of an expressive, personal mother tongue in favor of 
the multiple voices not only of her multiple writing-selves, but of the very indeterminate nature 
of the collaborative text itself.  
                                                                                                                                                       
 
Addendum: In response to Andy’s comment, I would like to point out that Mouré works more directly with Pessoa’s 
concept of the heteronym in her collection Sheep’s Vigil by a Fervent Person. Nonetheless, Pillage Laud is indeed 
the first time that one of her collections is attributed to an authorial name that differs slightly from her own, a 
tradition she would continue throughout her career, as footnote seven demonstrates. For Pessoa, the heteronym is a 
character different from the author who is created in order to write in a different style. Pessoa’s heteronyms vary in 
terms of development of the character and difference from Pessoa, the literal human who creates these variant 
identities. Mouré’s slight variations in the spelling and accent of her name are informed by heteronyms, but do not 
usually amount to the creation of entirely different individual characters. Instead, they are “misspellings” of the 
author’s real name used to allow for a greater freedom of variety in the style of the poetry produced under these 
names, especially useful in her numerous translations, a “translation” of the self rather than the creation of a new 
self, which is especially useful for her translation work.  
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 So, we arrive at a point where we must treat collaborative authorship quite differently 
than the subjective authorship of the lyric. This collaboration is also somewhat different from the 
technological collaboration of, for example, Mac Low’s interaction with his diastic programs. 
Rather than treating the computer output as raw product with which the poet works to produce a 
text, Mouré’s collaboration with the computer in Pillage Laud privileges technology as co-
producer insofar as the poet herself merges with the machine in order to place her own 
subjectivity in flux. This is what Lori Emerson argues in her article “Materiality, Intentionality, 
and the Computer-Generated Poem.” Emerson observes that the use of pseudonym and computer 
generation together signal to Mouré’s readers that “the border of a name is not a straight line 
[and] has no final point either” (175). Emerson writes that “Mouré’s poems are material objects 
devoid of authorial intention at the same time as they are material objects that reveal her 
intentions or the intentions to the programmer/writer” (48). The text therefore must constantly 
negotiate the relationship between machine and human, or between intentionality and 
intentionlessness (49), understanding that at its core this is a tension between material and 
intention, not a binarism (51). If, as so many critics have ascertained in the past half a century, 
the poststructural conceptions of the author do not account for the materiality of the text, then the 
materiality as manifestation of process in a computer-generated text must open us up to the 
consideration of intention—as my own work has done throughout this project—even where 
intention cannot justly be traced. That is, I can, by relying on collaboration and materiality, read 
the line quoted above—“The writer orbits me. My line (article) has sighed”—as emblematic of 
social and agential experimental authorship, even though clearly the computer did not and cannot 
intend for me to read its cryptic “line (article)” as such. Even in a computer-generated text, 
Emerson maintains, intention must be considered (57). While Emerson and others (including 
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Weaver and Michael Joyce) maintain that issues of paratext will always be more obvious 
markers of interpretation, I would argue that the collaborative nature of the computer-generated 
text signals that these paratextual clues are merely signposts rather than laneways to guide 
interpretation. Because readers understand that Pillage Laud’s intentionality is complicated by 
computer-generation, paratextual notes such as the one that describes the book as “lesbian sex 
poems” should be taken as a suggestion, and one that is at least in part tongue-in-cheek. The 
book is indeed a collection of lesbian sex poems, but it also is distinctly not—while the poems 
use the lexicon of erotic poetry, none of the poems can be adequately or exclusively labelled a 
lesbian sex poem, largely because of the computer’s role in the collaboration. After all, what 
could a computer really say about eros?  
 Reading Pillage Laud as collaboration with a machine means also that I read this text, 
ostensibly, as a collaboration between Mouré and Charles O. Hartman, who created the 
MacProse program used to produce the text. This question is brought up by rob mclennan on his 
blog post reviewing the BookThug reprint of Pillage Laud in 2011. I quote mclennan at length:  
if the computer program was designed by Charles O. Hartman, does this actually 
make the final product, the book-length Pillage Laud, a collaboration between 
Hartman and Moure? And what does this have to do with language, how words 
mean? How does such a work alter the considerations we bring to poetry? I've 
heard arguments that poetry created through such processes … became negated as 
poems for their perceived lack of “authorial intent.” Do we need to know what an 
author was thinking to read a single line, a single poem? I would hardly think so. 
It's not always what made the pieces, but what the pieces, in fact, become that 
matter in the end; how they exist as pieces, how they exist as poems. Despite what 
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some of the language poets might tell you, words can't help but mean, and the 
meanings emerge through how the words are combined. 
Ascribing the same agency to the text itself that Weaver sees in Pillage Laud’s paratext, 
mclennan here suggests that the text means on its own, and that this process of meaning making 
is something the text can’t help but do. While this does seem to support a reading of the text as 
indicating our own passive consumption of language, it doesn’t account for the ways in which 
the text questions who gets to mean and how this meaning can be attributed to a speaking voice. 
There is no language without a speaking voice, even in the indeterminate, experimental text. 
Mouré insists on reminding us of this. In the poem “In Tenebris, or The Gate,” included towards 
the end of the book, she keeps us from relishing the utopian radical potentials of the unegoic text, 
reminding us once and for all that “[t]his is just a copped line from MacProse” (99). But, this is 
not to say that the speaking voice of the text is inherent to, or even exclusively produced by, the 
text. Instead, any speaking voice of any text is necessarily produced by the complex interplay of 
the speaking subject of the text and the reading voice of the audience. All of this is complicated 
by the fact that the “speaking subject of the text” is itself already collaborative, social, and 
constantly in flux.  
 We must thus read both Howe and Mouré as assemblage authors. There are names 
written on the covers of both books to denote an authorial persona, but in both cases these names 
are complicated provocations and misdirections as much as they are statements of fact: Mouré 
writes with the aid of the computer, the MacProse program, and Hartman in direct connection to 
her writing-self; Howe writes with the complex authorship of the original Eikon Basilike and the 
historical and literary figures involved in this authorial mystery in indirect connection to her 
writing-self. They both present an understanding of authorship as, like Bruns wrote of Howe, an 
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authorial self produced by the amalgamation and appropriation of other voices. Rather than 
avoiding or reducing the presence of the authorial self in their texts, Howe and Mouré instead 
radically rethink the role of the feminist experimental poet. They thus open up a space for us to 
locate an agential author in the socially produced text. As DuPlessis urges in her article, a 
postanarchist literary theory acknowledges that it is not enough to simply look at authorship as 
complicated or as minimally egoic. Rather Howe’s Eikon Basilike and Mouré’s Pillage Laud 
afford us the rare opportunity of using the interventionary authorship of these poets to discuss the 
role of a gendered and subjective presence in these experimentally produced texts. They are 
feminist authors, to be sure, but they are also first and foremost social authors writing as 
assemblages and producing texts that invite their readers to similarly insert themselves into the 
social matrix from which each text emerges.  
Language VOL II: Logos and the Feminist Experimental Poet 
Following the discussion of Mouré above, I would like to revisit Eikon Basilike’s 
relationship to subjectivity. I realize at this point that my earlier observations about Howe’s 
complex relationship to subjectivity ignore one important element of this text: that it patently 
refuses to withdraw its subjectivity, its lyric “I,” even as it clearly works to dismantle the 
structures of language and authority that make that lyric subject possible. From the personal/ 
autobiographical anecdote that begins the text to the image of Ariadne’s thread that weaves 
through the text, a speaking subject—a storyteller—is persistent throughout. Of course, Eikon 
Basilike demonstrates a discomfort with the ways that language governs subjectivity. But, what 
is more interesting and more important for postanarchism is that the text also refuses to withdraw 
that subjectivity, not unlike my discussion of Levertov. Howe is not concerned about expressing 
the personal; her refusal to withdraw subjectivity warns against a worldview in which the subject 
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is not understood as a linguistic construct. That is, Howe reinserts the subject into the historical 
text to show that the subject is produced and governed by text, by language. For scholar Uta 
Gossman, this reinsertion of the “I” entails in Eikon Basilike a working-backwards, a kind of 
anarcho-primitivist politic that resists what she sees as language’s increasing ability to govern us 
as subjects. She writes, “[r]eversing the evolution of language also implies going back to a world 
less dissected, analyzed, and categorized by language that the increasing verbalization of culture 
has entailed over time” (105). I would argue, though, that this anti-evolutionary rhetoric 
mischaracterizes Howe’s poetic project in Eikon Basilike. Howe does not want to turn back an 
apparent “verbalization” of society, but rather to force herself into the structures of history and 
authority, both necessarily grounded in language. She thus refuses to be explained away by these 
structures. She emphasizes the subjective activity and experience of constructing a text rather 
than letting textual production dematerialize and pretending that language functions as a natural 
process. It is not enough for Howe to remove herself from Gossman’s “verbalization,” or perhaps 
better, overcoding. In fact, such a tactic would be, in light of the politics latent in Eikon Basilike, 
politically ineffectual or even politically damaging. So, instead, she forces a very personal, very 
real writing-self into the larger structures of the text.  
The best way to think about the problematic of the asserted (and inserted) self in Eikon 
Basilike is through Perloff’s argument that Howe’s work walks a line between a LANGUAGE 
poetics and a more traditional lyric sensibility. Perloff sees the lyric in action in Howe’s work 
despite the fact that Howe’s detractors frequently argue that her “cryptic” writing necessarily 
prevents the expressivity one typically wants from the lyric (“Language Poetry” 426). Howe is 
both concerned with the constructed nature of the LANGUAGE poem and interested in 
interrogating a lyric self, partially, Perloff argues, because she occupies a different position than 
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the heterosexual white men that dominate the LANGUAGE tradition: “Howe’s ‘I’—female, 
maverick, only half New England Blueblood—is much less of an insider, much more self-
conscious about her particular origins” (430). She argues that Howe “rarely speaks in her own 
person … preferring the voice of the chronicler … and the voices of others” (430-1). Thus we 
must understand Howe’s critique of history and authority as one grounded in forcing the 
individual subject back into structures that would be impersonal, in order that her work not give 
way completely to cryptic, apersonal formalism. 
This is the primary concern of Ming-Qian Ma in “Poetry as History Revised,” where she 
reads Perloff as arguing that Howe impinges biography on the lyric consciousness (719). Ma 
expands on Perloff’s arguments, insisting instead that Howe fuses history and fiction together in 
order to expose that divide as artificial (717). For Ma, the absent centre king in Eikon is both 
authority and the origin of meaning. Thus, Ma posits that in writing—though she here is 
referring specifically to another of Howe’s long poems, “Scattering Behaviour Toward Risk”—
the poet has a “perceptional meeting” with literary and recorded history (720), rather than simply 
a chronicling. This is necessarily a feminist position. “History is seen by the poet,” Ma 
continues, “as a series of reoccurring vengeances initiated from patriarchal perspectives and 
inflicted upon a woman not for what she has done but for what she is” (728-9). By collapsing the 
artificial divide between history and fiction, Howe demonstrates a now commonplace 
understanding of history as simply a story that gains credibility through its repetition (729). 
Howe’s work intersects with Derrida in this mistrust of the logocentric truth behind writing (and 
its ability to be conveyed by a writing subject). As Derrida writes in Disseminations, 
The truth of writing, that is, as we shall see, (the) nontruth, cannot be discovered 
in ourselves by ourselves. And it is not the object of a science, only of a history 
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that is recited, a fable that is repeated. The link between writing and myth 
becomes clearer, as does its opposition to knowledge, notably the knowledge one 
seeks in oneself, by oneself. (79-80) 
It follows that rather than attempting to articulate a history that would be somehow external to 
the logocentrism on which the very notion of history is built, Howe’s poetic project is one that 
insists on inserting or reinserting the personal into the narratives of history.  
 Keeping both Perloff’s and Ma’s comments in mind, we must thus read Howe as 
following a poetics similar to that put forth by Charles Bernstein in his verse essay “Artifice of 
Absorption.” Bernstein argues that the primary goal of the LANGUAGE poem is to destroy 
“utilitarian & / essentialist ideas about meaning” (18), which is to say that the LANGUAGE 
poem is not concerned with expressivity or with encoding a meaning that will ultimately be 
decoded by a reader or critic. Rather, the telos of the LANGUAGE poem is “[n]ot to describe or 
incant but to be / the thing described” (25, emph. mine). In this poetics, authorial identity in 
poetry (of which the lyric subject is just one manifestation) must be understood not simply as a 
reflection of monadic identification, but also potentially as a refusal to be absorbed, thus 
functioning as alternative and resistance (20). In Bernstein’s terms, absorption (the refusal of 
artifice, the acceptance of dematerialization of the writing process as the telos of language) 
functions as an ideological state apparatus, and thus the use of artifice or impermeability (29) to 
oppose or resist or refuse this absorption is an ideological or political act (53). In this light, we 
must read Howe’s poetics as literally embodying the lyric subject into the disjointed text, 
employing those elements of a LANGUAGE poetics that she finds salient. What’s more, because 
of Ma’s insistence on the feminine and feminist impetus behind Howe’s insertion of the personal 
into the historical, we must read Eikon Basilike’s almost overwhelming repetition of the lyric “I” 
 262 
as indicative of Howe’s larger feminist project of scepticism towards the eradication of the 
authorial persona. As she famously stated in an interview, which I quote in my introduction, the 
refusal of authorial control is “alluring—but problematic for women writing/reading poems” 
(Guthrie n.p).  
To support all of this theorizing, I would like to look to the many manifestations of the 
first-person pronoun in Eikon Basilike. What I would like to assert here is that despite Howe’s 
tenuous allegiance to LANGUAGE poetry, the lyric “I” is actually not as removed from this text 
as I may have suggested earlier. In fact, “I” is everywhere: the lyric “I” appears on nearly every 
page of the text, most often in statements of identity or intent. For example, a set of mirrored 
pages include “I” twice each: “that I hide” and “I am weary of life” (56-7). They also contain the 
exclamatory “O make me / of Joy.”  Other appearances of the “I” are as follows: “I go from a 
corruptible to an incorruptible Crown” (59); “Side of space I must cross” (61); “I am a seeker” 
(twice) and “Tell you my author / I knew his hand” (64); “Saying so I name nobody” (66); “I am 
afraid of him [Milton]” (71); and both “I saw madness of the world” and “I feared the fall of my 
child” (74). Strikingly, these examples both suggest intent or identity as well as an absence, a 
negativity, or an instability. For every “I” that speaks there is a “nobody,” a “seeker,” a “space” 
that must be “crossed.” The personal pronoun also appears a number of times in the lengthy 
references to Charles Dickens’s David Copperfield towards the text’s end: first, “I Become 
Friendly with Mr. Dick” (77), and then the “I” appears ten times in the Dickens quotation on 
page eighty-one. Here the authorial representation of the lyric subject is thwarted by the allusion, 
effectively adding another voice to the collaborative authorship of the text.   
“I” also appears in various other, non-signifying, instances throughout the text; if I am to 
insist on the visual and material importance of textual disruptions, I must similarly read these 
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appearances of the shape of the “I” as gestures toward an imposingly asserted subjectivity. Some 
of these are as simple as the seemingly random appearance of “Brazen Wall I” (54), a clear 
image of artifice. Some are admittedly stretches in my own reading practice, as in “1 blank leaf” 
(68), an example that, for me, almost immediately recalls E. E. Cummings’s poem that meditates 
on the 1/I, and the dual-meanings of “leaf,” “l(a.” The most important of these examples is the 
letter “I” that appears over and over again in the text in “Charles I,” whose designation provides 
Howe with the ability to repeatedly insert a subjectivity into the text without relying too heavily 
on the presence of a lyric subject. On page eighty, the link between this king, the process of 
writing and producing bibliographies, as well as the construction of history, are all brought to the 
fore in the imposingly capitalized lines: “K CHARL | WORKS | VOL I / K CHARLE | WORKS 
| VOL II.” With both the use of the capitalized “I” and the vertical bar—which is used in 
programming to denote the logical term “or”—the presence of the subject punctuates the 
incomplete names and volumes. Rather than refusing subjectivity, as I might have argued earlier, 
it seems that Eikon Basilike obsessively inserts the “I” into a history made porous and unstable 
through language. The result is the production of a poetic subject that bridges the gap between 
the impersonality of these larger structures of history and the fiction of the closed subject and 
his/her expression in the lyric.  
 Mouré’s poetry, much like Howe’s, is primarily concerned with confronting the 
structures that govern our use of language. Extending the postanarchist desire to engage with and 
confront these structures rather than ignoring or attempting to dismantle them entirely, Mouré’s 
work uses translation, nonlinearity, and, in the case of Pillage Laud, indeterminacy, to direct 
attention to the ways in which our ability to communicate is limited by the structures of linguistic 
and textual production. As she discusses in her brief poetics piece with Caroline Bergvall, “O 
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Yes,” Mouré’s poetry has long been concerned with confronting these historically oppressive 
structures, arguing that effective political poetry must “unpack the ghosts of the past” (171). 
Though she is often dismissed by readers as too cerebral or academic in her work, Mouré’s 
career has been driven both by the affective force of her poetry and by her philosophical and 
theoretical interest in politics. In her published correspondence with fellow Canadian poet 
Bronwen Wallace, Two Women Talking: Correspondence 1985-87, the two address this issue 
head-on in a heated exchange that comes to a boiling point over the role of critical theory in the 
production of poetry. Mouré laments the “hierarchization of theory and the creative act” (29), 
requiring that the new feminist poetic must be interested in both creativity and theory equally. 
This merging of political philosophy and poetics interests me most and positions Mouré as 
perhaps the most effective feminist poet in this project. 
 In Two Women Talking, Mouré insists that feminist poetics must not limit itself to its 
earlier concerns of maternal figures, embodiment, mythology, and reclamation, as these tactics 
seemed to only reinforce the typical relegation of the feminine in literature. Instead, the feminist 
poet for Mouré, as my discussions of postanarchism also prioritize, must draw attention to the 
fractures in the existing structures. S/he must “writ[e] out of the dislocation of speaking from 
negative space, non-space” (20, emph. Mouré’s), which Mouré posits as a facet of 
deconstruction. Mouré’s understanding of deconstruction is at once a gross oversimplification 
and an excellent way of focusing the frequently obtuse literary theory for effective feminist 
gains. She writes to Wallace saying: “The term deconstructionist theory just means to me that we 
have to question the structure/systems/origins of our own media as we are engaged in using 
them” (39). What follows is a close look at the ways in which Pillage Laud works to turn the 
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gaze back onto these structures/systems/origins, writing in excess of them and at times 
transgressing them.  
 In much of Mouré’s work, these structures are manifest in the theoretical concept of the 
archive as discussed by Derrida in Archive Fever. For Derrida, the archive, from arkhē (or first 
thing), is concerned with both “the commencement and the commandment” (1). It is “the 
principle according to the law, there where men and gods command, there where authority, 
social order are exercised, in this place from which order is given” (1). Inscription, the process 
of archivisation, is “what permits one to justify the distinction between memory and archive” 
(27), and thus the radical potentials of memory permit deviation from archive, the control of 
which is central to political power. After all, as Derrida states plainly, “[t]here is no political 
power without control of the archive, if not memory” (5). The archive is the underpinning of 
social order, of power exerted over subjectivities. Reading Mouré against the archive is not an 
entirely unique practice. Isabel A. Moore, in her article “Lyric Fever: Erin Mouré and the Queer 
Anatomy of the Lyric Body,” translates Derrida’s “archive fever,” the reactionary fear of the 
disruption of archival knowledge, into a “lyric fever,” which justifies the critical discomfort with 
Mouré’s queering of text and authorship. Moore argues that Mouré refuses the binaries of poetry 
versus philosophy, or LANGUAGE poetry versus lyric poetry (37), which set the stage for many 
of the negative reviews of her work.9 These critical responses, she argues, demonstrate a fear that 
the lyric subject has already given way to the poststructuralist and LANGUAGE destabilizations 
                                                
9 Moore details the reviews of Mouré’s work that consider the poet too interested in philosophy and theory. She 
quotes one review, for example, as saying that one of Mouré’s collections, Little Theatres, was more interested in a 
statement of philosophical poetics than in poetry itself. The reviewer, Moore writes, “wished she ‘would check her 
poetics at the door when publishing her poetry’ [as it was] too often ‘inf(l)ected’ … by political philosophy” (37). 
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of it (39). Thus, a “lyric fever” serves as a kind of spectral subject surrounding Mouré’s work 
(51), confronting the reader with manifestations and dissolutions of the lyric subject throughout.  
Mouré doesn’t look to destroy the archive, but rather to draw attention to the ways in 
which archival knowledge and its production of subjectivities governs our lives. In line with this, 
Weaver suggests that she produces a sub-archive. He works from Foucault’s elaborations of the 
archive, positing that Pillage Laud exposes the archive as nonuniversal, and thus unnatural (296). 
Following this, Weaver argues that Mouré’s work in Pillage Laud produces a “sub-archive” in 
which new understandings of the archive of language are presented. “The point of the sub-
archive,” he writes, “is to draw attention to the authorial relationship to the archive of language 
and to modify, not destroy, that relationship” (298). Pillage Laud, more overtly than the other 
feminist poets in this project, draws attention to the typically complicit nature of traditional 
authorship in the archive of language. The text, as its introductory note tells us, “selects from 
pages of computer-generated sentences to produce lesbian sex poems, by pulling through certain 
found vocabularies” (n.p.). The jacket blurb of BookThug’s reprint details the particularities of 
its production; it uses “MacProse, freeware designed by American poet Charles O. Hartman as a 
generator of random sentences based on syntax and lexicon internal to the program” (n.p.).  
By positioning the production of the text as a collaboration between poet and computer, 
Mouré’s text must be read as grappling with memory, as Derrida describes it, and as she herself 
describes it in her essay, “Poetry, Memory and the Polis,” collected in Language in Her Eye. For 
Mouré, memory in poetry is not dependent on semantics or on textual meaning; instead, she 
argues that it finds its manifestation in “[t]he sound of words” (201). And yet, because its very 
inscription draws attention to the archive, to the way that memory is archived, Mouré 
acknowledges that the poem is not and cannot function outside of the archive. Instead, she 
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suggests that “[p]oetry, I think, is the structuration … of memory that can undo the Law of the 
City, because it both precedes and transgresses the Law” (202). It is integral here that she says 
“transgresses” and not “avoids”; the fact that memory is external to, or precedes, the Law as 
archive does not mean that it can function without it. Poetry should seek not necessarily, or not 
only, to “break [the Law] down” but to “peel it back and reveal its brokenness, the non-congruity 
behind it” (204). In essence, Pillage Laud is a text of memory, which seeks to destabilize the 
archive and to draw attention to the ways in which the ephemerality and flux of memory is 
structured by the archives of language. Memory is—like the aural that Bernstein describes as 
preceding the oral, which I discuss in my previous chapter—that which precedes the 
structuration of graphism. In the aurality of memory, Mouré sees the radical potential of poetry 
to use sound, itself ephemeral to some degree, to complicate and transgress the Laws of logos. 
She neither ignores nor refuses the larger structures of the logos, but rather looks to the fissures 
in language that poetry can make obvious to help to transgress these otherwise limiting 
structures.  
One of the ways that Pillage Laud does this is through retaining the traditional structures 
of language (grammar, syntax, spelling) while disrupting others (meaning, sense, logic). While 
this decision has led some readers to dismiss this text as merely reifying language rather than 
interrogating it,10 I would like to argue that Mouré works through these structures to expose 
them, to peel them back revealing the archive behind the curtain. Like Howe, Mouré presents the 
reader with images of literal archives (libraries, dictionaries, museums, and so on) that are forced 
in the indeterminacy of this text to confront their own boundaries. Like Howe’s speaker sleeping 
                                                
10 In Weaver’s dissertation, for example, he argues that Mouré retains the aesthetics of Language poetry without the 
politics. In Mouré’s eschewing of the New Sentence in favour of more traditional syntax, Weaver sees her work as 
politically ineffectual, presenting the images of radical politics uncritically and thus unpolitically (293). 
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in the library (an image I will discuss more thoroughly later), Mouré’s computer-generated 
speaker forces the warmth of the body and the pleasure of tactility into the cold stacks: “After 
she rolled, libraries were your virtues” (50); “Certain libraries swelled the companion’s brevity” 
(38); “The library should observe the empire of respect, the / vertebrate of custom” (61); “so 
texture a library was” (36). In other moments, the library is positioned as a site of displeasure: 
“Certain theorems are the libraries of bitterness” (14). On occasion, the library is characterized as 
a site of illumination. On page seventeen the speaker observes “so / tremendous a library spent 
light”; on page sixty-nine, the speaker notes “a brilliant library.” At first I was tempted to read 
these examples as Mouré’s presentation of the library as a site of radical knowledge; these 
images of illumination seemed to be positive and potentially helpful. But, upon further analysis, 
it would seem that the concept of a library as luminescent and bestowing its light (“spen[ding]” 
it) is much more in line with an Aristotelian view of literature’s ability to illuminate the reader to 
the reality of the universe. Just as M. H. Abrams aligned this Aristotelian view with a lamp, 
Mouré aligns the library with luminescence, the ability to direct its readers to a clearly-viewed, 
and ultimately clearly-archived, reality. These positive metaphors thus serve as the misleading or 
seductive properties of the library, a place that purports to be about freedom and creative 
discovery but instead serves as an archive that would seek to limit and delimit live memory and 
the radical potentials of a freedom to make rhizomatic connections. It may dismay some readers 
that Mouré paints the library in such a negative fashion; the texts themselves are not the problem, 
but rather their organization in the library as archive is what poses the problem. Even this can be 
disrupted by the presence of the body and its radical possibilities in that space.  
Even more denigrated than the library, the dictionary is represented in Pillage Laud as a 
site of violence and oppression in which the speaker (with apparent exasperation) questions, 
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“What may the dictionary insist?” (19). The dictionary is represented, in one case, through the 
violent imagery of bondage and electricity: “the model of rope—voltage—is her dictionary” 
(25). In another, the dictionary occupies the position of authority: “A dictionary especially rules” 
(26). The dictionary is also presented as a set of rules that seeks to include and envelop more and 
more. The speaker bemoans: “Why does every dictionary extend?” (57). The dictionary requires 
not grammar and syntax, but rather sense, logic, and limited definition, the structures of language 
that Mouré finds most destructive and most in need of disruption. The image of the museum 
meets a similar fate, where its confrontation with the body initiates its destruction. Mouré’s 
speaker observes, for example: “While you drank me, museums vanished” (33). Even the light of 
the library proves ineffectual in the museum, whose primary concern is reification and 
inscription. The text asks, “Would the ray leave the museum of flesh?” (70), and receives no 
answer. Even the figure of the archive seems to fail here. The text, mocking the dismantled 
dictionary, provides its readers with a new definition of the term: “An archive: space, its 
vagabond between those roots and those / imitations” (68). This archive is empty (or emptied) 
and destabilized. Its former position of stability and uniformity (“those roots”) and its desire for 
mimesis, for representational linguistic sense (“those / imitations”) has been replaced by a 
nomadic condition (“its vagabond”). It occupies a liminal “between” rather than a binary of 
logic. Mouré, as one node in the complex authorship of Pillage Laud, guides her readers through 
the non-space of vanished museums. In Pillage Laud we are not without archive; we are with the 
new archive. Mouré as both reader and writer of this text repositions this discussion. She boasts: 
“I am your historian” (92). 
In the end, Mouré transgresses the archive by writing in excess of it. And excess is a term 
that must be usefully integrated into any critical discussion of Mouré’s work as a whole. The 
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concept of Mouré’s excess has been best analyzed by Susan Rudy in “‘what can atmosphere with 
/ vocabularies delight’: Excessively Reading Erin Mouré.” Here, Rudy argues that excess is a 
trademark of Mouré’s work, in terms of both form and content. She characterizes this “excess” 
as follows: Mouré “writes in excess of signification; refuses conventional word order and usage; 
redeploys grammar, punctuation, syntax, and spelling” (205). This excessive signification—
which refuses to be fully inscribed by the archive, to be placed among the library stacks or under 
the museum glass—exposes the ways in which the archive limits our potential uses of language. 
Rudy sees in Mouré that the “relations between words is endlessly shifting” (210), and that this 
ultimately “generat[es] an excess of meaning” (211). I will dwell on these excesses throughout 
the remainder of this chapter; in them I hope to demonstrate the ways in which poetry can 
function as a temporary autonomous zone without ever suggesting the utopian dissolution of the 
structures in which it operates. In her excess, Mouré’s poetic project again works in a similar 
fashion to Howe’s, whose insertion of the fluctuating and ephemeral individual or personal into 
the larger structures of history and language can be read as similarly excessive. Both authors, by 
pointing to the fissures and discontinuities of these larger structures of the logos, demonstrate 
that a primary concern of the experimental feminist poet must be to generate these excesses of 
meaning. Both authors thus refuse to be fully categorized by the archive, offering instead a 
multiple and shifting “I” that moves deftly throughout the stacks of the library. Their new 
archive is that of the poem, the structuration of live memory that transgresses as it speaks.  
Texts that Stain You: Affectively Reading in Common 
As I have asserted throughout my project, any discussion of the role of the reader in a text 
is first and foremost a discussion of the role of the author and how s/he must be destabilized in 
order to leave room for a readership. I have shown that this discussion has clear roots in 
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poststructuralist literary theory—namely in the seminal discussions of authorship by Foucault 
and Barthes—and its denigration (or death-sentence) of the Author, a regicide in and of itself. In 
her analysis of Susan Howe in “Language Poetry and the Lyric Subject,” Perloff also 
foregrounds the discussions by Barthes and Foucault on authorship (407). In this essay, she 
argues that Barthes’s privileging of the reader—that is, the birth of the reader as a result of the 
death of the author—ultimately leads to a critical ventriloquism (411); the critic speaks as though 
s/he is an authority him or herself. This dominating critical discourse is, for Perloff as for myself, 
a step in the wrong direction. It simply reproduces a new (and in some ways more pervasive) 
Author-God or Author-King: the academy, the bibliography, the archive. Part of my project is to 
resist this critical ventriloquism. Eikon Basilike provides me with an effective means to discuss 
the ways scholarship can approach literature that resists reproducing or ventriloquizing the 
authority of the Author.  
In this task, I am not alone. In fact, some of the critics that I have already discussed in 
this project have talked about how Howe’s work encourages us as readers to avoid this 
ventriloquism. They do this largely through a discussion of the ways in which Eikon Basilike 
works to engage readers on an active, affective level rather than encouraging the critical distance 
of a scholar who deciphers and decodes as he or she interprets a text. Dworkin, for example, 
argues that Howe’s non-grid writings “confound a reader’s expectations by eliminating the very 
direction axes on which those conventions are based” (32). Confronted with the task of reading 
without the traditional axes of conventional exegetical interpretation, Dworkin sees Howe’s 
reader as forced to engage with the form of the text in new and active ways. Bloomfield, too, 
argues that the visual disruption of the text encourages the physical engagement of the reader 
(417), especially through the literal need for the text to be physically manipulated—for example, 
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to be turned on its side or upside down—in order to be read. Brian Reed, in his essay “‘Eden or 
Ebb of the Sea’: Susan Howe's Word Squares and Postlinear Poetics,” also notes that Howe’s 
form encourages a new form of active reader engagement. While he does not discuss Eikon 
Basilike in particular, his arguments remain important. He writes that Howe “gives us language 
so stripped down, so denuded of syntax that a reader could essay it in any direction—
horizontally, vertically, diagonally, or at random—without finding a path capable of arranging 
the word-nuggets into a coherent picture or narrative” (par. 13). All three of these critics argue 
that Howe engages with her readers in what I would like to call an invitational, rather than an 
expressive way, which is nonconventional to say the least. She thus invites the reader into a 
collective (a common) with the text, effectively rendering traditional scholarship and its 
concomitant ventriloquism ineffectual. To avoid this ventriloquism I read Eikon Basilike as an 
anarchist text for and by a popular and populist audience that invites its readers into an 
egalitarian, affective community.  
There have been some attempts to extend this kind of affinitive rather than 
ventriloquizing scholarship, and some imply (though never directly engage with) the invitational 
elements I discuss. Norman Finkelstein’s reading of Eikon Basilike as séance in “‘MAKING 
THE GHOST WALK ABOUT AGAIN AND AGAIN’: History as Séance in the Work of Susan 
Howe,” for example, demonstrates the long poem’s capacity to include its readers in its 
processes of reading and writing. For Finkelstein, “the reader of Howe’s Bibliography is both 
witness to and participant in this frightening ‘eccentricity’” (230). By staging the text as a séance 
in which the ghosts of authority are simultaneously summoned and banished, Howe “exposes her 
readers to her daemon, which we discover to be our own” (233). Similarly, Miriam Marty Clark, 
in “The Library and the Wilderness: Susan Howe’s Pragmatism,” argues that Howe includes her 
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readers in a continuum of authors and texts that transforms the typically sterile atmosphere of the 
library, the site of bibliography and scholarship, into an anarchic wild. She writes that 
In these recurrent figures—of the reader and the scholar as library cormorants, of 
thinking as telepathy, of prior voices as ghosts and vampires, of the library as 
wilderness—Howe establishes continuity between the singularity of texts and the 
ubiquity of information, between the materiality and temporality of the printed 
word and the virtuality and simultaneity of information. (380) 
Clark is not discussing Eikon Basilike specifically, but we nonetheless find examples throughout 
the text of an attempt to forge affect and ephemerality out of the preserving and stultifying 
tendencies of archivization (in libraries, museums, etc), an act that should recall my analyses of 
Mullen on the subject of preservation and ephemerality. For example, trading in cold logic for 
warm affect, Howe juxtaposes the “[d]riest facts / of bibliography” (64) with “[t]his word 
Remember” (65). Appearing in the most lyric, readerly segments of Eikon Basilike, these 
opposing sides set a tone of searching the archive for bibliographical information, but finding 
instead the unquantifiable values of emotion, affect, and, surprisingly enough, security. Toward 
the poem’s end, Howe gives up searching for an “original text” (47) that her introduction already 
told us could not exist, writing instead “I am at home in the library / I will lie down to sleep” 
(75). Recalling Clark, Howe here transforms the dry, sterile space of the archive into a home 
filled with comfort and security by virtue of its misuse.  
 Rendering the library a home for the already complicated lyric subject, Howe constructs a 
vision of texts as singularities within the multiplicitous continuum of textual discourse, and in 
this way she encourages us to read Eikon Basilike as populist in nature, and anarchist in its 
assertions of the radical potentials of the people. One aspect of this populist reading is the 
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secretive and difficult ways in which the text encodes its stories. For Rachel Tzvia Back, much 
of the text is “encoded” as a way to communicate to the reader while trying to remain hidden 
from the omnipresent eye of an elusive and invasive government. She writes, for example, that 
“[t]he unconventional spellings and word placements of the epigraph poem may also be read as a 
type of encoding, particularly as the motif of clandestine messages is a central thematic and form 
thread of the Eikon” (133). For Back, the rationale for this encoding is linked to the discussions 
of textual violence that permeate Howe scholarship: 
The reason for the encoding, I believe, is not only to evoke the historical reality 
and dangers surrounding the captive king, but to hint at the dangers (of hostility, 
of erasure, of misrepresentation) waiting for any writer choosing a mode of 
literary expression that fails to conform to expectations and conventions. (133) 
It is important that this encoding, as palimpsestic overwriting, also “produces the additional and 
no less significant effect of simultaneity of voices—and of tales—speaking at once, cutting into 
each other and being, visually and aurally—as well as thematically—at cross-purposes” (139). 
Gesturing towards the popular, to the people outside of or external to governing authority, Eikon 
Basilike must be read as an invitation for the common, for the individual to read an encoded 
message written in the hidden language of communality, a code that cannot, by its very nature, 
be decoded.  
Of course, the book that is this poem’s namesake was also a book “of the people.” As 
Howe notes in her introduction,  “[o]n the day of the execution The Eikon Basilike, The 
Pourtraicture of His Sacred Majestie in his Solitude and Sufferings, was published and widely 
distributed throughout England, despite the best efforts of government censors to get rid of it” 
(47). In the name of these state-sanctioned efforts, “[p]rinters of the Eikon Basilike were hunted 
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down and imprisoned. But in spite of many obstacles the little book was set in type again and 
again. During 1649 fresh editions appeared almost daily and sold out at once” (47). Thus, the 
Eikon Basilike in its “original,” whatever text that might be, is itself a symbol of the proliferation 
of the common even under the strict eye of a supposedly anti-monarchical government. The 
rapidly reproduced and constantly fluctuating “original” of the Eikon Basilike serves, despite its 
claiming of royal lineage, as an antiauthoritarian, antigovernmental symbol that refuses the 
closed structures of the library and its requirements of an Author in favour of the immateriality 
of the common.11 As Howe herself writes, “the material object has become immaterial” (50). The 
text embodies a resistance to the bibliography and the archive, an anarchist pamphlet that invites 
its readers to sleep in the library beside it. It is thus unsurprising, though no less important, that 
in the very center of the previously discussed mirrored pages, Howe includes as the centre, “The 
People / Contemporary History” (56/7).  
And yet, as Weaver’s comments to me indicate, while the original The Eikon Basilike 
was indeed a “people’s book” circulated against state regulation among the greater population, it 
was also a book meant to celebrate—and indeed to deify—a monarch, and to encourage the 
return of monarchical rule to England, a return that came and has, in many ways, continued. We 
cannot read the text as purely anti-governmental if it is ultimately a text that supports the Divine 
Right of Kings and the reinstitution of a clearly problematic monarchical rule. Instead, the voice 
of the king is presented rather than beheaded in Howe’s text, and the result is not reification but 
                                                
11 Comment by Andy Weaver (23/4/14): “I wonder if there’s more to make of the content of the Eikon Basilike and 
Howe’s choice to deal with that book—specifically, when you say ‘The rapidly reproduced and constantly 
fluctuating ‘original’ of the Eikon Basilike serves, despite its claiming of royal lineage, as an antiauthoritarian, 
antigovernmental symbol that refuses the closed structures of library and its requirements of an Author in favour of 
the immateriality of the common,’ I’d agree—but, I’m not so sure it’s only that going on. After all, the Eikon 
Basilike itself, regardless of its being a ‘people’s book,’ as you say, was also a book specifically designed to 
celebrate a monarch and to bring about a return to monarchy. I guess what I’m wondering is, does Howe, through 
her choice of generant/allusive text, promote (or disclose?) a more fraught relationship between centralized and 
decentralized power?” 
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rather the addition of the king’s voice into the irreducibility of the common. The king’s voice 
does not speak for or (worse) to the people, but rather as a part of the people in Howe’s Eikon 
Basilike. It is included into the communal narrative, added, just like Howe as the beheaded-
Author-King, as just another subjectivity in the social authorship of the text’s production. Read 
in the most extreme way, Howe’s text does not support a monarchy despite the fact that her 
generant text did: she includes the ghost of a king as one reader; she includes herself as another; 
and, she makes all readers authors.  
Similarly, Mouré works in Pillage Laud to make her readership a part of the vast social 
authorship of the text. In the aforementioned DuPlessis article, she argues that the reader of 
Pillage Laud performs the text, and that the reader is thus a writer as well, but only insofar as the 
author/ writer herself is considered to be just one subjectivity in the multiplicity of textual 
production (989). Rudy’s reading of Mouré’s work places particular attention on the ways in 
which the complication of authorship produces what she terms a “communal narrative” (212). 
Even Mouré herself, in her collaborative essay with Caroline Bergvall, insists that all of reading 
(of her own work or otherwise), is “inherently a practice of exchange, or responsiveness” arguing 
in the exact phrasing of Duncan that it is “radically communal” (170). Later, recalling 
DuPlessis’s arguments about textual performance, Mouré and Bergvall position the reading of 
poetry in particular as a kind of “enactment” (175). Certainly a text like Pillage Laud, with its 
explicit confrontation of individualized authorship via computer collaboration, opens itself to 
new and various forms of reading processes. The process of the text’s production signposts the 
intentional fallacy better than perhaps any of the other experimental texts in this project; Mouré’s 
level of engagement in the process of computer generation is unclear at best. And yet, I must also 
point out that she does guide the reading process in ways that other indeterminate texts in my 
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project do not. For example, Mouré’s designation of Pillage Laud as a book of “lesbian sex 
poems” guides readers into exegetical territory in a way that, for example, Mac Low’s Stein 
Poems do not. By ascribing a way of reading the content of the poems, Mouré engages with her 
readers in a way that moves beyond a description of process. Pillage Laud develops a poetics of 
indeterminacy that directly addresses a communal readership rather than expressing a disinterest 
in the ways in which the text would or could be read.  
For some readers, this gesture towards content without the delivery of narrative is 
misleading, a red herring that tells readers what they will find in the text, and subsequently 
ensures that the readers cannot and do not find what was promised. For Weaver, this authorial 
guidance is actually the imposition of a limitation on the reader in that the text gestures towards 
narrative without also including the potential release of selfhood in the form of narrative suture. 
Weaver suggests that Mouré’s designation of Pillage Laud as a book of lesbian sex poems 
imposes an interpretation in a way that Cage and Duncan do not (270). Instead, the text functions 
in a rather traditional fashion. Weaver argues that “the reader can make sense of these sentences, 
since the text does not call signification into question” (279). Certainly, the poems draw attention 
to deviations in diction and sense, but not to meaning-making itself. The words may take on 
strange new uses, but the “referents are hardly ever missing” (291). The text simultaneously 
invites traditional readership and distances itself from it, and for Weaver this is the crux of the 
text’s limitations. That is, the reader is thus limited in his/ her ability to lose him/ herself in the 
text; maintaining traditional grammar without traditional narrative ultimately provides no 
narrative suture, and thus no destabilization of the reader’s self (280). What I would like to argue 
here is that the core of Mouré’s destabilization of authorship is precisely in this disconnect 
between grammar and narrative. In its cyborg authorship—its merger of human and computer—
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Pillage Laud approximates sense without delivering. It enacts a narrative suture without 
delivering and relies on the (very human) reader to fill in those gaps. As the text itself boasts, “Its 
suture presence (ventricle) was skin” (38). Essentially, Weaver charges the text with traditional 
narrative and authorial limits on the text because its sentences do not question meaning-making 
or signification. What I would argue instead is that Mouré’s retention of traditional grammar and 
the guise of narrative (even in the form of these paratextual clues) demonstrate the radical 
potentials of the language we already have rather than requiring the invention of entirely new 
modes of communication. Therein lies its greatest efficacy.12  
I would like to talk for a moment about this textual merging of technology and “skin,” or 
humanity, positioning Pillage Laud as a cyborg book produced out of confrontation between the 
two forms. For Lori Emerson, the fundamental difference between the computer-generated poem 
and the more traditionally (read: humanly) produced text is that a cyborg authorship requires that 
criticism focus on the reader rather than either producer or object (47). The computer-generated 
poem, for Emerson, does not kill the author or render him/ her unimportant. Rather, it suggests 
that the author is just one meaning-producer along with (and equally weighted as) the reader or 
                                                
12 Editorial comment by Art Redding (14/1/15): “As I understand it, Andy claims that the writing is overly formalist, 
sterile, stiff, and that that, consequently, cripples its political potential. You disagree, and try to demonstrate why 
with your readings.  OK, fine. BUT:  what would be the criteria by which either of you could be proven right or 
wrong? There is none, outside of your two readings, right? That is, as you read, Mouré proves politically viable; as 
Andy reads, she doesn’t.  This suggests that the political efficacy of the work can only be assessed as it is actualized 
by readings, audience, public, the commons, as it enters into circulation. Make sense?  Where both of you have erred 
(sorry guys) is in trying to find political viability within the language of the poem itself. But it ain’t there. The 
politics might be there, intrinsic to the poem, but not the political efficacy. … [F]or Andy, this avant-gardism is, 
paradoxically, precisely the problem—it boils down to sterile formalism. For Dani, results in a joyous, vital anarcho-
feminism. How am I to decide? If you are both right (I think you both are), then you must both be wrong, 
methodologically.” 
 
Addendum: I retain Art’s wording here because I think he both gets at the heart of the revolutionary potentials I see 
in Mouré’s work, as well as how the hermeneutics of even the most careful scholarship compromises those 
potentials. Andy and I are, of course, both wrong in asserting that the politics of the text lie in its enunciations 
exclusively. As my earlier work on Mac Low attests, the political efficacy of any work can only be observed in its 
“performance” by the reader.  
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the text itself, and that this is made especially apparent in the computer-generated text (55). The 
technology involved—MacProse, in this case—is further a fourth term in this collaborative 
meaning-making. Author Michael Joyce, a pioneer in digital texts, and hypertext in particular, 
suggests in a very early article in Postmodern Culture that the hypertextual or digital text13 
requires that new and important emphasis be placed on the reader’s role in producing the 
meaning of the technologically entwined work. Joyce, whose hypertext novel, afternoon, a story 
(1990), is widely considered to be the first of its kind, suggests that the digitally produced text is, 
at the time when he was writing, necessarily exploratory, and thus requires a kind of exploratory 
reading. “This kind of reading of an exploratory hypertext,” he writes, “is what we might call 
empowered interaction. The transitional electronic text makes an uneasy marriage with its reader. 
It says: you may do these things, including some I have not anticipated” (par. 18). Even more 
bold than Emerson, Joyce contends that “[i]t is to an extent true that neither the author’s 
representations nor the initial topography but instead the reader’s choices constitute the current 
state of the text for her” (par. 19). The exploratory digital text, in this way, invites its readers to 
confront their role in the production of textual meaning.  
First published in 1999, when digital poetry and technologically produced poetry was still 
relatively new and avant-garde, Pillage Laud is certainly exploratory. This is probably most 
                                                
13 Comment by Andy Weaver (3/6/14): “Your turn to Michael Joyce is interesting, but I don’t find it as 
compelling—for one specific reason: Pillage Laud isn’t a digital text. I think that distinction needs to be made 
clearly and directly, and then perhaps you can work to adapt Joyce’s points.” 
 
Response (4/6/14): “Oh but I firmly believe that (despite its print material) that Pillage Laud is indeed a digital text, 
or perhaps more appropriately a text of electronic literature. I should then spend some more time discussing what 
that means for me. It’s a highly contested definition, but I think at this point I’ve read enough that I can substantiate 
the inclusion of Pillage Laud in a digital discourse.” 
 
Response by Andy Weaver (5/6/14): “O, good—we might get to have an intellectual fist fight over whether or not 
PL is an electronic text (actually, probably not—your clarification and change in terminology to ‘text of electronic 
literature’ seems reasonable … but you should still define what you mean by that).”  
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evident in the ways that the text makes explicit its invitations for the reader to engage in the 
production of both meaning and, through metaphors, the text itself. “I may move me,” the 
poem’s speaker suggests, “but each of you longs14 to rule” (33). A few lines later, “each of you” 
is afforded even more agency in this process: “You appear to type” (33). Elsewhere, the text 
suggests that the reader is directly engaged in the “events” that are, in some form or another, 
“described” in the text. For example, amidst highly erotic discussions of the feminine body, a 
jarring line reads, “The audience snaps her form” (66). Later, we appear to be addressed as 
readers who occupy a position more valuable, even, than the speaker: “Dear one, I am the title, 
and you are the heights” (88). Authorship, in this line, is represented as authoritative in title only, 
quite literally. And, Mouré’s choice to include her name—in the BookThug reprint as Erín 
Moure—in quotation marks on the first edition’s cover seems to corroborate this line. We as 
readers are “the heights,” a suggestion of physical power that moves well beyond the name.  
Additionally, the speaker questions not only the presence of an audience (a feature not 
uncommon even in lyric poetry), but also the function of the text itself. The speaker asks, for 
example: “Whom had the fresh poem mattered to?” (51); “Had we read?” (71); “to whom is this 
speaking machine hastening?” (91). The text is positioned as a “speaking machine,” a cyborg 
text that continues its speech as though it is a clearly-defined speaking subject communicating 
directly to a comprehending audience. In the text’s final poem, “to exist is reading,” the question 
                                                
14 Comment by Andy Weaver (3/6/14): “You misquote (shame! shame!) the poem in your discussion of page 33: the 
quotation should be ‘I may move me, but each of you longs to rule’ (which would seem to support your point more 
strongly). And a thought about the second quotation you mention on p33: does it alter your interpretation if I read 
‘You appear to type’ not only as a suggestion that the reader ‘creates’ the poem but also as a statement that ‘you’ 
(whoever that may be) appear (as in ‘come into being’ or ‘enter my perception’) according to pre-established 
types?” 
 
Response (4/6/14): “Ah crap. I must have blended those two quotations in my head. But I absolutely love your 
suggestion of an additional element of that reading. You appear to type also suggests a reversal of the traditional 
reader gaze; you are made visible to the text, so the text gazes upon you (returns that gaze). Fascinating and 
beautiful.” 
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of readership and its relationship to the “speaking machine” is brought to the fore. The poem 
seems to meditate on the pages that preceded it, asking: “So mechanical a suggestion—how has 
everyone replied?” (103), and later, “Whom don’t the readers produce?” (104). In the end, the 
poem questions, in the event of the production of a text, whether it is even possible to imagine a 
text without a readership, an audience. It asks, “When to exist is reading, can listener stop?” 
(106), suggesting that a readership is produced at the same time as the text itself. This conception 
of readership as always already existing is where this “radically communal” element of reading 
is most clearly located. It is a place where the reader is free to enter, and thus to develop an 
ethical relationship in reading to both other readers and to the author. The text addresses not a 
potential audience but rather a very real audience. The “Erí(i)n Moure(é)” that authors Pillage 
Laud is thus presented as a first reader or, perhaps more appropriately, a microcosmic reader 
who functions as an audience synecdoche. “Moure(é)” figures her real audience into her work by 
simultaneously relating to and imagining into being, especially in this last poem, the vast 
multiplicity of her real, macrocosmic audience.  
Pillage Laud’s common is one in which we must recognize our affective connections 
with various subjectivities—including the machines—involved in textual production. The text 
seems to recognize the extremely affective relationship between the enactment of the text and its 
production, explicitly stating at one point that “To read was an affection” (91). At the end of the 
book the speaker directly addresses this concern, writing “Those texts stain you. / / You are some 
audience; / you expect affections” (102). The discomfort, the “stain,” brought on by the 
expectation of affect and the actual reception of the non-narrative, non-suturing, computer-
generated text, produces the audience. This discomfort is especially productive, a kind of poetic 
terrorism that encourages political engagement in a way that other texts (even in their extreme 
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indeterminacy and nonsense) seemingly cannot. Howe’s text, in its radical rethinking of 
monarchy through its inclusion of the ghost-king into the reader common, produces a similar 
discomfort. As the readers are invited to insert themselves, their live memory, into the “[d]riest 
facts / of bibliography” (64), they are invited into the same affective common that Mouré’s text 
invites. Ultimately, both Eikon Basilike and Pillage Laud produce slightly different reader 
commons, though ones that are both built on affect and in the dismantling of larger, unemotional 
structures. If this affective common produces discomfort, it is all the more effective for it. After 
all, libraries aren’t meant to be comfortable spaces for sleep.   
Hauntological Spectres 
 I am particularly interested in the persistent images of ghosts, spectres, and hauntings 
throughout Howe’s work, and in Eikon Basilike in particular. Reading through the criticism 
surrounding Howe, it would seem that I am not alone. Crown, for example, says Howe’s 
authorship functions as though the author is hearing “voices” (490). Dworkin writes that her 
work contains the spectres of authority and sense, and that “these specters [sic] fuse with the 
violent silencings that haunt the history of literature itself” (37). Bruns appropriately argues in 
his discussion of anarchic sound-forms that “for Howe, sound is also pneumatic” (39), a term 
that is especially appropriate in that it designates not only the spiritual, but also a system run on 
absence (that is, the absence that is pressurized air). Moreover, according to the OED, the term 
also designates the feminine, especially the voluptuous or busty feminine. I would like to discuss 
the role of the spectral and the supernatural in Eikon Basilike, beginning with the often-discussed 
but nonetheless important element of prayer in the text. While I have not explicitly discussed it, 
the theme of prayer has been latent in my analyses so far through the epigraphic poem that 
begins “Oh Lord / o Lord,” askew (51). The bending down of these lines has been read by many 
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critics as the bowing of one’s head during traditional Christian (and especially Catholic) prayer. 
This bowing of the head, a prostration that denotes respect for a supernatural authority, recurs 
later in Eikon with the image of Charles I bending down in prayer before his execution: “He 
bowed down his head and said / two or three words / in a low voice” (59). While monarchical 
and echoing the divine right of kings, Howe’s inclusion of this line amidst another mess of 
“visual prosody” emphasizes the imprecise and unclear nature of prayer and the tenuous 
relationship between the physical act of prostration and the ethereality of the spectral presence.  
 In Eikon Basilike the strange relationship between the physical and the ethereal in prayer 
is explicitly gendered through the image of Pamela, the feminine character who dominates the 
prayers included in the “original” text, prayers that preoccupy Howe, especially in her 
introduction. Of the inclusion of Pamela’s prayer, Howe writes:  
The prayer, a close paraphrase from ‘no serious book, but the vain amatorious 
Poem of Sr [sic] Philip Sidney’s Arcadia,’ was the prayer of a pagan woman to an 
all-seeing heathen Deity. A captive Shepherdess has entered through a gap in 
ideology. ‘Pammela in the Countesses Arcadia,’ confronts the inauthentic literary 
work with its beginnings in a breach. (49) 
For Howe, Pamela serves as the scapegoat for the accusations of forgery and inauthenticity 
placed on Eikon Basilike’s original, and she extends these charges of inauthenticity to Milton, 
who many critics accuse of having included the prayer himself in order to ridicule the 
authenticity of the authorship; these charges against Milton are also contested and tenuous, and 
Howe remarks that they have “been [both] confirmed, and denied” (49). Pamela features in 
Howe’s text as the “heathen woman” on page sixty-seven, a feminine ghost that seems to circle 
the incantatory centre of the text.  
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 Of course, to call the “centre” of this text anything, to suggest that it exists at all, is a 
misstep. As Howe reminds us at the end of her introduction to the poem, the text is structured 
around an absent centre, and “[t]he absent center is the ghost of a king” (50). Howe also tells us 
that she borrows this concept of the absent centre from Pierre Macherey, and in so doing 
immediately connects this absent centre to French poststructuralist Marxism. While Macherey 
seems a good fit for Howe’s absent and spectral poetics, I am tempted instead to draw the 
connection between this absent centre and Derrida’s concept of “hauntology.” The portmanteau 
hauntology is a deliberate homophone, recalling (especially in Derrida’s native French) 
ontology. With his characteristic wordplay, Derrida draws attention the difference between 
hauntology and ontology: where ontology depends upon certain concepts or structures, 
hauntology foregrounds the construction of such concepts, and the absences they are founded 
upon (Specters 63). In Specters of Marx he writes: “To haunt does not mean to be present, and it 
is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept, 
beginning with the concepts of being and time. That is what we would be calling here a 
hauntology” (202). The idea is, it seems quite clear, a readily available literary concept, and, in 
fact, Derrida uses literature throughout Specters of Marx to explain this idea of hauntology, 
namely in the Ghost of Hamlet, who serves not only as a symbol of the father figure that 
continuously haunts the son, but also as an image of father-son inheritance, as both Young 
Hamlet and the Ghost of King Hamlet are referred to by the same name, and Hamlet is in the 
position of heir, though that is usurped by Claudius. Hamlet does indeed inherit something from 
his father: a mission, a vengeance. But, in order to do so, Hamlet has to confront the spectre of 
his father, a fact Derrida notes himself: “One never inherits without coming to terms with some 
specter” (24). But, here the sexes match, and while this may appear arbitrary, when reading 
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inheritance as a gift from the psychoanalytic Father, gender is of the utmost importance, as I will 
demonstrate. Hamlet is male, and thus has access to his own paternal inheritance, whereas such 
inheritance is denied for the daughter; Ophelia inherits nothing from Polonius.15 For this reason, 
the hauntology of the daughter is complicated. 
Howe’s hauntological spectres are obvious. One of particular interest to me is the 
looming presence of Caesar’s ghost throughout. In a moment of humour, Howe writes a “Great 
Caesar’s ghost” (66) exclamation that reduces this particular spectre—the ultimate figure of 
Western rule and civilization—to rhetoric. Shortly after this, every figure of masculine authority, 
from Charles I to Oliver Cromwell, becomes Caesar as well (80). But Howe’s representation of 
the hauntological is not so easy as “all authority is rhetoric,” and Eikon Basilike constantly 
negotiates the space between a desire “To write against the Ghost” (61) and a desire for 
“MAKING THE GHOST WALK ABOUT AGAIN AND AGAIN” (47). The two goals are, I 
would argue, incommensurate. But, it is in their incommensurability that Howe approaches the 
problem of gender at the heart of the hauntological. That is, as I suggested above, hauntology is 
pretty clearly gendered; this issue has been skilfully interrogated by Nancy Holland in her article 
“The Death of the Other/Father,” wherein she attempts to resolve Derrida’s hauntology from a 
feminist perspective. In order to do so, she begins with the issue of the gaze, where the spectre 
looks upon the son (or in this case daughter), but the gaze is not, and cannot be, returned. For 
Holland, this gaze is complicated because the paternal gaze is not cast upon the daughter herself, 
but rather an idealized woman: “But what if the ghostly apparition that looks at us sees not we 
ourselves, we daughters as we are, but only its own ghost, the spectral image of what it wants to 
see, desires to see, must see when it looks at the female form?” (67). If we understand what 
                                                
15 This is, I should add, probably a good thing. I don’t know what Polonius would have that I would want to inherit. 
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Holland speculates to be the case, the hauntological inheritance for the daughter is more than 
non-reciprocal—it is not even received.  
To complicate this further, Holland argues that in order to intercept this gaze, to inherit 
anything at all from the father, the daughter is also under the gaze of an ideal, almost maternal, 
figure. “The ghost who looks at me,” Holland writes, “the spectral Other I have internalized so 
thoroughly that in some sense it has become me, is not my father, or not only my father, but also 
my father’s vision of the eternal idealized woman he would have loved” (67). So, as Holland 
goes on to write, “[f]or the son, there is always the opportunity ... to exorcize the father’s ghost, 
through obedience and/or patricide” (ibid) or in the case of Eikon Basilike, regicide. But for the 
daughter in hauntology inheritance is complicated and a simple lineage is impossible.  In “The 
Ghost of the Father,” Will Montgomery extends this image of the father in Howe’s work to 
authority and to law, which in Eikon Basilike amount to the complicated and nearly lost 
inheritance, or, in some cases, to the figure of the father himself. He writes that in Howe, “law is 
represented through an insubstantial paternal figure” (27). Recognizing the limitations of the 
patrilineal (the grid, the law, the logos that is disseminated along this lineage), “Howe’s poetry 
seeks to evade such limits, authorizing its indiscipline by appealing to a chaotic understanding of 
the sacred” (34). Towards the end of the poem it becomes crucial that Howe’s work rewrites the 




Father and the Father 
by my words will I be justified (74) 
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It is a prayer that recalls the text’s desire to both summon the ghost and to banish him; the 
hauntological spectre of the Father forms the absent centre of the text, but Howe does not let him 
speak for her, merely through her, a kind of possession that works both ways. The prayer begins 
not by addressing or summoning a deity—the “Lord” has been displaced from this position as 
early as the epigraphic poem—but instead by speaking “In Authorem,” as the author. The 
feminized prayer then speaks either to or as the Father, but the bastardized syntax does not make 
clear which. The prayer boasts its desire to make manifest the presence of the speaker whose 
“words” will “justif[y]” her, but the double-meaning of “justify” ultimately betrays the stated 
goal of this prayer. Neither sanctioned by a larger structure (moral or governmental) nor filling 
the page from left to right margin, the prayer instead draws attention to the blank space that 
surrounds it, marking the separation between the speaking subject and the archaic authority of 
the Latin. The feminine thus functions, in Howe’s poetic language, as the subversion that Cixous 
always maintained it would be: “She is a blank page / writing ghost writing” (68). The spectres 
that haunt Eikon Basilike are spectres that feminize the patriarchal structures, inserting a new 
writing subject into them. Exposing the absent centre of logos (of representation and its 
concomitant exegetical reading) leaves Howe space not only to critiques these structures, but 
also to insert her complicated and multiple writing-self/ves into the poems.  
Reading for Static, Nonsense, and Forkbombs 
 In the first essay proper included in My Beloved Wager (2009), “The Anti-Anæsthetic,”16 
Mouré navigates the impossible and contradictory spaces of the writing self in poetry. I would 
like to spend a moment on this poetics piece—while, at times, dipping into other essays included 
in this collection—to discuss the difficult issue of authorship in Pillage Laud. While “The Anti-
                                                
16 While the version of the essay I use in this project is its appearance in My Beloved Wager, I want to point out that 
it did appear originally in Open Letter 9.3 (1995): 13-24. 
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Anæsthetic” does not deal directly with the computer-generation element of authorship that we 
see in this book, her comments therein on the structure of poetry are strikingly relevant to this 
discussion. In this essay, Mouré distinguishes between poetic “form” and poetic “structure,” two 
terms that frequently get conflated in poetic study (and this project is no exception). “Form” is a 
highly politicized category with a long history in poetry of reinforcing tradition and the status 
quo. Mouré is quite explicit about being interested in “[s]tructure, not form. And the social 
consequences of structure” (21). If “form” refers to the ways that a poem interacts with the 
tradition of formal organization—metre and rhyme, types, visuality and aurality—Mouré shifts 
her attention to “structure,” which refers to the materiality of the text and its organization without 
the markers of traditional expression, and thus traditional study. While the distinction may seem 
inconsequential at first, the move from “form” to “structure” offers her the opportunity to focus 
on issues of materiality that often get ignored or absorbed into formal study. “It’s materiality that 
interests me in writing poetry,” she writes, “words and the force of words, sounds, and 
signification, as well as the relation between the parts or particles, the interrelation of parts in the 
whole” (22). And throughout this essay, Mouré’s interest in materiality leads her to look at the 
gaps and fissures caused by materiality, wherein the physical elements of the text and its 
production reveal the incomplete nature of expression and of meaning. These “gaps” in 
expression “make the body present as a reader, and make it impossible to be satisfied with a 
surface that alleviates anxiety; the oh-what-a-beautiful-poem representation and effect” (27). 
This is to say that a reading that ignores materiality in favour of meaning also ignores the reading 
body in favour of the direct transmission of ideas and expression; this elision thus produces in 
the reader an “anæsthetic,” a reduction of the anxiety produced by the politicized structure of a 
poem. For Mouré, meaning and representation are the primary culprits of an anæsthetic reading.  
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For Mouré, as for the other authors in my project, meaning is inherently incomplete. As 
such, a complete and perfect meaning is impossible; “words,” she reminds us, “cannot entirely 
convey our desires” (22). But, poetry can work to bring to the fore the incomplete nature of 
meaning-making and meaning-reception through sound, through aurality, which is inherently 
tied for her with the concept of memory that I have discussed previously. Mouré writes that 
“[s]ounds unlock memories which precede the laws of social order. Sounds that precede words. 
The sound is where memory coalesces in the poem” (23). In some ways, this statement recalls 
the kind of logocentrism that Derrida attacks in Disseminations, the notion that speech or live 
memory precedes the graphic process, and thus suggests a truth outside of language but gestured 
toward with every articulation. Mouré navigates away from this dangerous logocentrism by 
instead suggesting that all attempts to convey meaning articulate not an external truth, a logos, 
but rather the fluctuating and incomplete desires of a nebulous speaking subject.  
It may seem strange that a discussion of the authorial poetics of an ostensibly computer-
generated text would lead Mouré, and by proxy myself, to a discussion of a speaking subject and 
his/her attempts at meaning-making. But, as Mouré asserts in “The Anti-Anæsthetic,” ignoring 
this facet of writing would be a misstep. “Of course,” she writes, “we can’t speak about sound 
without admitting the presence of the speaker, that socially constructed being who enacts it” 
(24). In this equation, Mouré aligns “sound” with Julia Kristeva’s “semiotic,” and the “sign” and 
its concomitant meaning-making as Kristeva’s “symbolic,” entering into the Law of the Father 
(vis a vis Lacan) (ibid). As we move the sign away from its immaterial meaning-making 
processes by foregrounding its materiality and altering its traditional usage, Moure’s sound and 
the Kristevan semiotic enter the equation and ultimately disrupt this Law (25). When poetry 
attempts this practice, the reader can observe “a leak out of meaning and a folding back on 
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meaning, an excess, not a complexity of meanings but the way that new meaning occurs” (ibid). 
Pillage Laud brings this process to the fore, replacing the traditional speaking-subject with the 
cyborg author while at the same time retaining the dominant traditional grammatical structures of 
the sentence. The text reminds its reader that “even the breakdown of the logos is buried in the 
logos” (29), and we can never read or write either completely within or without these structures. 
The anti-anæsthetic is the “insensible” (ibid), and in Pillage Laud it is buried right into the 
structures that organize and guide anæsthetic meaning.17 
Because Pillage Laud is a self-described18 book of lesbian sex poems, however, we 
cannot ignore the social structures that construct the speaking subject. While Mouré focuses in 
this essay on the materiality of the text and of the bodies that read and write it, she is also 
particularly sceptical of identity discourses, arguing that sexual desire (and, for her, especially 
feminized sexual desire) resists an identity discourse19 (28). The cyborg authorship of Pillage 
Laud is an attempt to articulate this desire incompletely; the merger of machine and flesh is itself 
an intercourse filled with desire and produced in flux.20 In this way, the text neither relies on a 
                                                
17 Comment Andy Weaver (3/7/14): “Do you (and/or Mouré) mean that this insensible is necessarily immanent in 
language? If so, does it function as a Lyotardian [honestly, I've done my best not to always bring him into the 
discussion!] unpresentable sublime?” 
 
18 Comment by Andy Weaver (3/7/14): “I don’t like ‘claim’ in the sentence ‘Because Pillage Laud claims to be a 
book of lesbian sex poems’—it suggests that you find an artifice or error in that statement (which is fine, if you 
intend to do that and then explain why—if you don’t intend that, I’d change that word).” 
 
19 This discussion of sexual desire as moving beyond and against an identity discourse should recall Duncan’s 
arguments in “The Homosexual and Society” and my discussions of the essay in Chapter Two. The homosexual 
poetics of both authors may intersect in this way, but the difference between Duncan’s male homoerotic desire and 
Mouré’s lesbian sexual poetics is clearly gendered. While I do not have the space to do justice to this comparison 
here, I would suggest that the masculine nature of Duncan’s homosexual poetics allows him a more facile 
integration into tradition than we see in Mouré, though I would need more space and more research to discuss this 
properly.  
 
20 Mouré never claims to oppose or to embrace authorship; she is always explicit about her fraught relationship to it. 
As she writes in “My Relation to Theory and Gender,” “I don’t trust too easily the process of setting down, and 
being the author of, writing” (88). 
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clearly delineated speaking subject, nor does it attempt to completely refuse authorship. And this, 
for Mouré, is integral to the radical political potentials of the text. She goes on to write that: 
If poetry just privileges the author’s voice, without self-questioning, or if it tries 
to make the subject vanish, it fails to take into account this social and linguistic 
contradiction, … and if it fails to take into account the dynamic between the 
mainstream and the marginal, it will fail to deal with how information is conveyed 
and fall into the Order created by the public, thus perpetuating it. (33) 
In this way, Mouré encourages a poetics not of battling with or attempting to destroy the 
authorial voice or the presupposed identity of the speaking/writing subject, but rather what she 
calls a “cherishing” (34). A poetics of “cherishing” embraces an authorship in flux, encouraging 
a love that produces and is produced by the common (as proposed by Hardt and Negri) rather 
than an antagonism; it is self-questioning while always already acknowledging that sound must 
come from a socially-constructed speaking subject. While this process is of course possible 
outside of the computer-generated text, I would argue that the inclusion of machine writing and 
the digital21 elements of the produce of Pillage Laud makes it a prime example of this 
“cherishing” authorship made manifest. The confusion and incompleteness of meaning making is 
thus imbued right into the very materiality of the text and its production. As Mouré claims 
elsewhere, her work “is all about being hurtled or saddened, or a combination, trying to get some 
of the confusion about feeling into the material of the poem” (“My Relation to Theory and 
                                                
21 I should add an important caveat to my discussions here and elsewhere about my understanding of Pillage Laud as 
a digitally-inflected text. While the text is not, as digital humanists would argue, “born-digital,” the digital elements 
of the production of this text are indeed integral to the reading of the piece. Without a basic understanding of 
computer-generation, and of Charles O. Hartman’s MacProse program, the text can neither be produced nor fully 
read. Something of it is lost when we ignore the machine involved in its production. While I do not have the space 
or time to discuss it here, there is significant precedent to read this text as “post-digital” poetics, as articulated by 
Florian Cramer in “Post-Digital Poetics,” published in the Electronic Book Review.  
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Gender” 87). The result is that we must read the author of Pillage Laud, cyborg though she is, as 
a text herself, written both on and by these larger structures that govern identity. 
 To read the author as a text is to admit our own complicity in the production and 
reception of socially constructed identities. As Mouré argues in another essay collected in My 
Beloved Wager, “we must admit complicity with the social structure, and this admission to me is 
to divulge and admit our stake” (“For Scoping Girls” 90). The way to admit our complicity in the 
social structure while at the same time putting conceptions of identity and self under scrutiny and 
into flux is by understanding the human body22 as containing code (and here I intend for “code” 
to read as it is used in both computer and social sciences), as physical reality that is read and 
translated into something readable by a larger sphere. “Bodies,” Mouré writes, “are coding 
devices” (91) from which otherwise insensibilities (for example, desire) are read and organized 
by way of Order, Law, and meaning making. The inclusion of the digital in the process of 
writing (and reading) makes it thus even more important to read the body as such. Mouré admits 
that “it is critical to consider the body not as self-enclosed and complete but as a coding practice” 
(94), and the cyborg authorship of Pillage Laud makes this coding twofold. As readers of the 
computer-generated text, we must then become interested primarily with words as the 
articulation of coding, “enacting a poetry that … does not operate as representation but as 
designation—an act or coalescence—of being, that both counters the grain of power and 
recognizes … its complicity with and in those structures” (95). Pillage Laud is at once the excess 
of meaning and the recognition of its inevitable complicity in the transmission of meaning from 
speaker to reader. This process is inescapable. Pillage Laud doesn’t care about the New 
Sentence, but more importantly (and, I would argue, more effectively) it cares about sneaking the 
                                                
22 The argument could probably be made for the inclusion of non-human animal bodies in this discussion, though 
that is outside of my focus and my abilities at this juncture. 
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insensible into the Old Sentence. The computer-generated insensibility of the text functions as a 
fork bomb,23 instigating a process of excess (excess of meaning, of desire, of selves) that repeats 
and folds in on itself until the larger structures start to give way.  
 Eikon Basilike is a similarly invasive text bent on the destruction of larger structures and 
frequently depicting this as violence within the text itself, a fact that the vast majority of the 
scholarship surrounding the text notes. And yet, scholars of Howe’s work often use terms of 
pleasure or positivity, usually unqualified or in passing, to describe these moments of 
overwhelming. Consider, for example, Crown’s note on Howe’s work as “ecstasy” (488). While 
she does not pursue this line of argument, Eikon functions as ecstatic insofar as it works to move 
outside of or beyond the gridlines of a clearly delineated (literally in print as well as 
metaphorically) systems of logic, history, and legality. Dworkin also makes joking use of the 
term ecstasy in reference to her visual disruptions, arguing that “[w]ith an ear attuned to the 
pleasures of noise, Howe writes from out of the static; ex-static indeed” (47). Dworkin throws 
out “ex-static” almost unthinkingly, but I believe that the term is certainly worth pursuing in 
terms of Howe’s work; “ex-static” becomes a way of designating the radical potentials of joyful 
movement, at once out of the static, the stasis of grid and structure, as well as a communication 
coming out of static, or noise.  
                                                
23 Comment by Andy Weaver (3/7/14): “um… what’s a ‘fork bomb’? [Remember, I’m old!]” 
 
Addendum: In the simplest terms, a “fork bomb” is a virus in which a coding process continually causes itself to 
continually repeat and replicate itself in order to use up the memory and resources of the system causing it to slow 
down and, eventually, to crash. There are a number of different kinds of fork bomb processes depending on the 
coding system you are inserting it into (ie. HTML, Java, etc).  
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 Here the term “ecstasy” functions a lot like Mouré’s “cherishing” detailed above insofar 
as it is the joyful acceptance of the multiplicity and the desiring-flux of a newly destabilized 
authorship. It should also recall my use of the term earlier in my discussions of Mac Low 
wherein, for the poet, ecstasy, or ekstasis, functions primarily to transport both writer and reader, 
to move him or her beyond the typical confines of his or her identity. In this sense, we must 
begin a discussion of the ex-static in Howe as one grounded in the disruption of monadic 
identity. Crown gestures toward this in her use of “ecstatic” which she uses to signal Howe’s 
challenge to a linear view of history and its complicity with the supposed unity of the lyric 
subject (488). While she does not explicitly make this connection herself, Crown’s designation 
of Howe’s work as ecstatic is inherently tied to her analysis, a few pages later, of Howe’s 
language as a “stutter” (501), as in the expositional stuttering I discuss in Spahr. Both ecstasy 
and stutter function as the “anti-telos” of Howe’s work (486), which Crown foregrounds. But, 
Crown’s analysis asserts, at its core, that these moments of anti-telos, of stutter and ecstasy, 
function as inarticulation or noise that serve to overwhelm rhetoric with what she terms the 
somatic force of language (499). While the French feminists maintained the ecstatic or joyful 
aspects of a somatic linguistics, in Eikon Basilike this overwhelming somatic returns our gaze to 
the violence of colonialism, of regicide, and of the silencing of minor voices. There is something 
radical and important about aligning these forms of violence together. But, my work is interested 
in a politics of noise that is not particularly concerned with the body (linguistic or otherwise) and 
rather with something quite external to the physical. In this section I am primarily concerned 
with those moments when Eikon Basilike gets exstatic and moves away from these structures.  
 As Dworkin’s theorizations of poetic noise in Howe’s work tell us, while a poetics of 
noise is necessarily a poetics of disruption and of breaking-apart, it would be a misstep to 
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suggest that a poetics of noise is thus an attempt to 
mimetically reproduce these disruptions. Rather, a 
poetics of noise is primarily concerned with carrying out 
this disruption itself; noise poetry is a speech act. In 
Dworkin’s words, noise has the potential in and of itself 
to disrupt, and it is “[t]his potential to disrupt the 
message, to unsettle the code of the status quo [that] 
makes noise more than simply the record of violence” (39). Rather than merely serving a 
communicative function, a poetics of “noise proliferates hand in hand with an increase in the 
terms of communication” (45). Treating noise as representative or communicative—that is, 
reading it as hermeneutics, as the scholarship surrounding Howe (my own work included) tends 
to—jeopardizes its disruptive potentials. Dworkin reminds us: “[e]ven critical scholarly work 
that pays close attention to the disruptive possibilities of visual prosody runs the risk of 
neutralizing the very disruptive potential it identifies” (49). By characterizing Howe’s noise 
poetics as “visual prosody,” Dworkin foregrounds the material and physical aspects of poetry. In 
recalling Crown’s emphasis on the somatic force of language, Dworkin’s interest (following 
Howe’s) in “poetry as a physical act” (31) tends to similarly limit the radical potentials of noise. 
That is, in arguing that her abuses of language echo the historical dangers and violences of 
language (38), ultimately confronting “the illusion of the transparency of the printed page” (41), 
Dworkin’s work reifies the static, grounding what is essentially ephemeral into the limitations of 
the material text. Even if through her own emphasis in her poetics (namely in the wildly popular 
and frequently discussed My Emily Dickinson) on the material conditions of the grapheme, 
“Howe reinvigorates a consideration of the material conditions of poetry” (43), the anti-telos of 
Figure 13 
Susan Howe. From Eikon Basilike. The 
Nonconformist’s Memorial (78). 
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Eikon Basilike, and the spectral remainders that permeate the text suggest that a good deal more 
is happening in the literal intersections of these lines than a foregrounding of physicality.  
 Certainly Dworkin makes an important point in his argument that “[t]he material text 
cannot ever completely escape from the republic of signification; it simply crosses the border 
from the canton of ‘literary’ to that of ‘visual’ art” (48). But, I cannot help but wonder if this line 
of argument does not simply follow Plato, ultimately denigrating the written word in the way that 
Derrida opposed. Here Bruns seems to speak my own oppositions to Dworkin without ever 
naming him explicitly. Bruns, too, associates Howe’s semantically nonsensical work with 
“noise” (36), but in so doing he maintains that we cannot focus too much on the “grid” and 
Howe’s visual disruptions of it because that would ignore the important aural elements of this 
disruption. Seemingly reversing the Platonic scepticism of the mimesis of the grapheme, Bruns 
positions the aural as anarchic where the visual is not. For this reason, he calls Howe’s work, her 
visual prosody, “anarchic sound-forms” (37-38). While Bruns’s focus in his article is on Howe’s 
later work, I would like to use this conception of the anarchic sound-form to illuminate the fact 
that in Eikon Basilike so many of the visual illegibilities are actually based on the intersection 
between aural and visual connections, rather than the clear focus on the visual that we see in 
scholarship of this text.  
In this way, and not unlike my discussions of Mullen, I see Howe as working to collapse 
the unhelpful divide between the aural and the visual or written. Eikon Basilike presents its 
discontinuities as inextricably both aural and written, and I would argue that it is all the more 
radical for it. In fact, I would go as far as to argue that Eikon Basilike functions as a radical 
activist text most effectively in the moments where the aural and visual disruptions work 
together to expose different and multiple radical and political readings. In Eikon Basilike, Howe 
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uses this intersection as a point of activism, a point of “intervention” in the cognition and 
interpretation of its readers. “Intervention” is a term that Paul Naylor uses in his discussion of 
Howe (67), and that I used in my discussion of Duncan in Chapter Two. We can categorize 
Howe’s visual/aural interventions into three loose and necessarily interconnected categories: 
anti-regulatory, anti-assurance, and anti-logic (all inherently linked to the anti-telos that Crown 
signals in her discussion of iconoclasm). They all speak out of static, and intervene in stasis.  
Anti-regulation 
 Howe’s work as anarchic is concerned, in so many ways, with a disruption of the 
regulatory potentials of language. Rather than simply imagining language as regulating 
categorical or linguistic constructions, 
Howe’s work positions language’s 
regulatory function as upholding the larger 
oppressive structures of government and 
property. As Naylor observes,  “regulating 
nature’s representation in language with the 
tools of grammar and spelling keeps the 
lines of ownership and mastery well 
defined and open to adjudication by the 
‘European grid’ of property-rights law” (55-
56). In Eikon Basilike, these anti-regulatory 
interventions surface in the form of visual illegibilities or overlaps that work to dismantle the 
emblems of government and law. For example, on page fifty-four (see fig. 16) the words 
“misapplying Law” in a vertical line intersect with “misprison” and a “now nonexistent dramatic 
Figure 14 
Susan Howe. From Eikon Basilike. The Nonconformist’s 
Memorial (54). 
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personae.” Here, Howe identifies the potential for those in power to manipulate repressive state 
apparati (Law, prison) for the purpose of stifling opposition. But, in their intersection, the Law 
and the misapplication of it are brought together with a “dramatis personae,” the spectral actors 
in the scene of Eikon Basilike. As these two “confront each / other,” Howe’s illegibility brings to 





A few pages 
later, the terms of the 
repressive state 
apparatus begin to 
disintegrate, as in the 
“s t e p s” towards 
execution from the “p 
r i s o n s” in which the antigovernmental voice (here paradoxically24 represented by Charles I) 
slowly falls apart (56/57). Appearing on two pages (see fig. 17) that are reversed versions of each 
other, Howe separates the letters of these terms to reveal the erasure carried out by each, and to 
encourage their confrontation. Both pages feature at their centre “A  p i v o t” (56/57). Just above 
                                                
24 The paradox here is that Howe uses an extreme image of state power to represent its dismantling. As Charles I 
ascends the steps to his own execution, Howe exposes the fissures and hauntological vacancies within these terms. 
This paradox, rather than impeding her argument, actually strengthens it by demonstrating how quickly and easily 
the figures of government are altered, deposed, or repurposed, thus proving their arbitrariness. 
 
Figure 15 
Susan Howe. From Eikon Basilike. The Nonconformist’s Memorial (56-7). 
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this “pivot,” the lines “The People / Contemporary History” and “Through populacy / through 
the populacy” appear connected as if by a fulcrum. Here the typically regulated and recorded 
concept of “History” is destabilized slightly—turns on its pivot—by virtue of its new 
constitution by and through the people25 rather than by monarchical/governmental powers. The 
fact that this visually disruptive poem is duplicated (albeit reversed) on both verso and recto also 
attests to the poems’ desire to expose the impossibility of an “original” text or a 
truthful/historical “documentation.” Later in the serial poem, when the visual disruptions become 
even more pronounced, these emblems of government repression and legality become even more 
illegible. On page seventy-three, the designations of illegality fall apart: upside-down and 
segmented, “a u l t e r e r” perhaps recalls “adulterer”; “P e r e r i a t i o n s” perhaps recalls 
“perpetrations.”26 Both visually compromised and aurally disrupted, these terms contain only a 
trace of this state-sanctioned repression. They become exstatic in that they mean nothing in and 
of themselves, but their potentials for multiple, excessive meanings is opened up as the words 
themselves are made open by the dramatic kerning.  
                                                
25 It is also possible that these lines reference Howard Zinn’s interventionist historical project, A People’s History of 
the United States (1980), which gained popularity and ushered in a new popular and academic radicalism in the 
social sciences in the decade leading up to Howe’s publication of Eikon Basilike.  
 
26 Comment by Andy Weaver (26/3/14): “I think, though, that you might extend your suggestions further: 
‘pereriations,’ to me, suggests ‘peregrations,’ (the OED lists ‘pererration’ as an obsolete word with similar meaning) 
and possibly ‘perforations.’ Likewise, ‘aulterer’ suggests variations on ‘aul’ (‘all’) or ‘awl,’ as well as alterer/altarer 
(one who alters/altars). I just think that offering multiple suggestions for possible meanings maintains the 
destabilizing nature of Howe’s work, which you nicely emphasize in your discussion.” 
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The aural potentials are 
made manifold as the words are 
lengthened and the space for new 
and multiple sounds and 
meanings are provided. On page 
seventy-eight (see fig. 18), the 
“cudgel”—so often a symbol of 
self-defence or rebellion—
obscures the “in a time27 of 
Rebellion,” and suddenly the 
repressive apparati of opposition are brought into question, too. The section becomes semantic 
nonsense or noise, as the “dg” of cudgel interferes with the “me” to recall both visually and 
aurally both “danger” and “dogma.” Rebellion, in its capitalization and its cudgelling violence, is 
rendered dogmatic, too, aligned with the grid-like regulation of the government and its regicide.  
Anti-assurance  
 Naylor suggests throughout his chapter on Howe that her disruptions are all marked by a 
lack of what he terms “assurance” (61), or the comfort inherent in the encoding and decoding of 
a message received in Jakobsonian fashion. Assurance, in this case, is the mark of the unity of 
the lyric subject, the cohesion and trustworthiness of the lyric voice. Obviously, Eikon Basilike 
refuses to provide its readers with such a lyric, in Howe’s own words or in the words she 
                                                
27 While the 1989 original printing of Eikon Basilike makes clear the diagonal line reads “in a time of Rebellion,” 
this same passage in The Nonconformist’s Memorial includes the poem in smaller print and the line looks distinctly 
like it could read as either “time” or “rime” of Rebellion. The visual noise of the page opens up a new reading here, 
linking the literature of Rebellion (“rime”) with its actual appearance (“time”), possibly arguing for the 
revolutionary potentials of the text, or of all text.  
Figure 16 
Susan Howe. From Eikon Basilike. The Nonconformist’s Memorial 
(78). 
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borrows. The complex of authorship 
is made manifest in some moments of 
illegibility when the assurance of the 
lyric voice is made impossible by the 
visual and aural complications of the 
text. One excellent example of this is 
on page fifty-eight (see fig. 19), 
wherein the already experimental 
conception (owing no small debt to 
the Black Mountain poets) of the “Historiography of open fields” is superimposed by the upside-
down signature, “Signed  King in profile.” The already half-faced (that is, profiled) King who 
supposedly authored the “original” text in question is further complicated through reversal and 
palimpsest. Even more puzzling is the inclusion of a capitalized “W” just above the upside-down 
line and a capitalized “T” above that, which this author makes no attempt to decipher. This 
inability to decipher is pre-empted by Howe, too, in the following page where the line, “An 
intellectualist out of levelling love” (59), is superimposed diagonally over a prose-like paragraph. 
So, the historical facts here are already unclear, like the “Tuesday Jan. 30” with the “H T 
writings” on top, made really illegible (59). But my desire as “intellectualist” to decipher the text 
is met with the levelling (or destabilizing) force of “love.” Love is excessive and exstatic; it 
literally levels or dismantles static structures as it produces illegible moments on the page. 
Toward the poem’s end, the lines “in the ace of speechstone / Spelling surname” (76) criss-cross 
Figure 17 
Susan Howe. From Eikon Basilike. The Nonconformist’s 
Memorial (58). 
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to remind us that this assurance is withheld as a result of an impossible monadic identity.28 And 
just a page later the words “ithuriel intent” (77) are presented as connecting in an artificial centre 
by their “i”s. Howe not only foregrounds the artificiality of connecting an “author” with his or 
her “intent,” an old-hat observation by now, but she also suggests that authorial is really ethereal, 
the placing of the “I” into the ether. Without 
providing the assurance of authorship and intention, 
Howe destabilizes the reading process and thus 
opens it up to greater reader freedom.  
Anti-logic  
As she suggests herself throughout Birth-
Mark, a collection of poetics essays, Howe’s project 
is one of “unsettling” history. As Naylor goes on to 
explain, “Howe’s poetry seeks out a different logic, 
a logic she believes has been repressed rather than 
assured by the centuries” (61). It is this anti-logic 
that Crown identifies in her stuttering, that Dworkin 
sees in her noise, and that Peter Nicholls sees in her 
“stammering” which he argues “keeps us on the 
verge of intelligibility, [where an] emphasis on 
sound is coupled with a habitual shattering of 
language into bits and pieces” (597). So, in the 
                                                
28 It should be noted that in Eikon’s original edition, these two crossed-over lines are given their own page to 
emphasize their importance. In The Nonconformist’s Memorial they are relegated to the bottom of the page that 
comes before. 
Figure 18 
Susan Howe. From Eikon Basilike. The 
Nonconformist’s Memorial (82). 
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epigraphic poem I mentioned earlier, the word “beering” (already upside down) contains above it 
the letter “a” hovering over the second “e.” The word “beering” is an archaic term, according to 
the OED, for a buzzing, noisy sound (birr) as well as a contemporary colloquialism for 
consuming alcohol, especially socially. On the other hand, “bearing” suggests both a relevance 
or meaning (as in having or not having bearing on a case) and a movement or direction (as in a 
compass bearing). The meanings collide into one unpronounceable, unwritable word that refuses 
logical semantic inclusion. In its excess of meaning and its complicated aurality (how precisely 
does one read this page aloud?), this example too becomes exstatic in its illogic. This anti-logic 
is brought together with the themes of violence and authorship in the final page of the poem (see 
fig. 20), where a disassembled “s h i e l” instructs us to remove the “s h i e l d” from “T s h h r i e 
e a l d d” (a nonce “word” that I cannot help but read as “threshold”). Once the shield, the 
defensive posturing, is removed, we are left with “t h r e a d,” a recollection of the various 
images of Ariadne/ Arachne and the woven tale throughout. The poem risks disconnecting 
completely at its close: “t r a c e” works its disassembled way upwards, “w e f t” barely holds on 
in the bottom-right corner. The “bearing” that is signalled in the epigraph is disintegrated by the 
poem’s end, and we are left instead with the anti-logic of trace and weft, the spectral presence of 
meaning, the ecstasy of static noise between (and superimposed over) the lines of the grid.  
BEhold Mimesis: Queer Bodies and Concrete Poems 
As with many feminist embodiment projects, the text is clearly aligned in Pillage Laud 
with the (eroticized, female) body. The examples are plentiful, and I open this section with a few 
that draw this parallel most clearly. For the most part, the text seems to suggest that the poems 
embody the lover’s body (the lyric beloved, but also a common readership connected through the 
affinitive process of reading). For example, the text reads “you are certain letters” (43), or a page 
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later “You were these comments” (44), and perhaps most strikingly, “where did you leave the 
pen I last wrote you with” (98).29 Occasionally, the spectral presence of the author or speaker is 
aligned with language, as on page eighty-one where the text reads: “I was a canvas speaking for 
the likely word.” Other times, this relationship gets more complicated, as when the text reminds 
its readers that there is obviously a separation between body and text: “How shall the page sleep? 
/ Your voice was another theorem” (66). Regardless, the text repeatedly asserts that the 
materiality of language, and its inherent relationship to the physical bodies involved in its 
production and reception, are integral to the piece as a whole. “The tool of paper,” it reminds us, 
“is the milligram, and pursues the tale” (70). Canadian feminist poetics has a long history of 
insisting on embodiment, on the relationship between language’s materiality and the female 
body; Phyllis Webb, Daphne Marlatt, Lola Lemire Tostevin, and even Margaret Atwood, have 
led this charge. Mouré expands upon the works of these other authors through her poetry’s 
relationship to the body and the way that it has been silenced. If I have suggested a complicity 
with this silence by quoting Mouré’s statement that her “mothertongue is silence,” I should like 
here to remedy that misconception. After all, Mouré famously writes in “Poetry, Memory and the 
Polis” that “a poetic silence, however lyric, however utopic, is a complicity with the existing 
order” (206). She asserts that the feminist poet must write against that silence.  
 In the same essay, Mouré argues that the position of the feminist poet is a difficult one, as 
the desire to write one’s difference is fraught with the complication that difference necessarily 
contains within itself the sameness it opposes (203). She tells Bronwen Wallace that her primary 
                                                
29 I would like to note that from the first edition to the BookThug edition of Pillage Laud, a line break is added 
following this line, adding further emphasis. While I cannot even try to answer this question now, the change 
between editions makes me wonder: how or why has embodiment and the erotic materiality of the text become more 
significant between these two editions? what has changed in the world of digital or technologically produced texts 
that suggested that this line needed further emphasis? 
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interest is in “women searching to inscribe themselves in language, in text, in history” (10). 
Though she later concedes to Wallace that, as Lacan famously asserted, the symbolic order is 
phallically based (that is, rooted in the Law of the Father) (41), language can approach the 
articulation of a feminized eroticism through the diffuse (44). She suggests what is likely 
irreconcilable: the embodiment of the diffuse, which is to say that if something is diffuse (and 
thus fluctuating and unstable) it is difficult to conceive of it as embodied or stabilized. To avoid 
making this erotic stabilized, Mouré embodies desire itself rather than the objectively figured 
female body, and includes the computer as the third term between author and text. The 
computerized element of Pillage Laud queers the book and helps to articulate a diffuse, erotic 
female body. 
For Rachel Zolf, Pillage Laud’s computer-generated embodiment is inherently queer, not 
just because these are “lesbian sex poems,” but also because the incorporation of the computer 
into the eroticism of the text is a queering. In her article on Pillage Laud’s queerness, she points 
out that the computer’s presence is not a gender-neutral one, noting that “‘Erín’ changed all the 
spat-out generic ‘he’s’ to ‘she’s,’ interrupting the engine’s patriarchal inclinations via a few short 
keystrokes” (234). This is just one example of the ways in which the collaboration between 
femininity and the machine is made queer for Zolf, and though I do not have the space to pay 
enough attention to her wild and thoughtful reading of the text, I think her conclusion is just as 
valid for my own work. Zolf insists that the perversion of Pillage Laud extends to the processes 
of meaning, logic, and subjectivity, and that “we can’t, and don’t want to, repair the gaps in 
presence and meaning and certainty and identity and authorship and testimony and archive and 
confession in and among these happily perverted pillaged lauds” (240). Here, Zolf reconciles 
Mouré’s interest in making displacement of minor or oppressed voices visible while at the same 
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time allowing space for silences in the text. In many ways, the digital elements of this text 
provide Mouré with a unique opportunity to carry out this perversion, representing—
intentionally inadequately and incompletely—the diffuse nature of feminine erotic desire.  
 In My Beloved Wager, Mouré deals specifically with the ways that technology has 
integrated itself with the body, as erotic and as otherwise. “In this age,” she writes, “we as 
bodies, as coding devices, also extend over virtual spaces. Which is to say that, with computers 
and digital processing, any locality, including a body, is extensible over and through what we 
know as the old boundaries of physical space” (“Person, Citizen” 153-4). She suggests that the 
integration of technology into our lives extends the body to the point that she wonders if it can 
realistically be considered a closed, purely physical entity any longer. She asks:  
Does the skin still demarcate the borders of identity when we work with a 
computer, when we no longer see our interlocutors? What is the effect of distance 
on the human body, on a woman’s body, on relations between women? Is distance 
also an inevitable effect, thus a fact of the text? In what ways does the text act like 
a skin? (“A Frame” 104) 
Although she is referring to another of her collections, A Frame of the Book, Mouré’s attention to 
the technologized female body cannot be overlooked. The sexualized female body in A Frame of 
the Book bears some resemblance to the fragmented, eroticized body that appears throughout the 
pages of Pillage Laud.30 She concedes that the sexualized body is a primary feature of her work, 
even if nearly twenty years ago she told Wallace that this was not an entirely effective feminist 
practice. She instead asserts: “I do write from a sexual and sexualized body, and it is from this 
                                                
30 In A Frame of the Book, the erotic female body is presented as diffuse. Though written-upon by the coding 
structures of language, the body always finds a way to present itself as diffuse and desiring by poking through the 
fissures and fragments of Mouré’s incomplete and excessive meaning-making, most famously in the long poem 
“The Wittgenstein Letters to Mel Gibson’s Braveheart (skirting her a subject) (or girls girls girls).”  
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body that I receive the world” (“Speaking” 97). But, this body avoids the pitfalls of a Cixousian 
ecriture feminine because, as Mouré herself notes, it is presented as diffuse by way of the 
Spinozan concept of the body. Spinoza, Mouré tells us,  
defines a body in two ways, which work in simultaneity: first, as composed of 
particles, an infinite number of particles in motion or at rest, thus defined not by 
forms but by velocities; second, as a capacity for affecting or being affected by 
other bodies, so that part of a body’s it-ness is its relationality. (ibid) 
The body thus defined, language’s relationship to this body, which is made excessively diffuse 
by its incorporation with technology via its computer generation, is rendered postanarchist, 
diffuse and porous, defined by its affective relationships in the common.  
 It is through this understanding of the body that I must read the eroticized feminine 
imagery throughout the text, and in particular the image of the vulva that appears repeatedly 
throughout. In some cases, the vulva is aligned with the text, as is the case with its first 
appearance in the line “So arbitrary a vulva” (15). In other cases, the vulva is represented as a 
stand-in for the writing subject who is made diffuse and complicated by the computer-generation 
of the text. This is the case on page forty-six when the text reads, “When vulva typed this, she 
sprung at you.” The appearance of the vulva that I am most interested in appears on page sixty-
eight, when the text reads “Don’t violas count as vulva zombies?” In this case, the truly diffuse 
nature of the eroticized female body is made clear. The aural and visual similarities of “vulva” 
and “viola” are brought to the fore, immediately recalling the tradition of the eroticized female 
body as an object either represented by art or as a source of inspiration for it (but never as a 
productive or creative element of it). But, this time the relationship is reversed, as Mouré asks if 
the art (in this case music) is valid as a kind of female sexuality rather than the other way around. 
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And none of this deals with the surprise appearance of the term “zombie,” a jarring inclusion in 
the text’s lexicon. The vulva zombie is the feminist cyborg writer par excellence, wherein the 
zombie is the perfect irreducible merger of the machine and the biological.31 Pillage Laud thus 
writes against the Law of the Father, embracing the diffuse potentials of signification to queer 
the existing structures. The vulva zombie is, in many ways, the ultimate form of this queering.  
 Eikon Basilike is also concerned with issues of embodiment, though not in the erotic or 
sexualized manner that we see in Mouré. I would like to look at embodiment in Howe’s text 
because, while this issue has by no means been critically ignored, it has typically been 
approached as an issue of the materiality of the text. While nearly every critical study of Eikon 
Basilike over the last decade or so has pointed to materiality and the visual as blind spots in the 
scholarship, I have difficulty finding criticism on this text that does not look to, or focus on, 
these issues. What follows is a brief study of the literature surrounding Howe’s engagement with 
print materiality and a poetics of embodiment. I hope to divert the critical attention away from its 
preoccupation with mimicry and historical violence and towards an understanding of Howe’s 
work in Eikon Basilike as drawing from concrete poetry. In particular, I wonder if reading this 
long poem as walking the line between lyric and concrete “constellation” (the seminal concrete 
poet Eugen Gomringer’s term for concrete poetry’s deviation from the traditional “line” of 
poetry) may help to reveal its radical postanarchist potentials. 
Before I get into the issues of reading Howe as a kind of concrete poet, I want to look at 
how materiality, the visual, and textual embodiment are typically discussed in the scholarship 
surrounding Eikon Basilike. To begin, many articles, like the aforementioned one by Bloomfield, 
                                                
31 For more on the zombie as a new, radical version of Haraway’s cyborg, see Sarah Juliet Lauro and Karen Embry’s 
“A Zombie Manifesto: The Nonhuman Condition in the Era of Advanced Capitalism.” boundary 2 35.1 (Spring 
2008): 85-108. 
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treat this long poem as at once icon and iconoclasm. For Bloomfield, the text functions in its 
digressions from typical lineation as a visual mimicry of real, lived violence as well as textual 
violence. She consistently employs the language of mimesis in her discussion, arguing at one 
point that “the disrupted page echoes or even mimics historical violence” (418) that foregrounds 
“the haunting power of the icon” (424). For Bloomfield, there is an implicit link between 
iconoclasm and violence. That is, iconoclasm’s violence against the icon necessarily enacts a 
violence against the represented object, a violence that both Howe and Bloomfield connect to a 
politic of colonialism and othering (426). Bloomfield points to those moments in Eikon Basilike 
where violence is visually or pictorially gestured toward: the disruption of the image of the 
throne on page fifty four, for example, or the staggered reproduction of the steps to the guillotine 
on page fifty-nine. Additionally, Bloomfield likens the toppling “O lord” in the epigraphic poem 
as a tilt that mimics both prayer and decapitation (428). She also understands, if she does not 
explicitly state it, that Howe’s work functions in a much more complex way than simple pictorial 
mimicry; instead, the text literally embodies dispersal and discontinuity rather than merely 
representing or expressing it. This is what Bloomfield gestures toward when she attributes a kind 
of “agency” to the “specific shapes and arrangements” on the page that act upon the reader (422). 
Many other critics in their discussions of mimicry and violence similarly employ the 
rhetoric of embodiment in their discussions of what they conclude is representational or pictorial. 
In her discussion of the eye-witness in Eikon Basilike as visual, Crown gestures towards a 
reading of eye-witness as embodiment (500), arguing even that in linking iconoclasm to 
historical and colonial violence, Howe “absorb[s] the rhetorical violence of iconoclasm into her 
poem” (497). Uta Gossman, in her study of Howe and textual memory, argues that the visual 
discord of the poem mimics violence as well, but uses a metaphor of theatricality to gesture 
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towards Howe’s radical materiality. She writes that “Howe designates Eikon Basilike … as a 
dramatic poem with voices moving on the stage of the page. In Eikon Basilike, the typography is 
meant to express visually the violence of King Charles I’s death as well as the theatrical aspects 
of his execution” (98). While none of these critics directly address radical poetic embodiment, all 
of them understand quite clearly that Howe’s refusal to dematerialize text, her reorienting of the 
telos of language, is a political (and explicitly gendered) act of historical rewriting.  
Understanding Howe’s work, and Eikon Basilike in particular, as a process of rewriting 
or overwriting has become du rigueur in the criticism, emblematized by Michael Davidson’s 
designation of her work as “palimptext.” The readings of Howe as rewriting tend to fall into two 
related camps: historical rewritings of authority, and gendered rewritings of history. In the 
former, Perloff has led the charge, arguing that Howe’s texts work not against history and 
tradition, but rather in what she terms “collusion” with them. For Perloff, this rewriting is both 
metaphorical and literal, arguing that through a complex interplay of embodiment and 
abstraction, Howe’s collusion with history leaves the text “wounded” (530). In the latter, the 
most cohesive study of gendered rewriting and its intersection with materiality is Alan Golding’s 
contribution to We Who Love to Be Astonished: Experimental Women’s Writing and 
Performance Poetics in which he argues that “Howe’s poetics associates the feminine with 
rupture, gaps, erasure, absence—visually with various forms of fragmented text or ‘empty’ 
space” (159). The criticism surrounding Howe has been particularly interested in these gaps and 
absences. But, it would seem that an interest in absence and materiality is a contradiction. Thus, 
Golding appends this argument with the important caveat that while concerned with absence and 
erasure, “Howe constructs her ‘feminine [and feminist] accomplishment’ in and out of far from 
empty space” (164). What both Perloff and Golding insist in their reading is that Howe’s interest 
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in the dispersal of otherwise coherent textual elements requires rethinking the reading process. In 
Howe’s ‘words,’ our criticism needs “A  p i v o t” (56/7). In order to rethink these overwritings 
and absences, we need to turn our interests from erasure and towards what fills these spaces.  
For Elisabeth Joyce in “The Small Space of a Pause”: Susan Howe’s Poetry and the 
Spaces Between, the primary concern of Howe’s work is absence, the spectral centres from 
which her writing reconsiders dominant structures. But, Joyce also insists that we also look to the 
materiality of print and the visual elements of the page in order to rethink Howe’s textual 
organization. Gesturing towards a poetics of embodiment, Joyce argues that “[t]here are 
moments in Howe’s poetry where letters become so divorced from their word groupings that 
they begin to be only letters” (116). As in the “p i v o t” quoted above, this interest in letters as 
“only letters” surfaces quite clearly in Eikon Basilike. It is this interest in the materiality of 
language that concerns Dworkin, too, who acknowledges that Howe herself is always primarily 
interested in “poetry as a physical act” (31). Dworkin concedes that letters as functions of a 
larger linguistic structure cannot escape the processes of representation and expression that 
govern language. Nonetheless, he asserts that regarding poetry as a physical act allows us to 
reconfigure our manner of reading, focusing our attention on the visual and the material over the 
communicative. “The material text,” as he writes and as I have quoted previously, “cannot ever 
completely escape from the republic of signification; it simply crosses the border from the canton 
of ‘literary’ to that of ‘visual’ art” (48). Dworkin’s analysis recalls some of the first concrete 
poets who similarly worked to distance material language from its signifying function. Dworkin 
does argue that “Howe’s writing is generally not … shaped, pictorial, or even schematic” and is 
therefore “more rich and sophisticated than most concrete poetry” (34), but I maintain that a 
close look at the mandates of the early concrete poets can enrich our readings of Howe’s 
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materiality, allowing us to rethink textual embodiment in Howe in a way that avoids the pitfalls 
of a language of representation, mimicry, and icon.  
To start understanding Eikon Basilike as working through a tradition of concrete poetry and 
unexpressive (or uninterested in expression) embodiment, I turn first to Gomringer who, in his 
poetics manifesto “From Line to Constellation” (1954), positions the constellation as a poetic 
form that allows distinction from traditional horizontal lineation without constantly functioning 
in opposition to it. “The constellation,” he writes, “is the simplest possible kind of configuration 
in poetry which has for its basic unit the word, it encloses a group of words as if it were drawing 
stars together to form a cluster” (67). The rhetoric of embodiment here is clear. For Gomringer, 
the constellation is a new physical creation rather than a mimetic representation of an external 
reality. As he goes on to say, “[i]n the constellation something is brought into the word. It is a 
reality in itself and not a poem about something or other. The constellation is an invitation” (67). 
In this sense, the concrete poem is fashioned as an object in and of itself, valued for its own 
entity. This feature of the concrete poem would become the most discernible and lasting element 
of concrete poetics, as found in the following often-quoted segment of August de Campos, 
Haroldo de Campos, and Decio Pignatari’s “Pilot Plan for Concrete Poetry” (1953): 
Concrete poetry: total responsibility before language. Thorough realism. Against a 
poetry of expression, subjective and hedonistic. To create precise problems and to 
solve them in terms of sensible language. A general art of the word. The poem-
product: useful object. (72) 
The poem-product as useful object makes the speaker (an authorial persona) irrelevant, which 
necessarily distances this voice from the material writing process. In Eikon Basilike, this 
sentiment is solidified in the small concrete fragment that begins the final page (see fig. 20): “S i 
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lk” (82), where the materiality of the text, represented here by “silk”—the material product of 
Ariadne’s art—is ruptured by the lyric “I,” only to have the lyric subject’s appearance seem 
disconnected. The “I” is irrelevant to the silk, which continues its weaving uninterested with 
subjectivity entirely.32 
The constellation in Howe’s work, then, is a broken materiality, a series of connections 
that cannot and will not form into a tapestry, a coherent whole. This is what Back, in Led By 
Language, insists. She writes that “the materiality … of that being broken—whether Howe’s 
Eikon Basilike or Charles I’s Eikon Basilike—is brought to the fore, examined, and charged with 
meaning” (123). While the vast majority of criticism gets distracted by the representational 
potentials (and thus critical goldmines) of a “theme of verbal violence” (142), Back is also 
concerned with the fact that the materiality of print allows for new and unique, and in my view 
more powerful, affective connections with the reader. Back writes that “Howe extends the 
concerns of the bibliographer by not only describing the material object created by print [but] 
also by considering print’s manipulation of the reader’s attitude toward that material object” 
(130). In Eikon Basilike, Howe uses a foregrounding of the materiality of language, and a poetics 
of embodiment, in order to encourage an active reader 
engagement with her text, turning away finally from the 
“Lost power of expression / last power of expression” (Eikon 
63). She does this in the occasionally pithy way, as in her 
literal separation via enjambment of the “Nar-/” on one line 
                                                
32 Comment by Andy Weaver (9/4/14): “I was just reading the reissue of Emmett Williams’s An Anthology of 
Concrete Poetry, and I was struck by just how often the early concrete poets foregrounded the notion of the reader 
as a co-producer of the text (they really did establish that idea well before the Language writers). That might be 
something to mention in this plateau?” 
Figure 19 
Susan Howe. From Eikon Basilike. 
The Nonconformist’s Memorial (62). 
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and the “rative” on the next (67). But, this process is typically carried out in beautiful and 
nuanced concrete poems interspersed throughout the text. The most intriguing of these, for my 
purposes, is “BEhold a mirror” (62), a moment in which the reader’s engagement with the text, 
and his or her inevitable search for lyric voice and expression, is foiled by the text’s insistence on 
being read as a useful, material object. The point-of-view of “behold” is disrupted by the shift 
from capitalization to italicization, rendering the mirror’s reflection immediately fragmented: we 
cannot expect to see ourselves clearly or cleanly in this text. Instead, the reader is commanded to 
both exist as and embrace the text’s inability to encompass a point-of-view, or a subjectivity for 
that matter. At once external to us and ontologically part of us, the text refuses its position as 
“mirror,” as mimesis, as representation. In its refusal to cohere even on the level of one word’s 
typography, Eikon Basilike insists that its rewriting is always already rereading, rethinking, and 
most importantly repositioning.33 In this way the text contains more elements of concrete poetry 
than Dworkin might have us believe.  
While the embodiment projects of Howe and Mouré here differ greatly in terms of their 
content and, to and extent, their politics, reading them side-by-side illuminates the fact that what 
they critique in these projects is the same. Both poets use the materiality of their texts and their 
attempts to embody what they could not represent to shed light on the inadequacies and the 
potential dangers of assuming the possibility of complete representation. They thus present us 
with the incomplete nature of a postanarchist embodiment poetics, one that seeks to embody 
incompletely, allowing the text to contain and foreground within it the diffuse and partial nature 
                                                
33 Comment by Andy Weaver (9/4/14): “Your reading of the ‘BEhold a Mirror’ page is really suggestive—but might 
it go even further? There seems to be a tension between passivity (STay) and action (passenger) which is, in a sense, 
unresolvable if we imagine a command to ‘stay put’ and ‘remain a passenger’ (though, in a sense, isn’t that what 
readers do?), as well as a similar tension between ‘BE’ and ‘hold’ (as well as the command to ‘hold a mirror’—
though, as you perceptively suggest, that mirror reflects brokenly). Or does such an exegetical reading work against 
your argument in favour of Howe’s text as concrete?” 
 315 
of all signification, but especially the signification of desire, of subjectivity, and of the feminine. 
While Mouré’s text is not concrete, and while Howe’s text is not really erotic, what these texts 
share is not their methods but rather the larger structures they work against. Neither purports to 
get away from the “republic of signification” that Dworkin discusses. Instead, they both use the 
incomplete nature of their own embodiment poetics to bring to the fore the incomplete nature of 
all signification, of all representation, making these projects manifestations of the postanarchist 
critique of representation.  
“To march is writing”: Anarchism and Resistance 
 In light of these discussions of readership, authorship, and anti-archive, I should at this 
juncture spend some time discussing the role of politics proper and, for the sake of this project, 
of anarchism, in Pillage Laud. The text is at once clearly politicized—by virtue of the 
necessarily antitraditional positioning of the texts as lesbian sex poems notwithstanding the 
indeterminacy of their production—and apolitical due to the lack of a clearly defined voice 
speaking. If we read the text as the enactment of or enunciation of a speaking self through the 
fact that a text was produced in the first place, then we must also look at the politics of the 
relationship between an author produced by the text and his/ her audience. That relationship is 
anarchist in nature, not because there is no power exerted over individuals in the process of 
reading and writing this text, but because the power is reciprocal. In its reversal of the typical 
linear power relations between reader and writer, it produces a new way of approaching the 
political poem that is postanarchist in nature, and that relies heavily on the technological aspects 
of its production.  
 While Pillage Laud is not explicitly a digital text, we can still read its technological 
elements in light of the theories of reading hypertext that have, it would seem, gone out of vogue 
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since the rise of digital humanities. To do so, I return to the work of Michael Joyce and his 
discussion of the various forms of hypertext. Earlier I positioned Pillage Laud alongside Joyce’s 
conception of the exploratory hypertext, but on further consideration, I would like to instead (or 
perhaps also) read these poems as a form of constructive hypertext as Joyce also discusses. The 
constructive hypertext is marked as slightly different from the exploratory hypertext insofar as it 
is acutely aware of its readership and is thus unique in its relationship to its audience. Joyce 
argues that in light of this unique relationship to the reader who physically engages with and 
changes the text, the constructive hypertext can and should be read as politically salient if 
positioned as a series of encounters (par. 24). The constructive hypertext functions, much like 
Mac Low’s asemantic work, as a way of enabling the readers to become politically engaged by 
way of identifying the ways in which their choices are made for them through the acts of making 
decisions that would otherwise be made for them in their reading practices. The experimental, 
constructive hypertext helps its readers to identify the force of the ideological state apparatus 
(par. 26). This, Joyce concludes, is a primary factor in the development of a community, of 
communal readership. Central to this politics is a politic of witness, regarding which Joyce cites 
Mouré herself who, in her acclaimed collection of poetry WSW, positions a politics of witness 
against a bourgeois politics of nonengagement (par. 29-30). For Joyce, Mouré’s politics in WSW 
(one of her more traditional collections, though no less interesting or engaging for that), is one 
that encourages reader engagement, ultimately producing readers who are more critical and more 
inclined to draw attention to, or at best to work to complicate, the forms of power exerted over 
them in the form of limiting their ability to freely choose.  
 Mouré herself is not an explicitly politically-identified author, but in her work there are 
traces of anarchism and revolutionary thinking, which at times surface almost explicitly. For 
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example, in her aforementioned correspondence with Wallace, she calls her own writing 
“anarchic conspiring” (14). Later, she implies that this anarchism has its roots in a politics of 
witness, though Mouré’s witness is not that of trauma (as we saw in Spahr) or political 
indifference (as we saw in Levertov). Instead, Mouré encourages a politics of witnessing 
language itself, and looking critically and carefully at the ways in which phallogocentrism 
functions on the level of meaning-making itself. She tells Wallace that “looking at language … is 
a revolutionary or subversive act. Looking at how language produces meaning, and how that 
means that just changing … is just replacing the status quo, being used by convention” (19, 
emph. Mouré’s). Pillage Laud marks what is perhaps her most concentrated look at language and 
its production of meaning. Her retention of the grammar of traditional English, the misuse of the 
words themselves, and the freeplay of the semantic meaning highlight the ways in which 
language functions through limitation, organizing words through grammar and syntax, and 
subsequently limiting our options in both reading and writing through the process of meaning 
making on the level of the words themselves, on the level of signification. The goal, however, is 
not to produce a text that is activist in nature, or to produce a text in which a writer encodes an 
activist message that the reader must decode and receive. Instead, as Rudy notes in her excessive 
reading, the function of such close-ups on the production of meaning is not to make poetry 
activism, but to make poetry that disgruntles its readers (angers them, frustrates them, 
disorganizes them), allowing them to initiate social change (213). Pillage Laud is not activism; it 
produces activism; it produces activists.34 This may read as prescriptive at first, but the important 
                                                
34 Comment by Andy Weaver (3/6/14): “An honest question: are these two statements compatible, or are they 
contradictory: ‘we must also look at the politics of the relationship between an author produced by the text and 
his/her audience. That relationship is, I would like to argue, necessarily anarchist in nature, not because there is no 
power exerted over individuals in the process of reading and writing this text, but because the power is reciprocal’; 
and, later: ‘Pillage Laud is not activism; it produces activism; it produces activists.’ I’m sympathetic to both 
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thing here is that Pillage Laud does not have a positive politics per se, only a negative one. It 
critiques, notes inadequacies, and then steps back, allowing the reader to become the activist by 
virtue of signalling problems rather than providing solutions. Like Mac Low’s analogies of free 
communities, Mouré’s text functions as an analogy of activism, encouraging readers to draw 
parallels between the text and their own lives and encouraging them to become active both 
within and external to the text. 
We can unite Mouré’s politics with Joyce’s described above by understanding the reading 
of computer-generated text as an act of translation. That is, the politics of both authors is 
demonstrated clearly in reading the relationship between Pillage Laud and its audience as one in 
which the reader translates the nonsensical, technologically-produced text into a language that is 
meaningful to him/ her. Mouré is no stranger to the process of translation; she not only writes in 
a number of languages (English, French, Portuguese, Galician), but she is also an acclaimed 
translator of poetry. She discusses the politics and practice of translation candidly and often, but 
it is an early discussion of translation with Chris Daniels, “An Exchange on Translation,” that 
interests me most as it positions the translation of a text as a kind of activism. In this exchange, 
Daniels explicitly addresses the politics of translation, arguing that at its core, “[p]olitics is the 
art of wielding and managing power over others,” and that in the act of translation, “I exert 
considerable power” (177). But, rather than seeing this exertion of power as exclusively harmful 
or negative, Daniels argues that it is possible to consider translation “an act of friendship” that is 
political in that it forces the translator to recognize other voices, and thus “fights cultural 
narcissism” (178). Mouré responds in agreement, arguing that the act of translation is central to 
the disruption of the monadic self. She argues that in translation you “gain the loss of self” 
                                                                                                                                                       
statements, but I wonder if that second statement is too prescriptive/categorical to allow for the postanarchist 
freedom of possibility you so nicely argue for? Or have I misconstrued your argument?” 
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(182).35 In the multiplicity of voices produced by translation, we observe “our subjectivity 
shifting” (ibid).  
Pillage Laud positions this shifting as a kind of activism enacted external to the text by 
the reader. The text produces the communal, where the common is productive in its rejection of 
logocentrism and its embracing of the nonsensical and the affective. Very early in the text, 
Mouré implicates the speaking subject (whomever that may be) in this common, too, writing “we 
are these emotions, we are those errors, and we contribute” (14). The text seeks to produce this 
common, but in its error-ridden, indeterminate nature, it refuses the utopian connotations of an 
anarchic common, instead questioning “Do utopias complete those treatments?” (83). The text is 
a resistance that comes not in the form of imagining a more free society—and not even in the 
production of an analogy of a more free society—but rather a suggestion of how we may draw 
attention to those places in which our freedom is limited by phallogocentrism and its reliance on 
representation and signification. For Mouré as anarchist author of Pillage Laud, “[t]exts were 
methods” (66) of both resistance and experimentation rather than sublime visions of another, 
freer world. “To march,” she insists, “is writing” (56). In this way, the activism of Mouré’s work 
is a more pragmatic and less idealistic manifestation of the TAZ. Rather than occupying the 
fissures of power in temporary bursts of freedom, Pillage Laud will not avert its gaze from 
power itself. For all its emphasis on pleasure, the book insists on continuing the “treatment” of 
the problem rather than the dream of a utopian goal.  
Additionally, the text is repeatedly antirepresentational in the form of being 
antidemocratic insofar as democracy is inherently representation (it produces a government that 
                                                
35 Mouré is referencing the work of Robert Majzels, the acclaimed Canadian novelist and translator, with whom she 
shared a Governor General Award nomination for their translation of Nicole Brossard’s Cahier de roses et de 
civilization in 2008. 
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“represents” its people). Democracy is positioned as a form of government that produces stalled 
and static subjectivities. For example, on page thirty-seven she writes that “Every democracy / 
appeared to distribute someone, and you were / the diameter of shale” (37). Representational 
democracy thus produces the subject as shale, as stone; though shale as a sedimentary rock is 
necessarily multiple in and of itself, the modifier of “diameter” rejects the radical potentials of 
the stone here. Instead, the diameter of shale is perfectly circular and always already measured, a 
static piece of rock produced by a form of government that would speak for rather than of its 
subjects.36 Later, this conception of democracy as stasis recurs in the line “[t]o stop aids 
democracy” (94). Instead, a print-mark made to look like a hand-written “A” (see fig. 22) 
appears in the margins of page one hundred of the original printing,37 suggesting an anarchism 
just outside of the representation inherent in language, but complicated by the computer-
generation of the text. In this way, the text itself is positioned as a method of resistance, and one 
that works to aid in and to expand the existing resistance movements.38 In postanarchist fashion, 
                                                
36 Comment by Kate Siklosi (27/5/14): “In terms of the shale reference, I think it is compelling in terms of its 
connection between the ‘frailty’ of democracy and the structure of shale itself. According to my geological research, 
since shale is highly stratified using mud and sometimes clay, it results in very weak structural integrity, which 
allows it to be broken into individual pieces quite easily. It is also formed from the material of mud and sometimes 
clay, temporary materials that are pliable yet soft, and can be ‘washed’ away easily, which opposes the lasting 
presence of ‘stone’ as you mention. All this being said, I find Mouré’s use of shale here quite apt–shale is a 
conglomerate of soft materials that flake easily into even like a feeble democratic system that ‘distributes’ static 
individuals. Her use of ‘diameter’ is also interesting here, for it denotes a line passing through something, dividing 
and splitting it. So, perhaps then, like the feeble conglomerate that shale is, democracy actually works to create 
divisive and contingent ties between individuals.  
Also, it might be worth noting that shale is also a verb, and denotes the removal of a shell or husk from things such 
as fruits and nuts. I think this might work nicely in terms of Mouré’s posturing of democracy as a sort of prosthetic 
veneer of individuality, something that is supposed to ‘protect’ the inner core yet also renders it immobile.” 
37 This “A” is made substantially smaller in the later BookThug edition, which is probably not designed to suppress 
this intervention but rather to adapt to the smaller pages and margins of this later edition.  
 
38 Existing movements are characterized as weakened or ineffectual, as in the line “Why are the resistances of bread 
suffering?” (34). The line, for me, immediately recalls Kropotkin’s The Conquest of Bread and its insistence on 
engaged collective revolution, a text that encourages revolution (albeit a nonreactionary one). 
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the text ultimately encourages revolution of 
the mind and of the subject, writing first: 
“The book of ambition must wait: the chins 
of police / work to absorb mind” (32); and 
later, “Her identity drifted. / I am the 
voyage’s resistance; to burn is reducing 
this” (90). These examples suggest a 
radical postanarchist politics lurking just 
beneath the surface of these computer-
generated lines. It is a postanarchism 
relegated to the margins of signification, made available through the ways in which the 
borderline nonsensical nature of the text’s meaning encourages the engagement of the reader on 
a level quite unlike the typical reading process. 
In this sense, Mouré’s anarchism is not unlike the anarchism suggested by the other 
authors of my project, especially the ones who explicitly self-identify as anarchist like Cage, 
Mac Low, and Duncan. Like Mac Low’s anarchism, it is non-utopian and its radical potentials lie 
in its construction of “meaning” at the margins of signification. Like Cage’s, it is interested in 
posing questions or problems and allowing the reader the freedom to interpret and respond to 
those questions as he or she sees fit. Like Duncan, it is interested in viewing composition as a 
field in which with authorial persona is free to forge connections and to borrow from various 
voices. Howe’s anarchism is similarly anti-authority, and it is also interested in refusing the 
dominance of larger structures, but in this way it is probably more like the implicit 
(post)anarchism of Spahr, Mullen, and Levertov. Like Levertov, she is interested in building and 
Figure 20 
Erin Mouré. Pillage Laud (100).  
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addressing a larger community. Like Mullen, she is interested in appropriating voices and 
reinserting herself into texts that would otherwise be oppressive. Like Spahr, she refuses to self-
identify and instead speaks a testimony of the personal and the revisionist-historical. I do not 
mean to suggest here two schools of postanarchism that stand in contrast to each other. Indeed, I 
hope to have demonstrated throughout these chapters that all of these anarchist tactics are 
interconnected and rely on each other for their efficacy. I merely mean at this end to bring all of 
these divergent tactics together, and to propose after all a postanarchism that is just as multiple as 




 I start this conclusion in a way that is probably ill-advised and controversial: that my 
project has failed. I don’t mean to suggest that it hasn’t been a worthwhile endeavour, or an 
important learning experience, or even that I did not, in the process, produce some valuable and 
enjoyable scholarship. But rather, that my goals that I laid out in my introductory plateaus about 
the revolutionary potentials of the blog form were naïve and idealistic at best; they did not 
account for the fact that digital scholarship that embraces a collaborative atmosphere and is thus 
enriched by the plethora of voices made available in the digital common is a vastly different 
enterprise than the protomonograph (or doctoral thesis). Perhaps this means that, as digital 
scholarship gradually encroaches on the traditional realm of print-based media in the humanities, 
we need to rethink the protomonograph altogether. When I presented a pecha kucha1 presentation 
on my project for a panel concerned with rethinking the protomonograph at this past Modern 
Languages Association Annual Conference in Chicago, the response from the crowd was 
resoundingly that we can no longer justify the mode of the traditional print protomonograph or 
the resultant scholarship. It remains an archaic and unhelpful practice, and it is my hope that my 
own work and the (entirely anticipated) stir that has resulted from it can help to change doctoral 
requirements and open up space for new and exciting digital, creative, and collaborative work in 
literary studies and the humanities at large. But, the conclusion of a doctoral thesis is probably no 
place for such a diatribe; the work of doctoral reform and of humanities academic publishing 
more generally, has its roots and its efficacy elsewhere. I recommend Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s 
Planned Obsolescence, which argues optimistically for a commons of academic humanities 
                                                
1 From the originating organization’s website (pechakucha.org/faq): “a simple presentation format where you show 
20 images, each for 20 seconds. The images advance automatically and you talk along to the images.” 
 324 
publishing that embraces the rhizomatic networking and the potential for more direct communal 
engagement made available through digital potentialities.  
 But, I should return to my first claim—that this project has failed—because I am sure it 
merits clarification. As I bring this project to a close, what I am forced to confront is how very 
little discussion it has produced, and the fault of this lies primarily with myself. I see now that I 
was writing for too many audiences. To begin, I was always writing first and foremost for my 
supervisor and my committee, all three of whom welcomed the digital form of this project but 
who were always primarily concerned (and rightly so) with the research and scholarship 
produced therein. I was writing to the administration in my department who were resistant to the 
digital form of the project.  I was writing to my peers who were excited by the prospect and the 
potentials of this project’s collaborative elements, and some of whom participated actively and 
enriched my project in ways that they could never know.2 I also tried to write to a general public; 
but as the confused responses I got from non-academic friends and family can attest, I did not 
manage to reach this audience as I had hoped. All in all, the public and digital form of this 
scholarship required a tone of address that I could not and did not find, and largely for that 
reason the discussion on these posts tended to involve solely my supervisor, Andy Weaver, and 
myself. That said, the form of this project did radically reposition the relationship between 
myself and my supervisor, making it decidedly more colloquial and putting him decidedly more 
involved in my work—perhaps to his chagrin.  
                                                
2 And here I would like to add a special thank you to the members of my dissertation writing workshop who 
commented on the blog and privately, always reading no matter how crazy my ideas sounded. Mel, Jonathan, Thom, 
Sam, thank you for all your help! I’d also like to thank my colleagues and friends Kate, Matt, and Sean, for their 
comments, and especially for a coffee and liquor-fuelled discussions on the topic. Where would I be without you 
all? 
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But, discussion was also difficult to garner in this project because we typically 
understand scholarship in the humanities to be a solitary and highly individualized practice. As 
Lisa M. Spiro’s blog post “Collaborative Authorship in the Humanities” on her digital 
scholarship blog, Digital Scholarship in the Humanities, demonstrates, while collaborative 
authorship in publications is relatively common in the digital humanities, it is quite rare in more 
traditional literary studies, despite the fact that panels such as the one I participated in have been 
touting its benefits for many years. In fact, the concept of collaboration and collaborative 
authorship has been discussed for at least fifteen years, as Cathy N. Davidson wrote an article, 
“What if Scholars in the Humanities Worked Together, in a Lab?” for The Chronicle of Higher 
Education in 1999, critiquing the notion of the solitary humanist as one grounded in a Romantic 
conception of authorship that is more or less universally disregarded as archaic in literary 
scholarship. Nonetheless, print-based scholarship in the humanities has tended to prioritize 
single-author publications, fashioning scholarship in the humanities as something that happens in 
private, a special, secret relationship between one scholar and a rather large pile of books. This 
is, of course, not the case; the core of research is that we use the ideas put forth by other 
scholarships in order to improve our own work, and we as scholars in the humanities participate 
constantly in workshops, conferences, panels, peer-reviews, seminars, and the friendly exchange 
of ideas in order to better our scholarship. Regardless, print-based humanities scholarship is 
generally resistant to collaborative authorship in a way that the digital humanities,3 historically, 
                                                
3 Comment by Andy Weaver (28/7/14): “have you explicitly defined what you specifically mean by ‘digital,’ 
‘digital humanities,’ and (perhaps especially) ‘digital scholarship’? I know these are terms that have been thoroughly 
discussed over the past 10+ years, but I can’t recall if you’ve defined them somewhere in relation to your project. 
It’s quite possible you have (my memory, poor at the best of times, is further addled today from lack of sleep due to 
driving around a baby at 1am, desperately hoping he would fall asleep); if you have, that’s fine–but I wonder if 
that’s a section you need either to add to your introduction or else highlight more explicitly, now that it seems more 
central to your project?” 
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is not. Part of this is because digital projects often require different individuals with different 
kinds of expertise (a coder, a graphic designer, a linguistic analyst, a literary scholar). But part of 
it is also because digital projects—often using the internet as a networking tool—embrace the 
potentials of the digital world to produce a common readership.  
 As Dave Parry notes in his essay, “The Digital Humanities or a Digital Humanism,” it is 
not that digital humanities invented or even reinvented collaborative scholarship, but rather that 
is makes accessible and visible the collaborative nature of the work that we already do. “Of 
course,” he writes, “collaborative and collective scholarship has a long history both inside and 
outside of the academy, especially in the sciences, where collaborative scholarship is the 
standard, not the exception” (np). Instead, for Parry, digital humanities confronts the relatively 
new idea historically that scholarship in the humanities is what he terms “an individual, indeed 
often solitary, performance” (np). In the end, Parry argues that while “[d]igital humanities did 
not invent collaborative scholarship,” it ultimately “make[s] such work more acceptable and 
transparent” (np). My goal with this project was to carry on this task; in some ways my project is 
a digital humanities one, and in others—the fact that I work primarily with print-based media and 
I will defend this as a print-based dissertation—it is not. What I am primarily concerned with in 
welcoming other voices into this project is that my work be entered into a discourse with other 
scholars, ultimately producing better and more nuanced scholarship on both sides. While in some 
situations this work has successfully engaged other voices in its discursive practice, in other 
situations this has not been the case. What I learned from this project is that it is both idealistic 
and naïve to look only to the radical new potentials of digital scholarship and digital humanities 
without looking also at what the form obsolesces, namely the need to treat voices—even 
dissenting voices—as valuable in and of themselves, something face-to-face contact and, to an 
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extent, print-based media, tends to encourage. That is, it is much easier to disregard or discredit 
the relatively temporal or ephemeral digital text than the print-based one.  
What can we learn from digital poetics? 
 What I want to add to a postanarchist literary theory, then, is that it must embrace all 
work as containing the potentials and the limitations of a digital poetics. This is probably a very 
controversial argument, but one that has its roots in studies of digital poetry. As C.T. Funkhouser 
illustrates in his seminal work, Prehistoric Digital Poetry: An Archaeology of Forms, 1959-
1995, it is not only useful to understand that digital poetry has its roots in a history of the avant-
garde; it is also useful to consider that all poetry—especially experimental poetry—written in the 
last half-century is necessarily influenced by the radical potentials and McLuhanian 
obsolescences of technology and the technologization of poetics. Digital poetry, Funkhouser 
argues, was “mechanically and conceptually built in the decades before personal computers” (1). 
With roots in Dada, Oulipo, Black Mountain poetics and projective verse, concrete poetry, 
imagism, the French avant-garde, Futurism, and high modernism, digital poetry (and its many 
off-shoots like cyberpoetics, kinetic poetry, hypertext fiction, and so on) cannot be understood as 
separate from the print-based tradition. We must also consider the manner with which writing 
anything in the last fifty years or so is necessarily influenced by the technologization of this 
practice from the typewriter to the personal computer to the current ubiquity of internet network 
accessibility. In this way, the tendency in scholarship of digital poetics to look back on these 
precursors and influences should also work both ways; it would be incomplete to study the texts 
in my project without also considering them a part of the network of digital poetics. Throughout 
this project my eye has always been on the material and technological conditions of the 
production of these poems, which is often (see Mac Low or Mouré) digital in nature. But, I 
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would like to make explicit here the need for a postanarchist literary theory to pay particular 
attention to the digital and networked elements of all poetry, especially print-based (read: not 
born-digital) poetry.  
 To begin, digital poetics explicitly works towards a depersonalization of poetry and a de-
individualization of the author by virtue of their networked nature and the often randomized 
elements of their production as well as their tendency towards active engagement of their 
readership. As Funkhouser notes, “[d]igital poems are more inclined toward abstraction and are 
largely depersonalized, especially as the media used in composition has become hybridized” 
(17). My project saw this tendency in action in the works of Cage, Mac Low, and Mouré, but as 
my postanarchist readings of the other authors on my list can attest, print-based media also sees 
this concern enacted on the level of palimpsestic rewriting in Howe and Spahr, and intertext as in 
Duncan. While these effects are not exclusive to digital poems, the processes of  
[r]andomization, patterning, and repetition of words, along with discursive leaps 
and quirky, unusual semantic connections, are almost always found in digital 
poetry, though sometimes these effects are so amplified that the poems would not 
be considered poetry by someone using traditional definitions. (Funkhouser 18) 
Additionally, digital poems are marked by instability and flux. As Funkhouser goes on to 
describe, “[d]igital poems do not exist in a fixed state”4 and thus “[a]ny work that exists in digital 
form is temporary” (21). Indeed, “[l]ongevity is not one of the genre’s defining characteristics” 
                                                
4 Comment by Andy Weaver (24/7/14): “Fascinating stuff. One question/request for clarification: you note that 
‘Funkhouser goes on to describe, “[d]igital poems do not exist in a fixed state”’; how literally does Funkhouser 
intend us to take this comment? I haven’t read his work, so I’m curious—because you seem to take the comment 
rather figuratively, implying that a page-based poem, through its allusions and such, does not maintain a single, 
universal meaning. So, are you extending/adapting Funkhouser’s point to include rhizomatic print texts, or does he 
already intend that point?” 
 
Response (28/7/14): “In this particular case, Funkhouser is referring to the literal unfixed state of digital/kinetic 
poetry, but throughout the text he does use this unfixed’ nature of digital poetry to support politicized readings.” 
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(ibid). While recent curatorial work by the acclaimed digital humanist and creative writer Dene 
Grigar has endeavoured to change the way we view the ephemerality of the digital text, it stands 
to reason that this very ephemerality is a hallmark of the digital text. In some ways, the fleeting 
nature of the meaning inherent in the print-based media this project studies reflects the 
temporariness of the digital poem.  
 Perhaps the most important feature of digital poetry from a postanarchist perspective is 
that it is marked by linking, both through hypertext and through a radical intertextuality that both 
directs to other texts (either digital or print-based) and conditions itself to generate new poems 
and/or proliferate itself. As my introduction indicated, hypertext and hyperlinking are a major 
feature of the form of this project and of a postanarchism in general in that they embrace a 
rhizomatic structure that opens up the potentials of a reader freedom not typically afforded by the 
gestures toward linearity inherent in the bound book. For Funkhouser (and this position is 
affirmed by the scholarship of many other digital humanities studying electronic literature, 
namely Florian Cramer, Brian Kim Stefans, Sandy Baldwin, etc.), digital poetry is marked by 
this rhizomatic linking. “Digital poetry is not a fixed object,” he explains, and “its circuitry 
perpetuates a conversation” (18). Embracing the conversation and discursivity inherent in the 
common and outlined in my introduction, digital poetry makes apparent the fact that “[p]oetry is 
a social constructed art form, always situated within other texts (not limited only to poems) and 
extended by readers” (ibid). The poetry studied here embraces this fact, as demonstrated by the 
writing-through methods of Cage and Mac Low (and also of Howe and Mullen), the reading-
writing of Duncan, the active engagement of the reader of Levertov and Spahr, and the borrowed 
computer-generated language of Mouré. What all of this is meant to suggest is that a 
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postanarchist literary theory has a lot to learn from digital poetics, and the relative failures of this 
project in blog form is a testament to this.  
Postanarchism and the Digital 
 Does this mean that a postanarchist literary theory is best suited to study digital poetics? I 
am hesitant to go this far. But, what it does mean is that postanarchism is a political and literary 
theory bound to its sociohistorical context, and in this way it must embrace the digital in a way 
that Hakim Bey could never have envisioned when he coined the term decades ago. Embracing 
the digital elements of digital humanities, a postanarchist literary theory uses the radical 
potentials of the digital in order to break open the distinction between it and the classical or 
traditional anarchists that the term was originally meant to usurp. Just as Saint Schmidt argues in 
his essay, “Postanarchism is not what you think it is: The Role of Postanarchist Theory After the 
Backlash,” such a distinction is not only unhelpful, but it runs counter to the postanarchist desire 
to replace epistemological and ontological binarisms with openness and commonality. He writes,  
I … do not believe that it is desirable or even possible to pigeonhole unique 
individuals into two distinctly labelled boxes, namely ‘classical anarchist’ or 
‘traditionalist’ and ‘postanarchist’… [T]he postanarchist attitude is characterized 
by the endless interrogation of the reality of these very boxes. (np)  
If, as Schmidt argues, postanarchism is predicated on “the assumption that power is a pervasive, 
multinodal, phenomenon which is both creative and destructive in its operation” (np), as I tend to 
agree, then the digital offers postanarchism a way to address and appropriate power in a way that 
works against its potentially destructive capacities and towards its more creative ones.  
 It would be disingenuous to suggest that digital humanities and digital poetics are 
inherently postanarchist, or even inherently political. As Matthew K. Gold points out in “The 
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Digital Humanities Moment,” the introduction to the highly influential Debates in the Digital 
Humanities, “fault lines have emerged within the DH community between those who use new 
digital tools to aid in relatively traditional scholarly projects and those who believe that DH is 
most powerful as a disruptive political force that has the potential to reshape fundamental aspects 
of academic practice” (np). While it is clear from the form and the politics behind my project that 
I side with this latter group, I have no interest in designating my work as effective digital 
humanities in a way that other projects that appear to be much more traditional are not. Instead, I 
would like to argue first that any digital intervention into humanities scholarship—a historically 
and culturally print-dominated medium—has the potential to be disruptive, but it need not be. 
But, more importantly for my project, I would also like to argue somewhat controversially that 
all postanarchist projects must in some form or another pay attention to the potentials of the 
digitally networked world to create many and multiple temporary autonomous zones and to 
connect disparate and unique individuals into a common in which all voices can be accessed. 
This is not to suggest that the internet is an anarchist utopia where all humans are created and 
treated equally (such a statement would be so egregiously false that the internet itself would 
stand up to oppose it), but rather that postanarchism must insist on creating moments of digital 
scholarship in which moments of radical freedom and relative autonomy can erupt more easily 
and more accessibly thanks to the connective potentials of the digital.  
Moving Forward and Looking Back; or, How to Print the Internet 
 I would like to spend a few moments, then, critically reflecting on the transition from the 
open forum of the digital project to the more closed form of this final print-based project. I do 
this for two main reasons: first, because I want this project to be as transparent as possible to 
underscore the importance of process in research; second, because I hope that my work can serve 
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as the basis for more procedurally-conscious digital-print-hybrid projects. In its blog form, this 
project was difficult to contain and thus difficult to defend (both literally at a dissertation 
defense, and figuratively as a whole argument or text). My goal has been, in editing for print, to 
produce a project feasibly organized in the general form of the traditional print-based thesis, but 
one that leaves in it elements of the process that was so integral to its production, and that 
remains the most important part of it both formally and politically. The vestiges of the project’s 
blog form reappear in the print thesis in the following four ways: fragmented chapters, user-
generated comments, user-suggested revisions, and authorial responses.  
Fragmented Chapters 
 While it would not be possible to revise and print each plateau individually (that would 
make a project of unmanageable length and almost impossible readability), I did want the final 
form of this project to retain some of the fragmentary nature of the initial posts. I have worked to 
retain the fragmentary nature of blogging by organizing the chapters thematically, creating 
relatively short chapters of two authors. The posts are not recreated chronologically, but are 
rather organized topically, connecting two authors together where the single-author focus of the 
blog did not.  Ten-page sections, each dealing with both authors, are separated by subheadings 
that unite both authors but also embrace the multiple voices and viewpoints inherent in this 
project. This also serves to recreate the connective elements of hyperlinking which cannot be 
reproduced on the page. While all terminology denoting the blog form has been edited out for the 
final product (for example, all use of the term “plateau,” and all references to “this” or “last 
week’s post”), the organization of each chapter contains within it the remnants of the procedures 
through which it was born.  
User-Generated Comments 
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 Most of the comments posted to this site by readers are included in this project by way of 
footnotes. Typically, these have been edited so that evaluative comments or jokes are removed 
(but retained in my heart), and repetitive comments are similarly edited. Despite this, the 
addition of comments to footnotes has resulted in numerous notes that often overwhelm the 
initial reading of my work. This overwhelming works to my project’s advantage by 
foregrounding the multiple voices that went into its production. When a comment is added to my 
final work in a footnote, the full name of the reader (where available) is included, as well as the 
date and time of the initial comment.  
User-Suggested Revisions 
 Where reader comments have provoked me to make a substantive revision in my work, I 
typically do so without signalling it in the paragraph proper. Once the revisions are made, I have 
added a footnote providing the original comment as a signpost that a major revision has occurred 
and as a citation to the reader who originally suggested this revision. This element of my project 
is one I am particularly fond of because it lets the process (and the multiple authors involved) be 
made manifest, and it does not allow me to take the credit for work that has been made stronger 
by the input of other readers. It also marks the final version of this project as distinct from the 
draft-like status of the original blog posts.  
Authorial Responses 
 Finally, my own responses to comments are also included in the footnotes, at times 
resulting in a back-and-forth conversation that can span up to five comments per note. While 
these responses appear throughout my project, they are most frequently found in dialogue 
between my supervisor, Andy Weaver, and myself. These personal responses serve not only to 
allow for tangential notes littered throughout my project, but they also signal the degree to which 
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the reader-generated comments are tempered by and ultimately edited by my own authorial voice 
which cannot help but loom over this project. I am particularly interested, too, in the ways that 
my own voice in the comments section foregrounds the fact that the comments are dialogues 
rather than editorial instructions. In terms of my discussions with my supervisor especially, they 
demonstrate the ways in which the digital form of my project has shaped and altered the ways 
that I engage with my supervisor, and the ways that he is able to organize, affect, and provoke 
my scholarship.  
 In the end, while this final print-based project differs dramatically from the initial digital 
one, it still embraces the potentials of connection, commonality, and multivalence that form the 
core of my project at large. While I may have initially been hesitant to produce a print-based 
version of this work, I now appreciate organizing and combining all of these disparate materials 
into one project that refuses the complete cohesion traditionally expected from the doctoral 
thesis. I admire its hybrid nature and its refusal to let the work, the frustration, the difficulty, the 
errors, and the joys of the writing process remain implied at best, or more typically invisible. The 
transition from digital to print signals, too, the postanarchist interest is dissolving binaries; I may 
print this project out in the end,5 but it will always already (or always also) be a digital project. 
Above all, what it really does is open up the potentials for open, collaborative scholarship that 
never pretends to be anything but.  
                                                
5 Comment by Andy Weaver (28/7/14): “The blog will remain viable online, won’t it? If so, that theoretically keeps 
open the comments stream? So that conversation could, theoretically, continue? You might want to note that. Also, 
the print diss will acknowledge and directly point to the blog in the intro, right? That’s also worth pointing out, since 
it hints at possibly a synergistic relationship between print and digital forms.” 
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